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Preface
This anthology began in the summer of 1992, when we started soliciting ar-
ticles for a collection on the politics of maternity. At the time we imagined
that the volume would cover the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries in
England and America, including articles on contemporary literature, film,
psychoanalysis, and feminist theory. When it gradually became clear that a
tighter historical focus would offer a greater contribution to the burgeoning
field of research on motherhood, we tapered the volume to concentrate more
closely (though not exclusively) on the long eighteenth century, the period
when the idea of the tender, full-time mother was first institutionalized. As
scholars of eighteenth-century literature, we were aware that, although there
was an accumulating and extremely valuable body of material about mother-
hood in this time, there was little that offered the kind of immediate variety of
perspectives available in a collection of essays. One of our goals in limiting
the historical focus of the volume was to open up the range of interpretive
approaches to the period.
In determining the final form of the volume, we chose also to include
articles based on texts that pre-date and post-date the long eighteenth century,
both to help put eighteenth-century depictions of maternity in broader his-
torical perspective and because the articles were particularly effective at an-
ticipating or logically extending some of the major issues raised in the vol-
ume. Inventing Maternity thus begins with an article on William Harvey's
medical study de Generations animalium (1651) and concludes with a discus-
sion of Harriet Jacobs's slave narrative, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl
(1861). The first half of the volume, which covers the mid-seventeenth to
the late eighteenth centuries, considers some of the central debates of the
period about the mother's role in fetal development, pregnancy, breastfeeding,
and childrearing. The second half of the volume, covering the late eighteenth
to the mid-nineteenth centuries, charts a historical shift in attention to repro-
ductive regulation, as maternity is increasingly associated with problems of
infanticide, population control, poverty, and colonial, national, and racial
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instability. The essays throughout make reference to a wide range of textual
sources, including medical texts, political tracts, literature, domestic conduct
books, and cookbooks. Our hope has been to create a volume with both his-
torical depth and discursive and analytic breadth.
In the years we have worked on this project, we have incurred considerable
professional debt. We would like to acknowledge some of the people who
have helped us here. We are grateful to the numerous authors who responded
to our solicitations for essays and are especially appreciative of the patience
and support of those whose works were chosen for the volume. Toni Bowers,
who commented on the introduction, and Mary Chapman, who shared her
thoughts about the connections between eighteenth-century English and
American literature, made extra contributions. Paula Backscheider, Cora Kaplan,
Ruth Perry, Felicity Nussbaum, Dorothy Roberts, Ellen Ross, and Wendy Wall
read and commented on portions of the manuscript or offered crucial biblio-
graphic information or did both. Robert F. Himmelberg, dean of the Gradu-
ate School of Arts and Sciences at Fordham University, secured funds for
editorial assistance, ably provided by Patricia Manganello. Finally, there were
people who offered emotional as well as intellectual support: Allyson Booth,
Eve Keller, Jay Greenfield, Judy Greenfield, Matthew Weissman, and Thelma
Weissman were indispensable at every stage. Thank you.
Eve Keller's "Making up for Losses: The Workings of Gender in William
Harvey's de Generatione animalium" appeared previously: © 1998 OPA (Over-
seas Publishers Association) Amsterdam B.V. Originally published in Women's
Studies by Gordon and Breach Publishers. Reprinted by permission. Susan
Greenfield's "Aborting the 'Mother Plot': Politics and Generation in Absalom
and Achitopel," is adapted from an essay that appeared in ELH 62: 267-94.
"The Pregnant Imagination, Women's Bodies, and Fetal Rights," by Julia
Epstein, is reprinted by permission of The Yale Journal of Law & the Humani-
ties 7: 139-62; the essay appears here with a new prologue. Toni Bowers's "'A
Point of Conscience': Breastfeeding and Maternal Authority in Pamela, Part
2" appeared in Eighteenth-Century Fiction 7, and in her book The Politics of
Motherhood: British Writing and Culture, 1680-1760, © Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1996; it is reprinted with permission of Cambridge University Press
and appears here with a new afterword. Claudia L. Johnson's "Mary
Wollstonecraft: Styles of Radical Maternity" is excerpted and adapted from
her book Equivocal Beings: Politics, Gender, and Sentimentality in the 1790 s,
Wollstonecraft, Radcliffe, Bumey, Austen, ©1995 by the University of Chi-
cago; we thank the University of Chicago Press for permission to republish it.
Susan C. Greenfield
Introduction
This volume springs from the scholarly consensus that the idealization of the
full-time mother was an early modern development. Many have argued that
it was not until the eighteenth century that woman's social purpose was de-
fined in terms of the bearing, nurturing, and educating of children. This was
when the still powerful image of the tender mother took root. Inventing Ma-
ternity examines the various ways the early modern mother was represented
in Great Britain and America between 1650 and 1865. One of the premises
of the volume is that even as motherhood evoked an increasingly standard-
ized set of values, the concept was pliant and adaptable. Ideas about female
fertility, the maternal body, and the mother's role in producing children and
society were themselves produced in different ways for various reasons. Ma-
ternity was, in this sense, continuously invented and re-invented. What re-
mained constant was the enormous popularity of the image of the mother—the
consistency with which it was invoked and adjusted for a range of political
concerns.
One need only consider a few historical details to appreciate the chang-
ing interpretation of maternity in the early modern period.1 Wet nursing, popu-
lar among both the rich and the poor, reached an all-time high in England in
the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, but by the 1750s maternal
breastfeeding had become fashionable, especially among the middle and up-
per classes. Whereas earlier medical tracts on maternal breastfeeding had pri-
marily been addressed to midwives and nurses, by the mid-eighteenth century
such books were directed to mothers themselves and were read throughout
England and America.2
Change is also evident in the legal arena. The laws against infanticide,
invoked almost exclusively against mothers (and not other possible culprits),
remained the same in England and America throughout the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. But both areas witnessed a decline in the rates of
conviction as arguments about a mother's love for her deceased child were
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increasingly accepted as evidence of maternal innocence. Women who could
prove that they had made linen for their infants before birth, were tender
toward them after birth, or had cried at their deaths were routinely acquitted.3
Perhaps no legal change better encapsulates the accumulating emphasis
on the importance of maternal love than that concerning the delegation of
child custody rights. Until the end of the eighteenth century, English Com-
mon Law, granting the father sole custody of children and the sole right to
determine their guardianship in the event of his death, prevailed in both En-
gland and America.4 As Justice Blackstone explained in the late 1760s, "a
father may by deed or will, dispose of the custody of his child, born or unborn,
to any person," but the mother "is only entitled to reverence and respect."
This changed in England in 1839 with the passage of the Infant Custody Act,
the first law in English history to grant women the right to retain or visit with
their children in cases of separation or divorce, as well as the first to acknowl-
edge a married woman's independent legal status.5
In America, there were no major legislative changes until the early twen-
tieth century. But, with the significant exception of slaves, American women
were regularly awarded custody of young children by the judicial courts as
early as 1809, a policy that became known as the "Tender Years Doctrine."6
The logic for granting maternal custody in cases of separation or divorce was
aptly summarized by one court in 1842: "The law of nature has given to [the
mother] an attachment for her infant offspring which no other relative will be
likely to possess in an equal degree."7 Thus, in both England and America,
the belief in the mother's singular connection to her children had become
entrenched enough to revise centuries of exclusive paternal custody rights.8
There are countless ways in which motherhood continues to be seen as a
natural and timeless female occupation in our day, and the history of such
assumptions has been the subject of scholarly analysis for decades. The next
several pages of this introduction are devoted to a necessarily selective review
of the vast literature on early modern maternity, with more attention paid to
the interpretive patterns established by a few influential texts than to the array
and nuances of the many important studies that accompanied and followed
them. The review points to two central and often related trends in the schol-
arly treatment of early modern maternity—first, an interest in the way new
maternal ideals affected specific groups of women, and second, an interest in
the political advantages and liabilities of motherhood as an institution.
Scholarship on the history of the family has been an important source of
information on maternity. Discussions about the rise of the tender mother in
England appeared in Lawrence Stone's The Family, Sex, and Marriage (1977)
and Randolph Trumbach's The Rise of the Egalitarian Family (1978).
Trumbach focuses on the aristocracy and Stone on the middle and upper
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classes, but both argue that during the eighteenth century "biological moth-
ers became nurturing mothers" and "the dominant figure in children's lives."9
Both also emphasize the psychological consequences of this shift, suggesting
that devoted motherhood fostered the development of intense personal at-
tachments unavailable in previous generations. Critics of this view have pointed
out that there is no reliable evidence that such attachments did not exist in
earlier periods.10
Trumbach and Stone stress the domestic consequences of the new mater-
nity and the effects of being mothered, rather than the experience of being a
mother. Several studies by women that emerged in the next decade turned to
the mother's point of view and concentrated on both the social power and the
disadvantages of women's new image. Thus, in Liberty's Daughters (1980),
Mary Beth Norton argues that after the Revolution, American mothers saw
themselves as playing a major role in strengthening the new republic.11 Simi-
larly, in her study of the British aristocracy, In the Family Way (1986), Judith
Lewis suggests that motherhood "became a moral, intellectual, and emotional
pursuit" for aristocratic English women: "It became a woman's greatest source
of dignity and emotional satisfaction." On the other hand, the obvious ways
maternal norms restricted women's lives are also commonly noted. As Eliza-
beth Kowaleski-Wallace argues, for instance, with the popularization of full-
time maternity, woman lost the "ability to conceive of herself as an individual
outside the family."12
Another important strain of criticism focuses less on the particular his-
tory of women and more on the damaging ways in which motherhood — as an
institution — has been politically deployed and regulated by the state. One of
the obvious sources of this interest is Michel Foucault's The History of Sexual-
ity (1976, in English 1978), which focuses on France but has had an enor-
mous impact on English and American scholarship. Foucault places the
late-eighteenth-century mother at the center of a bourgeois family, increas-
ingly subject to and supportive of the governmental supervision of sexuality.
Preoccupied with its own sexuality and heredity, the bourgeoisie developed a
form of "dynamic racism" that had devastating effects on the proletariat class.13
Similarly attentive to the governmental regulation of family life and the
inequitable class effects of the new maternity in France, Jacques Donzelot
argues in The Policing of Families (1977, in English 1979) that while the bour-
geois mother was deemed responsible for educating her family and for diffus-
ing welfare and educational norms beyond it, the proletariat mother was taught
to police her relatives by overseeing the "social retraction of her husband and
child."14
Foucault's and to a lesser extent Donzelot's influences are evident in Nancy
Armstrong's study of domesticity and class in England, Desire and Domestic
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Fiction (1987). For Armstrong, the image of the domestic woman popular-
ized in British conduct books and novels at the end of the eighteenth century
was essential in the middle class's triumph over the aristocracy, and it became
an important source of the liabilities of bourgeois power.15
In keeping with the growing scholarly investment in colonial history and
postcolonial theory, a number of discussions of the political deployment of
maternity have focused on the relationship between domesticity and national
and imperial power—on what we might call the international effects of the
bourgeois family's "dynamic racism." A 1992 issue of Eighteenth-Century Life
featured two pivotal essays on the subject, Felicity Nussbaum's "'Savage'
Mothers" and Ruth Perry's "Colonizing the Breast." Perry's and Nussbaum's
articles are linked in their attention to the role that motherhood played in
eighteenth-century English imperial ambition, as the need to generate chil-
dren for the nation and empire began to constitute "childbearing women as a
national resource," and as England itself was "frequently likened to the be-
nevolent mother of its colonized children."16
What differentiates Perry and Nussbaum is their geographical and social
focus. Perry concentrates on the way the "imperatives of an expanding En-
glish empire" negatively affected middle- and upper-class English women.
Arguing that maternity became a means of female sexual repression, she sug-
gests that the popularization of maternal breastfeeding represented "the colo-
nization of the [English] female body for domestic life." Interested in the
effects of colonialism abroad as well as at home, Nussbaum contends that in
colonial narratives, "women of the upper and middle classes are pitted against
lower-class women, and 'civilized' English mothers against 'barbaric' moth-
ers—with their difference offered as proof of racial and class superiority, and
their sameness as an indication of their gendered inferiority."17 In alternate
ways, Perry's and Nussbaum's works draw the two traditional methodological
approaches together, highlighting both the effect motherhood had on par-
ticular women and the problematic political history of the institution.
If the range of these scholarly discussions exemplifies the variety of per-
spectives from which early modern maternity can be interpreted, one of the
interests that has remained most consistent throughout the decades is in the
scientific construction of the female body. Not only have many literary schol-
ars and historians drawn on scientific texts in their analysis of changing mater-
nal ideals and habits, but a growing number of authors, including Ludmilla
Jordanova, Thomas Laqueur, and Londa Schiebinger, have focused specifi-
cally on the role of gender in the history of early modern science.18 A com-
monly cited source of information in all fields has been Dr. William Cadogan's
Essay upon Nursing and the Management of Children (1748), in which
breastfeeding is represented as a mother's biological responsibility. Popular in
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England, America, and France, Cadogan's work was the most influential of
its kind and was adopted by the governors of the London Foundling Hospital
as their basis for infant care. Schiebinger evokes Cadogan's text in her intrigu-
ing suggestion that the idealization of maternal breastfeeding throughout
Europe was both reflected in and shaped by Carolus Linnaeus's decision to
introduce the term mammalia — referring to the presence of milk-producing
mammae —into his zoological taxonomy.19
While medical texts had long advocated maternal breastfeeding, the cul-
tural importance of the activity in the eighteenth century suggests that it was
during this period that maternity began to be popularly defined as a physical
predisposition. Laqueur argues that even among doctors the image of woman's
anatomy changed, as early modern science generated a female body that was
essentially different from the male sexual body and essentially maternal. Thus,
whereas women were once seen as being physically analogous (though infe-
rior) to men, bearing internal versions of male reproductive organs, in the
eighteenth century reproductive organs became the "foundation of incom-
mensurable difference: 'women owe their manner of being to the organs of
generation, and especially to the uterus,' as one . . . physician put it."20
Many feminist critics emphasize the way new scientific assumptions about
woman's anatomy privileged male authority over the female body. In calling
for universal maternal nursing, for instance, Dr. Cadogan's text "earnestly
recommend [s] . . . to every Father to have his Child nursed under his own
Eye, to make use of his own Reasons and Sense in superintending and direct-
ing the Management of it."21 Scholars routinely contend that it is characteris-
tic of male control over maternity that the doctor came to usurp the midwife.22
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, which features a scientist who imagines that he
can give birth to a human being without involving female labor at all, can be
read as a contemporary critique of male scientific proprietorship.23
It is important to stress that at the same time that medical science was
naturalizing the maternal body and raising questions about who should con-
trol it, many groups of women did not have the socioeconomic wherewithal
to raise their own children. Maternal duty was increasingly defined as a bio-
logical function, but such function was also marked by its exclusivity. In the
same era that maternal nursing became fashionable among middle- and up-
per-class mothers, for instance, slave women were often forced to leave their
nursing babies in order to work in the field. As one slave mother recalled:
"When I did go I could hear my poor child crying long before I got to it."24 If
middle- and upper-class women were burdened with the limitations and sur-
veillance that full-time maternity entailed, lower-class women and women of
color rarely had the luxury either to enforce or self-consciously to reject ma-
ternal values.
6 Introduction
As both Toni Bowers and Felicity Nussbaum have pointed out, the records
from the London Foundling Hospital suggest something of the pain that im-
poverished women suffered in a society that taught them to cherish maternal
love while making it financially impossible for them to care for their children.
The governors of the hospital were struck by the "Expressions of Grief of the
Women" who relinquished the first children to the institution in 1741. One
mother sought employment in the hospital to remain near her child, and
others visited regularly to get news of their children's health. Bowers suggests
that the anguish of maternal loss is made "disturbingly visible" in the painting
that William Hogarth bequeathed to the hospital, Moses Brought to Pharaoh's
Daughter, which draws attention to Moses's mother's grief. "Moses stands for
the London foundlings . . . because his mother, though attentive and affec-
tionate, is forced to resign him to a surrogate for economic and social rea-
sons." Nussbaum notes that the economic and social constraints affecting the
foundlings' mothers were typically the products of imperial expansion. Many
of the mothers who petitioned for their children to be admitted to the hospital
did so because their male partners had gone to war.2:>
Of course, empire also depended on the fertility of African women and
West Indian and American female slaves, whose children were regularly taken
from them in support of the colonial economy. Several slave narratives open
by stressing the emotional pain of this separation, and the production of the
narratives themselves can thus be read as an attempt to compensate for ma-
ternal absence. Olaudah Equiano, who was kidnapped from Africa, begins
The Interesting Narrative of his life (1789) by recounting his attachment to
the mother he lost.26 Similarly, in the opening pages of The History of Mary
Prince, a West Indian Slave (1831), the Bermudan-born narrator describes
the morning her mother escorted her and her two sisters to the auction block:
"Whilst she was putting on us the new osnaburgs in which we were to be sold,
she said, in a sorrowful voice, (I shall never forget it!) 'See, I am shrouding my
poor children; what a task for a mother!'"27 In Incidents in the Life of a Slave
Girl (1861), the first full-length American slave narrative written by a woman,
Harriet Jacobs also evokes death imagery in describing a slave mother's last
night with her children: "Often does she wish that she and they might die
before the day dawns." It is in keeping with the connections among maternal
absence, death, and slavery that Jacobs begins her narrative by informing the
reader that when she herself was six years old her mother died, and "for the
first time, I learned, by the talk around me, that I was a slave."28
In recounting her subsequent efforts to avoid being raped by her master,
Jacobs makes visible the sexual abuse at the foundation of slave maternity.
She stresses that because a slave woman's children were the master's property,
he had a double incentive to rape and impregnate her and then to deny a
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familial relationship with the valuable offspring: "Slaveholders have been
cunning enough to enact that 'the child shall follow the condition of the mother,'
not of the father; thus taking care that licentiousness shall not interfere with
avarice."29 The earliest American law concerning mixed offspring, established
in Virginia in 1662, highlights the English origins of this economy: "Whereas
some doubts have arisen whether children got by any Englishman upon a
negro woman should be slave or free. Be it therefore enacted . . . that all
children born in this country shall be held bond or free only according to the
condition of the mother."30 Pleading with her implied northern female audi-
ence, Jacobs even points to the inevitability of incest in a system where the
master need never acknowledge his kinship with slave children: "Talk to
American slaveholders. . . .  Tell them it is . . . atrocious to violate their own
daughters." It was also common for masters to hand-pick slaves and force
them to mate.31
As Hortense Spillers argues, in such a system, "the customary lexis of
sexuality, including 'reproduction,' 'motherhood,' 'pleasure,' and 'desire,' [was]
thrown into unrelieved crisis."32 In addition to fighting to protect the children
they bore, slave women in both America and the British West Indies appear to
have made concerted efforts to avoid maternity, employing the gamut of pos-
sible strategies: sexual resistance, birth control, abortion, and infanticide.33 At
the same time, though, both Jacobs's and Mary Prince's narratives suggest
that the brutality of slavery itself hampered pregnancies. Jacobs reports that
her aunt had six dead premature babies, and Prince describes a pregnant
slave, Hetty, who was stripped naked and whipped "till she was all over stream-
ing with blood. . . . The consequence was that poor Hetty was brought to bed
before her time, and was delivered after severe labour of a dead child," shortly
after which she herself died. In general, because of such abuse and poor pre-
natal care, black infant mortality was dramatically higher than white infant
mortality, particularly in America. There, fewer than two out of three black
children lived to be ten years old.34
This overview of recent scholarship on early modern maternity and the
sources on which it depends suggests some of the ways in which the political
ramifications of maternity can be interpreted. Each essay in Inventing Mater-
nity draws on the methodological approaches that typify the discussion about
maternity. In addition to exemplifying the characteristic interest in medical,
historical, and literary sources, all of the viewpoints emerge from the premise
that motherhood is political. Whether the authors analyze the tensions re-
flected in particular representations of motherhood or consider the effect that
domestic ideals had on certain groups of women or do both, they assume that
maternal images and practices register cultural conflicts concerning the orga-
nization of society and the replication of its values.
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The collection is distinguished, however, by its attention to the variety of
political meanings attached to early modern maternity. While any anthology
is, by definition, an assemblage of different perspectives on a topic, Inventing
Maternity is founded on the supposition that maternity was (and still is) a
contested terrain. As one of the single most important cultural symbols, the
mother constituted an open ground for political projections, responding with
remarkable flexibility to various efforts to shape its image and ideological
implications. Not only does the range of essays here indicate the numerous
ways motherhood might be formulated and deployed, but many of the indi-
vidual essays attend to the tensions underlining even the most specific mater-
nal issues, such as fertility, fetal development, or breastfeeding.
Because it is organized chronologically, Inventing Maternity also offers
an opportunity to examine how certain tensions shift over time. The early
articles about seventeenth-century literature, for instance, focus on compet-
ing models of maternal and paternal authority. As the volume turns to exam-
ine the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, the father's role gradually
becomes a less central topic, in part because the invention of full-time mater-
nity was accompanied by what Jordanova calls "a significant shift . . . away
from associating children 'naturally' with their fathers and toward associating
them 'naturally' with their mothers."35 One sign of the shift is that in the sev-
enteenth century, debates about procreation often concern the role that the
mother plays in mediating the bond between offspring and some patriarchal
source of value—be it God, king, or father. By the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury and throughout the nineteenth century, images of maternal procreation
are often linked with anxieties about mass reproduction in a secularized world
where value is no longer clearly defined.
Even as these essays are sensitive to different renditions of maternity and
to the impact of historical change, however, they also bear witness to the
longevity of certain cultural concerns. Like current debates about abortion
and reproductive technologies, early modern discussions of pregnancy and
embryology reflect attempts to conceptualize the boundaries between the
mother, fetus or offspring, and some governmental body. The articles in In-
venting Maternity indicate both the endurance of the desire to formulate these
borders and the consistency with which they nevertheless prove permeable.
Moreover, questions about maternal authority remain central through-
out the volume as they arguably do today. If the invention of the full-time
mother could, in practice, include only the most privileged women, and if it
inaugurated what many feminists have seen as a regressive period in women's
history, it also created a new and potentially threatening image of female con-
trol. What Nancy Armstrong says of the domestic woman is especially true of
the new mother: "Under her jurisdiction the most basic qualities of human
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identity were supposed to develop."36 Or, as Barbara Gelpi writes, with spe-
cific reference to maternity, "the power ascribed to women within their sphere
could be made so great that it threatened the masculine dominance it was
designed to maintain."37 Even the opening articles of the anthology, which
refer to seventeenth-century texts that predate the establishment of full-time
maternity, testify to growing cultural anxieties about how to reconcile new
ideas about maternal influence with older forms of patriarchal power.
Although the collection focuses primarily on English material, it includes
essays on American and Irish literature—Anne Bradstreet's poetry, Maria
Edgeworth's Ennui, James Fenimore Cooper's The Last of the Mohicans, and
Harriet Jacobs's Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl—which point both to the
widespread impact of new maternal ideals and (in the essays on Edgeworth,
Cooper, and Jacobs) to some of the specific consequences of British colonial-
ism. We can begin to imagine the complex ways in which colonialism af-
fected representations of maternity by considering the circumstances of a writer
like the English-born Edgeworth, who spent her adult life on her father's es-
tate in Ireland and wrote novels about mothers in both countries. Similarly,
Jacobs includes in her narrative a chapter entitled "A Visit to England." In
Susanna Rowson's Charlotte Temple, popular in both England and America,
the seduced heroine moves from England to America, where she dies after
childbirth. Rowson herself moved from England to America as a child and
back and forth again as an adult.38 Like people, literary and cultural influence
traveled in various directions. Whereas William Cadogan's Essay upon Nurs-
ing was widely circulated in America, Uncle Tom's Cabin was a best-seller in
England. Indeed, after the emancipation of English slaves in 1834, the British
antislavery movement eagerly adopted the cause of American abolition.39
The essays on Irish and American literature included here draw attention
to the mother's power to complicate the maintenance of national or racial
differences upon which empire depends. Ennui features an Irish wet nurse
who, after suckling her son and an English heir simultaneously, switches their
identities. In The Last of the Mohicans and Incidents in the Life of a Slave
Girl, the mother is associated with miscegenation, a practice common among
English colonists but much more visible in postcolonial America than in
England itself. By including articles on a variety of primary source materials,
Inventing Maternity aims both to document the range of political meanings
attached to maternity and to help concretize specific discussions, including
those about the relationship between motherhood and imperialism.
Organized chronologically, the articles in Inventing Maternity concentrate
on the political, scientific, and literary uses to which motherhood was put
between 1650 and 1865. The collection opens with three essays concerning
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the mid- to late-seventeenth-century tension between patriarchal models of
creation and maternal ones. If motherhood did not epitomize woman's privi-
leged parental authority until the eighteenth century, these articles suggest
that before this time it signaled the possibility of a unique creative agency.
While the generation of human beings was traditionally linked to some patri-
archal origin, in numerous seventeenth-century sources including medical
books, political tracts, religious texts, and poems, the mother exerts a poten-
tially competitive form of productive power.
Eve Keller's article, "Making Up for Losses: The Workings of Gender in
Harvey's de Genemtione animalium" (1651), offers a close reading of Will-
iam Harvey's scientific account of conception, focusing on the problems raised
by Harvey's erroneous determination that there is no male semen in the fe-
male uterus after intercourse. Harvey's belief in the absence of semen at con-
ception raised the logical possibility that the mother's body exerted greater
control than the father's over fetal development. The apparent lack of mate-
rial contact between semen and female matter threatened the physiology of
paternity and by extension the theories of patriarchy that relied on it, since,
"according to classic patriarchal arguments, the king ruled his kingdom as a
father his children." In a period of civil war and regicide, Harvey's findings
were bound to seem disruptive. Keller suggests that one way Harvey's text
compensates for the ideological implications of the discovery is by represent-
ing the maternal body as the space against which the fetus, as independent
male political actor, defines his subjectivity. In this model, the fetus evokes
the gradual shift from an English monarchy to a commonwealth, from a sys-
tem organized around the king as father to one based on individual male
sovereignty. The maternal body becomes the place on which the change from
one form of political patriarchy to another can be mapped.
In "'Such Is My Bond': Maternity and Economy in Anne Bradstreet's
Writing," Kimberly Latta discusses the mother's role in representing a differ-
ent set of gradual changes in colonial New England—the change from a spiri-
tual to a secular and market economy. In close readings of a number of
Bradstreet's mid-seventeenth-century poems and writings, Latta shows how
the author details her "profound emotional attachments to her children." At
the same time, though, Bradstreet was schooled in the belief that God was the
original and ultimate parent. This belief was commonly articulated in the
economic terms of God as creditor, the source to which the value of earthly
bonds had to be traced. Latta argues that Bradstreet's poetry reveals a tension
between the author's sense of her debt to God and her own maternal desert.
Often conflating the roles of mother and artist, the author seems "torn be-
tween the idea that something valuable," such as a child, a poem, or a book,
"could proceed from her and the more dogmatic view that only God can be a
Introduction 11
source of value." Suggesting that motherhood can serve both as a model of
female experience and as a metaphor for social change, Bradstreet's invest-
ment in the worldly meaningfulness of her personal creations reflects the grow-
ing acceptance of a distinction between secular and spiritual concerns in a
culture where value was increasingly determined by market demand.
My own contribution, "Aborting the 'Mother Plot': Politics and Genera-
tion in Absalom and Achitophel," examines the political usages of seventeenth-
century embryology in a close-reading of a particular poem and thus combines
different features of the methodological approaches in the articles that pre-
cede it. In John Dryden's royalist allegory, Absalom and Achitophel (1682),
the biblical King David stands for the notoriously philandering Charles II,
Absalom is his illegitimate son, Monmouth, and Achitophel is the earl of
Shaftesbury, the Whig leader who sought to have Monmouth succeed Charles
II instead of Charles's Catholic brother, James. If, as Keller argues, seven-
teenth-century patriarehahsm depended in part on a belief in the king's power
to pass his authority through genetic descent, then King David (Charles II) is
faced with a paradoxical problem, since the monarchal succession is threat-
ened by his own bastard child. Unless David is absolved of the responsibility
of generating Absalom (Monmouth), he must bear the blame for the political
instability his son now represents. Arguing that in his efforts to defend the
king Dryden rehearses a variety of embryological theories (including Harvey's),
I suggest that the author ultimately emphasizes female control over concep-
tion and fetal development so as to shift the onus for Absalom's birth onto the
mother. In interesting contrast to Harvey's text, in which a new form of patri-
archal individualism emerges from the minimization of female procreative
agency, Dryden's poem maximizes that agency so as to support the old king-
ship. At a time when succession had been thrown into doubt and there could
be no medical certainty about the process of fetal development, the compet-
ing models of procreative agency and embryology assumed enormous politi-
cal significance.
With Julia Epstein's essay, "The Pregnant Imagination, Women's Bodies,
and Fetal Rights," Inventing Maternity turns to one of the most important
medical and legal debates about female procreative agency in early modern
Europe: the question of whether or not the mother was responsible for "mon-
strous births"—what we now call "birth defects." In a telling indication of the
cultural interest in the subject, both Bradstreet and Dryden evoke monstrous
births in their poems, the first to describe the unauthorized publication of
one of her manuscripts and the second to characterize political chaos. Epstein's
article—first published in 1995 and included herewith a new preface — offers
a detailed explanation of the early modern theory that monstrous births
resulted when a pregnant woman's illicit thoughts or desires left a physical
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impression on the fetus's body. While Epstein argues that this theory gave
women "an active role in the development of their fetuses," such authority
also made the mother a culprit. Since, above all, a monstrous child "called
into question . . . the legitimacy of its parentage," and thus challenged patriar-
chal inheritance, social organization, and political power, the stakes of her
responsibility were high. Whereas my own article indicates that monstrous
births could be blamed on the female parent as a means of exonerating the
monarchy, Epstein examines the more enduring legal implications of the idea
of "mother-blame," suggesting that we see vestiges of earlier beliefs about the
mother's responsibility for fetal deformity in current American court cases
against pregnant drug users.
All four opening essays deal with questions or metaphors about the na-
ture of female procreation. Toni Bowers's "'A Point of Conscience':
Breastfeeding and Maternal Authority in Pamela, Part 2" is the first article in
the collection to emphasize maternal practice and to focus specifically on
debates about the mother's role in childrearing. While such concerns are
already evident in Bradstreet's poetry, they assume heightened significance
with the idealization of motherhood in the eighteenth century, a significance
especially well documented in Samuel Richardson's Pamela, Part 2 (1741).
First published in 1995 and included here with a new afterword, Bowers's
essay opens with a detailed history of maternal breastfeeding, particularly as it
was represented in Augustan conduct book literature. Nancy Armstrong de-
scribes how eighteenth-century conduct books generally glorify female do-
mestic authority, but Bowers concentrates specifically on the power granted
to maternity. The conclusion she draws — that depictions of maternal
breastfeeding signal both the triumph of maternal over paternal rule and a
middle-class rebellion against aristocratic values—presents a striking alterna-
tive to Ruth Perry's suggestion that one of the consequences of the campaign
for maternal breastfeeding was the sexual repression of women. The contrast
offers a good example of the various ideological uses to which even the most
precise maternal images were put in the early modern era and of the way they
remain an open ground for divergent interpretations.
Working from the premise that the representation of motherhood in con-
duct books "provided a rival source of authority from which wives. . . might
potentially resist their husbands' commands," Bowers examines Mr. B.'s
aristocratically based objection to Pamela's desire to nurse their child inPamela,
Part 2. In terms reminiscent of Bradstreet's linkage of religious and maternal
duty, Pamela defends her right to breastfeed on the grounds that it marks her
service to God. Pamela ultimately yields to her husband's prohibition against
nursing, but Mr. B.'s interests nevertheless appear to be "logically flawed and
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politically suspect." Though finally suppressed, maternal breastfeeding marks
the possibility of challenging the male aristocratic power Mr. B. represents.
In the next essay, by Claudia L. Johnson, "Mary Wollstonecraft: Styles of
Radical Maternity," motherhood poses a more fundamental challenge to male
control. Focusing on Wollstonecraft's posthumously published novel, The
Wrongs of Woman; or, Maria (1798), Johnson shows how maternity can dis-
rupt its own seeming dependence on heterosexuality. Johnson begins by not-
ing how Wollstonecraft's treatment of sexual difference in A Vindication of
the Rights of Woman is radically altered in The Wrongs of Woman. In the
earlier text, Wollstonecraft minimizes the importance of the physical distinc-
tion between the sexes, even when she discusses motherhood, but in her final
novel she stresses the bodily basis of maternal experience. Nothing indicates
the flexibility of maternity more cogently than this example of the same au-
thor adjusting the meaning of female physiology to suit the political purposes
of the moment. Yet even as Wollstonecraft is increasingly drawn to what might
be called a biologically deterministic description of maternity in Wrongs, she
rejects a deterministic defense of heterosexual passion, which, Johnson ar-
gues, emerges as "corrupt beyond the possibility of recovery" by the novel's
end. Ultimately motherhood signals the possibility of revolutionary change in
Wrongs because it offers women of all classes an opportunity to reject men
and bond together around their shared physical and emotional experiences.
Whereas Pamela, Part 2 questions the father's right to dictate the terms of
childrearing, Wrongs suggests that there are natural affinities between women
that make men dispensable.
It is revealing that the father is often irrelevant in the remaining articles
in Inventing Maternity, which cover the late eighteenth to mid-nineteenth
century, a time when the belief in the mother's central role in producing and
raising children was widely accepted. The more pressing questions in the
final portion of the volume concern the role maternity plays both in defining
class, national, and colonial difference and in regulating population. By the
end of the eighteenth century, attachment to a sovereign nation became an
important source of individual and communal identity in the western world,
a shift influenced as well as complicated by colonialism.40 British colonialism
and the investment in African slave labor were well established but neverthe-
less vulnerable because of the loss of the American colonies, the constant
threat of slave revolts in the West Indies, and political upheavals in Ireland.41
It was by no means clear how colonial subjects were to be controlled. At
home, the new science of population was becoming increasingly important
to the rising middle class.42 National and colonial success seemed to depend
on the production of healthy citizens, but the expansion of certain kinds of
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populations (poor, foreign, racially ambiguous) became a source of growing
concern. For complex reasons — including the spread of industrialism and
urbanization, increases in immigration, and the cost of wars against France,
especially over colonial territories—the numbers of poor people in England
were rising, as were the debates about how to manage them.43
It was in this context that Thomas Malthus published his influential An
Essay on the Principle of Population in 1798, in which he argued that popula-
tion growth is driven by sexual and therefore natural forces and that, unless
checked by "misery and vice," the "power of population is indefinitely greater
than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man."44 Malthus saw the
future of England as dire, but he was more hopeful about America, not merely
because there were greater resources for population expansion there but be-
cause he believed Americans had the economic and political liberty to take
advantage of them.45 In America, Malthus's theories tended to be employed
on overtly racist grounds, which appalled him.46 Before the Civil War, proslavery
and antislavery activists invoked Malthus in arguing that their own cause would
reduce the concentration of blacks.47 In the last decade of the nineteenth cen-
tury, Malthus's theories were cited in arguments against immigration.48
Most important, the association of population growth with sexuality, as
opposed to some divine or patriarchal plan, drew attention to the female body
as the site for controlling human increase. Women of the poor and laboring
classes were singled out for particularly critical inspection. As Deborah Valenze
suggests, in Malthus's formulation all women contribute to "a constant effort
towards an increase of population," but lower-class women are seen as exer-
cising the least restraint and being the most fertile. Proof of the "domination
of nature," poor mothers produce more children than they can afford and are
a central cause of the suffering that ensues.49
The novel that Julie Costello examines in "Maria Edgeworth and the
Politics of Consumption: Eating, Breastfeeding, and the Irish Wet Nurse in
Ennui" highlights the problem of mothering and poverty in Ireland, an inte-
gral subject in Malthusian debates. But Costello suggests that Edgeworth's
interest in colonial tensions prompts some original conclusions about the lower-
class mother's impact on population and subsistence. Whereas it was com-
mon for the poor to be seen as a drain on the British national economy,
colonialism often had a reverse effect. In the aftermath of the Act of Union
between England and Ireland, for instance, the poverty-stricken Irish sub-
sisted on potatoes while their grains were exported to England. Such ironies,
Costello argues, are epitomized in Edgeworth's Ennui by the lower-class Irish
wet nurse, Ellinor, who suckles an English heir and then exchanges him for
her own son. In the novel, "it is Ellinor, and hence Ireland, who feeds En-
gland, regulates the consumption of the Ascendancy class, commands their
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affections, and shapes their identities" so profoundly that the English heir
grows up believing he is an Irish peasant. By virtue of maternal affection and
nurturance, Ellinor breaks down the difference between populations. Con-
fusing colonizer and colonized along with any semblance of national, racial,
and class order, the mother's love proves as subversive as "political intrigue
and rebellion."
As Costello points out, the one danger Ellinor does not pose is that of
fecundity. As a wet nurse, she is the producer, not the consumer, of food, and
the birth control effects of breastfeeding have apparently helped her limit her
family. Such an image of moderated fertility belies widespread fears about
mass reproduction in Ireland and elsewhere —fears explored in the essay
by Anita Levy, "Reproductive Urges: Literacy, Sexuality, and Eighteenth-
Century Englishness." Analyzing Malthus's Essay as well as works by Charlotte
Lennox, Hannah More, and Jane Austen, Levy shows how the language used
to discuss problems of sexual reproduction and population emerged from
earlier tropes about the growth of print culture. As discussions of biological
reproduction integrated the discourse about sprawling literacy and literary
production, they "became a way of talking about danger in a social world
composed of people whose heritage and blood were often indeterminate."
Levy's article returns readers to the metaphor of maternal procreation, so
central in the opening articles of Inventing Maternity. Her suggestion that the
late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century mother is associated with the
problem of unauthorized reproduction is reminiscent of the threat that the
mother poses to monarchal descent in Harvey's and Dryden's texts, of the
links between literary commercialism and maternal creation in Bradstreet's
poetry, and of the connections between maternal desire and monstrous births
that Epstein describes.
What has changed is the term. As Jordanova and others have pointed out,
the word reproduction was not used to describe procreation until the late eigh-
teenth century; the earlier word was generation. Related to words like geneal-
ogy and genesis, generation suggests a close connection between the object of
creation and an original source of patriarchal value; an organized form of
lineage, as with the "generations" of a family; and the novelty and difference
of the subject produced. The term reproduction, on the other hand, evokes
the possibility of a simultaneous and endless replication that undermines value,
order, and originality. The opening articles discuss how the mother, by infect-
ing the bond presumed to exist between offspring and a sanctioned origin like
God, king, or father, might generate a distortion or disruption. But the image
of mass reproduction, based in part, Levy suggests, in the growth of print
technology, suggests that there is no difference between an original source
and the offspring that can numerically outstrip it. In both the early generative
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and the later reproductive models, the female body is a potential site of pro-
creative chaos, but the latter model lacks the compensatory balance of a patri-
archal progenitor. Now procreation appears to rest with the sexualized female
body alone. Indeed, the erasure of difference implied by the term reproduc-
tion might be read as a sign that the shift from an earlier patriarchal model of
creation to a more modern maternal model has been completed. Whereas
the patriarchal progenitor could generate something new, the reproductive
maternal body is the place where difference is collapsed. One result of the
indistinction connoted by reproduction, Jordanova suggests, is that the words
women and children become so familiar that they are taken as "two closely
related, even equivalent, taxonomic categories."50
In "Infanticide and the Boundaries of Culture from Hume to Arnold,"
Josephine McDonagh shows that the late-eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
British preoccupation with excess reproduction was complemented by an
obverse obsession with infanticide —usually represented in terms of the infan-
ticidal mother. Like images of maternal breastfeeding, tropes of infanticide
could be deployed for competing political arguments, which, in this case,
included those about overpopulation. Thus, the Malthusians argued that the
"refusal to accept the inevitability that the physical world [would] not be able
to sustain the population [was] tantamount to child murder." Yet, their oppo-
nents, including William Godwin (political philosopher and Mary
Wollstonecraft's husband), argued that Malthus implicitly sanctioned child
murder as a means of preserving natural resources.
The legal consequences of infanticide, though rarely enforced in the eigh-
teenth century, were stark. Between 1624 and 1803, a harsh law made a
woman's concealment of pregnancy or birth in the case where the infant died
proof of murder in both England and America, constituting infanticide as the
one criminal act for which guilt was presumed before innocence. The provi-
sion was repealed in England in 1803, partly because of this inconsistency,
but also out of a desire to improve the conviction rate. As previously men-
tioned, mothers tended to be acquitted as long as there was any sign of tender-
ness, and critics argued that judges and juries were unwilling to apply the law
because it was so severe. The punishment for infanticide was death by hang-
ing. By far, the people most often accused of infanticide in England and
America were unmarried women; in England, they were almost always ser-
vants. Married women, who did not need to conceal a pregnancy or birth,
were less likely to be suspected when an infant died and could more easily rid
themselves of unwanted children by neglecting to suckle them, or "overlay-
ing" them (smothering them in bed), or leaving them with a disreputable
nurse. For single women, and especially servants, such methods were imprac-
tical, as propriety dictated that the child be disposed of before anyone discov-
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ered its birth; their preferred methods appear to have been strangulation or
suffocation.51
McDonagh, however, is less concerned with the actual practice and con-
sequences of infanticide than with its symbolic significance. There is no con-
clusive evidence that infanticide was on the rise in the late eighteenth and
nineteenth century, but "the sheer quantity of references" to it in political,
philosophical, legal, and literary texts is overwhelming. Making a sweeping
survey of works by a wide range of authors (including Arnold, Burke, Eliot,
Godwin, Hume, Malthus, Martineau, Smith, and Wordsworth), McDonagh
argues that the repeated allusions to child murder and the infantieidal mother
are best understood as symptoms of "unresolved problems within the
conceptualization of civilized or modern society." She notes that discussions
about infanticide frequently break into two central strains of debate, both of
which invoke the infantieidal woman to mark the boundaries of civilization.
In one strain of the debate, the infantieidal mother is the savage whose behav-
ior "cannot be countenanced within the bounds of a civilized and modern
society." In the other argument, particularly resonant in England in the after-
math of the 1834 Poor Law, the infantieidal mother is the oppressed object of
sympathy, who signals "the savagery into which modern society has fallen."
Both discourses tend to figure the infantieidal mother as a working-class or
racially differentiated woman (Indian, Chinese, West Indian, or Irish), but in
one version, her difference makes her barbaric while in the other the modern
English society that interprets it is more so.
In "'Happy Shall He Be That Taketh and Dasheth Thy Little Ones against
the Stones': Infanticide in Cooper's The Last of the Mohicans," Mary Chapman
shows that infanticide is just as important a trope in eighteenth- and nine-
teenth-century American literature, where it also serves to mediate concerns
about racial otherness and barbarity. The popularity of discussions of child
murder on both sides of the Atlantic suggests not just the power of the image
but also something of the fluidity that existed between countries, which, among
other things, shared a colonial history. At the same time, though, because
America was itself a colonized land, the consequences of this shared history
were different than in England. Chapman, for instance, focuses on the ten-
sions between Native Americans and English settlers and descendants, ten-
sions not directly experienced in England itself. In American literature, the
recurrent child murderer is a Native American, who kills white children as an
act of war.
In fact, there is no historical evidence that northeastern Native Ameri-
cans made a consistent practice of killing white children (their general policy
was to adopt them), which suggests that the allusion serves a "discursive rather
than strictly documentary significance." This significance, Chapman argues,
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centers around anxieties about the possibility of miscegenetic relations be-
tween Native and white Americans, a mixing feared because it threatens Anglo
purity and portends white extermination in the "New Land." As with the com-
mon American adaptations of Malthus, the stress is on the need to maintain
a white native population. Chapman pays particular attention to a scene in
Cooper's The Last of the Mohicans, in which the only white mother in the
novel stages a sort of sexual striptease to encourage a Huron warrior to return
her infant. That both the mother and baby are subsequently murdered sug-
gests she must be punished for her willingness to consider a miscegenetic
exchange. In warfare, infants become the battleground in population control,
and the reproductive female body, as the potential site of cultural blending,
must be eradicated, even though without that body there can be no popula-
tion at all. Taken together, the articles by Costello, Levy, McDonagh, and
Chapman point to some of the political complexities of the new maternal
model of procreation and population. Seen as the locus of human increase
and the creator of new citizens, the mother appeared to reproduce national
identity and health. But she was also a potential hazard — the source of excess
population or infant death and the space where national, racial, and class
differences could collapse.
The context of colonial slavery further complicated such tensions, par-
ticularly those involving miscegenation. Unlike Cooper's novel, for instance,
in which a relationship between a white woman and a Native American sig-
nals a threat to the white population, Jacobs's Incidents in the Life of a Slave
Girl points to the white plantation owner's investment in miscegenetic rape as
a means of generating new slaves and thus enhancing population growth.52 If
miscegenation is the tabooed sign of racial blurring when it involves the white
woman, it is expected of the black woman, whose children — designated
slaves —mark not the collapse but the reinforcement of racial difference.
Inventing Maternity concludes with an interpretation of Incidents, Ann
Gelder's "Reforming the Body: 'Experience' and the Architecture of Imagina-
tion in Harriet Jacobs's Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl." Many readers
have discussed how Jacobs highlights the difference between black and white
women by emphasizing the impossibility of a slave woman's upholding the
dictates of female chastity. "Reforming the Body" extends this tradition by
looking at the specific ways in which Jacobs subverts domestic and pastoral
imagery in representing her own sexual experience and maternity. Gelder
argues that despite Jacobs's publicly requisite claims to the contrary, she re-
veals that she was raped by her master in her depiction of the domestic space
where the violence occurred. Her triumph was that she had managed first to
become impregnated by a white neighbor, thus denying her master the chance
to produce new slaves through his abuse. To the various ways in which a mas-
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ter's rape might be rendered unprofitable (birth control, abortion, infanti-
cide), Jacobs adds consensual sex with another white man, "who has the means
to buy and free their children." By virtue of this complex revision of miscege-
netic norms, Jacobs could "protect her children from the pain of being prod-
ucts of rape" and try to arrange for their freedom before they were born.
Gelder's article stresses Jacobs's representational strategies and particu-
larly the way she uses spatial images both to articulate the unspeakable expe-
rience of rape and to transcend it through her account of pregnancy. Jacobs
undermines "the domestic ideology of the home as sanctified space" to show
that she was raped. But she also describes her grandmother's attic, where she
hid for seven years, as a place of hope. After suggesting that she became preg-
nant to avoid bearing her master's child, Jacobs presents the attic as the archi-
tectural version of the pregnant body, a domestic space from which she herself
is reborn. In the attic, Jacobs inverts the law that the child follows the mother's
condition by securing her children's emancipation before her own, so that she
"follows" them. This "imaginative [use] of pregnancy . . . create[s] a politi-
cized spatial language for enslaved mothers."
In focusing on the representation of procreation, "Reforming the Body"
returns to the subject with which the volume opened. Harvey, Bradstreet,
Dryden, and the writers Epstein discusses offer varying accounts of female
procreative agency, demonstrating the extent to which descriptions of con-
ception and fetal development could be adjusted to suit particular political,
religious, or legal contexts. What distinguishes the slave mother's circum-
stances, however, is that her children are marked exclusively by maternal
kinship and thus fated to be slaves. The early texts examined in this volume
variously document the relationship between patriarchy and progeny, and
the later ones point to a growing association between reproduction and ma-
ternity. But on the plantation the master's part in fathering slave children is
entirely erased. In a world where it is forbidden to name his role in procre-
ation, black maternity is granted a particularly hazardous agency. Jacobs is
victorious because she transforms the onus of reproduction into an advan-
tage. Choosing an alternative white father for her children and depicting the
pregnant body as the source of freedom, she makes fertility a form of escape.
Although Jacobs is at pains to stress the unique difficulty and ultimate
power of black maternity, part of the political force of her argument depends
on her universahzation of maternal sentiment. Hoping to provoke her white
female readers to fight for abolition, she tells them that she acted out of "a
mother's love for my children," feelings they surely share and understand.53
Both British and American female abolitionists tended to stress such linkages
between black and white women as part of their justification for emancipa-
tion. But in both countries, this sense of cross-racial affiliation began to erode
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after abolition, as antislavery agitation evolved into the women's rights move-
ment in the latter half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth
centuries. In England, black women tended to be ignored by those struggling
for women's rights, and in the United States, the women's suffrage movement
was fractured by disagreements about black suffrage and racial equality.54
Lower-class women's interests also tended to be overlooked. In early-twentieth-
century America, for instance, women's rights agitators influenced the pas-
sage of legislation mandating funds for needy mothers, but aid was based on
whether the mother proved "worthy." Usually reserved for widows, the cat-
egory excluded poor, working, unwed, and deserted mothers, who were at the
greatest risk of having their children removed by the state.55
The early twentieth century also witnessed the inauguration of psycho-
analytic theory, which, in its most traditional forms, positions a seductive and
objectified mother at the center of its model of human development. The
value, hazards, and complexities of psychoanalysis as well as the impact it has
had on feminist scholarship are subjects of other books; none of the articles in
Inventing Maternity directly relies on psychoanalytic theory.56 It is neverthe-
less worth stressing.here that the traditional psychoanalytic account of mater-
nity can be seen as the logical outgrowth of the idealization of full-time
motherhood that began in Europe in the eighteenth century. Psychoanalysis
is one important register of the changing significance and practice of female
parenting. The story of the preoedipal bond, for instance, which posits an
unmediated attachment between a mother and infant, is meaningful only for
a society that teaches mothers to devote themselves to their offspring, some-
thing that neither the woman who sent her child out to nurse nor the wet
nurse or slave expected to put that child before her own at her breast was able
to do. Texts such as Pamela, Part 2, The Wrongs of Woman, Ennui, and Inci-
dents in the Life of a Slave Girl, which tentatively imply that a child's happi-
ness and health depend on maternal presence and affection, reflect the gradual
development of a cultural consensus about childhood needs that psychoanaly-
sis inherits and elaborates.
The debates concerning works by Nancy Chodorow, Carol Gilligan, Luce
Irigaray, Julia Kristeva, Sarah Ruddick, and others reveal the profound con-
flicts among contemporary feminists about how best to use psychoanalytic
theories without becoming trapped in essentialist models of motherhood.57
Drawing on Foucault, Judith Butler helpfully argues that the psychoanalytic
account of maternity is of greatest use to feminist theory when treated as the
"product of a historically specific organization of sexuality" and not as an abiding
precultural truth. Viewed historically, psychoanalysis serves a descriptive value
in cultures like our own, which place a premium on mother-infant attach-
ment, and precisely for this reason its conservative implications also provide
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useful avenues for social analysis. At the same time, though, as Jean Walton
shows, critics have only begun to consider how the "articulations of gendered
subjectivity" in psychoanalysis are "dependent upon or imbricated in implicit
assumptions" about race. Although a racial subtext informs the model of sexual
development in a number of early psychoanalytic case histories, the role moth-
ering plays in these negotiations has yet to be carefully analyzed.58
In modern-day America, the actual practice of mothering continues to be
profoundly affected by race and class. According to recent statistics, one-quar-
ter of American children are poor, nearly half of all children under age six are
poor, more than half of these live with single mothers, and minorities consti-
tute 70 percent of all children living in extreme poverty.59 The Urban Insti-
tute has predicted that the 1996 restrictions in the federal welfare policy will
move another 1.1 million children into poverty.60 Patricia Hill Collins points
out that while feminist discussions of maternity often center on problems of
maternal and child psychological health, poor mothers are faced with the
more basic problem of ensuring their children's physical survival.61
Arguments for the restriction of welfare benefits for the poor have implic-
itly been based on negative images of black and often young single mothers —
even though this is not an accurate portrait of the majority of women on
welfare.62 Nevertheless, as Dorothy Roberts puts it, "When Americans debate
welfare reform, most have single Black mothers in mind. . . . 'Welfare' has
become a code word for 'race.'" It has also become a code word for fertility.
Assuming that aid encourages its recipients to have too many children, wel-
fare opponents often justify restrictive policies such as "family caps" as a means
of limiting the growth of the poor. According to Roberts, these policies are
problematic not only because studies have found that there is "no significant
causal relationship between welfare benefits and childbearing," but because
they divert attention from the true source of poverty.63 By suggesting that pov-
erty is produced by procreation and not by an inequitable political, social,
and economic order, welfare opponents present racial inequality as a func-
tion of "nature rather than power," "perpetuated by Black people themselves" —
and especially by black mothers.64 In the context of this volume, such
assumptions point to the endurance of the Malthusian attack on lower-class
women's reproductive excess, initiated at the end of the eighteenth century.
Deborah Valenze suggests that by linking female fertility, overpopulation, and
subsistence, Malthus's theories helped make it possible for poor mothers to
be blamed for the cycle of poverty.65
Questions about abortion and reproductive technologies, also tied to con-
cerns about race and class, have enormously complicated contemporary de-
bates about maternity. It is worth remembering that it was not until the second
half of the nineteenth century that abortion became a crime in America. As
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Leslie Reagan documents, in both the colonial and postrevolutionary era,
terminating a pregnancy before "quickening" was legal under common law,
and abortifacients and the services of practitioners were widely publicized
and regularly available. The mid-nineteenth-century campaign against abor-
tion was spearheaded by the newly formed American Medical Association,
anxious to restrict the services of nondoctors. The promoters gained popular
success by evoking Malthusian apprehensions about population growth, ar-
guing that abortions would diminish the numbers of white, native-born Prot-
estants and enable Catholic immigrants to exceed them. Drawing on the idea
of the female body as the site of population control, the medical leader of the
antiabortion campaign asked: Shall the South and West "be filled by our chil-
dren or by those of aliens? This is a question our women must answer; upon
their loins depends the future destiny of the nation."66
The effect of the criminalization of abortion —mandated in all states be-
tween 1860 and 1880—was hardly what its promoters advocated, as privi-
leged women continued to be able to acquire safe and often legal abortions in
the following century. By the mid- twentieth century, however, a "nationwide
crackdown ended the relative ease of obtaining [safe and legal] abortions,"
and women who wanted to terminate their pregnancies were increasingly
forced to resort to dangerous alternatives. As a result, tens of thousands of
them annually poured into emergency rooms. Between 1951 and 1962, the
risk of death from illegal abortion nearly doubled and women of color, always
less likely to have access to safer measures, experienced almost four times
greater risk of death than white women.67
Since the legalization of abortion in 1973, the discourse against it, often
based on a notion of "fetal rights," has been used not only to challenge a
woman's right to terminate a pregnancy but to justify a variety of other mea-
sures, including the forced medical treatment of pregnant women and the
prosecution of pregnant drug users (these problems are discussed at some
length in Julia Epstein's article).68 Between 1985 and 1995, two hundred wo-
men in thirty states were charged with drug use during pregnancy, the major-
ity of them black.69 One 1990 study of pregnant women in Florida concluded
that although black and white women are equally likely to use drugs or alcohol
during pregnancy, black women's use is reported to the authorities nearly ten
times more often.70 In South Carolina, the Interagency Policy begun in 1989
resulted in the arrests of forty-two women; all but one were black. There,
mothers were shackled shortly before and after childbirth, and one woman
was handcuffed to her bed throughout her delivery.71
Cynthia Daniels argues that the fundamental issues involved in cases
concerning "fetal health" have profound political implications as pregnancy
becomes the grounds for exempting women from the right to bodily integrity,
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one of the most basic principles of liberal individualism and American citi-
zenship. The contradiction at the heart of the legal debates becomes clear
when bodily intrusions not permitted under the law are contrasted with those
tolerated in cases concerning pregnant women:
Robbery suspects cannot be forced to undergo surgery in order to remove
critical evidence, such as a bullet, from their bodies. Persons suspected of
drug dealing cannot be forced to have their stomachs pumped if they
swallow evidence. Suspected rapists cannot be forced to undergo
involuntary blood tests for AIDS. Parents cannot be forced to donate
organs to their children, even if the child's life is at stake and the parent is
the only appropriate donor. . . . Organs cannot even be taken from a
cadaver without the prior consent of the dying. . . . [But] pregnant women
have been forced to have blood transfusions against their will; they have
been sedated, strapped down, and forced to undergo major surgery; they
have been physically detained in hospitals when physicians suspected
they weren't following medical orders.
Daniels suggests that reproductive politics presses liberal political theory to
its breaking point by highlighting the limitations of the concepts of individu-
alism, privacy, and self-determination, which neither capture the relational
grounds of pregnancy nor are of consistent use in defending a pregnant woman's
rights to terminate a pregnancy or avoid intrusive procedures.72
Dorothy Roberts emphasizes a different problem: While much of the
debate about reproductive freedom concerns the pregnant woman's right to
have an abortion or avoid medical intrusion, black women also suffer from a
broad range of governmental policies that limit their ability to bear children —
from the coerced sterilizations of hundreds of thousands of minority women
in the 1960s and 1970s, to the mass distribution of Norplant among minori-
ties in the 1990s, to the current popularity of "family caps" for welfare recipi-
ents. Construing reproductive liberty as the pregnant woman's freedom to
make choices about her body without governmental interference fails to ad-
dress the way governmental incentives against childbearing narrow minority
and poor women's range of reproductive choices.73
Advances in reproductive technologies have compounded the political
tensions surrounding reproduction. On the one hand, these technologies en-
able motherhood to be separated from heterosexuality and offer "women a
greater chance to decide if, when and under what conditions to mother." But
on the other hand, they also increase the likelihood that female reproduction
will be the subject of medical and governmental surveillance as well as of
efforts to reinforce heterosexuality and paternal control. In the 1980s, for in-
stance, the Warnock Committee in Britain advised parliament that only
women in stable heterosexual relationships be allowed to take advantage of
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reproductive technologies, going so far as to suggest that married women of-
fer written consent from their husbands.74 In the United States, several state
courts have wrestled with the difference between seminal donation and surro-
gate motherhood, generally concluding that the process of pregnancy and
birth entitles the surrogate mother to more parental rights than the sperm
donor. But individual situations sometimes work to the father's advantage.
Thus, in cases involving lesbian and unmarried mothers, sperm donors have
been granted parental rights against maternal wishes because there is no com-
peting father.7'
Questions about reproductive liberty and reproductive technologies are
based in part on whether mothers should be seen as the center of procreative
control or as a competing interest group. The articles in this anthology indi-
cate that these questions are at once historically enduring and new. The open-
ing essays show that there have long been efforts to conceptualize and prioritize
the differences between mother, fetus or offspring, and some greater govern-
mental power, be it God, king, or father. In light of current arguments that
put the fetus's rights and health before the mother's, Harvey's celebration of
the fetus's individuality seems remarkably familiar as do the many seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century theories that fault the pregnant mother for fetal defor-
mity. Similarly, when Bradstreet and Dryden contemplate the difference be-
tween the mother's generational agency and that of God, king, or father, they
raise still-pressing questions about whether procreative authority rests with
the mother or with a governmental body.
As suggested earlier, by the end of the eighteenth century there is an im-
portant change in the governing figure's procreative position. In the seven-
teenth-century models, the argument often turns on the extent to which a
higher power actually generates the offspring—the extent to which it super-
sedes the mother as the privileged point of creation. In the late eighteenth
century and beyond, procreation is largely feminized, and the argument is
less about a governing power's role in producing the offspring and more about
a generalized social need to regulate a process associated primarily with
women. The articles at the end of the volume indicate that whether the mother
is blamed for excess birth or for infant death—whether she is the space where
national, racial, and class differences are reinforced or collapsed — she, and
not some governmental figure, has the power to originate (and thereby also
exterminate) bodies and populations. It is perhaps telling that after the mater-
nal model of reproduction replaced the governmental model of generation,
the mother's fertility was increasingly subject to governmental supervision.
In our own day governmental intervention appears especially pronounced
not simply because the assumption that female reproduction needs to be regu-
lated continues, but also because reproductive technologies have created so
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many new arenas for interference. At the same time, though, such technolo-
gies have arguably shifted attention away from the female body as the source
of human creation. Terms like artificial insemination, test-tube baby, and in
vitro fertilization, which emphasize science's contribution to conception, make
women's procreative role seem as irrelevant as it was for many seventeenth-
century theorists.76
If procreation was increasingly linked to the female body in the late eigh-
teenth century and maternal practice naturalized partly as a result, this did
not preclude the possibility of separating childbearing from childrearing. At
least two articles in Inventing Maternity explore this possibility. Johnson sug-
gests that the daughter in The Wrongs of Woman might be raised by a female
couple, only one member of which is the child's blood relative; and Costello
describes how the wet nurse in Ennui develops as powerful a tie to her foster
child as she does to her biological one. In the earlier Pamela, Part 2, when
Mr. B. overrules Pamela's desire to breastfeed, the mother's value as sexual
object and breeder carries more weight than her role as caretaker.77 In con-
trast, The Wrongs of Woman and Ennui demonstrate that women can nurture
and care for young children to whom they do not give birth. These later nov-
els indicate that even as motherhood came to be seen as a reproductive dispo-
sition, maternal care could be abstracted, idealized, and divided from
reproduction itself. Indeed, the prioritization of maternal practice generated,
in part, by a biologically deterministic view of the female body may have
actually facilitated the conceptual detachment of motherhood and biology.
As suggested at the outset of this essay, the prioritization of maternal care
had implications for fatherhood as well. When women gained child custody
rights in mid-nineteenth-century England and America, they did so, in part,
because paternal kinship became less compelling an argument for guardian-
ship than maternal bonding. It is a testament to the cultural value placed on
maternal care that in the hundred years that followed, American mothers
were more likely than fathers to gain guardianship of their children in cases of
separation or divorce, an important reversal of the centuries of laws treating
women and children as the property of men. But most recently, between 1960
and 1990, the judicial presumption infavor of mothers was abolished in nearly
all states, and fathers were given equal or nearly equal legal claim to child
custody.78 On the one hand, the change appears to reflect both the feminist
call for a more equitable distribution of parental labor and a healthful rejec-
tion of the naturalization of maternity. But on the other hand, the change
may signal an infringement on maternal authority: in contested custody cases,
courts often treat mothers differently than fathers, holding them to a higher
standard of parenting and allowing their careers or sexual behavior to be used
as evidence against them.'9
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It is not the goal of this volume to gauge the full historical impact these
and other measures will have on the understanding of motherhood, but rather
to suggest that maternity has long been the site of political change and debate.
Certain shifts—like that from a generative to a reproductive model of procre-
ation—mark significant alterations in the political use of maternity. It is pos-
sible that we are in the midst of an equally momentous —and oppressive —
transition today. Because maternal images and meanings remain malleable
over time, at least some political influence can be exerted at the level of rep-
resentation, and feminist scholarly efforts can be important here. But Invent-
ing Maternity also points to the long-term vulnerability of the maternal
body—whether that be before medicine, government, or the law. Changing
this is the harder task.
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Making Up for Losses
The Workings of Gender in William
Harvey's de Generatione animalium
By repeated dissection of hen and deer in the 1630s and 1640s, William Harvey
determined—as it turns out, erroneously—that there is no mass, either of
mixed semina or of male semen and female menstrual blood, to be found in
the uterus after intercourse. Although de Generatione animalium [Anatomi-
cal exercises on the generation of animals] is famous for much else, it seems
fairly clear that Harvey considered this experimental discovery momentous,
because it unambiguously demonstrated to him that his predecessors, who all
assumed the existence of some postcoital mass, had drawn "erroneous and
hasty conclusions" about the origins of generation.1 The new empiricism was
once again successful — as it had been earlier in Harvey's discovery of the
circulation of the blood —both in banishing what Harvey called the "phan-
toms of darkness" from traditional knowledge and in establishing a sure foun-
dation for new theories of animal physiology (151).
Historians of science have evaluated the accuracy of the conclusions that
Harvey drew from his observational discovery, particularly the roles he as-
signed to the male and female in procreation and the status of the egg pro-
duced.2 But precisely because it deals with male and female procreative agency,
Harvey's text is also available for study in light of its use of historically specific
and socially constructed gender relations. Harvey's discovery of the absence
of any postcoital mass in the uterus was indeed revolutionary, but not merely
because it contravened the biological teaching of Aristotle or Galen; it also
threatened to contravene the certain knowledge of male dominion — in both
the family and the state —that those theories supported. Starting from an ex-
perimentally produced "fact," Harvey suggested a theory of generation that
reveals a more or less explicit encoding of gender roles common to his cul-
ture. Although he did alter the scientific understanding of generation, he ap-
parently needed to "preserve the phenomena" of gender relations built into
the previous theories. I shall argue that Harvey's new theory is a response to
the ideological threats, both sexual and political, posed by the absence of
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semen in the uterus; that his text constitutes a compensatory drama in which
an inviolable male agency and an autonomous masculine identity emerge in
the face of threatened loss to male sexual and political power; and that both of
these are played out against the necessary diminution of the female, particu-
larly in her capacity as progenitor. But if de Generatione thus manifests the
normative interplay of a priori assumptions about gender and what Harvey
called the "obvious truths" of empirical observation, it will also reveal the
normative anxieties associated with the empirical method itself—that, though
heralded as the sure way toward the "citadel of truth" (153), the new empiri-
cism, for all its violent and valiant efforts, could not breach its walls.
This essay thus partakes of two intertwined traditions in the social study
of early modern science. The first, perhaps best theorized by Bruno Latour,
examines the specific interconnections between epistemological and
sociopolitical issues. In the earlier work of Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer
on the competing scientific methodologies of Hobbes and Boyle, and in
Shapin's more recent work on the function of gentlemanly discourse in secur-
ing credibility for empirical findings, these scholars have sought to show how
"solutions to the problem of knowledge are embedded within practical solu-
tions to the problem of social order" —that, in simpler terms, epistemology
and social politics are interdependent.3 The second tradition, roughly called
"feminist," tends to be more literary in orientation, as it examines the gendered
rhetoric of early modern science texts. Most influential in this regard has
been Evelyn Fox Keller, who in her many works has demonstrated with great
specificity the constitutive role of metaphors (and particularly those that arise
from or correspond to social relations) in the construction of scientific cer-
tainties and theories.4 Although none of these scholars deals explicitly with
Harvey's investigations into embryology, they offer methodological models
for what will be my approach here in examining the rhetorical and epistemo-
logical construction of Harvey's text.5
By now it is nearly a truism that the biological body is always culturally
inscribed, if not altogether culturally constructed. But the now commonplace
assertions of the mechanized body and the passivity of feminized matter in
the seventeenth century need to be refined against the specific texts in which
those portrayals emerge. Carolyn Merchant, for example, who has been so
influential in reappraising the scientific revolution in light of its engagement
with women and the environment, nonetheless relies too easily on generali-
zation in her discussion of Harvey's reproductive biology. Merchant claims
that "the passive role [Harvey] assigned to both matter and the female in
reproduction is consistent with . . . the trend toward female passivity in the
sphere of industrial production and with the reassertion of the passivity and
inertness of matter by the new seventeenth-century mechanical philosophy."6
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Merchant misses here what I consider to be crucial aspects of Harvey's theory,
among them the suggestion of the female as the efficient—and not merely
the material —cause of generation and the vitality (indeed, the vitalism) of
biological matter from the first moments of its creation. While I agree wholly
with Merchant's general sense that Harvey's theory was constructed in accor-
dance with prevailing gender ideology, I want to consider with somewhat
more specificity both the details of the theory and their rhetorical deployment
in order to make manifest the specific inscriptions of gender ideology on
Harvey's famous text.
In considering the cultural inscriptions in de Generatione, it is important
to remember that Harvey arrived at his theory of generation in a highly politi-
cized context. As the personal physician of Charles I, Harvey conducted some
of his most definitive experiments on the king's lands and at the king's behest,7
and, although based on work performed for the most part in the 1630s, de
Generatione was probably written during the second half of the 1640s, when
the king was already held captive by parliamentary forces. Harvey was thus
for years connected to an increasingly embattled court whose king was en-
gaged in an ultimately unsuccessful struggle to maintain his patriarchal rights
over his subjects. While the prefatory matter of the 1651 text argues Harvey's
distance from the turmoil of the time, the contention that scientific study was
a much needed refuge from the "anxious cares" of the day suggests Harvey's
keen awareness of the politicized context in which he worked.
The clearest evidence of the cultural embeddedness of Harvey's work is
that his discovery of the postcoital absence of semen in the uterus neatly rep-
licates the threat to political patriarchy that surrounded him. According to
classic patriarchal arguments, the king ruled his kingdom as a father ruled his
children; political and paternal rights were understood to be analogous or
even synonymous. As King James argued in The Trew Law of Free Monar-
chies, "By the Law of Nature the King becomes a naturall Father to all his
Leiges at his Coronation: And as the Father by his fatherly duty is bound to
care for the nourishing, education, and vertuous government of his children;
even so is the King Bound to care for all his subjects."8
Harvey's determination that the semen has no material contact with the
egg surely threatens the nature of paternity, since without physical continuity
between father and child the role of the father in generating the child be-
comes ambiguous. But it also threatens the nature of patriarchy as a form of
civil government, since classical patriarchy—the theory that political right is
paternal right—depended, at least implicitly, on the transmission of that right
through paternal procreation. Although patriarchal arguments took many
forms in the seventeenth century, a common ground of evidence was found
in the biblical account of God giving Adam dominion over his wife and chil-
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dren. As Richard Field argued in 1606, "When there were no more in the
World but the first man whom God made out of the earth, the first woman
that was made of man, and the children which GOD had given them, who
could be fitter to rule and direct, than the man for whose sake the woman was
created, and out of whose loynes the children came?"9
Ignoring the first Creation story, in which male and female are created
simultaneously (Genesis 1:26-27), and erasing entirely the female capacity
for birth, Field founds Adam's rule on his status as the sole material source of
procreation: Eve derives from his body and the children from his loins. Im-
plicit in Field's argument is the biological assumption that the father exclu-
sively creates the child: from his body, from his loins. Although clearly an
inversion of the obvious—that children come from a woman's loins — Field's
position, which was common to patriarchal arguments, was actually supported
by both Aristotelian and Galenic physiology, which granted the father the
greater share of procreative agency.10
The patriarchalists' use of Eve's derivation from Adam's body to support
claims of paternal rule offers perhaps an exaggerated example of how both
biblical stories and biological theories can get enlisted in political argument.
When patriarchal writers spoke of rulers in general and not specifically of
Adam's rule, however, the connection between generative and political sover-
eignty could not be made explicitly, since kings could not be said literally to
father their subjects. Nonetheless, the connection between paternity and pa-
triarchy continued to function in their claims, if only figuratively. Sir Robert
Filmer, for example, founded the right of governance in God's original grant-
ing of paternal power to Adam, and he demonstrated that this power descended
only through Adam (and not through Eve) because as "the Scripture teacheth
us . . . all men came by succession, and generation from one man."11 But
because Filmer recognized that political right was not always transferred by
lineal descent—kings could be usurped, for example, or governments con-
solidated—he did not actually rest his argument for patriarchy on the physiol-
ogy of paternity.12 That the two were nonetheless linked in his theory, however,
is evident from his telling response to Hobbes's contention that in the state of
nature children owe their original obligation to their mother. This could not
be possible, argued Filmer, because we know "that God at the creation gave
the sovereignty to the man over the woman, as being the nobler and principal
agent in generation."13 Because Adam —as man — is the "principal agent in
generation," he achieves solitary rule over both wife and children, and it is on
that physiological model that we are to understand the paternal rule of kings.
Patriarchal theory in the seventeenth century had grounds of support other
than the biology of paternity, but if an analogy between the two was at least
implicitly embedded in claims for fatherly rule, then Harvey's discovery, which
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threatened the traditional understanding of paternity, also threatened the un-
derstanding of patriarchy that derived from the father's procreative superior-
ity.14 Harvey's responses to the two conceptual dangers posed by his experi-
mental work are, however, somewhat different from each other. While he
mitigates the threat to paternity by playing out a fantasy of exaggerated male
dominion, he counters the threat to patriarchy by transmuting it to a domin-
ion based in a broadly masculine, as opposed to a specifically paternal, right.15
This emerges in Harvey's depiction of the embryo as an autonomous, free-
born male, unbounded by any constraints to either father or mother. In stress-
ing the embryo's masculine autonomy—an autonomy which, as we shall see,
characterizes Harvey's endeavors as an empirical researcher as well—Harvey's
theory bears certain similarities to the famous myth of origins envisioned by
his good friend Thomas Hobbes, who published his own work of anatomy
and masculine birth, Leviathan, in 1651, the same year that Harvey pub-
lished de Generatione. For both theorists, masculine right reemerges as tradi-
tional patriarchy gives way, and the masculine, freeborn individual becomes
the basis of the state.
de Generatione is set up as a series of exercises, some detailing Harvey's find-
ings from various dissections and observations, and some presenting the specu-
lative conclusions he drew from them. Although Harvey never sets forth a
formal or systematic theory of embryogenesis —in fact, de Generatione is
deemed valuable less for its positive formulations than for its negative rejec-
tion of prior theories — he does provide the shards of a theory, speculations
and observations that, though they never quite cohere, represent his thinking
about what he called "the heart of [nature's] mystery" (153). Working from
his determination that there is no semen to be found in the uterus after inter-
course, Harvey reasoned that fertilization must occur without the semen hav-
ing material contact with the egg. For Harvey the "egg" was not what we refer
to as the ovum but, rather, the complete origin of the embryo, produced solely
by the female; if the female was fertilized through intercourse, the egg would
develop and grow on its own, either within the female's body (in viviparous
animals) or outside it (in oviparous ones).16 When Harvey asserted that all
living things come from eggs, he was not propounding a universal female
contribution from an ovary—Harvey, in fact, thought that the ovary in vivipa-
rous animals did not participate in the process of generation at all—but was
rather suggesting that oviparous, rather than viviparous, animals should be
understood as the paradigm case for understanding generation.17
Although de Generatione follows Aristotle's teaching in much else, Harvey's
discovery of the lack of semen in the uterus compelled him to differ from
Aristotle, as well as from Galen, with respect to the components of concep-
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tion. For Aristotle, the semen acted directly on the female menstrual clot and,
though contributing nothing material to the future embryo, actually was re-
sponsible for forming it and for determining its telos; the female, by contrast,
supplied merely the matter on which the semen worked to craft the offspring.
Aristotle's analogy for this interaction makes the point: the semen works on
the menstrual blood as a carpenter does on a tree, carving out its creation
from some prior material.18 In Aristotle's theory, the female's role as material
cause allows her to be rightly considered a parent, but it is the male contribu-
tion that provides the motion of the offspring and directs its formation, and so
it is the male that is considered the primary progenitor.
The Galenic theory, which vied with Aristotle's for two thousand years,
differed from it in attributing procreative seed to the female. But Galen con-
curred with Aristotle in deeming the female's role to be vastly inferior to the
male's. In Galen's anatomy, women were understood to be stunted or defi-
cient versions of males: women possessed the same reproductive organs as
men, but because of their lesser perfecting heat, they had to retain those or-
gans inside their bodies to keep them warm. The seed that the female "tes-
ticles" produced, therefore, was necessarily inferior in quality and importance
to the seed produced by the more perfect organs of men.
As numerous recent scholars have shown, both Aristotle's and Galen's
embryological theories align contemporary biological knowledge with pre-
vailing assumptions about gender.19 Harvey's discovery that these theories
misconstrued the makeup of the material body of the fetus threatened to topple
their corresponding assumptions about gender, because it undermined their
biological support: if there is no postcoital mass in the uterus, then the semen
cannot be considered to contribute directly to the fetus. Further, the female
must be seen to produce on her own the egg out of which the fetus develops.
Harvey certainly considered the possibility of female preeminence in genera-
tion: he reasoned that since a hen can produce unfruitful eggs without the
cock, and since these eggs clearly have some vital principle that propels them
from the ovary through the uterus, "all creative force or vital power [anima] is
not derived exclusively from the male" (288). Harvey even refers to the fe-
male as an efficient, and not merely material, cause of generation, and he
says that the female may be considered the primary agent in generation: "It
seems probable that the female is actually of more moment in generation
than the male" (289). As the male role in procreation fades into indetermi-
nacy, the female's role emerges, at least potentially, as predominant.
It is important to understand that Harvey needed to assert female agency
to explain how an egg can be produced without the semen's direct contribu-
tion. But the potential of that agency's really assuming preeminence over the
male was troublesome: certainly, if the female herself were considered to
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control the giving of life to the egg, the traditional association of male with
spirit and female with matter would be reversed. Harvey, of course, never
portrays his discovery as potentially threatening in this way; his repeated asser-
tions of it are routinely proud and are offered as clear evidence of the efficacy
of diligent observation in the unveiling of truth. But although it is possible to
read his occasional statements of female agency in procreation as indications
of his willingness to alter the established gender hierarchy, the sense that the
prospect constitutes more of a threat or, perhaps, a site of anxiety is registered
in the vast edifice of explanation that Harvey constructs to counteract both its
biological and social implications.
Forced by his discovery into believing that the semen had to act at a distance
in order to have any role in generation, Harvey confessed himself unable to
determine definitively how fertilization occurs. But it was a problem that fas-
cinated him, one, he said, "full of obscurity," with much that he "admirefd]
and marvel[led] at" (575). Harvey even included inde Genemtione an appen-
dix devoted exclusively to the problem of conception, so that he "would not
appear to subvert other men's opinions only, without bringing forward any-
thing of [his] own" (575). Unable to establish any empirical evidence for the
process of fertilization, Harvey attempted to figure its workings through analo-
gies. Although presented without apparent order, many of the analogies co-
here as a logical series, one that works to foreclose the possibility of female
control in generation and to entrench instead male preeminence by progres-
sively reassociating the female with matter and the male with the pervasive
power of spirit.
The first in the series—though not the first to appear in the text—is the
suggestion that the semen works like a magnet:
But since it is certain that the semen of the male does not so much reach
the cavity of the uterus . . . the woman after contact with the spermatic
fluid in coitus, seems to receive influence and to become fecundated
without the cooperation of any sensible corporeal agent, in the same way
as iron touched by the magnet is endowed with its powers and can attract
other iron to it. When this virtue is once received the woman exercises a
plastic power of generation, and produces a being after her own image.
(575)
Of all the analogies Harvey uses, this one most aligns the male with material-
ity and the female with procreative agency. The semen here is considered the
vehicle of an incorporeal "plastic power," but the process necessitates a mate-
rial "touch" to transfer that power to the female. Once fecundated, though,
the female is said to be able to produce a being after her own image; through
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a derivative power, she is given the capacity to re-create her own form. It is
fairly clear, however, that Harvey was not satisfied with this understanding of
fertilization, since he mentions it only a few times.
The second analogy in the series —Harvey's most frequent analogy and
the one that apparently made most sense to him as a physician — is that the
semen acts like a disease, propagating by contagion.20 Conception should be
understood to occur, Harvey suggests, in the same manner in which "epi-
demic, contagious, and pestilential diseases scatter their seeds, and are propa-
gated to a distance through the air, or by some 'fomes' producing diseases like
themselves, in bodies of a different nature, and in a hidden fashion silently
multiply . . . themselves by a kind of generation" (322).
The contagion idea is useful to Harvey's purposes, partly because it helps
to explain the multiple births typical of many animals, and partly because it
demonstrates the irresistible, exclusive, and multiplicative vigor of the semen.
Scattering his seed, the male is still a material cause here. But, unlike the
magnet analogy, it is the male who here re-creates his image. In fact, every
time Harvey mentions the contagion idea, he suggests that the generative ability
belongs exclusively to the male: he says, to cite another instance, that animals
are procreated "by a kind of contagion, much in the way medical men ob-
serve contagious diseases . . . to creep through the ranks of mortal men, and
by mere extrinsic contact to excite diseases similar to themselves in other bod-
ies" (358; emphasis mine). In marked counterpoint to the "similarity" propa-
gated by the male, the female is implied to be "of a different nature." No
longer even of the same kind as the male, the female is relegated to a wholly
passive role: she is merely the place in which the male "multiplies" himself.
Whatever its attractions, however, the analogy to contagion did not really
accommodate all the particularities of Harvey's understanding of generation.
In Harvey's theory the female is not a wholly passive recipient; by whatever
means, she does actively produce the egg. Perhaps recognizing the disjunc-
tion, Harvey devotes most of his appendix on conception to explaining a third
analogy, in which uterine conception is understood in terms of mental con-
ception. He starts from the observation that the inner surface of the uterus,
when ready to conceive, "resembles in smoothness and delicacy the ventricles
of the brain." Because
the substance of the uterus . . . is very like the structure of the brain, why
should we not suppose that the function of both is similar, and that there
is excited by coitus within the uterus a something identical with, or at
least analogous to, an "imagination" (phantasma) or a "desire" (appetitus)
in the brain, whence comes the generation or procreation of the ovum?
. . . And just as a "desire" arises from a conception of the brain, and this
conception springs from some external object of desire, so also from the
42 Eve Keller
male, as being the more perfect animal, and, as it were, the most natural
object of desire, does the natural (organic) conception arise in the uterus,
even as the animal conception does in the brain. From this desire, or
conception, it results that the female produces an offspring like the father.
(577-78)
Though starting from a consideration of uterine conception, this analogy works
to magnify the male, asserting his association with the incorporeal. As "the
more perfect animal" and "the most natural object of desire," the male pro-
creates nonmaterially, imparting to the female an "idea" or "form" of himself
through intercourse. Only in response to that incorporeal influence can the
female conceive the egg. Furthermore, although the female is said to gener-
ate, the offspring is said to be "like the father," not like the mother, as it was in
the analogy to magnetism.
The last in the series of analogies completes Harvey's complex balancing
act between a female who must be said to produce and a male who nonethe-
less can be said to be the primary creator. In this analogy, Harvey takes to its
logical extreme the complementary concepts of the male as both "idea" and
"the most natural object of desire": here, the semen functions as the original
creator, God.
What is this transitory thing which is neither to be found remaining, nor
touching, nor contained, as far as the sense inform us, and yet works with
the highest intelligence and foresight, beyond all art; and which, even
after it has vanished, renders eggs prolific . . . and makes the hen herself
fruitful before she has yet produced any germs of eggs, and this too so
suddenly, as if it were said by the Almighty, "Let there be progeny," and
straight it is so? . . . In the generation of things is seen the most excellent,
the eternal and almighty God. (322)
In this analogy, the semen resembles God in the first moments of the uni-
verse, creating by fiat. By mimicking the divine "Let there be light," Harvey's
"Let there be progeny" gives to the semen all life-power of creation: the fe-
male produces germs of eggs, but they become fruitful, they are endowed with
life, only through the agency of the semen. Harvey even suggests the female's
awareness of the semen's divinity, since the hen, he observes, after intercourse,
"shakes herself for joy, and, as if already possessed of the richest treasure, as if
gifted by supreme Jove the preserver with blessing of fecundity, she [is] . . .
raised to the summit of felicity" (300). Here, finally, is the realigned balance
of matter and spirit: the female produces material eggs, but the male alone
gives them the spark of life, for which the female viscerally gives thanks. Al-
though confessing himself "at a standstill" (581), Harvey considers the func-
tion of semen that must work from afar and he sees, finally, God.
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Taken together, Harvey's analogies reveal his difficulties with the pros-
pect of denying to the semen the formative function possible with the old
notion of persistent material contact between male and female contributions
to generation. Harvey's conclusion (which he shared with his teacher, Fabri-
cius) that no material contact was involved in embryogenesis is surely polyva-
lent: it could mean that the semen controlled the process from a distance, but
it could also mean that the semen was merely a mechanical trigger, and that
life, form, and substance were all imparted to the egg by the female. Harvey's
analogies strive to foreclose the possibility of the latter by progressively giving
to the male all control in the generation of life.
Harvey in fact sees male predominance in generation not only in the
possible explanations for the mechanics of fertilization but even in the act of
intercourse itself, de Generatione is filled with sex stories, from traditional
lore about female animals that died for lack of regular intercourse to graphi-
cally detailed accounts of heterosexual and even homosexual mating prac-
tices. Like fertilization, sexual practice was a topic that fascinated Harvey—he
even planned a future volume called The Loves, Lusts, and Sexual Acts of
Animals — and, as with his consideration of fertilization, he found in it ample
evidence of male dominion. What is particularly interesting in his accounts
of male sexual prowess, however, is his consistent and unabashed anthropo-
morphizing: whereas in his writing about fertilization the connection to hu-
man beings is always implicit (based on the idea that oviparous generation is
the model for viviparous generation), in his discussions of animal sexual be-
havior, Harvey routinely speaks of a cock's "wives" or the desire of does to
protect their "chastity." The result, at least rhetorically, is to see the sex life of
animals as a template for that of humans, so that the practices that appear as
normative among animals may be considered to be so among human beings
as well.
Although de Generatione includes some evidence of female "lustiness,"
Harvey attends more closely to male sexual aggression, and he repeatedly
describes scenes of animal rape. For example, we hear of "a male pheasant
kept in an aviary, [which] was so inflamed with lust, that unless he had the
company of several hen-birds, six at the least, he literally maltreated them.. . .
I have seen a single hen-pheasant shut up with a cockbird . . . so worn out, and
her back so entirely stript of feathers through his reiterated assaults, that at
length she died exhausted" (193). The females, for their part, are "compelled
to submit" to the males' advances, and they are accounted to incite the males'
desire whether or not they are actually "inclined" toward sex: "An apparent
disinclination on [the hen's] part contribute[s] not a little to arouse the ardour
of the male and stimulate [s] his languishing desire, so that he fills her more
quickly and more copiously with prolific spirit" (319). Harvey presumably
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includes this observation to demonstrate that females may, in certain respects,
be considered a "first cause" of generation, but the implication is that the
females get sex whether or not they want it. Perhaps Harvey's "apparent disin-
clination" is a seventeenth-century version of "No means Yes": logically, fe-
males must want sex, since they were known to die for lack of it. But the most
straightforward understanding here is that rape is both natural and norma-
tive, performed as evidence of power, and not only of the male over the fe-
male but between males themselves. Thus Harvey tells us that the "common
cock, victorious in battle, not only satisfies his desires upon the sultanas of the
vanquished, but upon the body of his rival himself" (193). In this instance,
the purpose of sex is not to procreate (which is how Harvey generally portrays
it elsewhere) but rather to demonstrate dominion. That Harvey anthropo-
morphizes here as elsewhere (the cock's "sultanas") suggests that he thought
of these animal sexual patterns as normative for human relations: sex is a
power play, and females, whatever their desires, are mostly the objects of rape.
Harvey's treatment of the male role in generation, both in the act of inter-
course and in the process of fertilization, seems at pains to establish the per-
vasiveness of male prowess: the male is constructed as a sexual conqueror,
dominating his partners and endlessly regenerating himself in them. But
Harvey also needed to treat explicitly the female role in generation, and here
he met again with a threat to normative gender relations, since the female
had to be responsible for producing the egg without direct contribution from
the semen. If de Generatione alleviates that threat on the male side through
analogies that realign the male with the giving of life and through descrip-
tions of male sexual behavior that unambiguously demonstrate male domi-
nance, it deals with the threat on the female side by working nearly to erase
her importance, particularly in relation to the being she produces.
Harvey explicitly curtails the possibility of female predominance by tak-
ing back his assertions of her procreative agency. For example, just one page
after asserting that "the female is actually of more moment in generation than
the male" (289), Harvey corrects himself, as it were, to assert that she is "at
least equal" to him (290). But, of course, the female cannot be "equal" to the
male, as Harvey makes clear in his discussion of female physiology. Even as
he rejects the Galenic position of females as stunted forms of males, Harvey
manages to maintain the physiological insufficiency of the female in embryo-
genesis (especially in viviparous animals). In exercise 34, Harvey argues against
the Galenic position that females, like males, emit spermatic liquid at orgasm
and that it is from the mingling of these two semina that conception occurs.
His evidence is threefold: first, he says, not all prolific female animals, and
certainly not all childbearing women, experience such emission; second, the
liquid is emitted primarily externally—that is, at the orifice of the vulva and
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never within the uterus — so it could not be mingled with the male emission,
which enters the uterus directly (298-99). It would seem that either of these
arguments would suffice to cripple the Galenic position. But Harvey's third
argument, the one he apparently feels is the most forceful, derives from his
already certain knowledge that female physiology cannot attain to the perfec-
tion of the male and so cannot be said to produce what the male body can: "I,
for my part, greatly wonder how any one can believe that from parts so imper-
fect and obscure [i.e., the ovaries] a fluid like the semen, so elaborate, con-
coct and vivifying, can ever be produced" (299). The Galenic position is finally
wrong, Harvey believes, because it is illogical to think that the female can
match the male. And elsewhere Harvey praises the arrangement of nature to
produce perfection by supplying males to compensate for inherent female
"deficiencies": "Among the animals where the sexes are distinct, matters are
so arranged, that since the female alone is inadequate to engender an embryo
and to nourish and protect the young, a male is associated with her by nature,
as the superior and more worthy progenitor, as the consort of her labour, and
the means of supplying her deficiencies" (362). The arrangement here is not
merely that nature requires both a male and a female to perpetuate a kind but
that the male "corrects" the female deficiency.
In depicting the female as physiologically inferior to the male, Harvey's
work corresponds to the gender assumptions of his predecessors (though for
different reasons). But Harvey also shows himself able to break from the teach-
ings of the past while nonetheless maintaining its gender hierarchy; this is
clearest in his treatment of the egg. Here the implicit project oide Generatione
to aggrandize the father and reduce the mother coalesces, for Harvey makes
the offspring the exclusive image of the father, constructed on the near denial
of the mother.
Harvey stands enraptured before the egg. It is, he says, "a period . . . of
eternity," standing at the midpoint between those who are, those who were,
and those who are about to be (271). Like God, it encapsulates the beginning,
the middle, and the end of things: it marks the beginning of life, the mean
between male and female, and the end of procreation (271). In determining
the origin of the chick in the egg, Harvey is therefore delving into what he
considers nature's greatest mystery; he says it is not less "arduous [a] business
to investigate the intimate mysteries and obscure beginnings of generation
than to seek to discover the frame of the world at large, and the manner of its
creation" (225). It is important to note this consistent tone of radical amaze-
ment in Harvey's search for ultimate origins, because it indicates the value he
places on what he finds, namely, the egg's abiding and near complete inde-
pendence from its mother. He asserts this independence in all phases of the
egg's existence: in its initial appearance in the uterus, in its ability to grow and
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develop into a fetus, and in its eventual birth. In each of these phases, the egg
functions on its own as an autonomous entity.
This independence is first established in viviparous animals in the egg's
emergence in the uterus. In all things relating to generation other than the
function of the ovaries, Harvey insists on the analogy between oviparous and
viviparous animals. But whereas he was able to chart with some specificity
both the periodic changes in the hen's ovary and the day-to-day changes in the
incubating egg, Harvey could not do the same for the viviparous ovary or
embryo: he could not see any change in the viviparous ovary before or after
intercourse, and he could not see anything resembling a yolk. In his descrip-
tions of viviparous generation, the "eggs," which Harvey describes as masses
resembling pudding appended to the uterus, seem to spring up, as it were, by
their own volition six to seven weeks after intercourse (483f£); from their first
appearance, the eggs of viviparous animals seem to have no essential connec-
tion to the mother. The mother's role as efficient cause in generation reads as
if reduced to nothing; the embryo just suddenly appears, as if on its own.
Once visible, whether as a yolk in hens or as a conception in does, the egg
proceeds to develop by its own power. Harvey agrees with Fabricius that the
function of the uterus is to produce and grow eggs, but he stresses that growth
occurs not by means of the uterus but "by a certain natural principle peculiar
to itself" (203). In other words, the embryo is responsible for its own develop-
ment. To make the point, Harvey emphasizes that even while it is within the
fowl and connected with the ovary, the hen's egg is not, he says, "to be spoken
of as part of the mother" (275); the vital principle that controls its growth is
entirely its own.
This idea of the egg's self-regulation and innate vital principle is one of
Harvey's most remarkable breaks with Aristotle and is the central point of his
entire understanding of the embryo. For Aristotle, the semen formed a fetus
out of menstrual blood, endowing it with a vital principle that would direct its
growth. But for Harvey, nothing external to the egg is responsible for its vital-
ity; the "anima" is entirely the egg's own. In explaining the process of epigen-
esis, the doctrine that growth and development happen simultaneously, Harvey
uses the analogy of a potter: the potter "educes a form out of clay by the
addition of parts, or increasing its mass, and giving it a figure, at the same
time that he provides the material, which he prepares, adapts, and applies to
this work" (334); the work takes form and increases in size at the same time.
Unlike Aristotle's analogy to a carpenter, Harvey's analogy is inexact, because
embryologically there is in his theory no distinction between the potter and
his creation (the potter cannot be the semen, which never touches the egg).
The egg must therefore be understood to make itself. Harvey thus undoes the
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Aristotelian distinction between formal and material causes in the embryo:
for Harvey, the embryo both en-forms and en-matters itself.
This sense of the egg as a self-made entity is bolstered by the metaphors
that Harvey routinely uses to describe its autonomy. Not surprisingly, Harvey
understands the egg's self-determination in particularly gendered terms. The
egg, he says, "even when contained in the ovary, does not live by the vital
principle of the mother, but is, like the youth who comes of age, made inde-
pendent even from its first appearance" (278). Again, in arguing that the egg
is neither "the work of the uterus nor governed by that organ," Harvey thinks
in terms of sons freed from the control of their parents: the egg, he says, "is
free and unconnected, like a son emancipated from pupillage, rolling round
within the cavity of the uterus and perfecting itself" (281); "like children come
of age," Harvey says, they are "freed from leading-strings, they are maintained
and governed by their own inherent capacities" (282). Even in Harvey's other
analogy for the autonomy of the egg, which compares eggs to the seeds of
plants, the eggs are said to be "perfected in the bosom of the earth . . . by an
internal vegetative principle" (i.e., they are not controlled by the tree) (281);
and these seeds, "once separated from the plants which have produced them,
are no longer regarded as part of these, but like children come of age and
freed from leading-strings, they are maintained and governed by their own
inherent capacities" (282).
Since Harvey conceives of the egg's autonomy as a release from some
prior bondage—from pupillage or from leading-strings — and since the egg's
only previous connection is to the mother that "produces" it, that freedom is
gained by separation from her. Here again, the radical autonomy of the egg
can best be seen in contrast to Aristotle, for whom the "identity" or essence of
the embryo is carried by the male, who constitutes the offspring's formal cause.
In establishing the egg's identity, Harvey breaks with the Aristotelian pattern
by making the embryo self-determining. Because the embryo is self-motive,
its identity is generated in and by itself: the embryo becomes the very para-
digm of the self-subjectifying man. Because of the implied threat of female
control of fetal growth and development that Harvey's initial discovery makes
possible, this emphasis on self-regulation, self-determination, and self-
subjectification assumes special importance in Harvey's scheme; in this con-
text, the urgent emphasis on the egg's autonomy reads, at least in part, as a
safeguard response to that threat.
Just as the egg becomes for Harvey a full subject from its first appearance,
the mother, in turn, becomes a fetal incubator, even while gestating her off-
spring. This is equally true of viviparous as of oviparous females, since Harvey
considered the uterus an internal nest, the place where the egg is "cherished,
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matured and perfected into a fetus" (172). Even the act of birth is a wholly
passive process for the mother, since the fetus, both fowl and human, releases
itself from its place of growth. In describing the oviparous birth process, Harvey
notes that shell fragments are propelled outside the egg; this demonstrates
against Fabricius that the chick essentially hatches itself from its shell. Work-
ing again on the idea that oviparous processes are the model cases for vivipa-
rous ones, Harvey then makes the analogy to human beings: the human fetus
"attacks the portals of the womb, opens them by its own energies and thus
struggles into day" (535). Birth is the work of the fetus, not of the mother.
Battling its way out of its confinement, the fetus works alone and without aid.
To press the point, Harvey tells the story—of which he says he has knowledge
himself—of a pregnant woman in his village who died one evening; the next
morning, Harvey says, "an infant was found between the thighs of the mother,
having evidently forced its way out by its own efforts" (536). The fetus here
assumes the proportions of a superhero, fighting its way from death into life.
What emerges, then, from Harvey's treatment of embryology is that the
mother's role in generation, while initially active, is only fleetingly so: she
generates the egg but is unconnected to it. Yet this fleeting agency is crucial to
the definition of what becomes the two male roles in procreation: in produc-
ing the egg but then being separate from it, the mother at once allows the
father's role to be conceived of as godlike and allows the egg to be seen as
wholly independent and self-determining and thereby decidedly masculine.
Acting for only a restricted period between the injection of divine semen and
the arising of the self-reliant embryo, the mother becomes that against which
males define themselves and in relation to which males grow: for the father
she is a place in which to reproduce himself and for the embryo a place to
find comfort and nutrition. In other words, and perhaps not surprisingly, the
mother in Harvey's theory serves biologically the roles that she was beginning
to serve socially in the emerging bourgeois household. When Harvey there-
fore looks to the "heart of the mystery" of generation, he sees what surrounds
him: "self-sufficing and independent" males and the females whose function
it is to promote them (408).
Harvey's depiction of the embryo's radical autonomy and masculine iden-
tity-formation in the socialized terms of a son who comes of age takes on
special significance in the context of the times in which he wrote, during
which debates about subjection to a paternal authority were carried out on
the battlefield. In the early 1640s, Harvey's friend Thomas Hobbes challenged
the natural origin of paternal political right, in part by turning to biology. In
Hobbes's state of nature, dominion follows from the physical fact that females
give birth: since, he says, it cannot be known who the father of a child is
except by the testimony of the mother, and since the mother has it in her
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power either to nourish the child or to expose it to the elements, the child "is
therefore obliged to obey her, rather than any other; and by consequence the
Dominion over it is hers."21 Though this perhaps sounds promising as the
basis of a protofeminist politics, recent feminist critics have shown that Hobbes's
interest in mother-right inheres less in establishing the dominion of females
(or even an enduring equality between men and women) in the state of na-
ture than in countering patriarchal arguments: originary mother-right is a
way to deny the natural rights of the father and thus of any civil ruler.22 But
mother-right is a fleeting fixture of Hobbes's thought: useful as a critique of
the argument that paternal right is natural, mother-right quickly gives way in
Hobbes's theory to a collection of radically autonomous individuals. Although
Hobbes is never explicit about how such individuals become free — at one
point in De Cive he simply asks his readers to consider individuals as if they
were sprung up like mushrooms23—the state clearly arises from a social con-
tract among free men, not any subject to parents.
It is a logical corollary of Hobbes's theory that if the individuals who con-
tract into the state are wholly autonomous, self-driven, and self-regulating,
they must achieve their identity and their independence in their separation
from their original obligation to the mother. In tracing such a pattern of psy-
chological development in Hobbes's individual, Christine Di Stefano sees
the contours of the modern masculine identity, an identity forged in negative
relation to the mother: "The strict differentiation of self from others, identity
conceived in exclusionary terms, and perceived threats to an ego thus con-
ceived . . . all recapitulate issues encountered and constructed in the process
of securing a masculine identity vis-a-vis the female maternal presence."24
While I do not wish to argue explicit influence or even agreement on
matters specifically political, I do want to note a confluence between the con-
struction of Hobbesian man and that of Harvey's embryo. Just as mother-right
is necessary but fleeting in Hobbes's theory, and just as the Hobbesian indi-
vidual achieves freedom when mother-right is superseded, so Harvey's em-
bryo achieves its independence in its separation from the mother who is said
initially to produce it; and like Hobbes's individual in the state of nature,
Harvey's egg is self-determining and wholly autonomous.
Of course, for Hobbes the postulated past of radical freedom is necessary
to justify the legitimate rights of a de facto state —the myth of prior freedom
justifies subjection to Leviathan's sword—whereas for Harvey the autonomy
of the individual seems genuine and enduring. But for both, writing in the
mid-seventeenth century in the midst of the greatest social upheaval their
country had ever known, the originary human being —for Hobbes in the state
of nature, for Harvey in the mother's womb — is autonomous, self-ruled, and
distinctly masculine.
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The similarity between these two theorists inheres not just in their con-
struction of an insular identity, however; it obtains on a more directly political
and public level as well. In studying the contemporary debates between the
classical patriarchalists, who identified political with paternal right, and the
emerging social contract theorists, who considered political right to be de-
rived from the consent of freeborn individuals, Carole Pateman has argued
that patriarchy itself did not so much die out in the seventeenth century as get
transformed. Recognizing that patriarchy proclaims man's dominion as both
father and husband, Pateman suggests that the contract theorists rejected pa-
ternal right but "simultaneously transformed conjugal, masculine patriarchal
right."25 Pateman argues, for example, that Hobbes is a "patriarchalist who
rejects paternal right": whereas mother-right provides a counter to paternal
right, it does not provide a counter to masculine right, since even in the state
of nature, Hobbes speaks of families in which the husband unambiguously
rules.26 Pateman shows the crucial transitional role of originary mother-right,
which denies paternal right as natural, yet nonetheless coexists with mascu-
line or conjugal right. Hobbes's civil state is therefore postpaternal but not
postpatriarchal.
In the context of Pateman's analysis of Hobbes, Harvey's innovative treat-
ment of the embryo as an autonomous individual reads as a physiological
version of the same process that Hobbes recorded in his political theory: the
transition enacted during the seventeenth century from a patriarchy based on
paternity to one founded on a masculine right made manifest in the mas-
tery—and self-mastery—of the (male) individual. If the traditional physiolo-
gies held the father to be the prime creator and thereby supported the
understanding of the father as the origin of political power, Harvey's discovery,
in jeopardizing the father's role in generation, jeopardized its political impli-
cations as well. But rather than reassert the old patriarchy—as he did pater-
nity—Harvey substitutes for it the independence of the egg, the new, self-made
man, and thereby replicates the political process of his time: from monarchy
to commonwealth, from paternal control to independent male sovereignty.
I have been arguing that, given the dangers to sexual and political ideologies
posed by his initial discovery, Harvey variously re-creates masculine supremacy
in the outlines of his embryological theory and in the rhetoric of his text. It is
perhaps an inevitable component of this effort that Harvey encodes the same
pattern of self-determining masculinity in his depiction of his own efforts as a
scientist: the Harvey that emerges in de Generatione is autonomous, heroic,
and even at times godlike. Although Harvey follows both Aristotle and Fabri-
cius in many points, and in fact strives wherever possible to align his observa-
tions with their opinions, he routinely takes pride in demonstrating his
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independence from them, in showing them wrong. In fact, Harvey opens de
Generatione with just such a declaration of independence:
It will not, I trust, be unwelcome to you, candid reader, if I yield to the
wishes, I might even say the entreaties, of many, and in these Exercises on
Animal Generation, lay before the student and lover of truth what I have
observed on this subject from anatomical dissections, which turns out to
be very different from anything that is delivered by authors, whether
philosophers or physicians. (151)
There follows a brief statement of the Aristotelian and Galenic positions on
embryogenesis, and then Harvey continues:
But that these are erroneous and hasty conclusions is easily made to
appear: like phantoms of darkness they suddenly vanish before the lights
of anatomical inquiry. (151)
Harvey here presents himself as the torchbearer, breaking free from the shackles
of traditional knowledge, driving away the old bogeys of his predecessors. Just
as the egg is characterized as a son free from maternal bonds, so too is Harvey
a son free from the bonds of his teachers.
Further on in his introduction, Harvey takes on the role of hero-
adventurer, a role commonly assumed by early modern scientists, in which
the experimenter explores and seeks to control some uncharted and typically
feminized territory.27 Arguing for the arduous method of direct observation
over the more popular but indolent habit of reading books, Harvey says that
discoveries have been made only by those who, "following the traces of nature
with their own eyes, pursued her through devious but most assured ways till
they reached her in the citadel of truth. And truly in such pursuits it is sweet
not merely to toil, but even to grow weary, when the pains of discovering are
amply compensated by the pleasures of discovery" (153).
The rhetorical suggestion that science is an erotic pursuit takes on special
significance in the context of Harvey's particular subject matter, not only be-
cause the territory he will be claiming is the female body itself (and not merely
a more abstracted feminized nature), but also because his role in achieving
dominion over it is characterized by the same aggression and violence that he
will elsewhere obsessively describe as normative in male sexuality. Describ-
ing the external genitalia of the common fowl, Harvey explains that the three
orifices of the pudenda "lie concealed under the velabrum as under a kind of
prepuce. . . . So that without the use of the knife, or a somewhat forcible
retraction of the velabrum in the fowl, neither the orifice by which the faeces
pass from the intestines, nor that by which the urine issues from the ureters,
nor yet that by which the egg escapes from the uterus, can be perceived"
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(181). This is Harvey's only mention incfe Generatione of the "forcible" method
of dissection, and it is telling that it comes in the context of a unique descrip-
tion of a sexual encounter in which the fowl reveals herself in the same posi-
tion as the dissected fowl is revealed before Harvey (i.e., with pudenda exposed
to sight):
During intercourse, the hen on the approach of the cock uncovers the
vulva, and prepares for his reception. . . . I have myself observed a female
ostrick, when her attendant gently scratched her back . . . to lie down on
the ground, lift up the velabrum, and exhibit and protrude the vulva, seeing
which the male . . . mounted, one foot being kept firm on the ground, the
other set upon the back of the prostrate female; the immense penis (you
might imagine it a neat's tongue!) vibrated backwards and forwards, and the
process of intercourse was accompanied with much ado. (181)
With the use of a knife and a "somewhat forcible" exposure of parts, Harvey
displays before himself the pudenda of the fowl in the same way that she
readies herself before the cock for sex. In this description —and this is rare in
de Generatione — the male's approach is seen specifically to be gentle, and the
female herself presents her parts for his approach. There is then an odd kind
of parallel between Harvey and his scientific subject on the one hand and the
cock and his sexual mate on the other: it is as if the female's voluntary self-
exposure compensates for the "necessary violence" of Harvey's heroic meth-
ods, the "immense penis" an instrument of apparent pleasure, displacing the
less pleasurable exposure to a knife.28 That violence, however, also declares
Harvey's dominion, not only over the subject itself—the body of the female
fowl—but over his subject matter more generally, for the forcible use of the
knife is, as Harvey explains in his introduction, the "devious [and] most as-
sured way" of achieving truth.
Finally, Harvey finds in his work a moment of godlike power. In the course
of his researches, Harvey has noticed that the punctum saliens, the little beat-
ing bit of blood that is the first sign of a chick embryo, stops its motion when
removed from incubating warmth, but returns again to life when some man-
ner of heat is reapplied: "After the punctum has gradually languished, and .. .
has even ceased from all kind of motion . . . still, on applying my warm finger
. . . lo! the little heart is revivified, erects itself anew, and, returning from
Hades as it were, is restored to its former pulsations.... So that it seemed as if
it lay in our power to deliver the poor heart over to death, or to recall it to life
at our will and pleasure" (239-40). Such power to bring a "little heart" back
from Hades —literally to control life and death —is surely superhuman and is
a most distinctive mark of Harvey's self-inscription as the idealized, and even
godlike, masculine subject.
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Yet for all Harvey's heroic posturing, he cannot, as he freely admits, pen-
etrate to the "heart of the mystery" of generation. In this, too, he mimics the
semen, unable to enter the inner sanctum of the womb, where the secrets of
life abide. This final similarity, grounded as it is in apparent inadequacy, sug-
gests something about the nature of the idealized images of masculinity that
pervade Harvey's text. The godlike semen, the conquering cock, the autono-
mous egg, the heroic empiric —they are all constructed in response to per-
ceived or threatened failures, of paternity and patriarchy, as well as of the
empirical method of science. The images of masculine triumph therefore
ultimately appear hollow, generated, like the embryo itself, on a perceived
absence. Seen in this way, the workings of gender in Harvey's de Genemtione
can never make up for losses; they can only expose them to view.
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"Such Is My Bond"
Maternity and Economy in
Anne Bradstreefs Writing
Such is my bond, none can discharge but I,
Yet paying is not paid until I die.
"To Her Father with Some Verses"
Take thy way where thou art not known.
"The Author to Her Book"
Blending economic, domestic, and theological imagery, Anne Bradstreet
(1612-72) painstakingly investigated the nature of her "bonds" — her debts,
duties, and loving connections to her mother, father, husband, children, and
God. Since Protestant poets commonly represented spiritual realities through
everyday worldly figures, Bradstreet's elaborate conceits of binding investments
and obligations conventionally expressed the widespread belief in an over-
whelming human debt to God.1 As Robert Daly has observed, Anne Bradstreet
"was concerned with figuration, not as a verbal trick the limitations of which
gave her opportunity to display her ingenuity, but as a basic principle opera-
tive in her perceived universe. She lived in a world in which several orders of
reality now often separate—the worldly or earthly or natural or sensible, the
biblical, and the eschatological—were the harmonious creation of a single
God and were held together by him in a web of intrinsic correspondence."2
While this is certainly true, it has also been argued that living in a world in
which everyday experience was repeatedly invested with spiritual meaning
often produced a heightened sense of the distinction between what is and is
not religious or spiritual. A separation between the spiritual and the physical
became conceivable in the very moment in which it was denied. It is this
distinction, many scholars have claimed, that lies at the heart of seculariza-
tion. I observe the rudiments of this distinction in Anne Bradstreet's terminol-
ogy of debts, interest, and payments.3
By extending the figure of the bond between human beings and God, the
original parent and creditor, to herself as both a child and a mother, Anne
Bradstreet implicitly searched for the limits of that figure's applicability.
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Describing the religious force of the bonds between mothers and children,
Bradstreet also inevitably underscored the worldly force of the obligations
that tie family members together. Although, it must be admitted, this does not
necessarily mean she understood these two forces as separate, Bradstreet's
late work in particular demonstrates her own anguished awareness of and
attraction to the material realm as valuable in ways not comprehended by the
spirit. She therefore begins to articulate an almost "modern" understanding
of a secular realm in which bonds between mothers and children, or authors
and their works, might compel and have value in their own right. John
Sommerville defines secularization as the gradual transition away from a pri-
marily religious culture, in which the world is seen as subsumed by the spiri-
tual and which is characterized by a collective sense of "unmediated access to
the realm of supernatural powers, from almost any type of activity or line of
thought," to a primarily secular culture, in which the sacred and the worldly
are seen as separate but analogous realms and in which "it would take real
thought to make the connections between any activity and one's religious
ends."41 argue here that the trope of debt or "bondage," which allowed Brad-
street to situate herself within her culture's religious and social hierarchy, also
seems to have afforded her a significant means by which to visualize her own
creative power. It allowed her to imagine herself as a mother-creator of worldly
values that mattered in their own right.
Bradstreet's vexed representation of herself as a maternal creator hinged
on her understanding of herself as a maternal obligator or creditor, and it
relates to a much broader cultural nervousness over the nature of artificial or
autonomous generation. This anxiety is particularly evident in the debates
over usury and the growing acceptance that human beings could create, as if
out of themselves, wealth that had hitherto not been part of divine creation.
Vilifying such "unnatural" production, sixteenth-century antiusury writers fre-
quently depicted usury as a covetous mother uncontrollably breeding mon-
sters or illegitimate offspring (interest) not fathered by God.' By Anne
Bradstreet's time, people were beginning to accept the usurious production of
wealth as benign, and Puritan moralists such as John Winthrop and John
Cotton strove to rationalize and sanctify the generation of moderate interest
by the elect.6 But the hybrid tropes of maternal, monetary generation sur-
vived, among other places, in seventeenth-century Puritan tracts on the pro-
liferation of knowledge. The millennialist John Goodwin, for example,
imagined an "increase" of scientific and spiritual knowledge, which he envi-
sioned as an organic bringing forth of new treasures that heralded the Second
Coming.7 Seventeenth-century writers did not uniformly celebrate the inde-
pendent or autonomous generation of knowledge and wealth, however, and
religious and economic thinkers alike worried about the production of new
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things that did not seem to issue naturally from God's creation. They contin-
ued to regard the bringing forth of something, whether child or thought or
profit, that God had neither authored nor authorized as an act similar to, only
much worse than, the sin of giving birth to an illegitimate child. To do so was
to mother monstrosity and to demonstrate the utter depravity of one's soul.
The poet who represented herself as an artist-mother, the generator of
new life and new ideas, must be sure, then, that the material yield of her labor
proceeded from a divine source and had value only insofar as it came from
the spirit. Yet, by articulating in such loving particularity the worldly mean-
ingfulness and value of her own children and poetic creations, Anne Bradstreet
seems to have taken steps toward the distinction between the secular and the
spiritual, a distinction in which the autonomously generated earthly values
(such as "original" poetry or monetary interest) could positively be under-
stood as values analogous to, but separate from, spiritual values. She takes
those steps by taking her motherhood seriously.
Christian Bondage
A brief summary of the way that Protestant writers envisioned their debt to
God is crucial for an understanding of Anne Bradstreet's representation of
obligations and bonds between family members. Protestant theologians be-
lieved that Adam and Eve's original covenant with God (the Covenant of
Works) was a kind of debt contract, which they had to pay immediately after
the Fall. Christ sacrificed himself as a surety on that original "bond" between
human beings and God, allowing the Father to issue a new contract (the Cov-
enant of Grace) between himself and his children.8 Accordingly, many Prot-
estant ministers spoke of the "Spirit of Bondage" as an agency that reminded
them of their debt to God for life. "Bondage" meant duty, debt, confinement,
imprisonment, servitude, and covenant as well as union or connection in
seventeenth-century usage. In much Protestant writing, the "Spirit of Bond-
age"—which the New England Puritan Thomas Hooker (1586-1647) called
a "spirit of humiliation and contrition" —reminds human beings of their eter-
nal debt to God. It restrains, confines, and reforms spiritual waywardness by
painfully reshaping the soul to make it worthy of reuniting with its divine
origin.9 Protestant theology held that the loving, parental bond between God
and his children would be realized fully only when the children paid off their
original debt, but that God, the ultimate creditor, alone enabled payment.
Many Protestants therefore imagined the spiritual bond between the divine
parent and his children as both a financial and an emotional connection.
Redemption was a simultaneous canceling of the financial bond and joyful
reunion or rebonding with the spiritual progenitor. Furthermore, because they
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conceived of bondage as a kind of radical isolation from divinity, many writers
imagined release from bondage not as independence but as its opposite: con-
finement in God. They longed to lose themselves in the Spirit, origin of all
value and life in the universe.10
As Phyllis Mack has observed, for seventeenth-century Protestants in
England and New England, "the paradigm for the experience of spiritual
striving and ultimate union with God was the relationship between the mother
and her infant child. The labor of childbirth was the archetypal metaphor for
the agony of spiritual transformation."11 One was literally reborn through
Christ, but in redemption one also returned to the cosmic womb of Christ.
And it was there, paradoxically, that one inherited the riches with which to
repay completely the contractual loan incurred at birth. Another important
Protestant paradigm for the experience of spiritual striving was the relation-
ship between creditor and debtor, and believers looked to the parable of the
talents in Matthew 25:14-30 for the command to return what God had given
them with "vantage" or interest.12 As we shall see, Anne Bradstreet seems to
have envisioned earthly bondage, or the contractual obligation to acknowl-
edge continually her spiritual debt to God, as dissolving in a more profound
bonding with the heavenly parent. Many Protestant ministers referred to the
doctrine of adoption in Romans 8:15 and Galatians 4:21-31 as a consoling
lesson that human bondage on earth was a relationship between a parent and
a child designated not as a slave but as an heir. While Romans 8 depicts God's
relationship to his creatures as paternal ("For ye have not received the Spirit
of bondage to feare againe: but ye have received the Spirit of adopcion, whereby
we crye Abba, Father"), Galatians 4 also figures that relationship as maternal
("Jerusalem, which is above, is fre[e]: which is the mother of us all.... There-
fore, brethren, we are after the maner of Isaac, children of the promise").13
Since Scripture provided patterns for the contractual relationship between
humanity and God as both a father and a mother, it was possible for Bradstreet
to conceive of her spiritual bondage in terms of her own paternal and mater-
nal relationships of obligation.
Paternal Bonds
In "To Her Most Honoured Father," the dedication of her quaternion poems,
Bradstreet represents her father as her creditor, the source from whom she
has derived her poetic skills and personal worth. "I bring my four times four,
now meanly clad /To do their homage unto yours, full glad" (lines 14-15).14
Thomas Dudley, who wrote poetry in addition to serving as deputy governor,
provided his daughter Anne with her first and perhaps most significant liter-
ary pattern. Cotton Mather recorded, "He had an excellent pen, as was ac-
"Such Is My Bond" 61
counted by all; nor was he a mean poet."15 Bradstreet portrays her own poems
as "bounden" or characterized by obligation and connection to him, because
they do not cancel but perpetuate her poetic debt and bond. Hence, the worth
of her poems "shines" in her father's own poetry ("To Her Most Honored
Father," lines 19, 8). The impoverishment of her verses, "meanly clad" and
"ragged" "goods," can only barely reflect the immense "worth" of his "rich
lines" (lines 14,43, 39, 8). Her own "true (though poor)" poems are meant to
"do their homage" to his rather than to declare her own value (lines 39, 15).
Although the poet represents herself as her father's subordinate, there is no
indication that she imagines that her "lowly pen" and "humble hand" are
inferior because she is female. Bradstreet depicts her poems, which treat the
four humors, ages of man, seasons, and monarchies, as "bounden handmaids,"
yet she also refers to her father's poems as "four sisters" (lines 13, 18, 19, 5).
"Although it was common practice among English women poets," Eileen
Margerum has observed that Bradstreet "never uses her sex as an excuse for
writing poor poetry."16 The subservient position that the poet adopts for her-
self and her "handmaids" in both "To Her Father" and "To Her Most Honoured
Father" proceeds rather from conventional formulae for Christian humility,
not only between poets and their patrons but also between children and their
parents in Puritan culture.17
In "To Her Father with Some Verses," Bradstreet depicts a more compli-
cated relationship with her father by describing it in terms that refer to finan-
cial, genealogical, and religious notions of bondage or debt. Like "To Her
Most Honoured Father," this poem can be read on two levels of meaning, one
secular, the other spiritual. On the secular level this poem defines the vast
difference between the genealogical and economic "worth" of the father and
daughter. That difference in turn figures the difference in value between cre-
ator and creature. On both levels of meaning, economic tropes predominate:
To Her Father with Some Verses
Most truly honored, and as truly dear,
If worth in me or ought I do appear,
Who can of right better demand the same
Than may your worthy self from whom it came?
The principal might yield a greater sum,
Yet handled ill, amounts but to this crumb;
My stock's so small I know not how to pay,
My bond remains in force unto this day;
Yet for part payment take this simple mite,
Where nothing's to be had, kings loose their right.
Such is my debt I may not say forgive,
But as I can, I'll pay it while I live;
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Such is my bond, none can discharge but I,
Yet paying is not paid until I die. (lines 1-15)
Bradstreet layers terms of poetic and genealogical production on top of terms
of capitalist expansion through interest to describe her relationship with her
father.18 These terms were becoming increasingly specialized in seventeenth-
century usage, as Bradstreet's poem demonstrates. Here she suggests that a
portion of Thomas Dudley has been lent to her as a "principal," which has
yielded a smaller "sum" of interest than might have been expected from so
"worthy" or large an original investment (lines 6, 5). Her stock, which should
be extremely valuable because it is a share of his capital, has been "handled"
poorly, or mismanaged; it is "so small" that only a "simple mite" can represent
it (lines 7, 8,10). "Principal" connoted not only origin or source of money, but
also rudimentary element, embryo, or seed. Figuring herself as "stock" (which
had the sense of the source of a family line of descent before it meant capital
or fund) that has not prospered, the poet apologizes for having only the poem
itself, a small "crum," or "mite," to return to her father (lines 7-10). The Oxford
English Dictionary shows that in this period mite meant not only a tiny copper
coin but also a small child. What the poet has generated is represented as the
pitiful financial and familial "yield" of the Dudleys. When Bradstreet implies
that expectations of surplus personal value (biological as well as poetic) are
meaningless where "nothing's to be had," she laments her barrenness, her in-
ability to reproduce her father—by being unable to produce enough poetic
goods and personal value—to succeed her father or to pay off her debt (line
II).19 Bradstreet can repay her debt only with the yield of the talent that she
has received entirely from her father, who is both her procreator and creditor.
Her spiritual debt remains the tacit structure through which she explicitly ac-
knowledges her earthly poetic debt. But that her language permits us to distin-
guish between the two kinds of inheritances, spiritual and earthly, suggests
that it was becoming possible to conceive of them as separate but analogous.
"To Her Father" explores the vast difference between the "worth" of the
father and the daughter through a multitude of meanings for the word bond.
For example, Bradstreet divides oughtworth, which generally meant "of any
value" but was often used to indicate negative worth, into its two components
to suggest that she is worth nothing (line 2). The word ought also expressed
the past tense of the verb "to owe." If Bradstreet is worth "ought," she is nega-
tively worthy in the sense of amounting to only what she must but cannot yet
pay. The poet explains this lack by asserting that anything valuable in her is
only borrowed from her father, who is "dear" in the sense of "lovable" as well
as "expensive" (line 1). Paradoxically, she cannot settle the debt that her lov-
ing bond to him entails, and yet she is the only one who can "discharge" it
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(line 14). Bradstreet also seems to be observing what her contemporary, Henry
Wilkinson, termed the "Sacred Debt of Love." "As in the Obligation, such is
the Debt," Wilkinson asserted. "Civill obligations cease when the pecuniary
debt is paid, but the bond of love among Christians is perpetuall."20
Anne Bradstreet's debt of love to her father mirrors her spiritual bond to
God, who finally stands as the origin of the value she has borrowed from
Thomas Dudley. Only God has the power to cancel her debt, but this fact
does not release her from the obligation to honor or to acknowledge it through-
out her life. As written documents that declare her debt, Bradstreet's poems
themselves do not pay but serve as "bonds" or paper promissory notes. Each
poem circulates like a note of credit and only signifies the value of the original
who has issued it. That Bradstreet realizes or expresses her perpetual debt to
God in terms of her obligation to her father, which she represents in the
specialized terms of capital generation, demonstrates that she conceived of
her spiritual "worth" and earthly "worth" as values not separate but rather
mixed up with one another. Nevertheless, she articulates her familial debt in
the same terms with which the tacit Christian debt was often recognized.
Furthermore, her explicit portrayal of both kinds of nonpecuniary obligation
(her debt to her father, her debt to God) in such vividly economic language
indicates that separations between divine and genealogical inheritance and
between heavenly and earthly values were conceivable.
Anne Bradstreet's economic vocabulary should not surprise us, not only
because it conforms to Protestant literary conventions, but also because the
poet had extensive familial ties to the merchant community.21 Her father had
served as the earl of Lincoln's steward, or manager of the earl's estate, and
helped to found the Massachusetts Bay trading company. Her husband, Simon
Bradstreet (1603-97), was a merchant as well as a nonconformist minister.
Her sister, Sarah, married the son of Robert Keayne, one of the colony's most
prosperous merchants. And Anne Bradstreet's son Samuel made a financially
prudent alliance with Mercy, daughter of the prominent merchant William
Tyng. Bernard Bailyn has argued that by the 1660s, these very New England
merchants had, through intermarriage and close contact with European mar-
kets, changed their society from one centered not on the Puritan principles of
"social stability, order, and the discipline of the senses" but on the more secu-
lar principles of "mobility, growth, and the enjoyment of life."22
Bradstreet's language unquestionably does reflect the cultural change in
which her family was engaged. But can we read the economic, poetic, and
biological metaphors of these poems as registering meanings that can be sepa-
rated from their obvious religious contexts? The answer to this question is no
and yes. Clearly, that she employed the language of the material world to
represent the spiritual in no way demonstrates that Anne Bradstreet separated
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these realms from one another as separate categories of being. It demonstrates
quite the opposite point: that she understood them as completely interrelated.
Yet Bradstreet acknowledged genuine worldly debts to her father: she felt per-
sonally indebted to him for nurturing her poetic gifts, and communally or
politically indebted to him for nurturing the colony as an underwriter, deputy
governor, and governor.25 She also knew him to be an economic creditor in
the colony. Because Thomas Dudley "engrossed quantities of corn and lent it
to his poorer neighbors on credit, to receive ten bushels for seven and a half
after harvest," Governor John Winthrop regarded his rigorous and rigid deputy
as a usurer, according to Edmund Morgan.24 Nevertheless, the prevailing tone
of Bradstreet's poems about her father is devout, and it would be a mistake to
argue that she set worldly debts outside of the religious doctrine to which she
adhered.25 On the other hand, because she aligns various and seemingly
nonrelated things —personal obligations, economic debts, and spiritual bond-
age; poetic productions, biological offspring, and spiritual restitution—we
might also say that she sets these things side by side in such a way that they
form secular and spiritual categories that later generations would understand
as separate but analogous.
Marital Bonds
As in her poems to her father, Bradstreet structured her verses to her husband,
Simon Bradstreet, along the lines of Christian bondage. For example, in "To
My Dear and Loving Husband," she indirectly compares her husband's love
for her, worth more than "mines of gold" and "all the riches" of "the East," to
the inestimable value and incomprehensibility of divine love (lines 6-7). As-
serting that the love of this merchant and colonial leader is a love she cannot
"repay" (line 10), the poet situates herself in the same position of utter lack of
value in relation to him that she takes in "To Her Father with Some Verses."
Indeed, receiving her husband into her arms after one of his journeys to En-
gland frequently inspired Bradstreet to contemplate her overwhelming spiri-
tual debt. In a poem concerning her loneliness during one of Simon's long
voyages, she prays for "a better heart" with which to "pay the vowes which I do
owe / For ever unto Thee. . . . If thou assist me, Lord I shall / Return Thee
what I owe." ("In My Solitary H o u r s . . . " lines 48-52). In "May 13, 1657" she
thanks God for sending Simon home from a dangerous journey and then
wonders how to make up for this bounty: "O studious am what I shall do / To
show my duty with delight; / All I can give is but Thine own / And at the most
a simple mite" (lines 22-25).26 In these lines Bradstreet humbly demonstrates
her gratitude for God's gifts, which include Simon and his love for her, while
simultaneously affirming that reimbursement itself is an activity that her maker
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has given her the strength and skill to perform. According to this logic, she
could only "repay" Simon's richly valued love for her if God makes it pos-
sible.27 Her "mites," the poetic currency of bond notes, only record her debt
to him. But this reasoning does not explain the overriding sense, here and in
all of Bradstreet's matrimonial poetry, that she freely loves Simon and that she
wants her poems to have enough value in themselves to count as earthly pay-
ments of worldly love.28
As in her poems to her father, the terms that Bradstreet used to celebrate
her marital bond suggest that the earthly power of this bond could be, but was
not necessarily, subordinated to its spiritual analogy. Hence the rhetorical depth
of the marital relation draws upon both the figure of the Christian as the be-
loved of God and the unmistakable worldliness of marital bliss in lines such
as the following:
Return my dear, my joy, my only love,
Unto thy hind, thy mullet, and thy dove,
Who neither joys in pasture, house, nor streams,
The substance gone, O me, these are but dreams.
Together at one tree, oh let us browse,
And like two turtles roost within one house,
And like the mullets in one river glide,
Let's still remain but one, till death divide. ("Another," lines 25-32)
In these lines Bradstreet uses the imagery from the Song of Songs (2: 8-12;
8:14) to draw upon the trope of Christian marriage as mirroring the unity of
Christ and the church and to explore the opposition between substance and
absence, soul and matter. She longs not only for a unification on earth that
prefigures the final bliss of oneness with God, but also for a metaphysical
miracle — the in-spiriting of matter with true substance, the fusion of soul and
body—that the incarnated God (Christ) represents and that Canticles (the
Song of Songs) was thought to celebrate. But what stands out is the poet's
expressed desire to become like the turtle doves, the mullets, and the deer, to
realize the earthly bond of love that ties her to Simon, the bond that death
will sever.29 Her desire to repay her husband's love for her on earth clearly
parallels her desire to be reunited with her bridegroom in heaven, but it also
registers as an emotion that can be separated from that spiritual inclination
insofar as she is longing specifically for Simon's return. It is an emotion which
for a moment, at least, seems to supplant her desire for Christ's return.
Bradstreet's work generally affirms a religious understanding of the material
world as but the shadow of the only true, spiritual reality. Yet her ability to
represent the world and its bonds as forceful and, possibly, meaningful in
their own right gives her conceits their complex force. This phenomenon is
66 Kimberly Latta
most striking when she meditates on the bond between mothers and their
children.
Maternal Bonds
While there is little direct financial imagery in her writings about mother-
hood, the poet's representations of the bonds between mothers and children
recall the spiritual creditor/debtor relationships in her other work. In "An
Epitaph on my Dear and Ever-Honoured Mother, Mrs. Dorothy Dudley,
Who Deceased December 27, 1643, and of Her Age, 61," Bradstreet's de-
scription of her mother as a spiritually "worthy," "wisely awful," and "true
Instructor of her family" recalls her depiction of her father as a "worthy" pro-
genitor and teacher.30 Dorothy Dudley was "worthy" not only because she
was descended from a wealthy family but also because she gave generously to
the poor.31 Bradstreet implies that she gave away her handiwork and kindness
as well as her money. The poet's representation of her mother as a figure of
charity corresponds to traditional representations of this Christian virtue.
Charity was frequently represented as a maternal aspect of holiness, perhaps
not only because mother's milk was associated with blood, and therefore with
the blood that Christ shed to save humankind, but because mothers' gifts
were thought to come from self-sacrifice and to sustain life. "In subcurrents of
[medieval] religious thought," Londa Schiebinger notes, "mother's milk was
thought to impart knowledge. Philosophia-Sapientia, the personification of
wisdom, suckled philosophers at her breasts moist with the milk of knowledge
and moral virtue."32 This notion was residual in the seventeenth century and
took on special significance in Bradstreet's poetry about herself as a generous
mother. But in her poems about her parents, Bradstreet portrays both her
mother and father as sources of value and instruction to whom she is obli-
gated for any "worth" in herself.
The works in which Bradstreet recounts her own motherhood derive ge-
nerically from a literary form that I call the "maternal epistle." Maternal epistles
are prose or verse letters to children, from actual or impersonated mothers,
which function as contracts that perpetually, emotionally, morally, and spiri-
tually bind the two parties together.33 A common trope in this genre is an
overt or indirect association of the author with Paul as a laboring mother in
Galatians 4:19: "My little children, of whom I travail in birth again until
Christ be formed in you." Bradstreet echoes this verse in her autobiographi-
cal "To My Dear Children": "I have brought you into the world, and with
great pains, weakness, cares, and fears brought you to this, I now travail in
birth again of you till Christ be formed in you" (Works, 241). She has de-
signed this letter for them so that "when I am no more with you, yet I may be
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daily in your remembrance . . . that you may gain some spiritual advantage by
my experience" (Works, 240). The letter outlines what she has done for her
children and requires them to learn from her and to remember her daily.
As I have suggested, male and female seventeenth-century colonists fre-
quently imagined their creator in maternal terms, especially when they wanted
to convey the special care and love that they felt their spiritual parent had for
them. Anne Bradstreet compared God to a "prudent mother" who tailors sepa-
rate garments of honor, wealth, and health for each child,34 and Thomas Hooker
assured his parishioners that God "hath rocked your Cradles, nursed you at
your Mother's Breasts, trained you up in your tender years, taken care of you,
and then prayed for you.... Oh the Riches of Mercy!"35 As Hooker illustrates,
the merciful, motherly benevolence of God was frequently imagined as the
giving of gifts ("riches"), which entailed certain obligations in the receiver. In
her spiritual autobiography, Bradstreet passes her spiritual debt to God on,
implying that because God gave her children to her as gifts, they are espe-
cially obliged to be good Christians: obedient and grateful children of God.36
When she depicts herself as a caretaker and religious instructor whose
children are obliged to her for their lives on earth as well as their hope for
salvation, Bradstreet associates herself with the motherly authority of God.
For example, she represents herself as a protector whose "wings kept off all
harm" in the maternal epistle "In Reference to Her Children, 23 June, 1659"
(line 60). She wants her children to know what her maternity has cost her, as
well as the extent to which they are indebted to her for those costs:
Great was my pain when I you bred,
Great was my care when I you fed,
Long did I keep you soft and warm,
And with my wings kept off all harm,
My cares are more and fears than ever,
My throbs such now as 'fore were never, (lines 57-62)37
Bradstreet wants to continue to shield her children from the world after they
have left her "nest" by instilling moral precepts in them that will allow them
to remain good Christians. She instructs them to remember her:
In chirping language, oft them tell,
You had a dam that loved you well,
That did what could be done for young,
And nursed you up till you were strong,
And 'fore she once would let you fly,
She showed you joy and misery;
Taught what was good, and what was ill,
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What would save life, and what would kill.
Thus gone, amongst you I may live,
And dead, yet speak, and counsel give:
Farewell, my birds, farewell adieu,
I happy am, if well with you. (lines 85-96)
By repeating this catalog Bradstreet lays out the terms of her children's rela-
tionship or "bond" of obligation to her. Her status as a maternal obligator or
creditor consists in her having been the nurturer, literally the nursing mother,
of their bodies and souls.38 To repay her, Bradstreet's children must not only
be grateful for what she has extended to them but must perpetuate her author-
ity over them by narrating histories of her to their own children. Like her, they
exist in a state of perpetual debt and, to use one of Bradstreet's own formula-
tions, must give an "account" describing their "stewardship" of the gifts they
have received from her.39 Bradstreet's children must honor their obligation to
her in narratives that resemble her own written offerings to her parents.
By demanding that her own biological reproduction in grandchildren be
supplemented with textual reproductions of herself in narrative, Bradstreet
again associates children with writing (See "To Her Father with Some Verses").
As with the paternal bond, a child's obligation to his or her mother entails a
duty to "yield" upon the "principle." The child's narrative about the mother
will both "pay" (by producing the narrative) and perpetuate the debt (by ac-
knowledging it in the narrative) incurred at birth. That debt constitutes the
bond or the physical and spiritual link between mother and child. "In Refer-
ence to Her Children" further resembles Bradstreet's poems about her father in
that it describes contractual obligations between people in the world while it
reiterates the bond between God and his children. The poems about Thomas
Dudley also differ from the maternal epistles, however. In the former, Bradstreet
becomes the child who wants to return to her origin; in the latter, she identi-
fies with the origin and wants to draw her children to herself. If, then, the
main emotional thrust of Bradstreet's poems about her bond to her heavenly
and earthly fathers articulates her wish to be redeemed through them and
with them in heaven, her maternal epistles also express her longing for her
children to be redeemed through and reunited with herself.
Although Protestant women were encouraged to think of themselves as
serving God when they cared for their children, Bradstreet's longing to pre-
serve her bond with her own seems to compete with her desire to focus solely
on spiritual things.40 This is most evident in her brief poems on the deaths of
her grandchildren, where she asserts that children are but loaned by God to
their earthly families. "Farewell fair flower that for a space was lent," she calls
after her grandchild, Elizabeth Bradstreet. ("In Memory of . . . Elizabeth
Bradstreet," line 3). Venting her grief for another granddaughter, who was named
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after her, she complains, "Experience might 'fore this have made me wise, / To
value things according to their price; / Was ever stable joy yet found below? /
. . . I knew she was but as a withering flower, / That's here today, perhaps gone
in an hour; / . . . More fool then I to look on that was lent / As if mine own,
when thus impermanent" ("In Memory of. . . Anne Bradstreet," lines 10-12,
14-15, 18-19). She confesses her deep affection for little Anne even as she
chastises herself for having forgotten that no "stable joy" (or fixed value) can
be found on earth. The grandmother's mind moves in two directions here,
toward the agony of her loss and toward the consolation of her beliefs: "Fare-
well dear child, thou ne'er shall come to me, / But yet a while, and I shall go to
thee" (lines 20-23). Even as she states the religious doctrine that locates all real
value in the spirit, she expresses her earthly regret that her granddaughter will
never again approach her, never again touch her in this world. The loss of this
child, who had brought her "delight" and "bliss," and who now has been re-
called by God, has plunged her into sorrow (lines 2, 13). Bradstreet may also
mourn her mortality as she realizes that the child will not live to "come to me"
or succeed her as another Anne Bradstreet living on earth (line 20).
Although the elegy remains conventional, "In Memory of . . . Anne
Bradstreet" suggests that the poet had profound emotional attachments to her
children and grandchildren and to her life on earth.41 Yet how can we recon-
cile this sense with statements such as "Base world, I trample on thy face. . . .
No gain I find in ought below," and "O let me count each hour a day / 'Til I
dissolved be" ("My Soul, Rejoice Thou in Thy God," lines 21-22, 27-28). In
her mystical "Meditations When My Soul Hath Been Refreshed with the
Consolations Which the World Knows Not," Bradstreet seeks solace for her
worldly losses through the loss of herself in God, praying: "Let me be no more
afraid of death, but even desire to be dissolved and be with Thee which is best
of all" (Works, 250). But that she feels the need to pray for this favor indicates
that she felt she did not long with sufficient fervor for transcendence. She
reconciles her wish to hold onto her children and her wish to be released
from all her earthly bonds by imagining that her family members will be re-
united on the day of redemption, when all debts will be canceled through
joining the oneness and absolute value of God. As she wrote to her son Simon,
"The Lord bless you with grace and crown you with glory hereafter, that I may
meet you with rejoicing at that great day of appearing, which is the continuall
prayer of, your affectionate mother" (Works, 271). In this letter, religious senti-
ment reinforces earthly love, and maternal bonding eases and promotes de-
sire for the afterlife.
The alleged function of Bradstreet's maternal epistles is to forge a spiri-
tual bond between her children and God: "I have not studied in this you read
to show my skill, but to declare the truth, not to set forth myself, but the glory
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of God" (Works, 240). Yet the very accommodating of the spirit to the worldly
examples of great "pain" and "care," of keeping the children "soft and warm"
("In Reference to Her Children," lines 57-59), draws attention to the material
signifiers and to the earthly experiences themselves. In this case, Bradstreet's
desire to be "well" with her children registers on the same level as, and some-
times even seems to compete with, her desire to be "dissolved" in God (Works,
250). Finally, the poet seems torn between the idea that something valuable,
such as a grandchild or a poem, could proceed from her and the more dog-
matic view that only God can be a source of value. This conflict characterizes
maternal epistles in general. Because the maternal author focuses with such
concentration on the earthly bonds with her children—the bonds established
in childbirth, breastfeeding, and daily care — in order to achieve her spiritual
ends, these earthly connections seem to take on greater force than the author
might admit. In other words, the effect of the attempt to forge a spiritual bond
between her children and God is the revelation, and perhaps the realization,
of the immense importance of the earthly bond between the mother and her
offspring.
The secular thus seems to burst out of the spiritual. As I have already sug-
gested, the mother's hope for reunion with her children has nearly as much
weight in the maternal epistle as the mother's desire to lose herself in God.
Both of these emotions can be and are expressed in the terminology of spiritual
(but also earthly) bondage. In addition to highlighting the earthly importance
of a child's life to a parent or grandparent, Bradstreet's focus on the longing for
redemption reinforces the worldliness of the economic metaphor that struc-
tures the relationship between parent and child. Furthermore, by associating
the reproduction of children with the reproduction of narrative, Bradstreet
implies that the maternal epistle can "breed," or generate interest upon itself,
in the same way that money increases when wisely invested. As in her poems
to Thomas Dudley, the terms of debt, obligation, and restitution that charac-
terize the parental bond echo the world from which they are drawn with such
intensity that "secular" values seem to separate out from spiritual values.
Maternity and Publication
The interrelation of spiritual, economic, and genealogical meaning in words
used to express Christian bondage suggests that notions about redemption,
money, and reproduction were only just beginning to come apart from one
another during this period of early merchant capitalism. Bradstreet's use of
these terms seems to indicate the beginnings of conceptual divisions between
these categories, divisions which were not yet present, for example, in John
"Such Is My Bond" 71
Donne. The early seventeenth-century poet and Anglican minister connected
redemption, money, and reproduction when he preached that Christ came to
pay Adam's original debt
in such money as was lent: in the nature and flesh of man; for man had
sinned and man must pay. And then it was lent in such money as was
coyned even with the Image of God; man was made according to his
Image: that Image being defaced, in a new Mint, in the wombe of the
Blessed Virgin, there was new money coyned; The Image of the invisible
God . . . was imprinted into the humane nature. And then that there
might bee omnis plenitudo, all fullness, as God, for the paiment of this
debt, sent downe the Bullion, and the stamp, that is, God to be conceived
in man, and as he provided the Mint, the womb of the Blessed Virgin, so
hath he provided an Exchequer, where this mony is issued; that is his
Church.42
Donne imagines Christ as appearing on earth in the same "money as was
lent." But unlike worthless human currency, the coin that issues from the
mint of Mary's womb has miraculous, infinite, and intrinsic value that alone
can redeem all of God's human children. Christ's value, mixed with the base
metal of human specie, ensures and enables the final return of humanity into
its original principle, the heavenly womb of God the Father.43
Donne's association of the reproduction of children with money lending
was conventional and helps to explain this imagery in Bradstreet's work as
well as her uneasiness about her own necessarily fallen generation and spiri-
tual debt. While medieval and Renaissance scholastics accepted what they
sometimes called "spiritual usury," which involved the reproduction of chil-
dren as lawful interest on the loan of life that God had made, they rejected
fiscal usury, or moneylending, because it seemed to bring forth illegitimate
and indeed blasphemous value from a thing which was perceived to have no
intrinsic spiritual value.44 The antiusury writers looked back to Aristotle, who
instructed that money was a barren thing and should not "breed." Money
should be used only as a medium of exchange. By the seventeenth century,
however, English men and women both at home and in America increas-
ingly accepted modest interest on loans and disapproved only of those who
charged exorbitant rates for the sole purpose of enriching themselves. Writ-
ing about this topic, John Winthrop distinguished between lending as an act
of mercy and lending "by way of commerce," arguing that the former was
subject to the biblical injunction to be charitable, whereas "the rule of jus-
tice" should govern the latter.45 He thereby made a categorical separation
between the spiritual and the secular in matters of market exchange itself.
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Anne Bradstreet must have been aware of the debate over interest, since Tho-
mas Dudley worked closely with Winthrop, and her sister's father-in-law, Rob-
ert Keayne, was twice censured for taking too much profit. She may also have
known that Winthrop considered her father's grain lending usurious.46
An early English proponent of interest, James Spottiswood, also contrib-
utes to our understanding of Bradstreet's eschatological concerns about po-
etry as "mites" generated from an inherited or invested talent. Spottiswood
rejected the idea that "money begetteth not money" on the grounds that "there
is a lawfull increase & gaine made of artificiall things as well as natural as
Houses and Shippes."47 The yield of money through trade was "artificiall" for
Spottiswood, because it was value produced through human management.
As such, its "increase" was no less real or legitimate than the profit gained
from the increase of natural things, such as livestock or land. From a strictly
religious viewpoint, Spottiswood's theory that artificial things (things not found
in nature, such as money) can increase appropriates for human imagination
the power of generation that properly belongs to God alone. To make things
that human beings have made yield of themselves seems from this standpoint
covetous or self-glorifying, for it is to assert that human-made values can be as
real or as legitimate as values which proceed from God alone. From Anne
Bradstreet's perspective, poems could participate in spiritual but not worldly
usury. As textual productions, or "artificiall things" generated, they should
serve only as mediums of exchange, or currency that acknowledges one's ob-
ligation to the spirit, and not as things that increase one's own worldly value.
Yet Anne Bradstreet approaches Spottiswood's potentially blasphemous
and therefore dangerous view when she manipulates the idea that one legiti-
mately yields interest on the loan of life through the production of children as
well as of writing. She does this when she refers to her poem as a "mite," which
meant both a coin and a child, in "To Her Father with Some Verses," and in
one of her devotional poems, "May 11, 1661." She also treads into potentially
heretical territory in her maternal epistles, where she associates the produc-
tion of children with the production of narrative and seems to imagine her
letters to her children giving rise to or "breeding" similar texts. If Bradstreet
goes out of her way to emphasize her worthlessness in her poems to her father
and her desire to glorify not herself but God in her letters to her children, it
may be because she is aware of the danger she courts by imagining her writing
as interest. The danger is that she will become a poetic usurer by believing
that she has the power to create and to give artificial things the power to gen-
erate themselves rather than understanding this power as God's alone. The
danger is also that she will set herself up as a creditor in her own right, a source
of value and life, to which loans, "notes," and children will return and be
redeemed. Finally, the danger is that she will imagine herself as an author in
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the sense of a person who can generate texts that signify in and of themselves,
rather than in the sense of a person whose texts only imperfectly signify higher
truths.48
The poet contemplates the dangers of generating herself in writing in
"The Author to Her Book." It is worth quoting in full:
Thou ill-formed offspring of my feeble brain,
Who after birth didst by my side remain,
Till snatched from thence by friends, less wise than true,
Who thee abroad, exposed to public view,
Made thee in rags, halting to th' press to trudge,
Where errors were not lessened (all may judge).
At thy return my blushing was not small,
My rambling brat (in print) should mother call,
I cast thee by as one unfit for light,
Thy visage was so irksome in my sight;
Yet being mine own, at length affection would
Thy blemishes amend, if so I could:
I washed thy face, but more defects I saw,
And rubbing off a spot still made a flaw.
I stretched thy joints to make thee even feet,
Yet still thou run'st more hobbling than is meet;
In better dress to trim thee was my mind,
But nought save homespun cloth i' th' house I find.
In this array 'mongst vulgars may'st thou roam.
In critics hands beware thou dost not come,
And take thy way where yet thou art not known;
If for thy father asked, say thou hadst none;
And for thy mother, she alas is poor,
Which caused her thus to send thee out of door.
In this poem Bradstreet recounts the history of her manuscript's unauthorized
publication in 1650, her initial rejection of the book, and her subsequent
editing of the second edition, which appeared posthumously in 1678. She
also extends John Woodbridge's metaphor of her book as an "infant" whose
"birth" he helped to force.49 While it circulated in manuscript form among
her friends, Bradstreet imagined it to be by her side, still within the purview of
her management and interpretive control, as if still connected to her mater-
nal body. This manuscript was kidnapped and introduced into the world be-
fore its mother could dress it properly for public — or divine—view. Regarding
this "ill-formed offspring of my feeble brain/' the poet also seems to view her
book "as one unfit for light," as a monstrous birth. Children born misshapen
were thought to express their mother's spiritual deformity. Likewise, as Mack
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points out, "evil opinions or malicious acts . . . were portrayed as monstrous
births, and their authors as monster mothers."50
Insofar as Bradstreet's earlier "mites" functioned to praise God for lend-
ing her the skills with which to repay the immense loan he had made to her,
they served as elaborate demonstrations of a bondage that signaled her readi-
ness for glorification—that final union with the paternal/maternal corpus.
John Woodbridge disrupted this poetic economy when he surreptitiously re-
moved Bradstreet's manuscript to public view. I am speculating that Bradstreet
regarded the copies of The Tenth Muse Lately Sprung Up in America (1650)
that found their way back to Massachusetts and into public circulation as a
kind of illegitimate interest that increased (because it was published and is-
sued in multiple copies) by itself, beyond her control. The book was also
illegitimate because it was born without a father; it proceeded from her, but
not through the bonds that tie all of her other interestlike offspring to her
Father in heaven.51 Confronting the prospect of her privately written and pri-
vately circulated poems roaming "'mongst vulgars," Bradstreet betrays anxiety
about how her art will be understood and received in the world: "In critics
hands beware thou dost not come." The book, she instructs, must be careful
how it presents itself, lest people who do not understand the soteriological
function of her writing fail to see or endeaver to undermine its spiritual cred-
itworthiness. Will the poems in this book still register as symbols of her intent
to pay her religious debts if they circulate in the material economy and are
exchanged for money rather than for the approval and inspiration of those
who have helped to guide her to God? Or does the birth of this misshapen
child register her own spiritual bankruptcy?
The idea of repayment corresponds to the Protestant soteriological vision
of reunion with the parent in the sense that the true value of the child as bond
note is realized only when it is paid, when it finds its way back to the original
lender, who makes it "good." To make a loan is to disburse a portion of one's
money and allow it to circulate independently, like a child or a book, in the
world. In Protestant theology, the loan, child, or book needs to return to its
parent, to be reunited with its source, in order to have any real value or mean-
ing. As Bradstreet's contemporary, John Robinson, observed, "Writing is the
speech of the absent. . . . Great care is to be taken, and circumspection used
in writing of Books; not onely (though specialy for conscience of God); but
also because the Author therin exposeth himself to the censure of all men."52
Just as Bradstreet sought to maintain her bond with her children in order to
ensure their acceptability as lawful interest to her heavenly father, she wanted
to preserve control over her writing so that it would serve as a sacred offering
and legitimate increase on her loan of life and talent from him.
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In "The Author to Her Book" Anne Bradstreet makes explicit a problem
that is only implicit in her maternal epistles: the problem of maintaining
control over one's (re)production. In the maternal epistles she associates writ-
ing with children and with the perpetuation of herself by regulating her own
sons and daughters, who have gone out into the world but who will give accu-
rate "accounts" of her "travail" to their own offspring. She associates writing
with children by conceiving of her book as a child that has entered the world,
where it will report about her to (and be reckoned by) strangers. The mater-
nal epistle maintains a spiritual bond, a contract and a link, between mother
and child. But Bradstreet's "ill-formed offspring" has broken that connection
and wanders without guidance. The poet recognizes with some pain that she
cannot shepherd her book in the world (as she can shepherd her children
through her maternal epistles) and that the accounts it will give of her "stew-
ardship" will be unreliable. "In better dress to trim thee was my mind," she
complains, as if she has been unable to tailor garments for this child that
accord with divine dispensations.53
Finally, the break that the book makes with its mother launches it into a
space that is divorced from the spiritual realm at the center of her maternal
epistles. Thus Bradstreet's reluctant acknowledgment of maternity and assump-
tion of responsibility for sending her illegitimate child "out of door" because
she is "poor" troubles the spiritual water in which we expect to find all of her
work. Has she acknowledged this "rambling" (wandering, sinful) "brat" as her
own for worldly or economic, as opposed to spiritual, reasons? Does she want
to make money with it? Or does she imagine that its proliferation in print
yields upon her own poetic value in the world? She admits that "affection" for
her earthly, public child has motivated her to "amend" its "blemishes" and
make it more fit to be seen. But if no amount of rubbing can wash this child,
is this so because, like the hands of Lady Macbeth, its sins cannot be cleansed?
Has this creature of an earthly and not a divine womb been permitted to
wander in the world because it will never find its way to heaven? And if so,
then what kind of existence or meaning does its mother imagine it having, if
not a purely worldly one? "Take thy way where yet thou art not known,"
Bradstreet counsels her book, seeming to encourage it to circulate and be-
come valuable independently in a public, commercial world not enclosed by
the spirit. As in all of Anne Bradstreet's work, earthly images figure divine
realities. "The Author to Her Book" registers Bradstreet's nervousness that she
and her book may have no legitimate spiritual value. That possibility, though
denied, remains present in the poem. The potential for worldly value sepa-
rates from its spiritual complement even as it is asserted as a thing that the
spirit overwhelms. Thus the image of her book as an errant child in the world,
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which will not be redeemed and dissolved in the spirit, becomes embraeeable
on its own terms. Not quite "profane," it nonetheless exhibits nonreligious
value. Rather than taking us to a higher realm, this figure of the book as child
exhibits a possibly secular worthiness through its circulation in the material
world, a "worth" that Bradstreet only hints at in her poems to her father and
that she begins to articulate in her maternal epistles.
Although recent critics have interpreted Bradstreet's nervousness in this
poem as the trepidation of a woman worried about offending patriarchal au-
thority by speaking in public, I see it also as gender-neutral anxiety about
autonomous generation, a fear of offending the creator by imitating him
through the generation of worldly value that both male and female writers
shared.54 George Herbert's (1593-1633) presentation of his "writings" as a "spe-
cial Deed" in "Obedience," Andrew Marvell's (1621-78) meditation on the
insignificance of the "wreaths of Fame and Interest" in "The Coronet," or
Edward Taylor's (ca. 1642-1729) endless scrutiny of his value in such lines as
"Am I thy Gold? Or Purse, Lord, for thy Wealth" in Preparatory Meditations
1:6, all worry about the dangers of overweening poetic creation in a language
of marketplace terms and values. That said, I have also tried to show how, by
embracing the role of mother, Anne Bradstreet assumed a spiritual and cre-
ative authority and that the problem of generating value was particularly vexed
because of the affective bonds she formed with her real and textual children.
These bonds conferred a worthiness that seemed to slip past the boundaries of
religious culture and that made her children valuable purely because they
sprang from her.
Like many early modern writers, Bradstreet attempted to accommodate
the worldly to the spiritual. The world of finance, agriculture, and genealogy
is both merged and set into conflict with the spirit in the father-poems. The
poems on marriage and biological motherhood sketch out further conflicts
between worldly and heavenly values but reconcile these oppositions by imag-
ining all realms and all distinctions as things transcended in the spirit. "The
Author to Her Book" seems to disrupt this larger spiritual economy in which
Bradstreet located all of her work. The book becomes a child adrift in the
world where it has a material value but owes no obligation to its mother, its
only parent. Completely dissociated from the contractual bonds that origi-
nate in God the Father and that are enforced by the mother, such a produc-
tion can never be redeemed and therefore will not maintain a spiritual
connection to its origin. "The Author to Her Book" also differs from Bradstreet's
other poems about parenthood because in it the poet neither longs for her
own dissolution in the spirit nor seeks to draw her child up after her; she
merely acknowledges the book as her progeny and sends it on its way. The
bond Bradstreet establishes with her book, then, remains an earthly connec-
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tion. She finally does not cast it aside as blasphemy, but sets it apart as a thing
that exists in a universe parallel, if inferior, to the spiritual realm that encom-
passes all her other offspring. It is as if the very effort to articulate the spiritual
in graphically material terms, to read religious meaning into all worldly expe-
riences, resulted for her in a nascent distinction between spiritual and worldly
experience. "The Author to Her Book" records the culmination of a seculariz-
ing trend within the poet's essentially spiritual thought, for it demonstrates
how the domestic, the economic, and the theological—which Anne Bradstreet
understood as interrelated locations of the bond between parents and chil-
dren—were beginning to come apart for her as separate but analogous realms.
Bradstreet's writing about obligation and restitution between parents and
their offspring demonstrates the complex connections between familial, com-
mercial, and sacred aspects of experience in a culture in which it became
possible to conceive of value outside of the spiritual canopy that theoretically
encompassed all existence. That she rejected nonspiritual values does not
mean that she also repudiated the positive power to create things of earthly
significance, which she associated with being a poet and a mother. The meta-
phor of Christian bondage afforded Bradstreet a position of great authority
and creativity, not only as a mother-producer and nurturer but also as the
fortunate recipient of priceless gifts from God. Finally, and perhaps most
important to her, the ineluctability of her bonds promised reunion in heaven
for all time with those she loved most: "Where we with joy each other's face
shall see / And parted more by death shall never be" ("To the Memory of My
...Father," lines 74-7 5).
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old. i. who is not aswel able, to make som new discoverie, & to bring forth somwhat of
himselfe in the things of God in one kinde or other," sig. b4r-v. Cf. John Milton, The
Reason of Church Government (1642), in John Milton: Complete Poems and Major
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Prose, ed. Merritt Hughes (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), 643. Also cf. Milton,
The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce [1643, 1644] and Areopagitica [1645], in
Complete Prose Works of John Milton, ed. Don Wolfe (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1959), 2:224-25, 505,562.
8. Cf. Genesis 17:7. For a short description of covenant theology, see Miller,
Errand into the Wilderness, 60-61.
9. Thomas Hooker, The Soules Preparation For Christ; or, A Treatise of Contri-
tion, Wherein is Discovered How God breakes the heart and wounds the Soule, in the
Conversion of a Sinner to Himselfe (London, 1632). Thomas Hooker was a contem-
porary of Bradstreet's and a minister who led a settlement in Connecticut. In A Briefe
Exposition of the Lords Prayer (London, 1645), he wrote, "True, Lord, the talents and
debt whereby we are ingaged unto thee are many and great," (63). Cf. The Covenant
of God's Free Grace  (London, 1645), where John Cotton tells his congregation that
they will become "free" by paying not money but obedience to God (11-13, 19-21).
In A Treatise on the Covenant of Grace, 3d ed. (London, 1671), Cotton describes
Christ as the "Surety" of the Covenant established between God and Abraham, and
he states, "God indeed may give with a purpose to receive back again; but he looketh
to receive no more than what he first giveth us, and giveth us strength and Will and
Deed to give him back again" (5, 11). In the latter work Cotton referred to the "Spirit
of Bondage" as the force that imposes God's will on the soul, drawing it "from sin,
and from the world in some measure," and the force which teaches human beings
that they can not "lay hold of Jesus Christ" "from any power of our natural gifts and
talents" (114, 117). For poetic explorations of this theme, see, for example, George
Herbert (1593-1633), "Redemption," and "Obedience"; John Milton (1608-74),
"Comus"; Henry Vaughn (1621-95), "Regeneration"; Thomas Traherne (1637-74),
"The Recovery"; and Edward Taylor (1642-1729), Meditation 1.41.
10. See, for example, Odet de la Noue, Lord of Teligni, The Profit of Imprison-
ment. A Paradox, that Adversitie is more necessarie than Propertie: and that, of all afflic-
tions, close Prison is most plesant, and most profitable. This is bound with [Salluste]
Du Bartas, His Devine Weeks and Works, trans. Joshua Sylvester (London, 1605). It is
possible that Bradstreet, who adored Du Bartas, either owned or had seen this edition.
See Elizabeth Wade White, Anne Bradstreet: "The Tenth Muse" (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1971), 56-57.
11. Phyllis Mack, Visionary Women: Ecstatic Prophecy in Seventeenth-Century
England (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 39-40.
12. The King James or Authorized Version of the Bible translated this word (van-
tage) in Matthew 25:27 as usury.
13. All references to Scripture are from the Geneva Bible, which was the version
Anne Bradstreet used. See White, Anne Bradstreet, 60-61. I have used The Geneva
Bible, Facsimile of the 1560 Edition (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969).
14. These and the opening lines suggest that Dudley wrote a quaternion poem,
now lost to us, "on the four parts of the world."
15. Cit. White, Anne Bradstreet, 179.
16. Eileen Margerum, "Anne Bradstreet's Public Poetry and the Tradition of
Humility," Early American Literature 17 (1982): 152-60, 157. For some influential
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arguments in favor of a feminist or prefeminist sensibility in Bradstreet, see also
Adrienne Rich's introduction to Works of Anne Bradstreet, ed. Jeanine Hensley; and
Ann Stanford, "Anne Bradstreet: Dogmatist and Rebel," in Puritan New England:
Essays on Religion, Society, and Culture, ed. Alden T. Vaughn and Frances J. Bremer
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977). Timothy Sweet implicitly challenges aspects of
these interpretations in "Gender, Genre, and Subjectivity in Bradstreet's Early Ele-
gies," Early American Literature 23(1988): 152-74, asserting that the "constitution of
a feminine subject is unproblematic" in Bradstreet's "domestic poetry" where "no
strain is put on the dominant discursive conventions. Thus the domestic poetry does
not expose the gender-based power relations of the discourse that determines it; rather,
it merely reproduces the existing ideology (the gender system), without questioning
the 'order of things' created and supported by discourse" (170). Sweet speculates that
Bradstreet "surrendered or retreated into less hostile terrain" in her later works. Ivy
Schweitzer makes a similar claim in The Work of Self-Representation: Lyric Poetry in
Colonial New England (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 127-
80. I am uncomfortable with the division of Bradstreet's poetry into "public" and
"domestic" categories, since these terms oversimplify the nature of her often com-
plex work. Many of the "public" poems express "private" or "domestic" sentiments,
and the "domestic" poems arguably concern issues of central concern to the "public"
community in which she lived. Furthermore, such a separation presupposes a dis-
tinction between private and public "spheres" that may be emergent, but is not real-
ized in her work. As Paula Kopacz points out in "'To Finish What's Begun': Anne
Bradstreet's Last Words," Early American Literature 23 (1988): 175-85, all of Bradstreet's
poems are a form of prayer. I also prefer to think of Bradstreet as moving more val-
iantly into a spiritual realm in which she willingly gave up her "subjectivity" and
where the gender hierarchy breaks down. My reading is therefore more in line with
those of Paula Kopacz, "'To Finish,'" and Beth Doriani, "'Then Have I . . . Said with
David': Anne Bradstreet's Andover Manuscript Poems and the Influence of the Psalm
Tradition," Early American Literature 24 (1989): 52-69. Unlike Sweet or Schweitzer,
these critics focus on Bradstreet's spiritual strategies rather than on her effort to assert
a modern subjectivity.
17. Generally, men and women were held equally subordinate to God, from
whom any power in them was wholly derived. Spiritual equality between the sexes
did not cancel the superiority of men over women in matters of earthly government
or, as William Gouge said, in "domesticall duties." See his Of Domesticall Duties
(London, 1634). Bradstreet treats Thomas Dudley as her superior not only because
he was her father but also because he was her patron. See Margerum for more on
Bradstreet's adoption of patron-client literary conventions. There are many fine stud-
ies of gender ideology and the social hierarchy in Puritan culture. I have relied on
the following texts: Allison Coudert, "The Myth of the Improved Status of Protestant
Women: The Case of the Witchcraze," in The Politics of Gender in Early Modern
Europe, ed. Jean R. Brink, Allison P. Coudert, and Maryanne Horowitz (Kirksville:
University of Missouri Press, 1989); John Demos, A Little Commonwealth: Family
Life in a Plymouth Colony (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); A.J. Fletcher,
"The Protestant Idea of Marriage in Early Modern England," in Religion, Culture,
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and Society in Early Modern Britain, ed. A.J. Fletcher and Peter R. Roberts (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); William and Malleville Haller, "The
Puritan Art of Love," Huntington Library Quarterly 5 (1941-42): 235-72; Lyle Koehler,
A Search for Power: The "Weaker Sex" in Seventeenth-Century England (Urbana: Uni-
versity of Illinois Press, 1980); Sarah Heller Mendelson, The Mental World of Stuart
Women: Three Studies (Brighton, England: Harvester Press, 1987), esp. 62-115;
Edmund S. Morgan, The Puritan Family: Essays on Religion and Domestic Relations
in Seventeenth-Century New England (Boston: Trustees of the Public Library, 1956);
Schweitzer, Work of Self-Representation; Keith Thomas, "Women in the Civil War
Sects," Past and Present 13 (1958): 42-62; and Diane Willen, "Women and Religion
in Early Modern England," in Women in Reformation and Counter-Reformation Eu-
rope: Public and Private Worlds, ed. Sherrin Marshall (Bloomington: Indiana Univer-
sity Press, 1989). Finally, Jeffrey Hammond observes, "Although a number of critics
interpret [Bradstreet's] difficulties with the faith as rebellion against the androcentric
theological and political structures of her time, such difficulties comprised a normal
and even mandated dimension of inner experience for all saints, male and female":
Sinful Self Saintly Self: The Puritan Experience of Poetry (Athens: University of Geor-
gia Press, 1993), 139.
18. For a discussion of new models of and terms for capital generation through
interest, debt, and credit transactions in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe,
see Wilson, A Discourse upon Usury, 16-169.
19. Her language reiterates the terms of the Parable of the Talents, which the
commentary in the Geneva Bible interpreted as teaching that "we ought to continue
in the knowledge of God, and do good with those graces that God hath given us,"
Marginalia for Matthew 25:14 in The Geneva Bible (1560).
20. Henry Wilkinson, The Debt Book, or, A Treatise Upon Romans 13, ver. 8,
Wherein is handled: The Civill Debt of Money or Goods, and under it the mixt Debt, as
occasion is offered. Also, The Sacred Debt of Love (London, 1625), 114.
21. Indeed, Bradstreet's concern with written acknowledgments of inheritance
may stem not only from Puritan sermons and Scripture but also from her high status
among the wealthiest members of the Massachusetts Bay Company. Those without
property rarely made wills, but, as I argue below, Bradstreet's will understood her
writings to her children as legacies. On women leaving wills, see Susan Amussen, An
Ordered Society: Gender and Class in Early Modern England (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1988), 92-94.
22. See Bailyn, New England Merchants, 19, 26, 53, 125, 135-39, and 163. The
quotation is from page 139.
23. See "To the Memory of My Dear and Ever Honored Father," in which
Bradstreet exhorts her fellow colonists to acknowledge their collective financial and
political debt to this man who "spent his state" in order to found the commonwealth:
"But now or never I must pay my Sum; /While others tell his worth, I'll not be dumb;
/ One of thy Founders, him New England know, / Who staid thy feeble sides when
thou wast low, / Who spent his state, his strength, & years with care / That after-
comers in them might have share. /True patriot of this little commonweal" (lines 26-
32).
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24. "Winthrop regarded this practice as oppressive usury": Edmund S. Morgan,
The Puritan Dilemma: The Story of John Winthrop (Boston: Little, Brown, 1958), 87.
On Dudley's rigidity, see 103-6.
25. Even in her most overt declaration of a "public" and seemingly secular debt,
"To the Memory of My Dear and Ever Honored Father Thomas Dudley Esq.," the
sacred wholly encompasses the political. By the end of the poem, Thomas Dudley
the governor has literally become her father in heaven; see lines 66-75.
26. See also "In Thankfull Remembrance for my Dear Husband's Safe Arrivall,
Sept. 3, 1662," where she writes, "I owe so much, so little can / Return unto thy
Name" (lines 8-9).
27. John Cotton wrote, "But God himself is said to be our gifts and graces, and
therefore they are nothing but his spirit in us," in The Covenant of God's Free Grace,
33.
28. This apparent contradiction could be explained through Protestant dogma,
as promulgated in Puritan conduct books on marriage. Conjugal love was the result
of both God's and human beings' free wills, since those who experienced what the
clerics regarded as true matrimonial harmony were thought to have internalized God's
will as their own. See William and Malleville Haller, "The Puritan Art of Love," esp.
264-65.
29. Ann Stanford's argument in "Anne Bradstreet: Dogmatist and Rebel" that
Bradstreet struggled between dogma and personal feeling regarding her attitude to-
ward her husband (by focusing on their earthly love more than on the ecstasy of the
afterlife, and by asking him to remember her after she dies) confirms my point that
the poet found it possible to conceive of both the spiritual and the secular worlds as
meaningful in and of themselves.
30. See "To Her Father with Some Verses," line 6, and "To the Memory," lines
10-14.
31. Her father was Edmonde Yorke, a substantial yeoman. Cotton Mather de-
scribed her as "a gentlewoman whose Extract and Estate were considerable": Magnalia
Christi Americana, quoted by White, Anne Bradstreet, 36.
32. Londa Schiebinger, "Why Mammals Are Called Mammals," American
Historical Review 98 (1993): 394. Of all the virtues, Charity is the only mother. In The
Fairie Queene, Charissa appears in the House of Holinesse as a woman "of wondrous
beauty, and of bountie rare," whose "necke and breasts were euer open bare / That ay
thereof her babes might sucke their fill." See I. x.29-31. See also Mack, Visionary
Women, 36,40-41.
33. The tradition begins, perhaps, with the first known European woman writer,
Dhouda (ca. 803-after 843), who wrote a manual of conduct for her elder son, Liber
manualis, in Women Writers of the Middle Ages: A Critical Study of Texts from Perpetua
(f203) to Marguerite Porete (tl310), ed. Peter Dronke (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1985). But many writings by women in the seventeenth century could
be considered "maternal epistles." Among them are Elizabeth Grymeston's Miscelanea.
Meditations. Memoratives (1604); Dorothy Leigh's A Mother's Blessing (1617); Eliza-
beth Jocelin's The Mother's Legacie (1624); Eleanor Douglas's From the Lady Eleanor,
Her Blessing to Her Beloved Daughter (1644); and Elizabeth Richardson's A Ladies
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Legade to her Daughters (1645). Constantia Munda's dedication to The Worming of
a Mad Dogge (1617) acknowledges the tradition of what Gerda Lerner calls "the
theme of female bonding and honoring of motherhood" in explicitly financial terms
but is not itself a maternal epistle: Lerner, The Creation of Feminist Consciousness
from the Middle Ages to 1870 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 129. The
maternal epistle tradition involves bonding between mothers, their daughters, and
their sons. Bradstreet's maternal epistles include "In Reference to Her Children, 23
June, 1659," "To My Dear Children," "September 30, 1657," "For My Dear Son
Simon Bradstreet," and Meditations Divine and Morall.
34. "A prudent mother will not cloth her little child with a long and cumber-
some garment; she easily foresees what events it is like to produce, at the best but falls
and bruises or perhaps somewhat worse. Much more will the allwise God proportion
His dispensations according to the stature and strength of the person He bestows
them on": Meditations Divine and Morall, no. 39. Cf. Thomas Hooker, A Brief Expo-
sition of the Lords Prayer, 49: "A childe happily would have a coat four or five yards
too long, and to tyre him, or fire to burne him, but a father will not have it too long,
to tyre him, or fire to burne him. So our Father, we would over-flow our measures,
out-run our proportions too beyond our need."
35. Hooker, Lords Prayer, 32.
36. "It pleased God to keep me a long time without a child, which was a great
grief to me and cost me many prayers and tears before I obtained one, and after him
gave me many more of whom I now take the care, that as I have brought you into the
world. . . . I now travail in birth again of you till Christ be formed in you": "To My
Dear Children," 241.
37. Cf. Bradstreet's poem, "Childhood": "My mother did waste as I did thrive /
Who yet with all alacrity, / Spending, was willing to be spent by me" (lines 73-75).
38. As a mother, she is like God who gives birth to children but also like the
church who nourishes them. We may compare her representation of herself as a
nurturer to John Cotton's mystical interpretation of the Song of Songs 7:2 ("Thy
navell is like a round goblet") in A Brief Exposition with Practical Observations upon
the whole Book of Canticles (London, 1655): "The Navell serving for the nourish-
ment of the Infant in the wombe, before it be born, doth fitly resemble Baptisme,
which serveth for the nourishment of the Infants of the Church, even before they be
born, and brought forth by Spirituall Nativity. If children were born, the breasts were
for them (verse 3), but now Navell . . . Infants of Church-members are the seeds of
the faithful, and conteined in the wombe of the church. .. . Therefore they had need
to be nourished," 191-92. The idea of the church as a mother was common. Cf. for
example George Herbert, "The British Church."
39. "Few men are so humble as not to be proud of their abilities, and nothing
will abase them more than this: what hast thou, but what thou has received? Come,
give an account of thy stewardship": Meditations Divine and Morall, no. 17.
40. Linda Crawford, "The Construction and Experience of Maternity in Seven-
teenth-Century England," in Women as Mothers in Pre-industrial England, ed. Valerie
Fildes (London: Routledge, 1990), 15, observes that a mother's spiritual obligations
could sometimes interfere with her maternal responsibilities in this period.
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41. Bradstreet's meditation on her grandchild's death has much in common with
Ben Jonson's epigrams "On My First Daughter" and "On My First Son." For some
controversial accounts of the attachments of early modern parents to their children,
see Demos, A Little Commonwealth, 70-74; and Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex,
and Marriage in England, 1500-1800 (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 99-102.
These views have been rebutted by many scholars. Two good summaries of this de-
bate are Ruth Perry, "Colonizing the Breast: Sexuality and Maternity in Eighteenth-
Century England," Eighteenth-Century Life 16 (1992): 209n; and Olwen Hufton,
The Prospect before Her: A History of Women in Western Europe, 1500-1800 (New
York: Knopf, 1995), 23-24, 209-14. In addition, the first thing Bradstreet requires of
her children in "In Reference to Her Children" is to tell that they "had a dam that
loved you well" (line 86).
42. John Donne, Sermons, cit. E. Pearlman, "Shakespeare, Freud, and the Two
Usuries," English Literary Renaissance 2 (1972): 234.
43. Similarly, John Milton imagined the mind as a mint, in which "the Deity has
imprinted . . . so many unquestionable tokens of himself": The Christian Doctrine, in
John Milton: Complete Poems and Major Prose, 904. Michael O'Malley points out
that the word specie in the seventeenth century had the sense of both currency and
species. "Specie and Species: Race and the Money Question in Nineteenth-Century
America," American Historical Review 99 (1994): 372.
44. Gabriel Powel defined "Spirituall or celestial usury" as "that gaine and glory
wherewith God rewardeth the graces and good workes of his owne children":
Theologicall and Scholasticall Positions concerning Usurie (London, 1602), 2, cit.
Pearlman, "Shakespeare, Freud, and the Two Usuries," 232.
45. Bailyn, New England Merchants, 21-22.
46. This last matter prompted John Cotton, whom the Dudley family knew well
on both continents, to formulate and publish laws on commercial transactions and
interest rates. See Winthrop, Journal (1996), 307; and John Cotton, "An Abstract of
the Lawes of New England (London, 1641), 8, 9.
47. John Spottiswood, The Execution ofNeschech (Edinburgh, 1616), 33.
48. Robert Daly explains that Puritan poetics "avoided the worship, not the
making, of images." Yet, because "Puritans believed that meaning resided in the sym-
bolic world itself,. . . their poetics has far more in common with the Latin concept of
the poet as vates ('seer'), one who sees and says the truth, than with the Greek con-
cept of the poet as poeta ('maker'), one who creates verbal artifacts.... [T]heir avowed
task was simply to say, to utter, the truths they saw": Daly, "Puritan Poetics: The
World, the Flesh, and God," Early American Literature 12 (1977): 157-58.
49. In his 1650 dedicatory poem "To My Dear Sister, the Author of These Po-
ems," John Woodbridge writes,
If you shall think it will be to your shame
To be in print, then I must bear the blame;
If't be a fault, 'tis mine, 'tis shame that might
Deny so fair an infant of its right
To look abroad; I know your modest mind,
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How you will blush, complain, 'tis too unkind:
To force a woman's birth, provoke her pain,
Expose her labours to the world's disdain, (lines 55-61)
Woodbridge secularizes the childbirth metaphor of Galatians by imagining the "tra-
vail" that Paul speaks of not as a spiritual effort but as a poetic effort. For the history of
the original publication of The Tenth Muse Lately Sprung Up in America (1650), see
Works., ed. Hensley, xxvii-xxxiv; and The Complete Works of Anne Bradstreet, ed. Jo-
seph R. McElrath Jr. and Allan P. Robb (Boston: Twayne, 1981), xx. At the time of
this essay's composition, this latter fine edition was sadly out of print.
50. Mack, Visionary Women, 41. See also Crawford, "Construction and Experi-
ence of Maternity," 7-8; and Jean Marie Lutes, "Negotiating Theology and Gynecol-
ogy: Anne Bradstreet's Representations of the Female Body," Signs 22 (1997): 328-30.
51. Considering the metaphor within the context of contemporary beliefs about
mother's and father's roles in generation, Lutes ("Negotiating Theology and Gyne-
cology," 333) has observed that the book as child is a mental offspring arising "not
from the material in her womb reacting to a masculine force but, rather, from the
material in her mind reacting to her own need for self-expression."
52. John Robinson, New Essays or Observations Divine and Morall (London,
1628), 135-37.
53. See Meditations Divine and Morall, no. 39; and Crawford, "Construction
and Experience of Maternity," 15.
54. See Lutes, "Negotiating Theology and Gynecology," 336-37; Schweitzer,
Work of Self-Representation, 170-73.
Susan C. Greenfield _ _ ^ ^ J>
Aborting the "Mother Plot"
Politics and Generation in
Absalom and Achitophel
John Dryden's Absalom and Achitophel (1682) is a royalist allegory about the
English Exclusion Crisis. It draws an analogy between Absalom's rebellion
against King David in 2 Samuel and contemporary conflicts concerning
Charles II and the Earl of Shaftesbury, the Whig leader who sought to ex-
clude Charles's Catholic brother, James II, from succession by encouraging
Charles's illegitimate Protestant son, the Duke of Monmouth, to claim the
throne instead. In the poem, King David represents the notoriously philan-
dering Charles II, Absalom is his rebellious son, Monmouth, and Achitophel
is the Earl of Shaftesbury.
Although many critics have pointed to the poem's obvious emphasis on
fatherhood and kingship, it has hardly seemed a likely source of information
about early modern maternity.1 But motherhood is actually a pivotal and po-
litically charged problem in Absalom and Achitophel. The poem begins and
ends with references to mothers: The opening describes how, despite his queen's
infertility, the promiscuous King David has still managed to create "several
Mothers" (13), and the poem concludes with David's stunning image of a
"Viper-like" destruction of the "Mother Plot" against him (1013). Indeed, the
shift between these framing images of maternity is a central mechanism in
the poem's royalist resolution. Although the text initially suggests that David
bears the procreative responsibility for the birth of his rebel son, it ends by
transferring the blame for the insurrection onto the Mother Plot, as if only the
female power of generation threatens familial and political order and must be
suppressed. The shift works because the poem's emphasis on David's promis-
cuity is gradually replaced by references to a feminine sexual desire and pro-
ductivity so dangerous that the king appears politically reliable by contrast.2
In the process, political questions about the future of monarchal succes-
sion are brought into conflict with scientific questions about the nature of
conception and the difference between paternal and maternal procreative
control. Writing during a period of debate about the source and extent of
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monarchal authority, as part of a pragmatic effort to defend a king whose own
son had challenged him, Dryden is faced with a particularly complex set of
issues. Not only was the traditional belief that the king passed his power through
genetic descent generally on the wane, but Charles specifically needed to be
dissociated from his rebellious child. In an apparent attempt to address these
problems, Dryden appropriates and discards various procreation narratives in
the poem, finally moving toward a model of maternal generation in order to
resolve them. .
Before considering the poem closely it is useful to review the cultural — and
specifically political and medical — context for its familial and sexual details.
Much has been written about the way the king was viewed as the ultimate
patriarch of a family of subjects. But to appreciate Dryden's attack on mater-
nity, it is also important to recognize that the most popular patriarchal politi-
cal theory of the period—best articulated in Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha
(1680)—was fundamentally structured around the erasure of the mother.3 In
trying to prove that "the first kings were fathers of families" and that "kings
now are the fathers of their people," for instance, Filmer points out that "the
law which enjoins obedience to kings is delivered in the terms of'honour thy
father ' . . . as if all power were originally in the father."4
As John Locke later suggests in his Two Treatises of Government (1690),
Filmer is clearly manipulative here, "for God [actually] says, Honour thy
Father and Mother; but our Author . . .  leaves out thy Mother quite, as little
serviceable to his purpose."5 Locke here is not especially interested in biblical
accuracy or in the question of women's rights but rather in the dynamics of
political rhetoric. Arguing against unconditional and exclusive monarchal
authority, he understands that the paternal argument can work only if the role
of the mother is denied, because to acknowledge her would suggest that the
father-king does not have an inherent right to unilateral control. It thus logi-
cally follows that to introduce the idea of mother is to disrupt the patriarchal
justification of kingship: "It will but very ill serve the turn of those Men who
contend so much for the Absolute Power and Authority of the Fatherhood . . .
that the Mother should have any share in it. And it would have but ill sup-
ported the Monarchy they contend for, when by the very name it appeared
that the Fundamental Authority from whence they would derive their Gov-
ernment of a single Person only, was not plac'd in one, but two Persons joyntly."6
Critics have pointed out that this is hardly a feminist argument, since Locke
"uses the mother's 'equal Title' as a reductio ad absurdum to refute the deriva-
tion of political from parental authority."7 That is, he uses her to prove the
inherent separateness of parenthood and state. Nevertheless, it is worth noting
how, by concentrating on the threat that maternity poses to any conservative
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understanding of monarchy, Locke ironically demonstrates the mother's po-
litical utility.8
The Two Treatises, composed during the 1680s but published anonymously
nearly a decade after Absalom and Achitophel, did not directly influence the
poem. As Steven Zwicker suggests, however, Locke's and Dryden's texts may
be read in relation to each other (as well as to Filmer's Patriarcha) "as con-
temporary rhetorical and political events, as competing interpretations of the
origins of government, the nature of royal authority, and the political mean-
ing of paternity and patriarchy."9 Locke is particularly useful in the context of
the present discussion about maternity because he articulates an implicit ten-
sion in patriarchal theory that was already long evident, clarifying one posi-
tion about motherhood in an ongoing debate about the relationship between
political and familial power. In both De Cive (1642) and Leviathan (1651),
for instance, Hobbes had already implied that fatherhood could not be the
ultimate grounds upon which sovereignty is based because "the originall
Dominion over children belongs to the Mother. . . . The birth followes the
belly."10 If in many political systems the father acquired control over the mother
and young, that was simply the consequence of civil laws that privileged him,
resulting from the fact that "for the most part Common-wealths have been
erected by the Fathers, not by the Mothers of families."11 Thus, paternal power
was a sign of conquest but not of unquestionable governmental entitlement.
Fully understanding that any successful argument about the mother's natural
authority could dismantle his defense of monarchy, Filmer challenged Hobbes
in his Observations Concerning the Originall of Government (1652) by coun-
tering: "But we know that God at the creation gave the sovereignty to the man
over the woman, as being the nobler and principal agent in generation."12
Significantly, Filmer here promotes not just the idea of paternal power
but a specific theory of conception, maintaining that the father plays the more
active role in generation and refusing "any acknowledgment of the capacity
and creativity that is unique to women."13 Hobbes was not alone in
deconstructing such arguments by suggesting that the mother was the more
important creator. In Of Government and Obedience as They Stand Directed
and Determined by Scripture and Reason (1654), John Hall reminds his read-
ers that the mother "hath part of her own substance imployed in nourishment
of the young whilst it is within her."14 And Locke is even more explicit:
For no body can deny but that the Woman hath an equal share, if not the
greater, as nourishing the Child a long time in her own Body out of her
own Substance. There it is fashion'd, and from her it receives the
Materials and Principles of its Constitution; And it is so hard to imagine
the rational Soul should presently Inhabit the yet unformed Embrio, as
soon as the Father has done his part in the Act of Generation, that if it
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must be supposed to derive any thing from the Parents, it must certainly
owe most to the Mother.15
There is something at stake here in addition to the problem of governmental
succession. Whether or not the authors were deliberately referring to specific
medical theories (and Locke, who was trained in medicine, may well have
been), the contrast between their accounts of generation is also characteristic
of contemporary scientific debates. Filmer's emphasis on paternal agency
evokes the popular Aristotelian notion that the female contributes the matter
or passive principle in conception and the male bestows the efficient or active
one that creates the movement necessary for the embryo to develop.16 Like a
sculptor, "the male model[s] or mouldfs] this [female] material into a form
like itself."17 Aristotle himself explains: "The female always provides the ma-
terial, the male that which fashions i t . . . . While the body is from the female,
it is the soul that is from the male."18
In his pathbreaking de Generatione animalium (1651 [discussed in more
detail in Eve Keller's article in this volume]), William Harvey challenged
Aristotle's emphasis on female subordination and argued that both mother
and father provided the efficient cause of generation.19 It is unclear exactly
how much influence he believed the female primordium had, but Harvey did
argue that the material carried by the mother contained its own "power to
develop/' which was then ignited by the semen.20 Harvey also suggested that
the womb functioned as a kind of brain that "conceived" the fetus like an
idea, but this was not necessarily evidence of maternal power, since Harvey
considered the uterus an independent organism and also believed that the
fetus's life did not depend on the mother's.21 Those scientists who, unlike
Harvey, favored preformation theory (believing that the offspring existed fully
formed at conception) were much more willing to credit a single parent with
the power to shape the child, insisting that "only one sex could donate the
true embryo."22 By the end of the seventeenth century there were two compet-
ing groups in this category of thinkers: the ovists, who argued that the whole
embryo existed preformed in the ovary, and the animalculists, who claimed
the same for the sperm.23
Locke's account of generation blends and revises a number of these medi-
cal theories. He never questions the Aristotelian idea that the woman supplies
the matter for the embryo, but Locke does insist that it is primarily the work of
pregnancy —and not the act of the sperm — that fashions the female material
into a child. Contesting the notion that the father gives the soul as well as the
notion that the embryo exists fully formed in either the sperm or the egg,
Locke emphasizes the process of development, reasoning that because the
embryo grows in the mother, she most influences the child's outcome.24
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Despite their very different scientific assumptions, both Filmer and Locke,
like Hobbes and Hall, assume that discourses about the body and state over-
lap, and they recognize that any representation of conception is thus a politi-
cal act. This sense of integration was obviously influenced by their own system
of government, figured in the body of a ruler who passed his power through
genetic descent. At the same time, though, recent historical events — prima-
rily the execution of Charles I—had proved that the royal succession could
be broken.25 The classic seventeenth-century patriarchalism that linked mo-
narchal and paternal procreative power would not endure. As Carole Pateman
explains, "Filmer's father . . . stands at the end of a very long history of tradi-
tional patriarchal argument in which the creation of political society has been
seen as a masculine act of birth."26 In challenging the logic of a political theory
based on paternal procreation, Locke's arguments articulate and anticipate
permanent changes in the understanding of the origin of government.
Absalom and Achitophel is situated at the crossroads of this change. As he
seeks to develop a pragmatic and contemporary defense of monarchal au-
thority, Dryden moves from a story of paternal conception, reminiscent of
Filmer's, to an account of maternal creativity that anticipates Locke's. When
Dryden finally abandons the model of patriarchal generation at the end of the
poem, he, like Locke, marks the cultural turn against the traditional emphasis
on masculine birth as well as his own wariness of the role of paternity in
political argument.27 But unlike Locke's work, Dryden's narrative is designed
to support the king and, more specifically, to resolve the generative problems
posed by Monmouth's bid for the throne. Because Charles was challenged by
his own illegitimate child, the paternal control of conception is necessarily
associated not with the king's authority but with his vulnerability. In the poem,
Charles's counterpart, David, is ultimately acquitted of his generative role
when maternal creative power, far from signaling a Lockean need to recon-
sider the origin of government, emerges as the primary and most dangerous
source of any challenge to the status quo. For Dryden it is the very variety and
ideological flexibility of accounts of generation that make them useful, and
he shapes and reshapes conception to suit his changing narrative needs.28
Absalom and Achitophel opens by suggesting that David has, at least in part,
conceived his own problems.29 Most obviously, because he is so "Promiscu-
ous" (6) and has sired bastard children "through the Land" (10), David has
encouraged his own destruction, producing a population that has little sym-
pathy for a system of privileges based on legitimacy and hereditary succes-
sion. As Howard Weinbrot suggests, "David makes his own rebellion by
propagating his own lawlessness in his lawless son and lawless nation."30
Absalom is especially dangerous because David has overindulged and failed
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to discipline him, encouraging the favored son to expect rights and opportuni-
ties he does not legally deserve.
But the problems of generation in the beginning of the poem are also
specifically related to the way David makes mothers at the same time that he
does children. We learn first that Michal, the royal wife, is barren because her
"Soyl [is] ungratefull to the Tiller's care," and next that
Not so the rest; for several Mothers bore
To Godlike David, several Sons before.
But since like slaves his bed they did ascend,
No True Succession could their seed attend. (13-16)
Precisely because it is confusing, this passage is important, as it generates a
variety of ways to interpret David's culpable behavior and the problem of
female desire. In many respects, Dryden at first seems remarkably sensitive to
the mothers, reflecting what James Winn has described as his "more than
occasional insight into the hard lot o f . . . women."31 But as Winn notes of
other works, this insight is also balanced by Dryden's tendency to lapse into
misogynistic conventions.32 Ultimately, the competing readings available at
the beginning of Absalom and Achitophel are narrowed, so that by the end
only the negative implications about female sexuality persist.
Let me unpack the various angles of interpretation initially available by
beginning with the "several Mothers." A quick reading suggests simply that
their problematic status is the source of the trouble with "True Succession";
based on earlier lines, it seems that because the women were not brides but
slaves or concubines, their children cannot be kings. But this explanation is
not entirely precise. The passage specifically emphasizes the sexual moment
when the several Mothers ascended David's bed "like slaves" (15). We are not
told that the women were slaves, and a careful reading of the opening reveals
that some may have actually been among David's many wives (9). Zwicker
points out that "the line suggests not just a technical category but sexual sla-
very or slavishness."33 Indeed, the stress is on the means by which the mothers
came to bed: if they entered like slaves, perhaps they were forced to lie with
the king. From this perspective, the problem of succession has as much to do
with the way the mothers were impregnated as it does with their status, the
implication being that it is because the women were passive objects of David's
desire and possibly victims of rape that their children are not fit for royalty.34
Lest this emphasis on the absence of female desire seem anachronistic,
we need only recall that until the middle of the eighteenth century, it was
widely believed that female pleasure and orgasm were necessary for concep-
tion.35 Thus, a seventeenth-century audience would likely have made a con-
nection between the mothers' sexual experiences and their success in
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generation. Dryden himself need not have been concerned with the question
of women's sexual rights to have been interested in the reproductive implica-
tions of female pleasure. At this point in the interpretation, however, it is hard
to understand how the women's sexual unwillingness would have affected the
"seed" of "True Succession" (16), as their enjoyment alone could not guaran-
tee a royal issue.
The relevance of sexual abuse is easier to document, since the poem
returns to the problem of rape a few lines later with a reference to the biblical
Absalom's murder of Amnon (39). In 2 Samuel, Absalom kills Amnon (his
half brother) for raping their sister, Tamar. The narrator in Dryden's poem
condemns Absalom's behavior, but nevertheless uses the attack on the brother
to foreshadow Absalom's attack on his father. This, plus the fact that Amnon
was also the king's son, invites us to consider the resemblance between Amnon
and David — even to wonder whether Absalom, who has killed his brother for
having offended his sister, may have reason to object to his father's treatment
of his mother.36
In the context of this layered allusion to David's problem with female
desire, the earlier description of how Michal's "Soyl" is "ungratefull" to David's
"care" reads not simply as an account of the queen's infertility but also as a
satiric comment on her own sexual experience with the king. Michal is clearly
distinguished from the "several Mothers" and Tamar, for there is no indica-
tion that she has been raped. But given David's apparent neglect of female
sexual feeling, as well as his notorious philandering, she may have little rea-
son to be grateful in bed. Perhaps, when it comes to lovemaking, the "Tiller's
care" is inadequate.37 For those seventeenth-century readers who believed that
conception depended on female orgasm, such sexual insensitivity could ex-
plain Michal's infertility. In order to prevent barrenness, "the man was . . .
obliged to ensure the woman's satisfaction."38 Modern readers have assumed
that the burden of infertility lies with Michal without considering the possi-
bility that David has failed to perform his sexual duty to please — and thereby
impregnate —his wife.
The connection between female pleasure and conception becomes more
complicated when read in relation to the "several Mothers." On the one hand,
the seemingly illogical suggestion that the several Mothers have not emitted
the "seed" of "True Succession" because the king neglected their desires makes
some sense if we interpret it as another account of failed conception. One
might argue that while the Mothers obviously prove fertile, their inferior chil-
dren reflect the inferiority of their own sexual experiences. The passage thereby
anticipates the description of Achitophel's son, who is born deformed because
he was conceived during a particularly unsavory act of intercourse (170-72).
The quality of lovemaking marks the quality of the product.
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On the other hand, if the connection between female orgasm and gen-
eration is taken literally, then regardless of the means by which they came to
David's bed, the several Mothers must have enjoyed themselves; otherwise,
they could not have proved fertile. Although there were medical theories that
challenged the relationship between female orgasm and conception, a woman's
pregnancy could be used to disprove an accusation of rape well into the eigh-
teenth century. As Richard Burn put it in his 1756 Justice of the Peace, "a
woman can not conceive unless she doth consent."39 According to this logic,
the several Mothers wanted what they got, an implication that anticipates
Achitophel's oft-noted suggestion that the king, like all women, secretly longs
to be raped (471-74; discussed in more detail below). Along these lines, one
can argue that the problem with the royal wife is that David has singled her
out and treated her with too much "care." If, like the several Mothers, Michal
had been abused in the way women secretly desire, perhaps she too would
have conceived.40
The competing readings available here serve both a political and a narra-
tive purpose. The poet exposes the king and acknowledges the problem of his
promiscuity, something necessary to gain credibility with an audience that
would have been well aware of Charles's sexual faults.41 But Dryden also pro-
tects David by leaving open the possibility that the main culpability lies else-
where—that the production of a rebellious population, and specifically of an
illicit son, was fueled primarily by maternal, not monarchal, desire. At this
point, however, the balance of responsibility is unclear, and the irresolution
generates useful suspense.
If anything, the case against David remains stronger. The king's apparent
indifference to female desire, for instance, is highlighted by his contrasting
indulgence of Absalom: "To all his wishes Nothing he deny'd, /And made the
Charming Annabel his Bride" (33-34; first emphasis added). These lines con-
tinue to draw attention to the problematic objectification of women (the gift
of Annabel indicates the extent to which Absalom has been spoiled), while
also introducing a homoerotic twist. Pointedly contrasting with his neglect of
women, the account of the king's excessive interest in pleasing his son (in this
case sexually) highlights David's disorientation. He gazes at the boy with "se-
cret Joy" because in Absalom David sees "His Youthfull Image . . . renew'd"
(32), and this narcissistic investment emphasizes the king's attraction to a
body that is the same as his own.42
The stress on David's physical similarity to Absalom is important for an-
other reason as well because it suggests that as a father he has exerted greater
control over the act of conception, corroborating the argument that he is re-
sponsible for producing the political problem embodied in the son. In gen-
eral, stressing what Filmer describes as the man's "principal agen[cy] in
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generation," the poem begins by offering an Aristotelian account of fertiliza-
tion, showing how the king ignites or works on female matter to shape his
progeny.43 If he has failed to heat the queen's soil, David has nevertheless
fruitfully imparted his "vigorous warmth" (8) throughout the land. In keeping
with later animalculist theories, which suggested that the full embryo existed
in the sperm, the beautiful Absalom seems to have sprung complete from his
father's seed. Apparently bearing no relationship to his mother, Absalom is
the product of his father's great desire and activity, perhaps even "inspir'd" by
David's "diviner Lust" and gotten "with a greater Gust" (19-20).
But then in contrast to the way Filmer celebrates and links male genera-
tive and governmental control, Dryden here exposes the political problems
of masculine conception. For if David has determined the development of
his son, then the father is ultimately the source of the troubles that ensue.44 As
with Achitophel, David's control of procreation is a dangerous one. Granted,
when we learn about Achitophel's act of fatherhood, it is clear that he is con-
siderably less successful than David; his son is an "unfeather'd two Leg'd thing"
who was "born a shapeless Lump, like Anarchy" because he was "Got, while
his [father's] Soul did hudled Notions try" (170-72). But, as different as their
sexual acts may have been and as different as their children now appear, both
David and Achitophel seem unilaterally to have begotten a political problem.
It is not until Absalom himself speaks that this account of paternal con-
ception begins to be redefined and the idea of the mother's participation is
clearly introduced. The moment marks the point at which the poem begins
to develop an increasingly more direct attack on maternal culpability. Tempted
by Achitophel's call for him to seek the political privileges he is denied, Absalom
memorably exclaims:
Yet oh that Fate Propitiously Enclined,
Had rais'd my Birth, or had debas'd my Mind;
To my large Soul, not all her Treasure lent,
And then Betray'd it to a mean Descent.
I find, I find my mounting Spirits Bold,
And David's Part disdains my Mothers Mold.
Why am I Scanted by a Niggard Birth?
My Soul Disclaims the Kindred of her Earth. (363-70)
On the one hand, Absalom's account of his own production repeats the ear-
lier Aristotelian model, stressing how the mother gives the matter and the
father creates action and soul. As before, the mother here is associated with
"Earth" and the physicality of birth; in addition to the "Soul," the father be-
queaths the "Mind" and "Spirits." However, in contrast to the opening of the
poem, this passage also rebalances the generational model by suggesting that
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the female parent's contribution is at least as important as the male's to the
development of the child: thus, "David's Part" is evenly balanced by "my
Mothers Mold," the latter an arresting formulation since it suggests that the
mother has the power to shape her offspring and it conflicts with the way
David sees the child as an image of himself. Indeed, what torments Absalom
is the extent to which he sees his mother in himself—the extent to which he
feels that, as one of her "Kindred," he is indelibly marked by a "mean De-
scent." Absalom longs to rise out of this maternal boundary, but to his frustra-
tion he cannot.45
The narrator encourages us to agree with Absalom's account of maternal
influence. We are told that, when tempted by Achitophel's promise of power,
Absalom is "Half loath, and half consenting to the 111, / (For Royal Blood
within him struggled still)" (313-14), meaning that when he agrees to rebel
Absalom is influenced by his ignoble blood, the mother's half.46 Such intima-
tions would, for a seventeenth-century audience, have been strengthened by
the scandalous history of Monmouth's mother, Lucy Walter, a woman ru-
mored to have been a whore of "mean Descent." She died (perhaps of vene-
real disease) shortly after Charles removed their young son from her care. Not
all of the rumors were true, but Lucy was well known for her affairs, and she
created considerable trouble for the king, which Monmouth would later com-
pound.47
In addition to evoking memories of Monmouth's actual mother, the nar-
rator reinforces Absalom's account of maternal influence by associating him
with Milton's Eve throughout the seduction scene. As Frank Ellis points out,
"Dryden would not forget that it is Eve whom Satan deceives," and he creates
here "an androgynous Monmouth" marked by an effeminate beauty to dra-
matize the connection.48 So too, as with Satan and Eve, the serpentine
Achitophel "sheds his Venome, in . . . words" (229) that ultimately flatter and
provoke the initially resisting child to turn against the father and reach for the
"Fruit . . . upon the Tree" (250-51). The desire that Achitophel arouses in
Absalom is framed as a feminine one, linked to that experienced by Milton's
"general Mother." And the danger that Absalom poses, intensified by the ru-
mors that Monmouth's mother was a whore, shifts attention away from the
critique of the king's sexual excesses and toward the earlier intimation that the
political problem is the consequence of feminine longing.
Like the description of David's eagerness to please his son, the interac-
tion between Absalom and Achitophel can also be read as a homoerotic one,
but whereas his father once indulged him, Achitophel is seducing Absalom to
satisfy his own needs.49 Oblivious to the various ways in which he has been
feminized, Absalom himself is attracted by Achitophel's false promise of greater
masculinity. Achitophel begins by assuring Absalom that if he dares to seize
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the temptress Fortune he can enjoy a kind of sexual conquest reminiscent of
his father's:
Now, now she meets you, with a glorious prize,
And spreads her Locks before her as she flies.
Had thus Old David, from whose Loyns you spring,
Not dar'd, when Fortune call'd him, to be King,
At Goth an Exile he might still remain. (260-64)50
Reminding the son of his own debt to David's sexual fertility and invoking an
image of exclusive paternal generation that has already proved problematic
(Absalom springs from David's "Loyns"), Achitophel encourages Absalom to
imitate his father and gain the advantage of sexual dominance. Next, he
changes his strategy and puts David in Fortune's position, arguing that the
king himself is the feminine figure whom Absalom must conquer. After twice
describing David as "Naked" (280, 400) and stressing that he lacks "Manly
Force" (382), Achitophel famously urges Absalom to commit "a pleasing Rape
upon the Crown" (474), suggesting that the king "by Force . . . wishes to be
gain'd / Like womens Leachery, to seem Constraint" (471-72). The descrip-
tion does the trick: "And this Advice above the rest, / With Absalom's Mild
nature suited best" (477-78).
If the "Mild" Absalom is really moved by the idea that he will be doing
what his father wants, it is notably the image of rape that persuades him to
act. Evoking the opening allusion to the king's capacity to rape and Achitophel's
demand that he ravish Fortune like his father before him, the passage suggests
that Absalom is driven to become his father's sexual replacement, perhaps
hoping that he can exert the very force against David that David has so mag-
nificently displayed, or that he can reverse the abusive act that injured his
birth by becoming his father's abuser. In either case, according to Achitophel,
rape is productive, an implication that plays off the opening example of the
prolific "several Mothers" brought like slaves to David's bed. Apparently con-
sumed by the evidence of his father's virility, Absalom needs to imagine the
king as an effeminate figure whom he can dominate in order to re-create
himself.
But Absalom's fantasy of masculine grandeur proves simply ironic, first
because the rape he and Achitophel imagine performing is pointedly homo-
erotic and, second, because Absalom is actually the one who, like Eve and the
whorish Lucy Walter, is being seduced throughout the scene. When he thinks
he will become most virile, the son is really the reverse. The contrast high-
lights David's genuine manliness, reminding us that Achitophel's account of
the king's effeminacy is just as much a ploy as his description of Absalom's
machismo, and that although David may have been too eager to please his
Aborting the "Mother Plot" 97
son, he is nevertheless the man who has not only demonstrated the potential
to rape but done so with women. So too, Achitophel's efforts to paint David as
old and impotent are undercut by the narrator's earlier assurance that
Achitophel is actually the one who "Refuse [s] his Age the needful hours of
Rest" (166). He may have an impact on Absalom, but Achitophel cannot
function successfully enough in bed with a woman to generate a well-shaped
child. The accumulating evidence of the sexual differences between David
and these men begins to reconfigure the implications about the king's behav-
ior. David's aggressive promiscuity with women is no longer necessarily a prob-
lem so much as a mark of his masculine authenticity. And it is in keeping with
his virility that far from wishing "by Force . . . to be gain'd" (471), David
ultimately proves instead that he is "not Good by Force" (950).
But if Achitophel's description of how women secretly long to be raped
finally fails to define the king's position, it nevertheless is gradually validated
as an accurate account of feminine sexual desire, a turn that revises the open-
ing emphasis on women's passivity and possible victimization. Not only does
Absalom demonstrate a feminine readiness to be seduced, but the crowd,
which he (now playing the role of a man) in turn seduces, is lecherously
interested in his overtures. Aroused by his good looks, the people open them-
selves to Absalom, enjoying his penetration. As "He glides unfelt into their
secret hearts," his "words" are "easy" and "fit," "slow" and "sweet" (693-97). In
this context, the accounts of how "govern'd by the Moon, the giddy Jews" by
"natural Instinct" often "change their Lord" (216-19) and are apt to leave
themselves "Defensless, to the Sword / Of each unbounded Arbitrary Lord"
(761-62) read as further evidence of the people's sexual exposure and whorish
eagerness to be raped.
Some of David's enemies are also marked by their capacity to be "Seduc'd"
(498) and by their effeminacy. Zimri (standing for Buckingham, who had a
notorious affair with the countess of Shrewsbury) may seem as fertile as the
king, but the "ten thousand freaks that dy'd in thinking" (552) that he sires
signal his failures of conception and resemble Achitophel's monstrous son.
Demonstrating what Weinbrot characterizes as an "impotence of which
Charles is free," Zimri may be "Stiff in Opinions" but he performs "every
thing by starts, and nothing long" (547-48).51 And like the fickle and whorish
Jews, he too is influenced by the feminine "Moon" (549). Corah (who repre-
sents Titus Oates) is just as bad. Although he stands "Erect," Corah's "Monu-
mental Brass" only proves his masculine inauthenticity (633), especially
because it was well known that Oates had been dismissed from his office as
chaplain for the navy after committing sodomy while on ship.52
Like Monmouth, Oates was also rumored to be illegitimate and, echoing
the description of Absalom's development from and desire to rise above
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maternal matter, Corah's "base" birth originates in "Earthy Vapours," although
he seeks to "shine in Skies" (636-37). The implicit return to the problem of
the maternal prepares us for the later account of Barzillai's son (the earl of
Ossory), Dryden's "concept of the ideal" male child, whose legitimate birth
and noble death enable him to be free of matter in a way that Absalom and
Corah cannot.53 Unlike Absalom, torn between "David's Part" and his "Mothers
Mold" (368), Barzillai's child fulfills "All parts . . . of Subject and of Son"
(836; emphasis added), suggesting that he reflects his father more completely
than the divided Absalom. The passage as a whole, however, does not so much
endorse a paternal model of generation as establish the advantages of escap-
ing feminine origins. When Ossory dies
Now, free from Earth, thy disencumbered Soul
Mounts up, and leaves behind the Clouds and Starry Pole
From thence thy kindred legions mayst thou bring
To aid the guardian Angel of thy King. (850-53)
In echoing Absalom's earlier longing to escape his mother's influence — "I
find my mounting Spirits Bold . . . / My Soul Disclaims the Kindred of her
Earth" (367-70)—the lines define the essential difference between the men.
Where Absalom is grounded in the maternal earth, Ossory's soul can mount
above it. Ultimately his "kindred" transcends the feminine.
When David reappears in the finale he seems to have reaped some of
Ossory's advantages without having to die. Demonstrating the true superior-
ity of a godly ruler, he is closer to heaven than ordinary mortals and suddenly
free of earthly faults. Originally "inspir'd by some diviner Lust" (19), David
now speaks "from his Royal Throne by Heav'n inspir'd" (936).54 He thus bears
a greater resemblance to his "Maker" than he did when he was self-indul-
gently scattering his own image throughout the land. Nevertheless, the differ-
ence remains between the legitimate Ossory and the illegitimate Absalom
and thus between the virtuous Barzillai and the promiscuous David. As if
recognizing the problem of his reputation, David pointedly reconfigures his
history of sexual indulgence in his speech, completing the poem's attack on
maternal desire and danger, and finally proving that he is not responsible for
generating the child of disorder (though he may be guilty of the lesser charge
of having raised Absalom "up to all the Height his Frame coud bear" [962]
and thus of having given him a false sense of potency). Even as he resolves the
initial problem of the poem, then, Dryden leaves open the possibility that
David, like Achitophel, is simply developing a rhetorical strategy that is nec-
essary for his own political survival.
Part of David's strategy is to emphasize his phallic advantage, magnified
now for readers by the contrasting effeminacy of his enemies. Unlike Zimri,
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for instance, who is "nothing long" (548), David's "Manly [temper] can the
longest bear" (948). And he is prepared to exercise his potency on the "Fac-
tious crowds" (1018) — to "rise upon 'em with redoubled might: / For Lawfull
Pow'r is still Superiour found, / When long driven back, at length it stands the
ground" (1023-25). David here defines governmental repression in terms of
his lawful right to phallic conquest, and in so doing, he reverses the opening
intimation of his lawless capacity for sexual abuse.55
But David's defense of his phallic authority cannot, in itself, solve the
problem of the conception of Absalom and the Plot. To extricate himself, the
king still needs to prove that the burden of desire and generation lies else-
where. He is at an advantage with the reader because the text has increasingly
emphasized the problem of the people's desire. In addition to the crowd's
prostitution before Absalom discussed above, the opening describes how the
Jews "led their wild desires to Woods and Caves, /And thought that all but
Savages were Slaves" (55-56). At the conclusion David is finally convinced
that "no Concessions from the Throne woud please" (925). And when the
narrator defends hereditary succession, he specifically insists that the reason
subjects should never be given the right to choose their own ruler is that "Then
Kings are slaves to those whom they Command, /And Tenants to their Peoples
pleasure stand" (775-76). In weighting the problem of desire with the popu-
lace, the text reconceptualizes the whole issue of slavery. If it begins by ques-
tioning David's enslavement of women, the poem subsequently stresses the
savagery of a people in need of control and suggests that the king had better
play the part of "Master" (938) lest he himself become a slave. Given Charles's
central role in sponsoring the Royal African Company, these passages argu-
ably serve a colonialist purpose, functioning to support England's expanding
empire and role in the slave trade.56
But by shifting the onus of desire away from the king, the passages also
prepare the reader for David's ultimate attack on maternal longing and re-
sponsibility. First David links the petitioners' pretended interest in his ap-
proval of their choice of king to the way "Esau's Hands suite ill with Jacob's
Voice" (982), recalling another biblical mother who, like Eve, plotted to un-
dermine the father. After all, Jacob deceives Isaac in Genesis 27:13 only be-
cause Rebekah urges him to do so, assuring him that "Upon me be thy curse."
Next, David insists that, as with Absalom, he has been far too indulgent
with his people —and especially with his enemies in Parliament—who are
"Unsatiate as the barren Womb or Grave; / God cannot Grant so much as
they can Crave" (987-88). Developing a wonderful counterpart to the open-
ing possibilities that Michal is barren either because he has neglected her
needs for sexual arousal or because he has not delivered the force she secretly
wants, David instead figures his subjects' ravenous longing as the result of
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their feminine infertility. The problem is not that he has in some way failed to
satisfy feminine desire, but rather that such longing is so uncontrollable that
nothing he could have done would have produced a solution. Bearing no
relationship to the king's own behavior, the empty womb becomes the driving
force of the revolt, reminding us that if only the queen had been fertile all
might be well.
David's final maternal image completes the reconfiguration of the several
Mothers. Adopting an opposite strategy than the one above, the king now
blames his problems on feminine fertility as he anticipates his enemies' self-
destruction by exclaiming:
By their own arts 'tis Righteously decreed,
Those dire Artificers of Death shall bleed.
Against themselves their Witnesses will Swear,
Till Viper-like their Mother Plot they tear:
And suck for Nutriment that bloody gore
Which was their Principle of Life before. (1010-15)
Originally unrelated to the rebel son, the mother here becomes the plot against
the king, her pregnant body the bloody incubator of revolt. Compared with
the description of Achitophel's and Zimri's children, the birth of the vipers is
the most monstrous of all, in part because here, for the first time, the mother
alone provides the "Principle of Life." Having moved from a paternal to a
joint parental model of generation, the poem ends, ironically, with the same
emphasis on the power of pregnancy that Locke would later endorse: the
offspring "is fashion'd [in the mother's womb], and from her it receives the
Materials and Principles of its Constitution."'7 But unlike Locke, Dryden fig-
ures maternal generation as the ultimate horror. His emphasis evokes not
Harvey's or the ovists' accounts of the importance of the egg so much as an
ancient and enduring myth about pregnant mothers (discussed in more de-
tail in Julia Epstein's article in this volume). Mounting embryological re-
search had done little to erode the widespread belief that a woman's mental
state and desires could affect and distort the child in her womb, even turning
it into a monster.58 It was assumed that frustrated maternal longings could
mark and injure the fetus, and as one eighteenth-century gynecological text-
book explained, any excessive feeling might impress "a Depravity of Nature
upon the Infant's Mind, and Deformity on its Body."S9 Suggesting that the
development and birth of the vipers is the result of a Mother Plot, Dryden's
image exonerates the father by emphasizing the gestatory danger of a certain
kind of intensive maternal thinking.60
Moreover, according to ancient lore about vipers and in keeping with theo-
ries about monstrous births, the progeny here is specifically the product of the
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mother's excessive desire. In addition to recalling Spenser's Error and Milton's
Sin, the description of the viper is based on popular fables, one of which ex-
plains that when vipers copulate, the male puts his "head into the mouth of the
female, who is so insatiable in the desire of that copulation, that when the male
hath filled her with his seed-genital... she biteth" off his head and kills him. As
a result, the young she conceives, "in revenge of their fathers death, do likewise
destroy their mother, for they eate out her belly, and by an unnatural issue
come forth."61 If there were any question at the beginning, the answer is now
unmistakable: the female not only wants to copulate but she is voracious, and
the offspring that result are marked by her hunger. The depiction of the viper
completes David's acquittal, dramatizing the uncontrollable danger of mater-
nal sexuality and his own victimization as father.62 Far from producing the plot,
David has fallen prey to it. The comfort, however, lies in the certain knowl-
edge that he will be avenged when his rebels turn against their mother and, in
destroying her body and consuming their own placenta, effectively abort them-
selves. Beautifully, even these vipers will participate in the father's defense.
Because it recalls the way Achitophel developed the plot by shedding
words of "Venome" (229), the image of the viper also completes the attack on
his manliness by associating him with a monstrous mother. Now the earlier
description of his "shapeless Lump" (172) of a son has a different ring. H.T.
Swedenberg suggests that the word Lump refers "to the soulless body or to the
primordial matter of chaos."63 Perhaps, then, Achitophel has not simply failed
in his paternal mission to shape his progeny and give it a soul; perhaps the
child remains a form of chaotic maternal material because that is actually all
he has to offer.64
Tearing out of their mother's belly, the vipers are the last in a series of
images suggesting that those associated with the plot have grown too large for
the containment of the body. From the opening, the plot itself is a raging
fever, boiling the blood so that it "bubbles o'r" (136-39) and "Foam[s]" (141)
out of physical boundaries. Similarly, Absalom's "warm excesses . . . / Were
constru'd Youth that purg'd by boyling o'r" (37-38). And Achitophel cannot
stay inside himself, for his "fiery Soul . . .  working out its way, / Fretted the
Pigmy Body to decay" (156-57). It is in keeping with such details that, at the
end of the poem, David finally recognizes the way the people, bearing the
"Wound" of a "fomenting] . . .  Disease" (924-26), cannot be placated or
restrained. The recurring ideas of blood, disease, and interior pressure, con-
cluding in the final description of the viper birth, construe the revolt itself as
the inevitable rupture of a swelling pregnancy.65 And the discussions of how
the "Plot [that] is made" (751) is designed to persuade people that they "have
a Right Supreme /To make their Kings" (409-10, see also 795) read in this
context as warnings about the danger of offering the subjects any kind of
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gestatory power. If the populace believes that kings are made, not designated —
if it assumes the right to create a ruler—then like the mother viper, it too will
become the breeder of chaos.
Dryden's dismissal of the theory of patriarchal procreation reflects a larger
political trend. Pateman suggests that "the classic patriarchalism of the seven-
teenth century was the last time that masculine political creativity appeared
as a paternal power or that political right was seen as father-right." Dryden's
poem might then be read as marking the end of an ideal, the moment when
the generative father-king is no longer a viable image. So too, the attack on
maternity anticipates the misogynist implications that, according to Pateman,
shaped the contractual body born out of the lost father—the "body of the
'individual'" whose form is "very different from women's bodies. His body is
tightly enclosed within boundaries, but women's bodies are permeable, their
contours change shape and they are subject to cyclical processes. All these
differences are summed up in the natural bodily process of birth."66 Among
other things, Dryden's explosive mother viper proves that the female cannot
contain political rights.
But the familial images in Absalom and Achitophel are also specifically
related to the particular details of the Exclusion Crisis and Dryden's determi-
nation to support the king. Given the nature of Monmouth's role, Dryden
could not have depended on traditional patriarchal theory to defend the mon-
arch even if he had wanted to, because it appeared in part to be Charles's act
of fatherhood that threatened his position as king as well as the endurance of
royal succession. To emphasize how a ruler, especially one who promiscu-
ously generated a rebellious son, "had, by right of fatherhood, royal authority
over [his] children" and subjects would simply have highlighted the irony of
the situation.67
The poem's attack on maternity instead enables the king to rise by virtue
of contrast. Locke's debate with Filmer suggests that, whether or not it was
explicitly acknowledged, the fatherly model of kingship was sustained by de-
nying the role of motherhood in the family. "That the Mother too hath her
Title," Locke cautions, "destroys the Sovereignty of one Supream Monarch."68
Dryden clearly capitalizes on this rhetorical tension between motherhood
and monarchy, although for political reasons much different from Locke's.
Unable to rely on David's paternity as proof of his right to govern, he turns to
the other parent and proves her more harmful. Demonstrating that to intro-
duce the mother into the governmental model is to invite disaster and effec-
tively "Physick [the] Disease into a worse" (810), Dryden argues thatthe mother
must be erased if a stable kingship is to be maintained; in so doing he upholds
one of the most basic premises of patriarchal theory.69
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By insisting on the mother's primary role in conception, the poem can
end by disposing of the notion that David was sexually responsible for making
his own chaos. Maternal productivity, the consequence of a feminine desire
that far outstrips David's own, is the ultimate danger. And David's virtue is
marked by his removal from all aspects of the process of generation. The king
proves stable both because he suggests that his blood did not create the child
of blood and because he rises above average mortals, becoming someone
who is not (and should never be) bred or made by them, someone whose
origins are fundamentally dissociated from the feminine earth.
But perhaps what is in the end most compelling about the politics of
generation in Absalom and Achitophel is the variety of narratives about sexual-
ity and the family that emerge before this conclusion. Dryden develops a model
of maternal generation in order to defend the royalist tradition as best he can
under the circumstances, but because he has adopted and discarded other
models along the way, the work ultimately reflects the ideological flexibility of
a familial political theory that could be shaped to suit various purposes. At a
time when the traditional emphasis on patriarchal procreation was on the
wane, when the inevitability of royal succession had long been subject to doubt,
and when there was no uniform scientific account of the creation of the hu-
man body, any political defense that depended on the image of governmental
generation was necessarily unstable and open to rhetorical play. If Dryden
ends with an account of maternal monstrosity and a nonprocreative monar-
chy that solves the problem with which his poem began, he also proves in the
process the ease with which his own structure could be dismantled — espe-
cially because the questions of who comes next and how are still unresolved.
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to His Friend in the Country, but Shaftesbury recalled him in 1679 to assist him dur-
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69. Dryden's treatment of the mother thus typifies what Zwicker describes as his
general approach to the problem of patriarchal theory: "Without burdening himself
with the full run of the patriarchal argument, [Dryden] places it within the poem and
by implication and innuendo endorses its language and principles": Lines of Author-
ity, 149.
The Pregnant Imagination,
Women's Bodies, and
Fetal Rights
Prologue
The essay that follows was written in 1994 and appeared in the Yale Journal of
Law and the Humanities 7 (winter 1995): 198-211. Its statistics reflect its date
of publication, although no substantial change has occurred since then to
make me rethink the arguments detailed here. The project I undertook after
completing this one was, I thought at first, wholly unrelated. I began to col-
laborate with a colleague at the Temple University School of Law, Jane B.
Baron, on a study involving the uses legal scholars have made of narrative
theory. The law, many assert, turns on the recounting of stories and their in-
terpretation. Proponents of legal storytelling come primarily from the ranks
of feminists, poverty lawyers, and critical race theorists. Having proposed that
the law rests on a narrative foundation of human stories, these scholars go on
to argue that not everyone in the legal arena has an equal chance to tell her
story or to have his story adequately heard. Not surprisingly, these silenced
voices tend to be the voices of racial and ethnic minorities, women, the poor,
gays and lesbians, and immigrants — in other words, "outsiders." Indeed, much
of this work goes by the name "outsider scholarship," and one of the key ar-
ticles in the field is entitled "Storytelling for Oppositionists."1
Some of the legal storytelling scholarship also uses personal narrative,
most famously Susan Estrich's account of being raped at knifepoint to intro-
duce an article on rape law, and Patricia Williams's story of her treatment by
the clerks in a Benetton store to illustrate the gap between the legal definition
and the felt experience of racism.2 The account I offer below also investigates
the personal stories of women. I argue that parallels exist between the eigh-
teenth-century ascription of birth malformations to pregnant women's imagi-
nations and the current trend toward criminalizing the behavior of pregnant
women on the grounds that it endangers their fetuses. Looking at this argu-
ment from the perspective of the legal storytelling debates, it now seems clear
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that there is another parallel. In the eighteenth century, women were the arbi-
ters and the authoritative voices in relating their experiences of pregnancy
and childbirth. They were trusted to tell their own stories, and those stories
were given weight and credence. In the late twentieth century, in contrast,
pregnant women have been disenfranchised from storytelling. Their stories
are mediated through professional legal and medical discourses that
disempower the experiencing subject and turn her into an acted-upon object.
# # $
Competing historical and cultural understandings of the human body make
clear that medicine and the law construe bodily truths from differing knowl-
edge bases. Jurists rely on medical testimony to analyze biological data, and
medical professionals are not usually conversant in the legal ramifications of
their diagnoses. In early modern Europe, physicians and jurists recognized
that their respective professions were governed by different epistemological
standards, a view articulated by Felix Vicq d'Azyr (1748-94), anatomist and
secretary to the French Royal Society of Medicine. Vicq d'Azyr noted that
whereas lawyers were required to make unyielding decisions based on con-
flicting laws, customs, and decrees, physicians were permitted more latitude
for uncertainty.3 In the late twentieth century, western medicine and law have
become inextricably entwined as technologies have produced new ethical
problems for medicolegal jurisprudence.
The authority of women to describe their experiences of pregnancy and
childbirth before and during the eighteenth century contrasts powerfully with
the twentieth century's reliance on medicolegal decisions to define these ex-
periences. In early modern Europe, women controlled information, experi-
ence, and beliefs concerning reproduction, and women held authority over
it. A woman only became officially and publicly pregnant when she felt her
fetus quicken, or move inside her, and she alone could ascertain and report
the occurrence of quickening. In 1765, William Blackstone's Commentaries
on the Laws of England concluded that life "begins in the contemplation of
law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb."4
A pregnancy did not exist until there was quickening, as announced by
the pregnant woman, and a child did not exist until it was born alive. Preg-
nancy in the West today, in contrast, usually entails certification by a medical
professional and is verifiable through a number of tactile, laboratory, and
visual interventions into a woman's body, from palpation to chemical analysis
to ultrasonography. Focus on the fetus as an entity that is available to medical
and legal professionals for pronouncement and intervention, and that can be
discussed separately from the womb that contains it, is very much a modern
phenomenon.5 In a sense, female interiority has been made public, while
women's bodily exterior has attained juridical and moral privacy rights.6
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It is useful to examine these sharp contrasts between eighteenth- and twen-
tieth-century ideas about pregnancy in order to understand the quagmire that
has trapped attitudes toward pregnant women. During the eighteenth century
in Europe, heated controversy surrounded the issue of whether the mental
activity of a pregnant woman could cause her fetus to become misshapen and
thus to be born malformed. Analyzing the way this controversy was articu-
lated in Enlightenment Europe helps us to understand the recent trend to-
ward criminalizing the behavior or status of pregnant women in relation to
their gestating fetuses. Knowing the history of the thorny decisions we face
concerning women and reproduction can help us to appreciate the contro-
versies in which we are currently embroiled.
In 1991, a Florida appellate court upheld Jennifer Clarice Johnson's 1989
conviction under a Florida statute that criminalizes delivery of controlled
substances to minors. Her newborn infant had tested positive for cocaine.
Johnson was convicted for "gestational substance abuse" and sentenced to
drug rehabilitation and fifteen years probation. The court found that Johnson
had passed crack cocaine to her fetus through the umbilical cord; its opinion
signaled the first successful prosecution of a pregnant woman in the United
States for prenatal damage to a fetus. The following year, the Florida Su-
preme Court unanimously overturned the conviction, declining "the State's
invitation to walk down a path that the law, public policy, reason and com-
mon sense forbid it to tread."' By mid-1992, more than 160 women had been
prosecuted in the United States for drug use during pregnancy through a
variety of charges (e.g., criminal child abuse, assault with a deadly weapon,
drug trafficking), although at this writing no state or federal laws specifically
criminalize prenatal maternal behavior. Most of the women who were pros-
ecuted were women of color living in poverty. Many pleaded guilty or ac-
cepted plea bargains, but all twenty-three women who have challenged their
prosecutions to date have won their cases on grounds that their prosecutions
were unconstitutional or without legal basis.8
Jennifer Johnson, twenty-three years old, poor, and African-American,
became the first woman in the United States to be convicted of delivering
drugs to her fetus in utero. Crucial to her prosecution was the fact that Johnson
was not convicted of using drugs, only of exposing her fetus to drugs. Had
Johnson terminated her pregnancy, the prosecution would never have taken
place. The charges brought against, Johnson concerned drug exposure rather
than harm. The government introduced no evidence to prove that Johnson's
drug use adversely affected her children; on the contrary, there was testimony
that Johnson's children were healthy and normal. Dorothy E. Roberts has
argued that race and class figured prominently in the Johnson prosecution
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and generally influence the state's choice to punish, rather than to provide
services for, pregnant drug addicts, who are primarily poor African-Americans.
"These women are not punished simply because they may harm their unborn
children," Roberts asserts. "They are punished because the combination of
their poverty, race, and drug addiction is seen to make them unworthy of
procreating."9
Criminal cases such as the one brought against Jennifer Johnson have
profound repercussions for ideas about women's bodies, pregnancy, and fe-
tuses. Such prosecutions necessarily vest fetuses with the status of persons
whose rights can be asserted against the rights of their mothers, thereby creat-
ing an adversarial relationship between pregnant women and their fetuses.
The legal notion of fetal personhood is relatively new in our legal discourse
and, ironically, results in part from the 1973 Supreme Court decision on abor-
tion in Roe v. Wade. In Roe, the court held that "the unborn have never been
recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense," and that the word per-
son, as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, "does not include the unborn."10
However, the trimester division that defined "viability" in Roe paradoxically
relied on the determination of a certain moment at which a fetus becomes an
entity separate and separable in law from its mother. Fetal viability as a con-
cept inherits much of the power of quickening, but with the crucial difference
that it is decided by physicians and jurists rather than by pregnant women.11
In early modern Europe, the pregnant woman was responsible for prena-
tal care, because pregnancy was not the medicalized condition it is today.
The period's advice literature tended to be written by and for women (al-
though only a small percentage of women, mostly in the upper classes, could
read), and included counsel on nutrition, exercise, and travel as well as reci-
pes for abortifacients, often described as mixtures to bring on menstruation or
to remove false pregnancies.12 The literature advised pregnant women not to
travel in carriages or ride horseback and not to consume strong liquor or spicy
foods. Some advice, and its underlying rationale, differed from today's advice
for pregnant women. Wine, for example, was often recommended during
pregnancy, but strong drink while pregnant or lactating was thought to cause
childhood rickets. The traditional diet in England during the seventeenth cen-
tury was highly salted and included a high consumption of alcohol, estimated
by Robert Fogel at the stunning amount of between three and nine ounces of
absolute alcohol daily.13 However, nothing existed that bore any resemblance
to our current ideas about the etiology of fetal alcohol syndrome.14
A long history predates recent challenges to maternal autonomy in deci-
sion-making about pregnancy and in blame for its outcome. In Dietrich v.
Northampton (1884), Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes denied cause for wrongful
death in the case of a premature fetus that died after its mother had fallen.
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Holmes argued that the fetus is part of the mother and is not owed a separate
duty of care. Courts followed Holmes's analysis concerning prenatal injuries
until 1946, when a District of Columbia court recognized a fetus as a "dis-
tinct individual."15 Thus, the concept of fetal personhood in United States law
is a post-World War II phenomenon.
"At all stages of pregnancy," writes Lynn M. Paltrow, "the fetus is com-
pletely dependent on the woman as everything she does could affect it. . . .
Recognizing 'fetal abuse' moves us toward criminalizing pregnancy itself be-
cause no woman can provide the perfect womb."16 Paltrow argues that we
face a slippery slope: the prohibition against cocaine could similarly promote
bias against alcohol and tobacco, strenuous exercise, poor nutrition, driving a
car, riding in an airplane, or owning a gun. The imperfect womb, while not
the object of legal sanctions until after 1946, has been targeted for centuries
as the source and foundation for birth disabilities and malformations. Although
the move toward criminalizing the conduct of pregnant women is radically
new in U.S. jurisprudence, it harks back to an ancient tradition of searching
for explanations for birth mishaps in the minds and bodies of pregnant women,
a tradition that reached its peak during the eighteenth century.
Eighteenth-century physiologists, philosophers, and medical commentators
engaged in a heated debate about whether or not imaginative activity in
the minds of pregnant women could explain birthmarks and birth defects.
Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century developments in embryology and neu-
rophysiology were crucial for the unfolding of this quarrel about pregnancy
and the power of mind. The adversarial and internally conflicting discourses
that constituted this debate grew out of a range of cultural beliefs about the
human body and about women and mothering, and they were embedded in
eighteenth-century medical writings.
Bodily borders were ambiguously demarcated in the eighteenth century.17
The physical body was known to have a skin, which represented not only a
boundary but also a fluid surface on which interior life revealed itself.18 Inside
and outside, body/self and external world operated in a process of continual
exchange. Early in the century, women did not "reproduce" when they bore
children; rather, they participated in generatio, or fruitfulness. The reproduc-
tive apparatus of a woman's body that today is classified and studied under the
medical rubrics of obstetrics and gynecology did not exist as a unit of medical
knowledge in the early eighteenth century. Fetuses were nourished and devel-
oped by women, whose anatomical structures were far better understood than
their functions.
During the eighteenth century, Europeans insisted that bodies serve as
classificatory systems in relation to one another. Categories of the body
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delimited both sensory experience and notions of autonomy and aesthetics.
The female body could create monstrosity through its capacity for genera-
tion.19 By the mid-nineteenth century, representations of women's bodies were
assimilated into an etherealized domestic ideal, but early-eighteenth-century
images of women reflected the perceived threat of an unsocialized, willful,
and appetite-driven female sexuality.20 In the eighteenth century, Europeans
believed that ideas manifested themselves across the bodies of pregnant women.
The eighteenth-century maternal imagination debates were therefore crucial
not only for their cultural representation and medical analysis of women's
bodies, but also for the ability of women to control their own lives.
In London in 1714, English surgeon Daniel Turner published a medical
treatise called De Morbis Cutaneis-.A Treatise of Diseases Incident to the Skin.
Turner's brief treatise was important as the first English dermatology text in
the history of medicine, but its fame rests on the vehement debate it pro-
voked. In De Morbis Cutaneis, Turner defined what he called "that Faculty of
the sensitive Soul called Phansy or Imagination" as a physiological power
that resided in the brain. It operated, he argued, by irradiating nervous fluid
inward in response to impressions received by the external organs, admittedly
a vague definition from a modern perspective. Turner needed to define the
imagination in his treatise on skin diseases because he made a controversial
claim in his chapter about the causes of birthmarks. That chapter carried a
typically long-winded eighteenth-century title: "Of Spots and Marks of a di-
verse Resemblance, imprest upon the Skin of the Foetus, by the Force of the
Mother's Fancy; with some Things premis'd, of the strange and almost in-
credible Power of Imagination, more especially in pregnant Women."21 Turner
could not explain his claim. In fact, he wrote: "How these strange Alterations
should be wrought, or the Foetus cut, wounded and maimed, as if the same
were really done with a Weapon, whilst the Mother is unhurt, and merely by
the Force of her Imagination, is, I must confess ingenuously,... Supra Captum,
i.e., above my Understanding" (116-17).
James Augustus Blondel, a Parisian educated at the University of Leiden
and a noted member of the London College of Physicians, responded to
Turner's assertion with vituperation. Blondel asked, "What can be more scan-
dalous, and provoking, than to suppose, that those whom God Almighty has
endow'd, not only with so many charms, but also with an extraordinary Love
and Tenderness for their Children, instead of answering the End they are
made for, do bread [sic] Monsters by the Wantonness of their Imagination?"22
The theory of the maternal imagination, or maternal impressions, em-
braced two ideas. First, a pregnant woman's longings, if ungratified, were
understood to mark her fetus. Hence, if a woman's overwhelming desire for
strawberries could not be satisfied, her infant would be born with a strawberry
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mark.23 Cravings (or aversions) of this sort did not always involve food. They
could also pertain to religious or sexual activities or to obsessive acts or thoughts.
Yet it is telling that the vast majority of examples of the first type of maternal
impression involve a pregnant woman's uncontrollable appetite for fruit. The
French physician-theologian Nicholas de Malebranche, a central influence
on Turner, had written in his 1674 De la recherche de la verite that a mother's
desire for fruit caused the fetus to imagine and desire the fruit as well, so that
"these unfortunate infants thus become like the things they desire too ardently."
It is not hard to find here a theological analogy between monstrous offspring
and forbidden fruit.24
Second, the pregnant woman needed to avoid disturbing experiences at
all costs, on the theory that negative experiences would be mirrored in a re-
lated physical deformity in her child. For example, if the sight of a street
beggar missing the fingers of one hand startled her, her infant would be born
lacking the fingers of the corresponding hand. The pseudonymous early-eigh-
teenth-century midwifery handbook, Aristotle's Compleat and Experienc'd
Midwife, contained this advice: "Let none present any strange and unwhole-
some Thing to her, nor so much as name it, lest she should desire it, and not
be able to get it, and so either cause her to Miscarry, or the Child to have
some Deformity on that Account."25 John Maubray went further in his popu-
lar Female Physician (1724). Maubray placed responsibility for these misad-
ventures on the pregnant woman herself. "She ought discreetly," Maubray
wrote, "to suppress all Anger, Passion, and other Perturbations of Mind, and
avoid entertaining too serious or melancholick Thoughts; since all such tend to
impress a Depravity of Nature upon the Infant's Mind, and Deformity on its
Body." In addition, Maubray suggested that pregnant women must maintain
domestic harmony in their households and marriages. According to Maubray,
"There never ought so much as a Cloud to appear in [her] Conjugal Society;
since all such unhappy Accidents strongly affect the growing Infant."26
Families took seriously the desires of pregnant women and the need to
satisfy them. A striking example of this truth: when his pregnant wife told the
German botanist Joachim Camerarius (1534-98) that she felt overwhelmed
by the need to smash a dozen eggs in his face, he obliged her by submitting to
her desire.27 The best-known maternal imagination case in England was actu-
ally a fraud: in 1726, Mary Tofts of Godalming in Surrey, commonly known
as the "rabbet woman," contrived a lucrative hoax by claiming that she had
given birth to seventeen rabbits after being frightened in the fields.28 In 1746,
the Gentleman's Magazine, a politically moderate English monthly that cov-
ered a wide range of medical topics, published a typical report of a malformed
birth ascribed to the maternal imagination: "The wife of one Rich. Haynes of
Chelsea, aged 35 and mother of 16 fine children, was deliver'd of a monster,
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with nose and eyes like a lyon, no palate to the mouth, hair on the shoulders,
claws like a lion instead of fingers, no breast-bone, something surprising out
of the navel as big as an egg, and one foot longer than the other. —She had
been to see the lions in the Tower, where she was much terrify'd with the old
lion's noise. 29
According to the theory of maternal impressions, ihe birth of a defective
infant unveiled the secret passions of its mother. In some ways, one could
argue that the birth of an addicted baby today also suggests a secret failing of
its mother. The very term crack baby implies a fissure or breakage in the
autonomy of a mother as well as in her ability to reproduce. It is not surpris-
ing, then, that the birth of what was invariably termed a "monster" called into
question, above all, the legitimacy of its parentage. Malformed births repre-
sented a major social problem in early modern Europe. A monstrous birth
lacked legitimacy in a fundamental way. Such an infant failed to resemble its
(or any) father; hence, in a social order ruled by the laws of primogeniture
and patrilineage, a malformed birth stood for a basic social disruption. Before
the sixteenth century, a monstrous birth signified the opposite of its father's
stamp. It was a portent, a sign of the wrath of God.30 Conflicts arose between
the ecclesiastical interest in the immortal soul of the infant and the secular
authority's concern for determining property rights, inheritance, and legiti-
macy. Both interests pressured midwives, who were responsible for determin-
ing whether a live birth had taken place (hence affecting primogeniture) and
for baptizing moribund newborns.
The notion of fetal personhood necessary to such cases as State v. Johnson
in 1989 was unthinkable in the eighteenth century when newborns did not
legally exist unless born alive. The familiar conflict between saving the mother's
life and preserving the product of her labor was not at issue in early modern
Europe. The mother's health and survival unequivocally came first, as it was
the pregnant woman who was being delivered, not the fetus. This clear hier-
archy of concern underlay the midwifery practice of manual version, using
hands to turn the fetus in the womb, and the more typically male surgical
practices of craniotomy and embryotomy, as means of removing a dead fetus
from a living woman.31 This view was not limited to early modern Europe.
The Mishnah, for example, stipulates that an embryo can be dismembered to
save the life of a woman, "for her life takes precedence over its life," as long as
its head has not yet emerged. Once its head is visible, "it may not be touched,
since we do not set aside one life for another."32
The subject of maternal impressions did not by any means originate either in
the eighteenth century or in Europe. The belief that the maternal mental
state influences fetal development is ancient and can be found in Hindu
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medical treatises that predate western Hippocratic medicine by many centu-
ries.33 Ayurvedic texts argue that prenatal beings are sentient and environ-
mentally responsive. The Garbha Upanisad and the Susruta-samhita, for
example, claimed that the fetus expresses its desires through the mother's
longings and that such longings must be gratified. The Caraka-samhita pro-
vides a guide for pregnant women that equates certain eating habits (exces-
sive sweets or fish) or behaviors (sleepwalking, sexual promiscuity) with
character traits in the unborn child.34 The Judeo-Christian tradition also of-
fers a notable example of the theory that maternal sense impressions mark
offspring: the story of Jacob placing rods before his flock so that they will bear
speckled and spotted cattle.35
The two ideas that together form the concept of the maternal imagina-
tion are quite different. Although both types are involuntary on the part of the
pregnant woman, cravings or obsessions are active, whereas witnessing unset-
tling persons, or events, or representations amounts to a passive, usually vi-
sual, experience that is externally imposed. Both types of maternal impression
ultimately raise questions about the formulation of theories concerning fe-
male desire and its location in the generative female body. The idea of cravings
is the one that persists both as folklore and in obstetric textbooks today—the
pregnant woman's desire for pickles and ice cream (or, in the 1959 Disney
animated classic Lady and the Tramp, watermelon and chop suey).36 But in
their early modern formulation, the maternal imagination debates proposed
a continuum between the passive reception of sensory experience and the
active production of desire. The maternal imagination debaters derived from
the Lockean concept of the primacy of sensory experience the closest ap-
proximation we get in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to a notion of
what women want.
In addition to the array of thinkers on generation from Heliodorus and
Empedocles to Etienne and Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (the father-and-
son founders of teratology, the scientific study of monsters), dozens of writers
participated in the debate about maternal impressions during the Enlighten-
ment. Responding to the ideas of Daniel Turner, Blondel published The
Strength of Imagination in Pregnant Women Examin'd: and the Opinion that
Marks and Deformities in Children arise from thence, Demonstrated to be a
Vulgar Error (1727). Turner responded in 1730 withThe Force of the Mother's
Imagination upon her Foetus in Utero. Henry Bracken's The Midwife's Com-
panion (1737) sided with Turner. Bracken referred to the example of the
fingerless beggar and suggested the sociopolitical implications of these ideas:
"Indeed, such Objects as these [the beggar] should be driven out of every
Town, by express Order of the Magistrate: For it is not hardly credible the
Number of Children who are born monstrous on such Accounts."37
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A French argument in support of Blondel appeared in 1745 when Bor-
deaux physician Isaac Bellet published his Lettres sur le pouvoir de I 'imagination
des femmes enceintes. Bellet argued against maternal impressions, and he also
reported that this mistaken prejudice destroyed the repose and health of preg-
nant women. The smallest events made them anxious or alarmed, and they
lived in fear of experiencing or thinking something that would hurt their in-
fants. This situation was so dreadful, according to Bellet, that he asserted that
imaginary maladies became real ones and affected the infant in the womb.38
Later in the century, in The Pupil of Nature; or, Candid Advice to the Fair Sex
(1797), Martha Mears presented the same circular argument about maternal
passions. Mears wrote that there was no nervous communication between
mother and fetus, but that "it is of the utmost moment to root out of the mind
those fatal apprehensions; or they will often produce the very evils to which
they are so tremblingly alive." Disease during pregnancy may result, or diffi-
culty in delivery, and even "a puny, or distorted infant is sometimes brought
forth—the victim of its mother's terrors."39 In 1747, John Henry Mauclerc
published a refutation of Blondel's 1727 treatise: Dr. Blondel confuted; or,
The Ladies vindicated. Mauclerc's subtitle, The Ladies vindicated, reveals the
underlying problem in these quarrels: the status of pregnant women as ratio-
nal beings. The debate made clear both that the locus of responsibility for
pregnancy remained with women and that female inferiority represented a
potential excess that must be policed.
The maternal imagination debate gradually died out, its ideas incorpo-
rated in some measure into the science of teratology by the early nineteenth
century. No definitive conclusion ever resolved the quarrel, and the power of
the maternal imagination remains with us in various cultures' folk beliefs. It is
clear from the language of the medical treatises that contributed to the mater-
nal impressions debate that the subject encompassed more than just the ma-
ternal imagination's influence on fetal development. This debate was about
passion and power with respect to the early modern understanding of the body
as an envelope, a coating for the soul, a receptacle whose corporeality was
allegorical as well as physical.
Embryology did not emerge as a separate medical discipline until the
second half of the sixteenth century. The Turner-Blondel contribution to ideas
of generation appeared at the height of beliefs in embryological pre formation,
the view that the whole human structure exists in miniature prior to concep-
tion. Preformationist views came in a variety of flavors and were not an eigh-
teenth-century invention, although they had been presented with greater
reserve in earlier periods.40 But around the end of the seventeenth century,
preformationist arguments began to appear frequently in medical literature.
The usual version of preformation was called animalculism or spermaticism.
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It held that a preformed human being inhabited the male seed. There was an
interesting controversy concerning why, if animalculism was valid, children
often looked like their mothers. One explanation involved the maternal imagi-
nation: vain pregnant women looked at themselves in the glass, and their
images then imprinted onto the fetuses they carried. There was also a strain of
preformationism called ovism which saw the female egg as the repository for
the homunculus, a view that seemed to be shored up by Reinier de GraaPs
discovery of the ovarian follicle in 1672. The most extreme version of
preformationist belief was the notion of emboitement, or encasement, which
could be accommodated in either spermatoeist or ovist formulations. The Swiss
anatomist Albrecht von Haller offered an ovist explanation of this all-inclusive
view: "It follows that the ovary of an ancestress will contain not only her daugh-
ter but also her granddaughter, her greatgranddaughter and her
greatgreatgranddaughter, and if it is once proved that an ovary can contain
many generations, there is no absurdity in saying that it contains them all."41
In other words, all potential human beings existed from the moment of divine
creation.
Blondel espoused animalculism, whereas Turner proposed a continuity
between fetal and maternal blood vessels, and followed an epigenetic view—
the view that the embryo develops structurally and sequentially in utero through
the growth and differentiation of specialized cells.42 This debate embraced a
central paradox in early modern thinking about fetal development: Turner
was relatively accurate about maternal-fetal relations in utero but supersti-
tious about the mental stability of pregnant women, whereas Blondel was
medically inaccurate in his knowledge of gestational physiology, but rejected
the prevailing folk beliefs about female irrationality and uncontrollability dur-
ing pregnancy. What is most striking is that both Turner's imaginationist view,
which attributed monstrous births to maternal impressions, and Blondel's
preformationist view, which argued that the maternal role was merely to house
the developing fetus, similarly negated the agency of pregnant women. For
preformationists, the mother remained entirely passive and useless except as a
vessel; for imaginationists, the maternal imagination operated wholly beyond
the will of the mother, who could not shape it or impose meaning upon it.43
The imaginationists believed women's stories and gave them an active
role in the development of their fetuses, but at a price—they held women
accountable for any birth not entirely normal. The preformationists (includ-
ing the ovists) denied women any role in gestation other than as pack animals
but absolved them of blame for the ensuing birth. The eighteenth-century
maternal imagination debates make clear that the ideological stakes of as-
signing responsibility for birth outcomes are especially high. In early modern
Europe, assigning blame for the horror of defective or malformed births
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affected inheritance, social organization, and political power. In a social system
dependent on male lineage, it was more than just politically and economi-
cally convenient to displace this responsibility onto women's bodies and minds.
The conflicting Enlightenment narratives that explain the etiology of, and
thus fix the blame for, "imperfect" infants bear striking similarities to current
ethical discussions stemming from the legal battles that pit pregnant women
against their fetuses. The underlying significance of these narratives involves
the legacy of blaming the mother for her children's appearance and behavior.
Blaming mothers serves to justify a wide range of strategies for containing
women's minds by containing women's bodies.44
Regulatory discourses concerning the physiology and reproductive roles
of women have a long social history. In the eighteenth century, physicians and
philosophers debated the power of a pregnant woman's mind to influence
fetal development. In the nineteenth century, medical practitioners in the
United States led an antiabortion campaign intended to establish medicine
as a scientific profession and to regulate reproduction. In the nineteenth cen-
tury as in the eighteenth, assumptions about maternal duty dictated attitudes
concerning the behavior of pregnant women. In a passage that makes these
assumptions clear, nineteenth-century Philadelphia physician Hugh Lenox
Hodge attacked pregnant women for disobeying medical advice: "They eat
and drink, they walk and ride, they will practice no self restrainment, but will
indulge every caprice, every passion, utterly regardless of the unseen and un-
loved embryo."45 The specter of unbridled appetites haunts this passage. The
nineteenth-century campaign to criminalize abortion sought to replace a preg-
nant woman's testimony about her pregnancy with an externally imposed
medical authority. Legal scholar Reva Siegel has shown that this campaign
had the effect of claiming for physicians "a special competence to mediate
between a woman and the state," an effect that continues to be important.46
The prevailing views in the nineteenth century permitted physicians to
step in and "restrain" women who were unwilling or unable to restrain them-
selves. Eighteenth-century discourses that attributed fetal malformations to
maternal mental activity, and nineteenth-century regulations concerning preg-
nant women, medical authority, and abortion, both served to make women's
role in reproduction conform to prevailing ideas about women's social place.
As Siegel notes, "Regulations governing the conditions in which women con-
ceive, gestate, and nurture children express social attitudes about sexuality
and motherhood and, in turn, shape women's experience of sexuality and
motherhood."47
Journalist Katha Pollitt analyzes these social attitudes in a provocative Na-
tion article entitled "'Fetal Rights': A New Assault on Feminism." She asks,
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"How have we come to see women as the major threat to the health of their
newborns, and the womb as the most dangerous place a child will ever in-
habit?"48 As I have shown, that is not such a new question. Women in the
United States today who use drugs, especially cocaine, during pregnancy may
face criminal prosecution for a variety of offenses, from drug trafficking to
criminal child abuse to assault with a deadly weapon. Yet Carol E. Tracy noted
in 1990 that only 11 percent of the pregnant women who need substance-
abuse treatment get it. Tracy wrote, "We live in a society that romanticizes
motherhood but provides virtually no structural supports for mothers."49 The
situation is improving: in 1985 almost no drug treatment programs would
accept pregnant users, whereas in 1995 about 75 percent did. At the time of
the initial trial of Jennifer Johnson in 1990, however, there were approximately
4,500 drug-addicted pregnant women in Florida, 2,000 of whom were on wait-
ing lists for the 135 drug treatment beds available statewide for pregnant
women.'0 Many drug treatment centers routinely turn away pregnant addicts,
and few have obstetricians on their staffs. Pregnant drug users avoid even basic
prenatal care for fear of being reported. Thirty-seven thousand babies are born
in the United States each year to drug-addicted women; fetal alcohol syndrome
affects one out of every one thousand U.S. births; and 1.5 percent of newborns
inNewYorkCityare HIV-seropositive.51The Supreme Court, in General Elec-
tric Co. v. Gilbert (1976), struck down EEOC guidelines requiring employers
to provide maternity leave under their benefits programs. In his dissent, Justice
William Brennan remarked that the United States is one of the few western
nations which has no universal legal or social provisions for maternity.52
Motherhood cannot be separated from the social conditions that surround
it. The United States confronts the tragedies of teenage pregnancy, women
and children with AIDS, single-mother households living below the poverty
line, inner-city crime, drive-by shootings, and homelessness. The overwhelm-
ing response has been to criminalize acts of desperation such as drug use
rather than to provide prevention or treatment services, create jobs programs
for inner-city youth, improve the public education system, or devise a system
for regulating firearms. The assertion that a person represents a "danger to
self and others" constitutes the legal justification for curtailing the individual's
civil rights. This justification fuels the discussion of mandatory drug treat-
ment for pregnant women, but it has not led the courts, for example, to im-
pose drug treatment on all drug users or to mandate medical treatment for
other untreated diseases.53 The medicolegal system in the United States, de-
fined as it is by adversarial relations and contests, cannot adequately grapple
with the problem of establishing a reasonable standard of care for pregnant
women.54 For example, increasing "fetal rights" will inevitably allow children
to bring lawsuits against their mothers for prenatal injuries. Roe v. Wade does
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not prevent tort actions for fetuses before they are viable. At the same time, a
maternal duty to utilize prenatal technologies has been emerging.
It is deceptively easy to conclude that eighteenth-century embryology was
not sufficiently advanced to produce more scientific explanations for "mon-
sters." The more pressing question is whether we can learn anything from
these early medical debates that might illuminate the complicated social, ethi-
cal, medical, and legal issues we face.5' For example, in prosecuting women
for drug use during pregnancy, is the state again displacing the systemic socio-
economic problems of unemployment, poverty, and despair onto the bodies
of women and taking over control of these bodies because women allegedly
lack self-control? Jurists try to translate the moral expectation that a pregnant
woman will make every attempt to ensure the healthy development of her
unborn fetus into an idea of enforceable legal duty. In this attempt, they un-
avoidably subordinate a woman's rights to privacy and autonomy to a codifi-
cation of the state's interest in protecting her fetus from harm.56 In a 1988
Illinois case, a suit was brought by an infant's father on its behalf against the
mother and a motorist for prenatal injuries the child sustained in an automo-
bile accident. The court summarized the situation created by the notion that
fetuses have a cognizable "legal right to begin life with a sound mind and
body" by stating, "It is the firmly held belief of some that a woman should
subordinate her right to control her life when she decides to become pregnant
or does become pregnant: anything which might possibly harm the develop-
ing fetus should be prohibited and all things which might positively affect the
developing fetus should be mandated under the penalty of law be it criminal
or civil." The court went on to argue that because any and all actions of a
pregnant woman can have an impact on her fetus, any act or omission could
render her liable, making a fetus's rights superior to those of its mother, con-
cluding "such is not and cannot be the law of this State." The Supreme Court
of Illinois found for the mother, holding that "There is no cause of action by
or on behalf of a fetus, subsequently born alive, against its mother for the
unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries."57
A number of feminist legal scholars have criticized the idea of fetal rights
and, consequently, the notion of fetal personhood itself that such rights pre-
suppose. Conceiving and bearing children have never been risk-free, and women
have always made, and been expected to make, sacrifices during pregnancy.
However, a pregnant woman must have a different status with respect to her
fetus than do others, including the state. Otherwise, women's ownership of
their own bodies is challenged, and pregnant women are punished for social
ills such as poverty, unemployment, malnutrition, and unequal access to edu-
cation and health care. In juridical terms, there is no "bright line" that may
confine this responsibility. "Until the child is brought forth from the woman's
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body," Janet Gallagher writes, "our relationship with it must be mediated by
her. The alternative adopts a brutally coercive stance toward pregnant women,
viewing them as means to an end which may be denied the bodily integrity
and self-determination specific to human dignity."58
The crux of this predicament can be located in the language of rights
itself. A focus on rights grounds the discussion in privacy law, which becomes
meaningless if the contents of a pregnant woman's womb can be severed from
her person and granted separate interests. The constitutional right of deci-
sional privacy detailed in Griswold v. Connecticut has begun to yield its place
to the rights of fetuses, pitting pregnant women not just against the products
of their bodies but against their very bodies themselves.59 In Eisenstadt v. Baird,
like Griswold a case involving contraceptive practice, the court held that "if
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual . . . to be
free from unwarranted intrusion."60 Privacy rights in law are not monolithic:
they include the rights to be left alone, to refuse medical treatment, and to
have possession of and power over one's own person.61 Christyne L. Neff per-
suasively argues that, for this reason, the doctrine of bodily integrity serves the
arguments of reproductive freedom better than does privacy law.
Bodily integrity doctrine underpins legal notions of assault and battery,
search and seizure, informed consent, and the right to refuse medical treat-
ment. Separating the fetus from a pregnant woman pursues what Neff calls
"an analysis that views the pregnant woman as a duality [and] is itself a viola-
tion of woman's bodily integrity."62 Privacy rights in their multiple forms can-
not be distinguished so easily from the legal notion of bodily integrity, since
the concept of privacy includes ideas about the body as a refuge, a space
protected from state intrusion.63 Indeed, a version of the idea of bodily integ-
rity seems to have existed for early modern European thinkers, a complex
irony given the arguments I have been making. At the same time, the
embeddedness of pregnancy within a network of social practices and indi-
vidual interests may have been more clearly delineated in earlier historical
periods in Europe than it is in the United States today.
The eighteenth-century maternal imagination debates were intricate from both
biological and philosophical perspectives. To contend that the maternal imagi-
nation was impotent, physicians subscribed to preformationism and used the
physiologically inaccurate argument that the fully independent fetus shared
no circulatory or nervous communication with its mother and, thus, could
not respond to her mental or sensory experiences. In contrast, writers who
affirmed the power of the maternal imagination chastised those who impugned
women's honesty concerning their experiences of pregnancy. This eighteenth-
century controversy, then, radically questioned the ontological relation between
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pregnant women and fetuses and did so in unexpected ways. That ontological
relation continues to be vexed. In 1668, Francois Mauriceau described preg-
nancy as "a rough Sea" and urged the pregnant woman "to be careful to over-
come and moderate her Passions, as not to be excessive angry; and above all,
that she be not afrighted; nor that any melancholy news be suddenly told her"
because she might miscarry or harm her fetus. He wrote of the pregnant
woman's "so great loathings, and so many different longings, and strong pas-
sions for strange things." Three hundred years later, David L. Kirp proposes
that in light of the problem of environmental and workplace hazards, "the
more that is learned about these insidious dangers, the more remarkable it
becomes that any fetus navigates the perilous voyage from conception to birth
healthy and intact."64 It is the socioeconomic infrastructure which needs sanc-
tion and repair, not the bodies of women.
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"A Point of Conscience7'
Breastfeeding and Maternal Authority in
Pamela, Part 2
Could you ever have thought, Miss, that Husbands have a Dispensing
Power over their Wives, which Kings are not allowed over the Law? . . .
Did you ever hear of such a Notion before, Miss? Of such a Prerogative
in a Husband? Would you care to subscribe to it?
—Pamela to Miss Darnford
Pamela's outraged description of her husband's domestic tyranny signals the
onset of the first conflict in her married life and introduces the reader to a
crucial episode in the sequel to Richardson's phenomenally popular first novel.
Part 1 oi Pamela (1740) had been occupied with the violent sexual pursuit of
a young servant girl by her wealthy and more experienced master; that pur-
suit ended, disturbingly for some readers, with the sudden repentance of the
master, Mr. B., who condescends at last to marry the girl he had hoped to
rape. Part 2 (1741) follows Pamela and Mr. B. into their married life.
What this means for the heroine is that the continuation is largely a record
of maternal experience: Pamela is pregnant throughout the sequel (seven times
in all), adopts an illegitimate daughter of B.'s from a former liaison, and gives
considerable attention in her correspondence to the care and education of her
children. Pamela's impassioned complaint to Miss Darnford is also occasioned
by her motherhood: she and Mr. B. have disagreed over whether Pamela should
breastfeed their first child herself, as she believes is her Christian duty, or hire a
wet nurse, as Mr. B. insists. The episode carries significant narrative weight in
Pamela 2. Pamela recounts each argument between herself and Mr. B. in detail,
adding her own ruminations and soliciting the advice of various correspondents.
Despite all this palaver, it is hardly surprising to readers familiar with Part
1 when Mr. B.'s tyrannical "prerogative" wins the day, and baby Billy is placed
in the hands of a wet nurse. What does seem odd, however, is the dissonance
between the inevitable subordination of Pamela's desires to her husband's
and the language that the text uses to represent it. Despite the fact that Mr. B.
eventually prevails, Pamela's arguments for maternal breastfeeding are repre-
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sented as powerful and persuasive. All correspondents except Mr. B. agree
that maternal breastfeeding is clearly preferable to wet-nursing, all things be-
ing equal; and Mr. B.'s arguments, as we shall see, are deliberately cast as
unconvincing and poorly motivated. So clearly does the text valorize Pamela's
position, in fact, that the dispute over maternal breastfeeding comes to seem
only superficially about the matters ostensibly being debated: the relative merits
of mother's and nurse's milk, the practical aspects of maternal breastfeeding
(the physical and emotional commitment, the investment of time), and so
on. Instead, the struggle to determine whether Pamela should breastfeed is a
struggle to define the relative authority of husband and wife over maternal
behavior and the status of maternal subjectivity within marriage. Fundamen-
tally, what is being contested between Pamela and Mr. B. is the source of
authority over a mother's body.
The vigorous arguments of a generation of conduct books and the in-
creasing enclosure of women in domestic space were finally, by the 1740s,
convincing many parents that maternal breastfeeding was preferable to hiring
the services of a nurse.1 In Pamela's central voice, Pamela 2 powerfully repeats
those arguments, presenting an all-but-watertight case for the dramatic ben-
efits of maternal nursing. Mr. B., on the other hand, mouths stereotypical
aristocratic attitudes toward motherhood, attitudes that Augustan conduct lit-
erature routinely, even ritualistically, disparaged.2 The novel sets up a para-
digmatic encounter between traditional, patriarchal authority—represented
by Mr. B. —and the new authority of conduct literature, a reasoned discourse
based (supposedly) on objective observation and predicated on the idea that
correct behavior may be defined communally. By teaching objectively cor-
rect female behaviors, especially maternal breastfeeding, conduct literature
provided a rival source of authority from which wives like Pamela might po-
tentially resist their husbands' commands.
In the end, of course, Pamela 2 enforces Mr. B.'s position of authority and
so works to curtail the growing influence of conduct literature and to reassert
the autocratic rights of individual fathers. But because it represents Mr. B.'s
commands as logically flawed and politically suspect, the novel undercuts its
own efforts to contain the potential subversiveness of Augustan conduct writ-
ers' advice to mothers. The effort to teach wives to obey their husbands even
when husbands are wrong backfires, to an extent, as the patently incorrect
Mr. B. is obeyed against reason and religion, merely because of his position as
husband. As Pamela herself is quick to note, the patriarchal family thatPamela
2 defends turns out to be very like the autocratic kingship that England had
publicly rejected half a century before.
Pamela 2 sets itself up as a corrective to conduct literature not only politi-
cally but aesthetically. Though primarily a didactic work, it sets moral lessons
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into motion, as it were, making entertainment of material that Augustan con-
duct books typically delivered in more direct, and even less palatable, forms.
Ironically, Richardson's effort to revise conduct writing along novelistic lines
is rather too successful for its own good. The "novelization" of didacticism is
just convincing enough to invite critical judgments of the work as a novel, but
it is not sufficient to make it seem a very good one.
For this reason, Pamela, Part 2 has achieved virtually unanimous critical
contempt3 as its readers have looked in vain for the linear structure that most
critics still believe must define a good novel.4 Even the most acute tend to
throw their hands up in frustration as the sequel moves with apparent aimless-
ness from one illustrative vignette to another, tracing Pamela's dilemmas as
wife and mother, inculcating lessons and drawing morals. The problem, ac-
cording to Terry Castle, is that Pamela 2 "lacks a unifying plot; nothing 'hap-
pens' in it. Plot, character, incident—all fail to produce a satisfying, coherent
narrative." Accordingly, most readers have found the text to be, as Castle puts
it, "more than a disappointment. At times it seems almost to insult us, to
affront our expectations. . . . For the most part, Richardson's sequel is more
than just plotless. It is an assault . . . on plot itself."5
But from the perspective I am adopting, Pamela 2 looks much less like a
failed novel than like a fascinating conduct book. Its structure reflects the
diffuse, even disjointed, world of domestic detail and daily routine; the epi-
sodic nature of the antiplot nicely serves Richardson's didactic purposes. Un-
der this rubric, it makes sense that instead of offering an original story,
Richardson's oddly amphibious text dramatizes (and, to an extent, revises)
familiar moral instructions and norms for female virtue, norms already coded
for eighteenth-century readers of conduct literature as classless and universal,
but presented here by means of what Castle rightly calls "a thinly disguised
paean to bourgeois values."6 So although Pamela 2 may look like a novel, it
doesn't work like one. Instead, the text functions as a generic anomaly, what
we might call a "conduct novel."7 Richardson puts the traditions of conduct
literature to work, giving form and voice to the perfect woman whom didactic
writers were so eager to define. "What a bewitching Girl art thou!" Lady Davers
cries to Pamela in Letter 19. "What an Exemplar to Wives now, as well as thou
wast before to Maidens!" (3:104). The Pamela of Part 2 is female virtue per-
sonified, the paradigmatic and impossible bourgeois woman brought to life
from the sketches of conduct writing, and worthy, as Richardson himself fa-
mously put it, "of the Imitation of her Sex, from low to high life."
In particular, Pamela demonstrates the attributes of her culture's vision
of a perfect wife and mother. The two duties are, of course, intimately con-
nected. When Lady Davers describes for Pamela the behaviors that will be
expected of her as Mr. B.'s wife, she emphasizes the requirement that Pamela
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produce "a Succession of brave Boys, to perpetuate a Family . . .  which . . .
expects it from you" (3:41-42). Without this, Lady Davers freely informs
Pamela, all the rest of her famous virtues will mean nothing, and Mr. B. "by
descending to the wholesome Cot. . . will want one Apology for his conduct,
be as excellent as you may" (3:42). Pamela's motherhood is the sine qua non
upon which depend all the rest—her social position, her marital happiness,
the continued recognition of her virtue, and its concomitant rewards.
Pamela would not have had to look far for advice on how to be a good
mother. At least since the publication in 1673 of Richard Allestree's The La-
dies Calling, conduct literature had been energetic in its efforts to dictate
specific standards for maternal behavior, standards that continue today to
influence Anglo-American maternal ideals. Allestree's supremely influential
work8 defined "the office and duty of a Mother" in detail, outlining what
would, over the course of the next generation, become standard prescriptions
for maternal excellence: feelings of peculiar and overwhelming "tenderness"
toward one's children, constant personal care and attendance on them "through
the several Stages of Infancy, Childhood, and Youth," responsibility for their
early education, and especially breastfeeding.9
In a formulation with immense ideological implications, Allestree repre-
sents motherhood as an exclusively affective matter: when mothers fail, it is
simply because either they love their children too much or they love them too
little.10 Mothers who overdo it are summarily dealt with: "The doting affec-
tion of the Mother," Allestree informs his readers, "is frequently punish'd with
the untimely death of her Children; or if not with that. . . they live . . . to
grieve her eies [sic], and to consume her heart. . . and to force their unhappy
mothers to that sad exclamation. . . .  Blessed are the wombs which bare not"
(205-6).11
It is when he gets to those mothers who love too little that Allestree for-
mulates the most important touchstone for maternal virtue to emerge in the
first half of the eighteenth century, maternal breastfeeding. Allestree argues
against "the Mothers transferring the Nursing her Child to another" as an
instance of maternal pride, a pride nowhere more clearly seen than among
wealthy and aristocratic women, who fail to breastfeed their own children
because of a vain belief in their own "State and Greatness. . . . No other mo-
tive," Allestree declares "but what is founded in their Quality, could so univer-
sally prevail with all that are of it" not to follow "the impulses of Nature"
(203).
The denigration of aristocratic mothers as unloving pleasure-seekers who
refuse to be inconvenienced by breastfeeding becomes ubiquitous in Augustan
conduct literature, reflecting a tendency among writers of the nascent bour-
geoisie to "see the aristocracy as deficient in maternal feeling."12 In the circular
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reasoning of conduct writing, women of means don't breastfeed because they
are unloving mothers, and they are unloving mothers because they fail to
establish the unique bond between mother and child understood to be the
result of breastfeeding. Maternal breastfeeding, according to an influential
compilation of conduct dicta published in 1714, is evidence of the "Affection
and Tenderness" that have been "implanted" in mothers by "Nature"; the
only "restraint" that breastfeeding places on women is restraint from the vices
of vanity, theater, and gambling, all popularly associated with upper-class
women.13 Breastfeeding, the ultimate indicator of maternal virtue, is also the
class act par excellence, distinguishing the selfless, virtuous, and affectionate
domestic mother from the idle, selfish aristocrat.14
Experts had long been vociferous about the need for maternal nursing,
and such tracts as the Countess of Lincoln's Nursurie (Oxford, 1628) demon-
strate that a few aristocratic mothers breastfed when it was anything but fash-
ionable to do so. Furthermore, even in the seventeenth century, upper-class
women who fed their own children were seen by their contemporaries as
exemplifying "true, self-sacrificing motherliness."15 But it was only in the early
eighteenth century that maternal practices actually began to change on a wide
scale, so that by the second half of the century a dramatic transformation had
taken place. Whereas in 1700 most babies of the upper classes and gentry
were sent out to wet nurses for at least the first year of life, by 1750 many
mothers from the same classes were nursing their children themselves, at
home.16 In the 1740s, when Richardson published Pamela, it was becoming
increasingly common — indeed, fashionable—for women of comfortable eco-
nomic circumstances to nurse their own children.
The shift to maternal breastfeeding was part of a complex of changes in
the dominant cultural definition of maternal virtue during the Augustan pe-
riod. Until the early eighteenth century, middle- and upper-strata husbands,
who decided how infants would be fed, tended to disapprove of maternal
breastfeeding and often vetoed mothers' deeply felt desires. "There is no doubt,"
Fildes observes, that "women who wished to feed their own children were
frequently overruled by their husbands."17 By the 1750s, however, many fa-
thers had been convinced that, for a variety of material and economic rea-
sons, maternal breastfeeding was preferable to sending a child out to a nurse
or even to hiring a nurse at home (as Pamela and Mr. B. eventually do).
Accordingly, reluctant mothers were as likely to be pressured to breastfeed as
formerly they had been forbidden from it. By 1750 the desire to breastfeed
was considered to be one of the attributes of "natural" motherhood, part of
virtuous womanhood itself.18 So, in commanding their wives to breastfeed,
husbands could imagine themselves as capitulating to a desire natural to any
virtuous mother.
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This paradoxical state of affairs, where fathers at once continued to exert
their unilateral prerogative in determining the method of infant feeding but
imagined themselves to be capitulating in the process to the desires of their
wives (or to desires their wives ought to have felt) is evidenced in the strikingly
ambivalent language used by the apothecary James Nelson in 1753. "I cannot
help advising in the strongest Terms," Nelson says, "that every Father consent,
and even promote, that the Child be suckled by it's [sic] Mother." Eliding the
difference between paternal "consenting" and "promoting," Nelson's statement
evades a recognition of different desires among mothers and further bolsters
the notion that virtuous mothers are necessarily breastfeeding mothers.19
Nelson's equivocation further suggests that he expects a mixed reception
from male readers and the aristocracy (he laments on the same page that
there is "little Probability . . . that my Advice herein will be follow'd by Per-
sons in high Life"). Such concern was well founded. Although the trend was
definitely toward maternal breastfeeding, there was by no means a universal
change in the behaviors of eighteenth-century mothers. Those women of the
upper classes who wished to breastfeed had found another source of authori-
zation in the unanimous counsel of conduct literature, but the opinions of
many husbands had not changed. In such cases, conduct literature may well
have functioned as an incendiary intermediary, a challenge to the univocal
authority of the father, a voice that spoke of maternal desire from within the
sanction of an established and overwhelmingly male-authored genre. In par-
ticular households, then, conduct literature could function as a tool of male
dominance or as a challenge to it.
From Allestree on, conduct writers who treated motherhood started from
the assumption that virtuous mothers naturally love their children more than
do equally virtuous fathers.20 And especially in the seventeenth century, con-
duct literature granted special authority to women as mothers, separate from
and greater than the authority granted to mere wives. To be sure, such works
shared with virtually all other forms of contemporary discourse the belief that
women were by nature inferior and rightly subordinate to their husbands. But
motherhood was understood as an exceptional circumstance that granted a
special dispensation, as it were, from the usual sexual hierarchy.
The Marquis of Halifax, for instance, makes the inequity of women's situ-
ation painfully clear to his daughter, but then goes on to suggest that women
may offset this state of affairs by means of their extraordinary influence as
mothers. "You must first lay it down for a Foundation in general," Halifax
writes, "that there is Inequality in the Sexes, and that for the better Oeconomy
of the World, the Men ... had the larger share of Reason bestow'd upon them;
by which means your Sex is the better prepar'd for the Compliance that is
necessary." In the overtly politicized domestic realm Halifax describes, the
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wife functions most often as the submissive subject of a husband who enjoys
absolute authority. But strikingly, "in the Nursery" she can expect to "Reign
without Competition."21
Halifax imagines the powerful mother as a Machiavellian strategist who
uses a rich array of political devices to appease and cajole a formidable list of
potential enemies: children, in-laws, servants, social acquaintances, and hus-
band. And as is well known, Halifax imagines maternal rule as necessarily
duplicitous, based on the manipulation of affect and opportunity.
You must begin early to make them [your children] love you, that they
may obey you. . . . You must deny them as seldom as you can. . . . [Y]ou
must flatter away their ill Humour, and take the next Opportunity of
pleasing them in some other thing, before they either ask or look for it:
This will strengthen your Authority, by making it soft to them; and
confirm their Obedience, by making it their Interest. . . . Let them be
more in awe of your Kindness than of your Power. (22-23)
So while Halifax sees the nursery as a unique realm of female authority, that
authority can succeed only when it proceeds with duplicity much like that
practiced by the famous "trimmer" himself when negotiating the treacherous
worlds of seventeenth-century public politics.
Furthermore, even the heavily coded and self-deprecating maternal reign
that Halifax imagined was to be short-lived. Although subsequent works of
conduct literature continue to encourage mothers to build their authority on
love rather than fear,22 later writers tend to shun Halifax's explicit identifica-
tion of maternal affect as a political tool and his suggestion that motherhood
might constitute a locus of unique, incontestable authority. The 1714 Ladies
Library follows Halifax in recommending that mothers elicit "honour" and
"obedience" from their children by "natural and gentle Methods" (137), but
it also takes pains to warn mothers against attempting to exercise "Craft." And
as if in direct rebuke to Halifax's matriarchal vision, The Ladies Library is
careful to insist that women enjoy no peculiar authority even as mothers.
The Father is . . . Superior to the Mother, both in Natural Strength, in
Wisdom, and by God's Appointment. . . the Children are especially to
Obey their Fathers. . . . [I]f it happens, that the Inclinations or Desires of
the Mother should differ from those of the Father . . . in . . . Things of
Moment, . . . the Father is the Superior Authority, and must be obey'd. . . .
[The mother] is not presum'd to have a Will contrary to her Husband's.
(33-34)
No longer, by 1714, could a woman expect to "Reign without Competition,"
even in the nursery.
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On the whole, then, Augustan conduct literature privileged motherhood
per se in new ways. It perceived mothers as uniquely suited, indeed obligated,
to be their children's first teachers and constant companions. It dictated ma-
ternal behavior across class lines (though according to a middle-class rubric),
and used breastfeeding not only as a litmus test for maternal virtue but also as
an indicator of broader personal and class virtues. The trend to recognize and
extol uniquely maternal behaviors continued as the century progressed. But
along with it came increasingly overt efforts to subordinate the power of mothers
to that of fathers and to give fathers more direct participation in childrearing.
This development is clearly visible in midcentury conduct handbooks.
William Cadogan (1748) calls on "every Father to have his Child nursed
under his own Eye" and to do away with traditional attitudes that made infant
care "one of the Mysteries of the Bona Dea, from which Men are to be ex-
cluded." James Nelson is careful in 1753 not to privilege mothers as his cho-
sen audience, insisting that he addresses "every Parent." And writing in 1769,
William Buchan extols the great "importance" of mothers, who "have it very
much in their power to make men healthy, . . . useful in life, or the pests of
society," but he is quick to add a revealing caveat: "The mother is not the only
person concerned in the management of children. The father has an equal
interest in their welfare, and ought to assist in every thing that respects either
the improvement of the body or mind."23 Writers of eighteenth-century con-
duct manuals and handbooks continued to teach that mothers love their chil-
dren more than fathers and are specially equipped to care for them. But the
suggestion implicit in late-seventeenth-century handbooks that motherhood
might therefore constitute a place where wives' authority is actually greater
than husbands' was being explicitly discredited. By the middle of the century,
mothers were increasingly being elevated as moral and religious exemplars,
and mothering was increasingly imagined as a set of behaviors and attitudes
entirely peculiar to women. At the same time, fathers were instructed to exert
patriarchal authority over even the smallest of nurslings and, in the process,
over mothers.24
The domestic crisis over maternal breastfeeding that erupts in Pamela 2
allows for a direct rehearsal of emerging bourgeois norms against the mater-
nal values associated in conduct books with the morally debilitated aristoc-
racy. When Pamela insists that she ought to breastfeed the coming child, she
repeats the arguments, the tone, and sometimes even the language of con-
duct writing. She reasons that a mother need not breastfeed if she is unhealthy
but that breastfeeding is an "indispensable duty" when a mother is well (4:34).
It is "most natural" to breastfeed, she says, and "unnatural," even "sinful," not
to do so (4:34-35). Pamela's language, though strong, is by no means inflated
when compared with that of conduct books, which routinely made a religious
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duty of maternal nursing. The Ladies Library informed its readers in 1714 that
maternal breastfeeding was "of a more necessary and indispensable Obliga-
tion, than any positive Precept of reveal'd Religion." Indeed, this text calls
maternal failure to breastfeed "one of the great and crying Sins of this Age and
Nation. . . . The neglect of this Duty, is a sort of exposing of Children . . . i t . .
. is but little better than the laying of a Child in the Streets, and leaving it to
the Care and Compassion of a Parish" (222).25
Pamela goes on to draw the conclusion obvious to Protestant readers: if
breastfeeding is a spiritual duty for which she will be held individually ac-
countable to God, then it supersedes all lesser duties, including her duty to
obey Mr. B. "As great as a Wife's Obligation is to obey her Husband," Pamela
says, "it ought not to interfere with what one takes to be a superior Duty. . . .
Even a Husband's will is not sufficient to excuse one from a natural or divine
Obligation" (4:34, 36).
It is this pious conclusion which causes the unpleasantness between
Pamela and Mr. B. For while he clearly understands that "the chief thing"
that makes Pamela want to breastfeed "is that you think it unnatural in a
Mother not to be a Nurse to her own Child" (4:40), he nevertheless sum-
marily forbids her to nurse. Furthermore, he uses the reasoning assigned spe-
cifically in conduct literature to the corrupt aristocracy: he wants Pamela to
keep her figure, he wants to have her body at his disposal (not the baby's), and
he wants her to continue her education (she is studying French and Latin).
He considers nursing to be "beneath" her as his wife. He argues that the child
would disturb her sleep; he wants to take Pamela abroad and can't if she's
breastfeeding. B. even hints that if Pamela insists on breastfeeding he may
take recourse in polygamy, a subject about which he has already made his
wife "often somewhat uneasy" (4:39).
Suppose I put you in mind, that while Rachel was giving her Little-one all
her Attention, as a good Nurse, the worthy Patriarch had several other
Wives. —Don't be shock'd, my dearest Love. . . . I will not think of any
more Wives, till you convince me, by your Adherence to the Example
given you by the Patriarch Wives, that I ought to follow those of the
Patriarch Husbands. (4:39)
And B. threatens to stop loving Pamela if she insists on nursing the baby herself:
I advise you, my dearest Love, not to weaken, or, to speak in a Phrase
proper to the present Subject, wean me from that Love to you, and
Admiration of you, which hitherto has been rather increasing than
otherwise, as your Merit, and Regard for me, have increased. (4:43)26
"A Point of Conscience" 147
A problem of conscience emerges for Pamela: ought she to obey what she
sees as a divine imperative to breastfeed her own children, or the unequivocal
edict of her husband, to whom she owes obedience as the "one indispensable
of the Marriage Contract" (4:34). "For if I think it a Sin to submit to the dis-
pensation he insists upon as in his power to grant, and yet do submit to it, what
will become of my Peace of Mind?" (4:44). The dilemma is a serious one.
Pamela believes that she will be individually responsible for the decision she
makes ("How can a Husband have Power to discharge a Divine Duty?" [4:34]),
while she recognizes that it is not really her own decision: her required "com-
pliance" (to use Halifax's term) necessarily compromises her agency. So Pamela
is irreducibly the accountable actor behind whatever action she chooses, yet
autonomous agency is also, paradoxically, denied her. As Terry Eagleton ob-
serves in a different context, Pamela's guilt resides precisely in the fact that she
is not a free agent.27 She agonizes over the compromised nature of her
overdetermined choice: "Must not one be one's own Judge of Actions, by which
we must stand or fall?" (4:34).
Richardson's answer to this crucial question is clearly "no." Pamela's par-
ents outline the text's rationalization for the necessity of Pamela's capitulation:
We think, besides the Obedience you have vowed to him, and is the Duty
of every good Wife, you ought to give up the Point, and acquiesce; for this
seemeth to us to be the lesser Evil: and God Almighty, if it should be your
Duty, will not be less merciful than Men; who, as his Honour says, by the
Laws of the Realm, excuse a Wife, when she is faulty by the Command of
the Husband; and we hope, the Fault he is pleased to make you commit,
(if a Fault, for he really gives very praise-worthy Motives for his Dispensa-
tion) will not lie at his own Door. So e'en resolve my dearest Child, to
submit to it, and with Cheerfulness too. (4:46)
Mr. B. is even more explicit, citing the Old Testament to demonstrate "of how
little Force even the Vows of your Sex are, and how much you are under the
Controul of ours" (4:40).
Even in such a strong Point as a solemn Vow to the Lord, the Wife may be
absolv'd by the Husband, from the Performance of it. . . . [A]n Husband
may take upon himself to dispense with such a supposed Obligation, as
that which you seem so loth to give up, even although you had made a
Vow, that you would nurse your own Child. (4:41)
The husband's will takes precedence over what his wife understands as "natural"
and "divine" in her motherhood, and makes it excusable—indeed, necessary—
for her to commit what she defines as "sin." Even if a husband is incapable of
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making fine judgments about moral and spiritual duty ("My dear Mr. B.,"
Pamela notes archly, "was never yet thought so intirely fit to fill up the Char-
acter of a Casuistical Divine, as that one may absolutely rely upon his Deci-
sions in these serious Points" [4:44]), his opinions nevertheless have virtually
divine authority in Pamela 2.28
Though hardly one to capitulate easily, Pamela finds the combined weight
of all these arguments and threats to be too much, even for her. "Recollecting
everything, [I] sacrificed to my Sex, as Mr. B. calls it," she writes (4:52). After
a good cry, finding that "my heart was relieved by my eye" and that she feels
"lighter and easier," she proceeds immediately to hire a wet nurse. "We are
quite reconciled," Pamela reports to her relieved parents, "although as I said,
upon his own terms" (4:54).
And so, we are to believe, the breastfeeding crisis is resolved. Never mind
that immense questions about power relations between spouses, individual
responsibility and agency, and maternal authority have been raised — a few
tears and a toss of the head presumably make everything right. Although Pamela
does regret the decision at one other point, when Billy seems to be dying of
smallpox ("Had I been permitted — But, hush! all my repining Ifsl" [4:252]),
her faltering proves unjustified: Billy pulls through and all is well. And apart
from this brief qualm, the text refuses to acknowledge that the disturbing prob-
lems raised in the breastfeeding crisis are not addressed, only deferred, by the
decision to hire a wet nurse.
Nevertheless, the cost of B.'s victory over Pamela's claims to maternal
authority and autonomy is high. In order explicitly to subordinate Pamela's
will to her husband's, Richardson must necessarily give her arguments a voice,
permitting dissonance to sound in his otherwise well-tempered text.29 Though
ventriloquized, contradicted, and finally neutralized, Pamela's subversive
maternal voice sounds clearly in the breastfeeding episode, and its echoes
disrupt the presentation of virtuous maternity as unproblematically submis-
sive to patriarchal authority.
The exchange between Mr. and Mrs. B. immediately upon her acquies-
cence—both what is said and what is left unsaid — undermines the ostensible
resolution of the conflict and complicates the reductive positions that hus-
band and wife have assumed. Mr. B. begins by complaining that Pamela forces
him to "a hated, because an ungenerous, Necessity of pleading my Preroga-
tive. And if this was not like my Pamela, excuse me . . . that I could not help
being a little unlike myself." Pamela's response to her husband's complaint is
in two parts —her spoken response and her silent thoughts, which she shares
only later in a letter. Aloud, she argues again for the priority of her individual
conscience and for her innocence:
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I am sure, said I, I was not in the least aware, that I had offended!—But I
was too little circumspect. I had been used to your Goodness for so long a
Time, that I expected it, it seems. . . . I thought, Sir, you would have
distinguish'd between a Command where my Conscience was concerned,
and a common Point: You know, Sir, I never had any Will but yours in
common Points. . . . I had no Intention to invade your Province, or go out
of my own. Yet I thought I had a Right to a little Free-will, a very little;
especially on some greater Occasions. (4:49-50)
Pamela's mixture of thick irony and obsequious apology, of course, makes little
impression on her husband. "I forgive you heartily," Mr. B. contentedly in-
forms her. "Give me one Kiss, and I will think of your saucy Appeal against
me no more" (4:51).
But silently, Pamela constructs a different response, equating Mr. B.'s
deployment of his "prerogative" in the breastfeeding crisis with his attempts at
crude sexual force before they were married. "Ah! thought I," she writes in
retrospect, "this is not so very unlike your dear Self, were I to give the least
Shadow of an Occasion; for it is of a Piece with your Lessons formerly" (4:49).
At stake in those former "lessons," of course, was the crucial question of whether
Pamela or Mr. B. had the authority to dispose of Pamela's virginity—that is, to
deploy her female body and its desire. In both Part 1 and Part 2, then, the
central conflict is between autonomy and subordination, choice and constraint,
liberty and tyranny. One might argue that Part 2 revises Part 1 on this issue: in
Part 1, Pamela was right to resist, but in Part 2 she is right to capitulate. On the
other hand, we might note that Pamela managed to come through the har-
rowing situations of Part 1 safely only because Mr. B. chose, at crucial mo-
ments, not to rape her after all. From this perspective, choice is B.'s peculiar
privilege in Part 1 as in Part 2. The difference is only that in the breastfeeding
crisis, B. makes a different choice, forcing his desire on Pamela against her
will. Crucially, it is the fact of their marriage that allows B. to perform this new
violence on Pamela without seeming to violate her, since as his wife she can
have no desires apart from his anyway. When Pamela pleads for "a Right to a
little Free-will, a very little," Mr. B. responds characteristically: "Why so you
have, my Dear; but . . . I must have your whole will" (4:51-52). As in The
Ladies Library, the mother (who is only legitimately visible as a wife) "is not
presum'd to have a Will contrary to her Husband's" (2:33-34).
To her credit, Pamela recognizes these strategies for what they are: mani-
festations of domestic tyranny.
He is pleased to entertain very high Notions . . . of the Prerogative of a
Husband. Upon my Word, he sometimes . . . makes a body think a Wife
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should not have the least Will of her own. He sets up a dispensing Power,
in short, altho' he knows, that that Doctrine once cost a Prince his
Crown. (4:39-40)
But though the "doctrine" of patriarchal absolutism had long been rejected in
the context of royal authority, it remains fully in force in the realm of domes-
tic politics: Mr. B.'s inflexible exercise of husbandly "prerogative" will cost
him nothing. As Pamela's parents advise, "It will signify nothing, after all [to
resist]; for he will have his Way, that's sure enough" (4:47). Or as Pamela
complained to Miss Darnford at the start of all the trouble, Mr. B. enjoys "a
Dispensing Power . . . which Kings are not allowed over the Law" (3:389).
Pamela 2, then, initially presents a perfect mother according to the rubric
established in Augustan conduct literature: tender, careful, always present,
educative, and eager to breastfeed. But by refusing to let Pamela breastfeed,
Richardson's "conduct novel" challenges not only Pamela's authority over
her own motherhood but also conduct literature's authority to dictate mater-
nal behavior. In the process, it redefines virtuous motherhood: specific mater-
nal behaviors become less important than the context of female subordination
in which they take place.
But delimiting the authority of conduct literature to dictate maternal be-
havior is only one of the projects of Pamela 2. The narrative of Pamela's un-
successful attempt to breastfeed her own child also colludes with midcentury
conduct literature's effort to further the extent of patriarchal sovereignty over
the bodies of children and mothers. Like other conduct works from the first
half of the eighteenth century, Pamela 2 seeks—with significantly qualified
success —to eliminate the possibility that mothers might "Reign without Com-
petition" even over the site of motherhood, and to deny particularity, autonomy,
and desire to maternal voices. So Richardson's sequel is an assault to more
than our literary sensibilities; in its efforts to reassert patriarchal prerogatives
over maternal bodies it constitutes an early statement of a sexual politics only
too familiar in our own day.
Afterword
I recently had a pleasure not often reserved for authors, when a reader whom
I greatly respect responded to the essay reprinted here in language I might
have chosen myself: she called it "disquieting."301 confess that I too have been
disquieted by "'A Point of Conscience.'" Even when I was drafting the essay,
its implications gave me pause. And now that the editors of this volume have
asked me to do something else that authors seldom have a chance at—to
reflect publicly on my own writing—it strikes me that the disquieting of read-
ers may be an important function of this essay.
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When I wrote "'A Point of Conscience'" I was working on a book about
eighteenth-century motherhood. What interested me about this episode from
Pamela 2 was that it demonstrated motherhood's threat to Pamela's control
over her own person and her own choices. A few years and another book
project later, I think about this material somewhat differently. What seems
most illuminating about the episode now is its suggestion that Pamela's iden-
tity as privileged wife shuts down her ability to resist B.'s arrogance. As Mrs.
B., Pamela can still name her husband's tyranny, but she must finally submit
to it, even at the expense of her child's welfare and her own values.
In effect, the conflict over breastfeeding in Pamela 2 forces Pamela to put
into practice the "injunctions" B. was already catechizing her on in Part 1: "I
must bear with him, even when I find him in the wrong. . . . I must be as
flexible as the reed in the fable. . . . If he be set upon a wrong thing, [I] must
not dispute with him, but do it" (467, 469). Further, the episode clears the
way for her submission to the particular demand that formed the immediate
context and the main point of those early "kind hints": B.'s demand that she
never seek to defend another against him, however unjust his behavior.
In Part 1, we recall, the immediate impetus for the list of injunctions was
B.'s rage over his new wife's temerity in daring to interpose with him on behalf
of his sister, Lady Davers. "Never think of making a compliment to her, or to
any body living, at my expense," B. thundered during that episode (461), and
Pamela dutifully recorded the lesson: "I must think his displeasure the heavi-
est thing that can befal m e . . . . And so, that I must not wish to incur it, to save
any body else from it." Significantly, it was during the same episode in Part 1
that we learned about B.'s liaison with Sally Godfrey, whom Lady Davers kept
mentioning "accidentally" and whose image kept intruding on Pamela's ef-
forts to memorize B.'s injunctions: "I must bear with him, even when I find
him in the wrong.—This may be a little hard, as the case may be circum-
stanced. I wonder whether Miss Sally Godfrey be living or dead" (467).
In Part 2 this Sally Godfrey, the mother of B.'s illegitimate daughter, takes
the place of Lady Davers as a woman Pamela might defend against B.'s tyr-
anny. But by now Mrs. B. has thoroughly learned her lessons and avoids re-
peating that mistake. Indeed, Pamela takes the initiative in enforcing Sally's
alienation from her child. For these reasons, the breastfeeding quarrel in Part
2 no longer seems to me separable from the subsequent episode where Pamela
colludes in annulling Sally Godfrey's motherhood.31 The two episodes are
intimately connected, as Pamela learns not only to submit to B.'s prerogative
herself but also to collude in forcing the submission of others.
Pamela, of course, is a document of eighteenth-century British culture,
specific to its time and place; and it is a work of fiction, not the record of a
lived life. Any legitimate reading must demonstrate meticulous attention to
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that historical distance and proceed with humility enough to recognize that
Richardson was not writing with twentieth-century readers in mind. But at
the same time, the breastfeeding episode in Pamela 2 remains disquieting for
more than antiquarian or narrowly "scholarly" reasons. Part of the episode's
power, I believe, lies in the continued pertinence of the questions it raises
about Pamela's autonomy and authority as a married mother.
Marriage does not automatically threaten female subjectivity nowadays: un-
like eighteenth-century women, we can become wives and still keep our names,
our jobs, and our financial independence. But the vast majority of even the
most privileged and autonomous wives still experience constraints when it comes
to motherhood. If we keep our names, few among us enjoy sharing our children's
names; if we pursue careers, we are resigned to inequitably shouldering the
labor of parenting, and we often find motherhood and work to be at odds. The
familiarity of this litany should not obscure its importance: despite women's
many advances since Richardson's time, motherhood within marriage still too
often forces capitulation to—and reinforcement of—patriarchal privilege. That
our capitulations may not be identical to those forced on Richardson's heroine
is less significant than the continuing necessity of capitulation.
While respecting the profound alterity of Richardson's Pamela and of the
society in which it appeared, then, it seems to me necessary also to acknowl-
edge the novel's power to delineate structural injustices that continue to shape
mothers' lives. And in that light, the most disquieting thing about the
breastfeeding episode may not be, finally, the way it facilitates Pamela's own
oppression, but the way it prepares her to oppress another mother, Sally
Godfrey. The breastfeeding episode not only narrates Pamela's forced capitu-
lation, as a married mother, to her husband's control over her body, her val-
ues, and her child's well-being. Even more disquieting, by demonstrating
Pamela's submission to the "kind hints" of Part 1, it makes inevitable her
collusion in defrauding a less privileged mother.
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mistress. Eventually raised to the status of a "Lady" (3:6), wife to a wealthy and almost
aristocratic husband, she remains ever mindful of her inferior origins and obsessed
with bourgeois values and duties.
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happy Children of imprudent Parents" (8). Richardson's Lovelace blames his indulgent
mother for his own villainy: "Why, why did my mother bring me up to bear no con-
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cramm'd with, 'till he dies a Victim to the mistaken Care and Tenderness of his fond
Mother": Cadogan, An Essay upon Nursing, and the Management of Children, from
Their Birth to Three Years of Age, by a Physician, 1748. Three Treatises on Child Rear-
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bor for ten weeks, where his mother visited him every day. For a discussion of Sarah
Johnson's motherhood, see my "Critical Complicities: Savage Mothers, Johnson's
Mother, and the Containment of Maternal Difference," The Age of Johnson: A Schol-
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18. Fildes, Wet Nursing, 118. For the cultural and political functions of the idea
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and Cure of Diseases by Regimen and Simple Medicines, 2d ed. (London, 1772), 5-6.
24. The paradoxical development I am describing has been observed recently
by Felicity Nussbaum, who calls it a "profound historical contradiction." She explains,
"Eighteenth-century Englishmen largely defined themselves, sexually and materi-
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158 Toni Bowers
37. The comparison signals the childlike status of wives in the conventional reason-
ing of Mr. B. and Pamela's parents. By worrying about her own responsibility, Pamela
presumes that she, like B., can claim adult subjectivity and spirituality. Pamela 1 had
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29. Defoe's 1724 Roxana: The Fortunate Mistress, ed. Jane Jack (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1964), provides a parallel moment when, in response to the
Dutch merchant's arguments that she should marry him for the sake of their child,
the protagonist makes her famous Amazonian speeches. Like Pamela's insistence on
her own responsibility, of course, Roxana's defiant independence is finally neutral-
ized: she comes to lament ever having spoken against marriage and is careful not to
miss her next opportunity to accept the merchant. But despite their eventual contain-
ment, Roxana's fighting words, like Pamela's, are never fully absent from the capitu-
lations that follow them.
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Mary Wollstoneeraft
Styles of Radical Maternity
I would like to frame this discussion of Mary Wollstoneeraft and the politics of
the maternal body with a tableau that figures an extraordinary personal drama
unfolding against the backdrop of an equally extraordinary national drama.
Having journeyed to France to observe a revolution in which she had placed
so much hope, Mary Wollstoneeraft met and fell in love with Gilbert Imlay,
scion of the new American republic, and someone Wollstoneeraft looked upon
as a sort of natural man, uncorrupted by European affectations and decadence.
Needless to say, the enlightened pair never considered seeking any higher
sanction to their union than personal honor; indeed, Wollstoneeraft even
bragged a bit about enjoying the pleasures of conjugal fellowship "without
having clogged my soul by promising obedience."1 In May 1794, a little more
than a week after giving birth to her daughter Fanny in Le Havre, Wollstoneeraft
proudly describes the following scene of republican domesticity: "My little
Girl," she writes, "begins to suck so manfully that her father [Imlay] reckons
saucily on her writing the second part of the R ts of Woman."2
According to Imlay's saucy reckoning, the project of women's emancipa-
tion will be complete once infant girls nursing at their mothers' breasts are
immasculated, transformed into vigorous men. Because Imlay soon would
desert the mother and child, his wit here seems exceedingly painful. After all,
breastfeeding was supposed to cement the conjugal tie. In A Vindication of
the Rights of Woman (1792), Wollstoneeraft herself not only had tried to dig-
nify breastfeeding as a civic duty conducive to the formation of sympathetic
citizens, but she had also labored to establish the sensuousness of the satisfac-
tion it afforded fond husbands looking on: "Cold would be the heart of a
husband, were he not rendered unnatural by early debauchery, who did not
feel more delight at seeing his child suckled by its mother than the most artful
wanton tricks could ever raise."3
But however unfortunate, Imlay's witty comment on the gendering of
the suckling scene does not really misconstrue the argument about women,
160 Claudia L. Johnson
mothers, and daughters that Wollstonecraft advanced in Vindication. Regard-
less of how it ends, liberal theory begins, at least, in Thomas Laqueur's words,
"with a neuter individual body: sexed but without gender, in principle of no
consequence to culture, merely the location of the rational subject that con-
stitutes the person."4 Yet although Wollstonecraft repeatedly insists that virtue
has no sex, she (like most liberal theorists, and like Imlay here) not only tac-
itly assumes the maleness of that ostensible sex-neutrality but she also mea-
sures women's capacity against the standards set by a very particular kind of
masculinity. Having posited rationality, independence, and productive bodily
vigor as man's true nature — a nature which culture has perverted into trifling
sentimentality, dependence, and weakness—Wollstonecraft's Vindication
clearly affiliated itself with a modified Commonwealth tradition of English
republicanism. This tradition championed the virtue produced by the partici-
pation of independent, property-owning, and arms-bearing (male) citizens in
civic life. Concomitantly, as G.J. Barker-Benfield has argued, it assailed the
"degeneration of both civic virtue and manhood" into vicious effeminacy as
the inevitable result of monarchy and hereditary privilege.5 James Burgh, for
example—who seems to have served posthumously as a mentor of sorts for
Wollstonecraft—had charged that "adultery, gambling, cheating, rooking,
bribing, blasphemy, sodomy, and other frolics" were the elegant amusements
of the pampered modern ruling class, whereas Paine damned peers as the
"counterfeit" of women and as a "seraglio of males" living in and for "lazy
enjoyment."6
As if it were possible to transmute misogyny into a form of homophobia
that could somehow leave women unscathed, Wollstonecraft attempts to turn
a political tradition foundationally scornful of femininity to feminist ends,
and she does this not by enlarging or inventing a positive counterdiscourse of
femininity but by celebrating a vision of republican masculinity into which
women too could be invited. Accordingly, she regards it as crucial for the
well-being of the state to differentiate men from fops, from enervated court-
iers, from unsexed men and "equivocal beings," but she refuses to consider it
important to differentiate men from women (249). Indeed, to allow that dif-
ference between the sexes has significance would weaken her liberal argu-
ment on behalf of women's political and educational rights. Of course,
Wollstonecraft was fighting a losing battle with her own ideological comrades.
Historians of the French Revolution have amply demonstrated women's ex-
clusion from the rights of self-responsibility and civic activity within the pub-
lic sphere that Wollstonecraft recommends in Vindication.7 In the French
Republic of Virtue, a woman could be a citizen only through maternity. As
Joan Landes has put it, "According to the logic of republican motherhood,
woman's major political task was to instill her children with patriotic duty. It
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followed, then, that the home could serve as the nursery for the state. As citi-
zens, women would be educated beyond their limited horizons and wholly
self-oriented concerns in order to embrace the larger polity, but ultimately in
a passive and not an active manner."8 The stoicism, autonomy, muscularity,
and self-control of the republican male body was not, in other words, allowed
to describe that of the republican female as well. From its vituperative attacks
upon Marie-Antoinette's crimes against maternity and sexual propriety to its
outlawing of women's political clubs, the Republic of Virtue insisted that
women's natural bodily difference mandated the separation of spheres, that
female virtue was "naturally" domestic and private.9
True, the nurse officiating at Wollstonecraft's lying-in was so impressed by
the soldierliness with which Wollstonecraft bore her labor pains that she re-
marked, "Frenchwoman like, that I ought to make children for the Republic,
since I treat it so slightly."10 Insofar as Wollstonecraft in Vindication indeed
urges her countrywomen to practice the duties of maternity, she would seem
to comply with ultimately defeating imperatives of radical ideology, and femi-
nist historians —more impressed than Wollstonecraft was with the public
antidomestic mores of the ancien regime and with the space it accorded to
(some) women through salon and court culture — have scolded Wollstonecraft
for her ostensible commitment to bourgeois conceptions of motherhood.11
But maternity, as Wollstonecraft sees it, in fact entails no necessary or
insurmountable division of the public and private spheres. Whereas Burgh
recommends that celibacy be penalized by law, Wollstonecraft readily acknowl-
edges that public servants of both sexes will probably not want to be married
and thus distracted by the private duties of parenthood. Indeed, for her the
duties of maternity are striking precisely for what they do not signify: they are
not binding upon all women, and they do not block women's participation in
civic life any more than the equally important duties of fatherhood customar-
ily inhibit men's participation. A feminist-inflected version of commonwealth
ideology as it pertained to domestic sexuality was attractive to Wollstonecraft
precisely because it de-specified the female body. Having reclaimed men from
debasing and, as Wollstonecraft would have it, feminizing customs of heredi-
tary wealth and privilege, a democratic republic would make men and women
alike more manly; it would de-essentialize republican masculinity; it would
de-eroticize women's incapacity and foster in them the same sturdiness and
self-control recommended for men; and it would rescue and redignify hetero-
sexuality itself—which had been excoriated in Wollstonecraft's early novel,
Mary, a Fiction (1788/89), as distempered and corrupt—by figuring the mutu-
ally respecting married couple not as libertine, frivolous, or idle but as public-
minded and purposive, as citizens and as parents busy about their work,
productively embodied rather than decadenfly sensual. With a political and
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sexual vision like this, it is no wonder that Wollstonecraft did not seem to
mind Imlay's wit, which resexed the maternal scene.
The Wrongs of Woman; or, Maria (1796-98) not only explodes this hope
in the emancipatory potential of republican masculinity but it represents that
hope as the madness from which the heroine must be emancipated. The speci-
ficity of the female body, far from being the strategic nonissue it was in the
political tracts, here is its starting point. We first encounter Maria as a body
that can only be female —a body frustrated in the sentiments which in part
constitute it (Maria is "tortured by maternal apprehension" for the daughter
who has been torn from her); a body thwarted in its physical functions (Maria's
breasts are "bursting with the nutriment for which this cherished child might
now be pining in vain").12 Here, the female body—having been insulted, sold,
hunted down, and imprisoned solely because of its femaleness — is accepted
in all of its creatureliness, and is offered as the basis for solidarity with other
women and as the spring of moral sentiment.
In arguing as much, I am dissenting from the common view of this work,
which is seen as a sort of novelization of Vindication. To be sure, as far as its
negative thesis is concerned —i.e., its determination to exhibit "the misery
and oppression, peculiar to women, that arise out of the partial laws and cus-
toms of society" (73) —this is the case.13 But as far as its positive thesis is con-
cerned, The Wrongs of Woman grimly narrates the undoing of Wollstonecraft's
earlier program: just as the plot works retrospectively to criticize middle- and
upper-class masculinity, in the person of the monstrous but altogether con-
ventional Venables, it also carries Maria forward to disenchantment with re-
publican masculinity, in the person of the feckless Darnford. To consider the
difference between A Vindication of the Rights of Woman and The Wrongs of
Woman, then, is to consider the difference between Wollstonecraft's revolu-
tionary and postrevolutionary careers. Wollstonecraft, like Wordsworth and
Coleridge, was despondent about the failure of the French Revolution and
the massiveness of the reaction at home. But these failures exacted different
costs from radical women. Wordsworth could leave France, as well as Annette
Vallon and their child, behind him. Given the hope Wollstonecraft had in-
vested in republican masculinity throughout Vindication, however, Imlay's
derelictions spelled a more extensive disillusionment that was political as well
as personal. In this essay, I will argue that Wollstonecraft's turn toward the
female body, as that body is a daughter and/or mother, is a turn away from the
political normativity of the male body in conservative and radical discourse.
When The Wrongs of Woman opens, Maria has been immured in a de-
caying mansion that is at once a prison and a madhouse, and it is important
to keep the dual nature of her confinement in mind. Insofar as her cell is a
prison, itliteralizes the condition of women across the kingdom. In chapter 1,
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the narrator asks, "Was not the world a vast prison, and women born slaves?"
(79), and subsequent chapters, constructing an elaborate network of meta-
phors of entombment and forcible constraint, answer a gloomy affirmative.
Maria herself later avers, coining a chilling phrase, "Marriage had bastilled
me for life. . . . [Fjettered by the partial laws of society, this fair globe was to
me an universal blank" (154-55), and women have the same experience all
the way down the social ladder. At the first house where Maria seeks refuge
from her husband, she discovers a haggard landlady who timorously declares,
"When a woman was once married, she must bear every thing" (170), for her
own drunken husband "would beat her if she chanced to offend him, though
she had a child at the breast" (171). Maria's second landlady, a craftier dame,
irks and bores Maria with a story that is much the same, even foreshadowing
Maria's own later experience before the court: having had no choice but to
suffer the depredations of a husband who, under the protection of the law,
pawns her clothes for whores and drink, she observes, "Women always have
the worst of it, when law is to decide" (178). Although these instances blast
the myth that heterosexual domesticity affords affective nurturance and pro-
tection to women, the case of the unmarried Jemima is more desperate still,
for having been raped and debauched of character and reputation since child-
hood, she is excluded from domestic service and can only subsist through
prostitution.
These sections of The Wrongs of Woman are clearly devoted to fleshing
out the intention Wollstonecraft formulated in a letter that Godwin made into
the preface of the novel: "to show the wrongs of different classes of women,
equally oppressive, though, from the difference of education, necessarily vari-
ous" (74). As such, they sometimes appear to be perfunctory inset tales with
no other rationale than to show yet another class of woman, like Maria, "caught
in a trap, and caged for life" (144). Despite this occasional blatancy—it is,
after all, unfinished—The Wrongs of Woman is a densely literary novel: texts
by Dryden, Rowe, Rousseau, Shakespeare, Johnson, Burney, Radcliffe, and
Godwin, to name only a few, are constantly being absorbed and transformed,
sometimes with results far more artful than Wollstonecraft is usually given
credit for. The quotation just cited alludes to the caged bird in Laurence
Sterne's Sentimental Journey, whose song—"I can't get out, I can't get out" —
moves Parson Yorick to conjure a vivid fantasy about a wretch imprisoned in
the Bastille. Anticipating Burney as well as Austen, Wollstonecraft both
radicalizes and feminizes the image throughout the novel, as Sterne's bird,
taught its song by a servant of the ancien regime, becomes all of England's
women, who regardless of class sing the same song: "I can't get out—I can't
get out."14 Moreover, the very bodies of these women both epitomize the
unnatural blockage they protest—as when Maria's maternal milk is not
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permitted to flow—and reproduce that gynocidal blockage, becoming reluc-
tant prisons in and of themselves — as when the wretchedness of Jemima's
mother becomes the daughter's manacle, the "heavy weight fastened on her
innocent neck" (79), or when Maria "mourning for the babe of which she was
the tomb" (202), realizes that her own pregnant belly is a deadly jail.
As determined as this novel is to show the corporeal character of women's
confinement, it is even more committed to representing how women's minds
are fettered, as Gary Kelly has put it, by the "false consciousness of a society
dominated by court and gentry notions of property, family and gender."15 The
orthodox conception of ideology that Kelly employs here is appropriate, for
the novel is written with the conviction that rational minds can "advance
before the improvements of the age" (73) and achieve a lucidity alien to their
blinkered contemporaries. The truth which Wollstonecraft's stunning novel
recommends to her enlightened readers is that Maria is immured most strenu-
ously by the ideology of sentimental heterosexuality permeating radical as
well as conservative discourse, and that she must cast off the chains that bind
women to men and that occlude women's relations to each other and to their
children if she is to be free.
The novel's case against heterosexual love is conveyed in part through
the pervasive intertextual presence of Hamlet. Confined in her own Gothic
house, Maria has occasion to meditate upon the rottenness of the kingdom as
she looks out her window upon a "desolate garden" gone to seed and a "huge
pile of buildings" fallen "to decay" and "left in heaps in the disordered court"
(77). But when this feminine embodiment of Hamlet thinks about "the ills
which flesh is heir to" (81), she has only women's flesh in mind: only a woman
could have her child torn from her, and only a woman could be forcibly in-
carcerated in the madhouse on her husband's word. Recasting Hamlet's "Frailty,
thy name is woman," Maria soliloquizes, "Woman, fragile flower! why were
you suffered to adorn a world exposed to the inroad of such stormy elements?"
(88), and the fragility she refers to is not women's susceptibility to sexual appe-
tite, but their tragic lack of material, legal, and personal resources with which
to withstand the brutality of men. The Ophelia she contemplates is a fellow
inmate —"a lovely maniac," yet another womanly "warbler" singing in her
cage —driven out of her mind by the "rich old man" to whom she was married
"against her inclination" (88).
Although Maria indulges some wishes "to sleep and to dream no more"
(85), her body hangs on, and her mind, unlike that of her Ophelian counter-
part, is doomed to a painful enlightenment that makes her look like the crazy
one in the corrupt world. Writing her "narrative" (85) specifically for her
daughter's edification, Maria describes her initial love for George Venables as
a fanciful projection onto him of the manly qualities she —like all Wollstone-
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craftean heroines—possesses in far greater abundance. When he contributes
a guinea to Maria's charitable projects on behalf of an old woman, Maria
believes him the soul of excellence: "I fancied myself in love — in love with
the disinterestedness, fortitude, generosity, dignity, and humanity, with which
I had invested the hero I dubbed" (130). But as fantastical as Maria's vision of
George is, her delusion is hardly self-induced. As Maria writes of an attorney
who is cold to the old woman's tears but moved by the ardent blush of Maria's
complexion, "in a world where humanity to women is the characteristic of
advancing civilization, the beauty of a young girl was so much more interest-
ing than the distress of an old one" (134). If Maria believes that George's
charity reflects anything nobler than the wish to impress the girl, that error is
the work of sentimental ideology itself. Maria's sarcasm here targets not only
the pretentions of Burke's reactionary inflection of chivalry in particular, al-
ready lambasted in the Rights of Men and Vindication, but also the larger
tendency of the sentimental tradition in general, of which Burke partakes, to
posit heteroerotic love as the basis for (men's) moral behavior. As Parson Yorick
explains, "if ever I do a mean action, it must be betwixt one passion and
other" for "one princess or another," for "whilst this interregnum lasts, I al-
ways perceive my heart locked up . . . and the moment I am rekindled, I am
all generosity and good will again."16
In her retrospective memoirs Maria assails the ethos of chivalry without
much difficulty, exposing how it invited her erroneously "to consider that heart
as devoted to virtue, which had only obeyed a virtuous impulse" (135) in-
spired by her erotic presence. But her love for the nonchivalric Darnford is
criticized far more reluctantly and considerably less frontally. In a subtle struc-
tural decision on Wollstonecraft's part, Maria's memoirs to her daughter are
withheld from the reader until chapters 7-10, when Darnford reads them.
Not until we read them can we appreciate why her love is represented under
the shadow of the madhouse and recognize how Maria's love for him reca-
pitulates the error she made with Venables. Here, of course, it is not only the
credulity of youth that impels her but also the urgency of sexual desire itself.
"Voluptuousness" is a pejorative in Wollstonecraft's earlier work, which links
culpable sensuality with the feminine precisely when denoting male vice. But
having tried in Vindication to dignify women by giving them access to the
idealized male body, to which they are fated ever to be inferior in degree of
strength, in Wrongs Wollstonecraft not only frankly accepts Maria's "volup-
tuousness" without a sneer but even claims that "it inspired the idea of strength
of mind, rather than of body" (98), as if the manifestly (female) sexed substan-
tiality of Maria's body could heighten rather than detract from her dignity. In
this novel, when the "air swept across her face with a voluptuous freshness
that thrilled to her heart" (89) after Maria has been reading La Nouvelle Heloise
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in her cell, we are supposed to side with the body and the instincts that seek to
expand beyond the constraints that fetter them. And whereas Mary, a Fiction
had evolved into protolesbian narrative, in Wrongs the heroine's instincts are
decidedly heterosexual. Mary finds a man as hyperfeminine as her beloved
Ann; Maria fantasizes masculine virtues. Darnford's forceful insistence —"I
will have an answer" (91) —contrasts markedly with Henry's modest reserve,
just as the virility of Darnford's presence —"His steady step, and the whole air
of his person, bursting as it were from a cloud, pleased her" (89) —contrasts
with Henry's languor.
The narrator clearly pities Maria's yearning for propinquity—"What
chance had Maria of escaping?" (98), the narrator asks, ominously—but clearly
implies that romantic love is another form of incarceration. Yet something
more than a purely personal need for love accounts for Maria's readiness to
turn Darnford, much as she had earlier turned her husband, into a "statue in
which she might enshrine" all "the qualities of a hero's mind" (99). A particu-
lar political program encourages the repetition of romantic error. Republican
ideology itself, I would argue, remystifies Darnford's masculine sexual privi-
lege in ways that make it hard to recognize. Maria reads Darnford's collection
of "modern pamphlets" and a fragment apparently of his own composition
about "the present state of society and government" (85-86). The republican
sympathies they evidently share make Darnford's account of himself—a re-
markably obnoxious mixture of self-pity and braggadocio — sound like a tale
of intrepid manhood. Maria could at first plead ignorance to her husband's
"libertinism" (130), but she is not ignorant of Darnford's. Indeed, he trum-
pets his finickiness about the fair sex: "And woman, lovely woman! — they
charm every where —still there is a degree of prudery, and a want of taste and
ease in the manners of the American women" (96). Even more damaging
(given Jemima's presence), he positively flaunts his fancy for prostitutes: "The
women of the town (again I must beg pardon for my habitual frankness) ap-
peared to me like angels" (97).
Maria cannot hear Darnford's grossness because republican discourse
has intervened and recoded it as frankness, much as it has recoded his selfish-
ness as a lack of servility, his gallantry as generosity of spirit, and his arrogance
as the unaffected brashness—the hypermasculinity, if you will —of the natu-
ral man, who puts the jaded effeteness—the effeminacy—of other males to
shame. Clearly a rendering of Wollstonecraft's experience with Imlay, the
Darnford/Maria episodes judge male culture to be so corrupt as to make af-
fective reciprocity between the sexes impossible: republican swashbucklers
and gentry and would-be gentry males alike assume the instrumentality of
women. The difference between masculinities collapses, carrying with it
Wollstonecraft's political hopes. The representation of Maria's relationship
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with Darnford breaks off with a violence that attests to an investment in it so
intense as to be virtually unnarratable. Perhaps the most disturbing indication
of Maria's pathetically lingering enslavement to heterosexual romance and to
the political hopes it underwrites is her unwillingness to leave her prison.
Imagining that in Darnford "she had found a being of celestial mould" (189),
she declares that "liberty has lost its sweets." But leave she does, and the way
out of prison and the way out of her "false consciousness" are the same. It is
Jemima who takes Maria out of her bedlam and Jemima who yanks her back
from death in the final fragment. As Janet Todd has put it, Maria's history is
marked by two movements, "one circular and repetitive, and the other linear
and developmental. The circular binds her to male relationships. . . the lin-
ear tends towards freedom and maturity."17 But this way toward freedom and
maturity, I would stress, also carries Maria toward solidarity and affective com-
munity with other women, a possibility which had hitherto been occluded.
Theorists such as Rene Girard and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick illuminate
plots structured by triangulated desire involving one woman and two men.
But The Wrongs of Woman suggests that the heterosexual dyad represses fe-
male rather than male homosociality. Maria first chooses Venable's eldest
sister as a "friend" (129), but this friend is no sooner mentioned than she is
dropped from the novel altogether. Similarly, although helping her sisters is
for Maria "a strong motive for marrying" Venables (143), we never hear from
or about them again. Not only are women kept irrelevant to each other but
they become jailers as well. Maria's first landlady is ready to betray Maria at
the drop of her husband's hat: "A few kind words from Johnny would have
found the woman in her," Maria bitterly writes, as if being a "woman" and
betraying women go hand in hand (173). For Jemima most conspicuously,
the brutality experienced at the hands of men is negligible in comparison to
the beatings inflicted by her stepmother or by the wife who "scratched, kicked,
and buffetted" Jemima upon discovering her husband raping her (112-13).18
In light of this "normal" functioning of female-female violence to sustain
heterosexuality, I am more struck by what the relationship between Jemima
and Maria tries to achieve than by what it fails to achieve. Vindication dis-
dains "square-elbowed drudges" and "servants" who pass on "nasty" sexual
tricks to their young mistresses, as if such women did not fall under the rubric
"woman" and hence had nothing to do with the "rights" that Wollstonecraft is
vindicating.19 But even though Wrongs offends working-class women most
egregiously when claiming not to — as when Maria observes of Jemima, "The
woman was no fool, that is, she was superior to her class" (78) — its attempt
to establish a collective sense of identity inclusive of all women is quite un-
precedented. Including prostitutes, landladies, and women of the gentry and
the middle class, this fellowship is based on a rational recognition of their
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mutually oppressive complicity in a system of male privilege as well as on
their shared susceptibility to "humanizing affections." At the point where we
expect a scene of passion between Maria and Darnford, Wollstonecraft al-
most comically disrupts the heterosexual dyad: Jemima barges in on the pant-
ing lovers and begins telling her very long and chilling story. Although many
formidable readers have taken issue with Wollstoneeraft's representation of
Jemima as magically converted by the middle-class couple's sensibility, in
fact it is not Jemima's sympathy with the romantic couple's tender love but
her connection to Maria that proves decisive.20 The upshot of Jemima's narra-
tive is a bond with Maria that supersedes any relation to Darnford. When
Jemima asks, "Who ever risked any thing for me?—Who ever acknowledged
me to be a fellow creature?" (119), Maria takes her hand, and on the strength
of this, Jemima becomes the deliverer that Maria had insanely hoped Darnford
would be.
The inset tales show a self-reflexive and self-corrective tendency in light
of Maria's gesture of affiliation to Jemima, for their alliance will become an
alternative, a way out of the love plot, and it not only permits but invites us to
critique the female-to-female violence that the tales elsewhere disclose.
Darnford, for example, blunders when bragging/confessing, "I was taught to
love by a creature I am ashamed to mention; and the other women with
whom I afterwards became intimate, were of a class which you can have no
knowledge" (94). But Maria, of course, does know this "class" of "creature" —
first as the "wantons of the lowest class" whose "vulgar, indecent mirth" roused
the "sluggish spirits" (146) of her husband, Venables. But even as this passage
savages Darnford (who went wild over "women of the town" [97]) and Venables,
it is in turn corrected by Jemima's own story about being such a "creature," a
story that grows out of the section oiVindication devoted to "ruined" women.21
Challenging tales about prostitutes not only as Maria tells them but also as
Darnford and Venables tell them, Jemima's experience disproves the argu-
ments that heterosexual propriety employs to shore itself up when it excul-
pates men who visit prostitutes and when it excludes "unsexed" women or
prostitutes from presumably "normal" women. As Jemima's story makes abun-
dantly clear, prostitutes are not wantons who enjoy their work; like wives, they
are an exploited class, despising the men on whom they are economically
dependent. Similarly, when Maria later heaps scorn on "the savage female,"
the "hag" (122) who takes over when Jemima temporarily leaves, we can now
see—because the Maria/Jemima alliance itself has taught us to see—that this
woman may simply be another Jemima and that such epithets are the fetters
that keep her and Maria alike in chains.
But if the bond between Maria and Jemima makes possible a rational
critique of male domination, it is itself based in a kindred warmth that Maria
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and Jemima link to the maternal. Representing heterosexual passion as cor-
rupt beyond the possibility of recovery, The Wrongs of Woman locates the
"humanizing affections" in maternal nurturance instead of in heterosexual
love and the benevolizing sentiments it had been said to nourish. Saturated
with images of nursing, the novel radically feminizes the imagery of natural
blossoming that Paine had employed to characterize revolution itself.22 The
revolution of the seasons, which Paine uses to naturalize the other kind of
revolution, the giving way of the old regime to the new, in Wollstonecraft's
hands represents the redemptive emergence of woman-to-woman affection.
As Maria writes in her memoirs to her missing infant daughter, "The spring
was melting into summer, and you, my little companion, began to smile —
that smile made hope bud out afresh, assuring me the world was not a desert.
. . . I dreamed not of the frost—'the killing frost,' to which you were destined
to be exposed" (181). According to this model, it is not subjected men, then,
but women and infant daughters at their nursing breasts who are the "tender
blossoms" which ought to burst from their cells into the fullness of life, and
Darnford shows himself capable of moral feeling only insofar as he can imi-
tate, however imperfectly, the maternal, as when "he respectfully pressed
[Maria] to his bosom" (187). Conversely, the "killing frost" depicted in Wrongs
is not the brutality with which privileged men of the ancien regime extin-
guish the potential of other men, but the cruelty with which male culture
represses women's warmth toward each other: the frost that blights Maria's
daughter has already wounded Maria herself—Maria's mother, we recall,
preferred Maria's brother. Similarly, Jemima's humanity "had rather been
benumbed than killed, by the keen frost she had to brave at her entrance into
life" (120), and her mother's coldness toward her makes her unwilling in turn
to "succour an unfortunate" such as Maria (79).
The blight Jemima and Maria share as mothers and daughters they re-
pair in their relations to one another and in their joint relationship with Maria's
daughter. Insofar as Wollstonecraft consigns women to their biological roles
as tender mothers, her achievement in Wrongs may seem to be yet another,
implicitly conservative articulation of bourgeois domesticity. But the mater-
nity that Wollstonecraft is serving up is radicalized by its departure from con-
ventional domesticity. Maria first dreams about Darnford in part because she
wants her daughter to have "a father whom her mother could respect and
love" (90). But when she awakens from this delusion of heterosexual domes-
ticity, she turns to Jemima — not to take the father's place but to stand as ma-
ternal coequal in a restructured domestic scene. Enjoining her help in locating
her daughter, Maria wins Jemima with an extraordinary promise that has re-
ceived little attention: "I will teach her to consider you as a second mother"
(121). Jemima takes this offer seriously. She persuades Maria to leave the
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madhouse with her by appealing to the affective duty they owe each other.
"On you it depends to reconcile me to the human race" (189), she urges, as if
the offer of joint maternity were a sort of marriage proposal valid even after
"their" daughter is believed dead. And the household they set up does not
conceal class difference. Jemima is neither servile nor calculating. Far from
acting out of a selfless devotion that places her outside economic necessity,
she insists on her wages and secures her independence. But their parental
bond ensures their cooperation. In the concluding fragment, when Maria,
having been betrayed by men and their institutions of law and marriage, is in
the throes of suicidal agony, Jemima reappears with the lost daughter, whom
she has tutored to say the word Mamma (203). The dual referent of the word
proves doubly redemptive: it takes Maria beyond the plot which heterosexual
sentimentality inscribes for her, for that girl child is not cherished because
she is the progeny of a still-beloved male but quite explicitly despite her rela-
tionship to her detested father; and it carries Jemima, the girl's "second mother,"
into an arena for purposive, kindred affection with which biological kinship
per se has nothing to do.
This, of course, is not a story which Wrongs completely tells. The heavi-
ness of Maria's despair is only barely overcome, and the novel itself is incom-
plete. And far from degenerating into a powerful and unambivalent physical
revulsion of the sort which Maria had felt toward Venables, the lapse of Maria's
relation to Darnford into betrayal is hardly depicted at all, and so it is impos-
sible to regard her eventual independence of it as fully voluntary. Still, the
outlines discernible beneath the rubble of sentimental heterosexuality at the
end invite us to conclude that the emancipated, sturdy, parentally purposive,
and rationally loving republican couple that Wollstonecraft spent her career
imagining is, finally, a female couple, although their republican virtues can
flourish only in a retreat from the insurmountable corruption of the mascu-
line public sphere. The last fragment rewrites the mother/father/child tab-
leau that Imlay joked about years before by expelling men and manliness
from the maternal scene, thus undomesticating women and their bodies, and
bringing female homosociality into representation as a moral, though not as a
clearly political, alternative.
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/Maria Edgeworth and
the Politics of Consumption
Eating, Breastfeeding, and
the Irish Wet Nurse in Ennui
"The difficulty [facing the enlightened landlord in Ireland] is to relieve present
misery, without creating more in the future," claims the good agent, Mr.
M'Leod, in Maria Edgeworth's Ennui (1809).' In the face of spiraling Irish
hunger during the 1830s and '40s, Edgeworth would feel this difficulty acutely
herself in the years before her death in 1849. Hunger was a problem that she
associated explicitly with her own divided (or doubled) responsibility (as the
daughter of a wealthy Anglo-Irish landlord)2 to regulate not only the material
but the spiritual consumption of those beneath her—to feed the bodies as
well as the minds of the lower-class Irish. Although the political economists
she admired had stressed since the turn of the nineteenth century that too
generous a system of poor relief in Ireland would foster indolence and over-
population, Edgeworth persistently questioned the physical implications of
the British government's limited responses to repeated subsistence crises, even
before the appearance of the potato blight in 1845.3 In May 1844 she wrote
the Reverend Richard Jones, a staunch supporter of laissez-faire policies,
"Take away the horror of seeing human beings perish—without offering aid
. . . [y]ou raise, you educate a race of political thugs. There are whole bands
of the selfish well-prepared for this education and quite ready to seize philo-
sophical reasoning as its pretext." Like incorrigible children, she believed, the
Irish necessarily had to be managed, but they also needed, first, to be fed. If
she fed the body, however, she might corrupt the spirit. "How shall we get the
people who have been fed gratis to believe that the government and their
landlords are not bound to feed them always?" she wrote to Jones in 1847.
"They evidently have formed this idea.... The character of Paddy knows well
how to take advantage of his misfortunes and of all fear and blunders."4
Edgeworth had given this conflict a sustained treatment in Ennui (1809),
the second of her Irish novels and one that anticipates many of the concerns
that would trouble her during the 1830s and 1840s. Set during the years
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immediately preceding the Act of Union in 18005 (and written during the first
half of the decade following the Union [1803-05]), the novel explores
Edgeworth's concerns about controlling the consumption of her Irish ten-
ants—largely through its analysis of the figure of the lower-class Irish wet nurse,
Ellinor O'Donoghoe. Ellinor epitomizes the gross materiality and political
subversiveness that Edgeworth associated with the lower-class Irish, but she
also embodies an alternative model of domestic authority. In Ennui it is Ellinor,
and hence Ireland, who feeds England, regulates the consumption of the As-
cendancy class, commands their affections, and shapes their identities. While
she is thus in many ways representative of the lower-class Irish mother whose
consumption patterns and disorderly housekeeping, Edgeworth persistently
stressed, needed to be managed in the broader interests of the state, Ellinor
also supplants the duties and rights of the upper-class (and necessarily absen-
tee) English mother, for whom she substitutes. Through the central figure of
the wet nurse, Edgeworth poses questions about what kind of woman really
has the authority to mother, and what the authority to mother in the hands of
the lower classes might portend.
Edgeworth's critics have largely ignored this attention to the physical dy-
namics of interpersonal and intercultural relations in Ennui or, like Eliza-
beth Kowaleski-Wallace, have stressed that Ellinor represents that which
Edgeworth herself "struggled not to become."6 Katie Trumpener argues per-
suasively, however, that Edgeworth accentuates in this "national tale" the "im-
peratives of cultural preservation" and that Ellinor's maternal body becomes a
site of "transcultural tolerance."71 will argue here that both perspectives are
valid, although incomplete unless seen in relation to one another. While play-
ing the role of enlightened mother-educator certainly aligned Edgeworth with
the Ascendancy class in Ireland, her focus on the physical dynamics of moth-
ering in Ennui helps her to confront simultaneously the difficulties in recon-
ciling maternal sensibility with sound economic practice.8 She critiques in
Ennui those aspects of utilitarian colonial policy which seemed to discount
the physical suffering of others, and she gestures toward a more maternalized
model of Anglo-Irish relations. Yet she nevertheless remains anxious about
the potential dangers of ungoverned local affections and loyalties, associating
these dangers explicitly with the threat of unqualified maternal love.
Maternal affection, in fact, proves as subversive a force in Ennui as politi-
cal intrigue and rebellion.9 Ellinor's substitution of her own child for the En-
glish earl whom she nurses becomes a form of political rebellion, a means of
satisfying her own hungers, if at a distance. (Her own child eventually inherits
the estate, while Ellinor raises the real heir as a humble blacksmith.) If she
represents a destabilizing threat to individual and cultural identities, how-
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ever, Ellinor also reveals that the danger of the wet nurse lay not merely in her
potential mutinousness but in the very deference which she appeared to
present—in the love which she might foster in the upper classes, and the
inverse obligations which that feeling engendered.10 In nurturing and feeding
her oppressors, the wet nurse cultivated dangerous sympathies in the ruling
classes. Although for Edgeworth these bonds of affection provide a possible
foundation for cultural hegemony in Ireland, such intimacy also functions in
Ennui as a potential threat to the political and economic interests of the As-
cendancy.11 As Edgeworth's contemporary Samuel Ferguson (another Protes-
tant Unionist) would emphasize, "Fosterage was one main instrument in that
process of Hibernicization through which the early invaders were invariably
withdrawn from their English allegiance."12 Writing in the immediate after-
math of the political and economic Union of Ireland and Great Britain,
Edgeworth questions whether such a distinction between "English" and
"Hybernian" allegiances is more destructive than productive—but she also
highlights the potentially destabilizing effects of the alternative model of cul-
tural hybridity offered by the Irish nurse.
Before turning to Ennui, I will examine the way that the upper- and middle-
class maternal responsibility to regulate the consumption of the lower classes
was constructed in late-eighteenth-century housekeeping guides and cookbooks
in England. I will suggest, then, that the problem of Irish hunger complicated
this responsibility for enlightened reformers such as the Edgeworths, given
their desires to, like the agent M'Leod, "relieve present misery without creat-
ing more." Turning to the case of the lower-class Irish wet nurse, I will argue
that she problematizes the issue of controlling the consumption of the lower
classes. As a food source, the wet nurse provokes the question, "Who is feeding
whom?" and thereby foregrounds acutely the material dynamics of power re-
lations in Ireland. In Ennui, Edgeworth suggests that, like Ireland, Ellinor is
valued only as much as she can be consumed, although as with Ireland, Ellinor
will threaten to turn the tables and become a devouring consumer herself.
The politics of domestic consumption and the role of the middle- to upper-
class woman in managing the diets of her family as well as those of the lower
classes were clearly spelled out in a genre that was relatively new to the eigh-
teenth century and dominated by the work of women writers after mid-cen-
tury—the cookbook.13 Although many scholars have examined the way in which
conduct literatures of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries par-
ticipated in the construction of specifically classed and gendered English sub-
jects,14 cookbooks have been widely disregarded as a field of inquiry, despite
the fact that these texts anticipate concerns central to our understanding of
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nineteenth-century class and gender relations in Great Britain. The domestic
homemaker functioned in cookery books of the period as the "unacknowl-
edged legislator" of a society increasingly defining itself through the food it
consumed and increasingly wary of the choices it thereby confronted. The
careful regulation of diet became a means to a higher (national) end after
midcentury, as English cooking was usually defined in opposition to the more
costly, elaborate, and time-consuming French culinary methods promoted in
cookbooks of the first half of the eighteenth century. Cookbooks helped to
foster a sense of solid national identity, addressing an increasingly urbanized
population that evidenced growing signs of imported disease.
Hannah Glasse's The Art of Cookery Made Plain and Easy (1747) was
perhaps the most successful cookbook of its day, and it set the tone for works
to follow in advocating economy and moderation in consumption patterns,
while characteristically condemning extravagance as a French national trait:
"I have heard of a Cook that used six pounds of butter to fry twelve Eggs; when
any Body knows (that understands cooking) that Haifa Pound is full enough —
or more than need be used. But then it would not be French!"15 Regulating
this habit of extravagance, according to Glasse and other women writing cook-
ery texts in the second half of the eighteenth century, would correspondingly
elevate the character of the British nation.16 Integral to this process was the
suggestion that waste might be controlled. (Glasse offered her readers, for
example, hints such as how "To Save Potted Birds That Begin to Go Bad.")
The implication that this type of ingenuity was an integral component of
good housekeeping increasingly assumed broader social significance in sub-
sequent best-selling cookbooks, and by the century's end, the social dynamics
of eating became a central issue in works like Maria Rundell's A New System
of Domestic Cookery; Formed on Principles of Economy, and Adapted to the
Use of Private Families (1806). Rundell encouraged domestic homemakers to
feed the urban poor with the leftovers from their tables (thus eliminating the
need for organized soup kitchens and other forms of governmentally regu-
lated relief), and she stressed that this type of domestic economy would help
to cure the British nation of its blight of poor. In addition to her "receipts" and
her extensive coverage of most aspects of thrifty household management,
Rundell included detailed instructions to middle- and upper-class housewives
on economic cooking practices for the relief of the lower classes. After a lengthy
description of how to make nourishing soup from scraps and bones, for ex-
ample, she noted:
I found, in the time of scarcity, ten or fifteen gallons of soup could be dealt
out weekly, at an expense not worth mentioning, though the vegetables
were bought.
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If in the villages of London, abounding with opulent families, the
quantity of ten gallons were made in ten gentleman's houses, there would
be a hundred gallons of wholesome agreeable food given weekly for the
supply of forty poor families, at the rate of two gallons and a half each.1'
Like Glasse, Rundell maintained that the business of feeding a family in-
volved the regulation of its waste —the laboring classes might then receive
that which would otherwise be discarded: "broken potatoes, the green heads
of celery, the necks and feet of fowls," etc. She further stressed that this careful
management of detail radiated or circulated throughout the system of the
nation. Not only would "the pieces of meat that come from the table and are
left on the plates after eating" yield "nutritious soup for the poor two or three
times a week," but servants could be taught to subordinate their own needs to
those of others less fortunate: "It very rarely happens that servants object to
seconding the kindness of their superiors to the poor; but should the cook of
any family think the adoption of this plan too troublesome, a gratuity at the
end of the winter might repay her, if the love of her fellow-creatures failed of
doing it a hundred fold."18
Rundell's domestic philosophy emphasized the inherent value of disin-
terested acts of "kindness," which enriched both giver and receiver. But ulti-
mately her goal was to teach others to help themselves, most especially the
"industrious mother, whose forbearance from the necessary quantity of food,
that others may have their share, frequently reduces the strength upon which
the family depends."19 Rundell suggested that there were concrete means
through which women contributed to the material as well as the spiritual
well-being of their families and the families of others, but she stressed, too,
that if the body of the mother ran to waste, the welfare of the entire family
would be jeopardized.
Edgeworth drew upon these domestic values in her 1798 pioneering work
on child management, Practical Education (cowritten with her father, Rich-
ard Lovell Edgeworth), but she put a somewhat different spin on the question
of the mother's duty to regulate the consumption habits of her family. She
cautioned her readers most specifically about the dangers of enjoying food to
excess, noting that in homes where "the pleasure of eating is associated with
unusual cheerfulness, and thus [with] the imagination," parents "conspire to
make [their children] epicures": "All children may be rendered gluttons, but
few, who are properly treated with respect to food, and who have any literary
tastes, can be in danger of continuing to be fond of eating."20 Promoting the
values of moderation and self-control, Edgeworth also suggests explicitly that
proper literature can become a kind of substitute for food. Needless to say,
she clearly hoped that her own moral and educational tales (which preach
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self-discipline and the control of appetites) might provide her readers with just
such a form of alternative nourishment.
Yet circumstances in Ireland complicated the more immediate sense of
responsibility to the poor that Edgeworth associated with her own position as
daughter of an enlightened landlord. Targeting the agricultural practices in
Ireland as the "root" of the country's trouble, she aligned herself with political
economists who found the potato to be an inferior food that pinned the Irish
to the bottom of civilization's ladder, linking the Irish dependence on the
potato to indolence and spiritual decline. She would note years later that
potato farming did not require "industry or labor sufficient for the moral pur-
pose."21 It was not only the scarcity of food in Ireland that concerned women
like Edgeworth, in other words, but the abundance of the wrong type of food.
Elizabeth Smith, of County Wicklow, expressed attitudes that were, by the
mid-nineteenth century, widespread: "The cheapness of this low description
of food encourages idleness, pauper marriages and dirty habits, and neither
mind nor body could be fully developed upon such nourishment."22
Ironically, although it would be consistently associated in this way with
economic and moral decline, Irish potato farming had developed in response
to the increased export of grain to England and its other colonies. Christine
Kinealy notes that an estimated two million people within Great Britain were
fed, on the eve of the Great Famine, with food imported from Ireland, "and
the demand for this food was increasing." Agricultural Ireland was in fact
described "as a granary for the remainder of the United Kingdom." Exporta-
tion was facilitated under the auspices of protectionist legislation, the infa-
mous Corn Laws, which guaranteed minimal prices for "home-produced corn,"
of which Ireland was England's "largest single supplier." Ireland served, in
other words, as a wet nurse of sorts to the English. While Irish exports filled
English stomachs, the potato provided a local substitute food source that was
both nutritious and easy to produce. Large quantities of potatoes could be
cultivated in poor soil and on small parcels of land. Moreover, the cottier
system, whereby Irish laborers leased a small portion of land from a larger
tenant farmer in exchange for a certain number of hours of contracted labor,
meant that subsistence might be maintained without cash transactions. Irish
cottiers farmed potatoes on small plots of land on a rotating basis. The pota-
toes helped prepare the soil for other cash crops, and were given to the labor-
ers as "left-overs." While they were thus cash-poor, the consumption of up to
fourteen pounds of potatoes a day23 generally kept the lower classes healthy.
Yet overreliance on the potato crop was increasingly associated with ram-
pant subdivision, earlier marriages, and an ever-burgeoning population in
Ireland. Thomas Malthus had anticipated the trend to scapegoat the potato
in his Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), in which he details "the
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disadvantageous effect of a low relative price of food on the consumption of
the poor":
The great quantity of food which land will bear when planted with
potatoes, and the consequent cheapness of the labor supported by them,
tends rather to raise than lower the rents of land . . . to keep up the price of
the materials of manufactures and all other sorts of raw produce, except
potatoes. . . . The exchangeable value of the food which the Irish laborer
earns, above what he and his family will consume, will go but a little way
in the purchasing of clothing, lodging, and other conveniences; and the
consequence is that his condition in these respects is extremely miserable,
at the same time that his means of subsistence, such as they are, may be
comparatively abundant.24
While he may be well fed, Malthus explains, the Irish laborer produces no
capital with which to reinvest in the Irish economy. In 1826 Malthus would
amend this passage, noting that the "indolence and want of skill which usu-
ally accompany such a state of things tend further to render all wrought com-
modities comparatively dear."25 Increasingly in this way, the negative influence
of diet on character was linked to its deleterious effects on economic stability.
Increasingly too, the "indolence" which was held to "accompany such a
state of affairs" in Ireland was associated with an even more threatening disor-
der—that of the fecundity of Irish mothers. Kinealy notes that besides indo-
lence, "the production of children" was alleged to be the favorite pastime of
the Irish people: "Hypotheses about human reproductive behavior . . . in the
context of the provision of poor relief, were popular among the intellectual
elite, linking high birth rates to indolence and the inactivity associated with
poverty on the one hand, and too generous a system of poor relief, on the
other." As the fear mounted that the number of Irish mouths was growing
more rapidly than the food supply, concerns escalated regarding the "ten-
dency," as Malthus so ominously expressed it, for population "to increase
beyond the means of subsistence."26 Writers like Malthus and Adam Smith
suggested that Irish women's natural capacity to bear children contrasted
sharply with their abilities to rear them —and that the dependence of Irish
children on the state would mean the further loss of English revenues.27 As
excessive (re)producers (not unlike the potatoes which fueled that reproduc-
tion), Irish women were held to be necessarily conspicuous consumers.
The Irish wet nurse, however, radically challenged such assumptions. By
definition she was a producer (the word foster derives from the Old English
"fostrian," which means "feed" or "nourish") despite her lower-class status.
The wet nurse utilized her body to turn a profit (she turned body into bread,
so to speak). While the nature of this transaction —the nurse's ability to substi-
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tute for the biological mother—suggests a sympathetic model of intercultural
relations, the wet nurse also becomes an uncomfortable reminder of the tenu-
ousness between outside and inside, self and other. So too, while maternal
value was grounded during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
in the mother's supposed separateness from the public world of exchange and
competition, the wet nurse testified to the fact that a woman "has value only
in that she can be exchanged."28 Rousseau had suggested this point explicitly,
if ironically: "The best nurse is the one who offers the highest bribe." Indeed,
as Valerie Fildes has stressed, wet-nursing had been a rather lucrative career
for working-class women before 1800. Extended breastfeeding was widely ac-
knowledged, moreover, to be an effective (if not always reliable) form of birth
control, and the contraceptive advantages of nursing may have been comple-
mented by the Roman Catholic doctrine of women's abstinence from sexual
intercourse while breastfeeding.29 Lower-class Irish wet nurses helped limit
their burgeoning families by prolonging the period of lactation, while enabling
aristocratic women to increase the size of their own families. The relationship
between the aristocratic mother, her child, and the lower-class nurse consti-
tuted a kind of self-contained economy of mutual benefits and rewards.
During the 1790s, however, the years in which the action of Ennui un-
folds, the practice of fostering out children began to decline in Ireland. Terry
Eagleton, following Kevin Whelan, connects this trend to the political turbu-
lence of that decade, which culminated in violent rebellion in 1798.30 Yet we
should note that the Irish wet nurse had long been the victim of English preju-
dice. As early as 1596, Edmund Spenser had suggested that fostered children
might be corrupted by the love they received from their nurses, whom they
might come to prefer over their mothers. Spenser appealed to this anxiety in
venting his racial as well as class antipathy for the Irish wet nurse in A View of
the Present State of Ireland, where he argues that the fostering system in Ire-
land is a "dangerous infection," and laments that "the child that sucketh the
milk of the nurse must of necessity learn his first speech of her . . . . The smack
of the first will always abide with him, and not only of the speech, but of the
manners and conditions. . . . They moreover draw into themselves, together
with their suck, even the nature and disposition of their nurses . . . so that the
speech being Irish, the heart must needs be Irish."31 This concern that the
child might pick up the language habits of its nurse reveals Spenser's deeper
anxieties about children learning to love "things Irish" —his fears that milk
might be thicker than blood.32 Edgeworth echoes this concern early inEnnui,
where she interrupts the narrative with a footnote in which she quotes Sir
John Davies: "Fostering hath always been a stronger alliance than blood"
(36). For Davies, as well as Spenser, the fostering system was one cause of the
English failure to subdue Ireland. The embrace of Irish custom, via the em-
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brace of the lower-class wet nurse, had led "the English, which hoped to make
a perfect conquest of the Irish," to be "perfectly and absolutely conquered" by
the Irish."
Edgeworth clearly draws on such anxieties in Ennui via the baby-switch
plot. But she also offers a more complex and more decidedly sympathetic
response to the Irish wet nurse. Her portrait of Ellinor O'Donoghoe empha-
sizes the (invariably) lower-class nurse's historical role in sustaining and nur-
turing the bodies of the English — her ability to be herself a food source that
fosters British strength. The rural nurse's milk, in particular, had been fre-
quently hailed in the late eighteenth century as a healthy alternative for up-
per-class children. Lord Glenthorn is placed with Ellinor as an infant for
precisely this reason. His father, an English aristocrat, "had an idea that this
would make me hardy" (5). The impulse proves to be sound, as the sickly heir
regains his health at the breast of his Irish nurse, who claims later that she had
been "sure. . . that he would die wid me" (289).
Although Ellinor is clearly a subversive presence in other ways, whose
duplicity is equal to any of Spenser's or Davies's charges, she is not an abusive
or neglectful nurse (like those targeted by Rousseau, for example), nor does
she possess a nature somehow deviant from her maternity, like Lady Clonbrony
or Lady Dashfort in The Absentee (1812). Those aspects of Ellinor's behavior
that ultimately prove most threatening, rather, are those most explicitly asso-
ciated with her mothering: her unqualified love, her intimacy with her chil-
dren (both biological and fostered), her ability to produce enough milk (and
affection) for not just one but two. As with the middle-class housekeepers of
Glasse's and Rundell's texts, who contribute through their thriftiness to the
financial well-being of the family, Ellinor channels surplus (the breastmilk
which she produces for her own child as well as another's) into profit—both
immediate financial profit and an added contraceptive payoff. Extended
breastfeeding has (apparently) limited the size of her own family (only two
biological children are mentioned in the text, both sons). Combining the
features of the good middle- and upper-class English mother with those quali-
ties valued in the good Irish nurse, Ellinor serves as a possible figure of recon-
ciliation in the context of the impending union between England and
Ireland — a union which is materialized through her act of suckling the heir
to the Glenthorn estate.
Yet Edgeworth insists too that there are dangers inherent in this union. If
it is in fact the Irish mother who is feeding the English, in whose breast does
the real power lie? The question of who controls the "means of consumption"
thus becomes a central issue in Ennui, where the regulation of diet proves in
fact to be a slippery business. Ellinor is valued as a food source, but only
insofar as she furthers the strength of those who would consume her. Ellinor's
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own appetites are an uncomfortable variable within this equation, not merely
because they represent a potential drain on British resources but because they
mirror the unregulated appetites of the English aristocracy in Ireland—those
who, according to Edgeworth, ought rather to have been teaching the Irish
the value of subordinating desire. As one of the novel's Irish aristocrats, Lady
Geraldine, explains, "We, Irish, might live in innocence half a century longer,
if you [English] didn't expedite the process of profligacy" (177). Lady Geraldine
refers to the influence of the English in Ireland as a "contagion," from which
the Irish need to be "quarantine[d]" (177). But how is it, Edgeworth wants to
ask, that English national character had become so degenerate when trans-
ported to foreign soil? To admit, like Spenser and Davies, the dangerous influ-
ence of the Irish fosterage system (the English child's absorption of "Irishness"
at the breast of the nurse) is at once to reaffirm the natural inferiority and
infectiousness of Irish national character and to concede the alarming fragil-
ity of English identity—a concession which undercut the Ascendancy's claim
to innate cultural superiority. Are the English, then, merely that which they
eat? Does national character determine consumption patterns, or might the
reverse prove true?34
Rather than providing us with definitive answers to such problematic ques-
tions, Edgeworth sidesteps them in Ennui by shifting her attention away from
the problem of Irish national character (so central to her earlier Castle Rackrent)
and focusing instead on the more overtly "natural" dangers of maternal love.
She scapegoats, in other words, not Ellinor's inherent Irishness but her seem-
ingly natural maternal responsiveness (her loyalties to both the child of her
body and her nursling). Ellinor's original crime, the substitution of one child
for another, dramatizes these split loyalties. By Ellinor's own account, this
substitution represents an attempt to support—not to subvert—the status quo.
She claims to have been motivated by sympathy for the Glenthorn family,
stressing especially her consideration for their financial interests: "I thought
with myself, what a pity it was the young lord should die, and he an only son
and heir, and the estate to go out of the family, the Lord knows where; and
then I thought, how happy [the Senior Lord Glen- thorn] would be if he had
such a fine babby [sic] as [mine]" (289, emphasis Edgeworth's).
While we might detect more than a shade of Thady Quirk-like dissimula-
tion here (even the turn of phrase, i.e., "I thought with myself," suggests a
doubleness of perspective), Ellinor never denies her consciousness of the fu-
ture benefits that would ultimately accrue to her own child as a result of her
actions. She rather stresses her sense of responsibility to all parties concerned:
"I thought. . . what a gain it would be to all, if it was never known" (290).
Such apparent disinterestedness, of course, masks dangerous local interests,
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although Ellinor herself seems unconscious of this. Her allegiances have be-
come blurred —not just for the reader but for Ellinor herself. And this,
Edgeworth wants to stress, is precisely what is best and worst about the Irish
fostering system. While fosterage breaks down cultural barriers, it also threat-
ens to destroy the objectivity of both the English and the Irish, who can no
longer, like the reader, distinguish who is who.
Edgeworth is careful to emphasize to this end that Ellinor's seemingly
benevolent actions produce their share of casualties, not the least of which is
her natural son, who believes himself to be an orphaned English earl. Raised
without the benefit of a mother-legislator (Lady Glenthorn has died shortly
after giving birth), Lord Glenthorn does not learn the values of moderation
and self-control so necessary for happiness and sound leadership. He has rather
been "bred up [in England] in luxurious indolence . . . surrounded by friends,
who seemed to have no business in this world but to save me the trouble of
thinking or acting for myself" (1). This faulty education (whereby idleness
rather than industry is rewarded) produces in Glenthorn, "whilst yet a boy," a
"mental malady" characterized by melancholy and boredom, which he re-
fers to as "ennui" (2-3). That ennui is a disease foreign to healthy English
subjects is reinforced by Edgeworth's detailed attention to the manifestations
of Glenthorn's disorder: his French epicurism (19-24) and his taste for revolu-
tionary upheaval (236). While his bad eating habits and inclinations for po-
litical intrigue might be viewed as marks of Glenthorn's "natural" Irishness,
Edgeworth persistently stresses that her protagonist's character flaws are rather
the products of his decadent upbringing among English aristocrats—them-
selves rendered corrupt through exposure to French culture.3'
The thorny path down which Glenthorn has been led, however, takes a
radical swerve when he is confronted in England, on the birthday that marks
his coming of age, by Ellinor herself, whom he believes to be his Irish wet
nurse. To highlight this transitional moment, Edgeworth has Ellinor, in a
burst of joyous enthusiasm, provoke Glenthorn's "fortunate fall" from his
horse—fortunate, that is, because the accident allows him a glimpse of the
"true characters" of his wife (whom Glenthorn has "purchased . . . by the
numeration table" [17]) and his friends (who he realizes are anxious "to get
rid of me" [35]). The accident is fortunate, too, in that it provides Ellinor with
an opportunity to nurse Glenthorn back to health, both physically and spiritu-
ally. The recovered Glenthorn (whose wife has eloped with his crafty finan-
cial manager) decides to return to his estate in Ireland, where he believes he
can enjoy what he imagines to be "feudal power" and live "as a king" (39).
Upon discovering his actual identity, however, Glenthorn assumes his real
name (Christopher O'Donoghoe), relinquishes his estate to his foster brother,
184 Julie Costello
Christy (the actual earl, who has been raised by Ellinor), and begins to live by
his own wits. Through industry and perseverance he attains self-made happi-
ness and the bride of his choice (upon whom his former estate has been con-
veniently settled). When Christy, the restored earl, later relinquishes the estate
(which has all but been destroyed by his wife's extravagant consumption pat-
terns), a wiser, more deserving Glenthorn/Christopher reassumes his former
position —"the demon of ennui [now] cast out forever" (359).
Ennui thus plays out (on the surface) Edgeworth's program for the devel-
opment of legitimate Ascendancy authority. If Glenthorn/Christopher is un-
qualified to rule by virtue of the birthright which he has been led to believe is
his own, in learning the values of hard work, just principles, and affectionate
duty, he appears to be so qualified upon the completion of the novel, which is
written as his memoir. As with English rule in Ireland, his authority will in the
end be merited rather than arbitrarily inherited. "Honors of your own earn-
ing," notes Lord Y****, who oversees Christopher's education and facilitates
his class transition. "How far superior to any hereditary title!" (393). Moving
away from an explanatory model of political legitimacy that is rooted in blood
ties or in ties to the land helps Edgeworth to validate the claims of the ruling
Ascendancy over those of the displaced Irish landowners. Yet the confusion of
identities that attends this movement also helps to obscure the fact that an
Irish O'Donoghoe eventually assumes control of the Glenthorn estate.
Edgeworth pushes this sense of confusion still further. Local lore holds that
the lowborn O'Donoghoes were once "kings of Ireland" (304), whereas the
Glenthorns, "long and long before they stooped to be lorded," were at one
time but mere "O'Shaughnasees" (37, emphasis Edgeworth's). Perhaps there
is something of poetic (as opposed to utilitarian) justice at work here after all.
Even if obliquely, these references to familial decline and ascent raise
specters of a violent past marked by the rapid (and coercive) reordering of the
social classes in Ireland. Ellinor's methods of political conversion, by con-
trast, constitute an alternative to the problematic colonial model that history
offered Edgeworth. In reforming Glenthorn through love, Ellinor teaches him
in turn to love and, moreover, to love Ireland, a country for which he has
previously felt only antipathy (5). Love will eventually become the motivat-
ing force of his life, driving him to pursue the law laboriously so as to make
himself worthy of Cecilia Delamere. Ellinor's resumption of her mothering
of Glenthorn is in this sense his enlightenment, a point that Edgeworth ac-
cents through the promise Ellinor asks of him: to be allowed to light his fire in
the morning and draw open the shutters (81). The name Ellinor is, in fact,
from the French Helene, meaning "light." Glenthorn's coming into the light
is rendered, furthermore, as a return to nature. "You want the natural touch,
you do," Ellinor tells him, specifically in the context of Glenthorn's initial
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"virtuous resolution" not to be merciful, when mercy might interfere with
"what was due to justice" (281-82). Ellinor's function in the text becomes to
"touch" Glenthorn, to personalize his understanding of just rule. Her affec-
tion cures not only his "hard heart" (282) but, via his heart, also his ennui.
Hers is a revisionary model of politics, similar to what Anne Mellor has iden-
tified as a feminine Romantic "ethic of care."36 At her death, Lord Glenthorn
loses "the only human being who had ever shown me warm, disinterested
affection" (321).
Yet precisely because all of Ellinor's ideas of virtue "depended upon the
principle of fidelity to the objects of her affections, and no scrupulous notions
of justice disturbed her understanding, or alarmed her self-complacency" (299),
there are troubling implications for this ethic. Ellinor is a threat to the social
order specifically because her affections take precedence over justice. While
she inspires in Glenthorn a broader concern for the physical well-being of
others that dramatically reorients his sense of personal and social responsibil-
ity (and that consequently enables him to abandon his former absenteeism),
she also reveals that ungoverned sympathies can be problematic. Ellinor, in
fact, cultivates in both her natural son and her foster son sympathies that
threaten the broader political and financial interests of the Ascendancy. She
teaches them to be, in other words, "bad mothers," who cannot control the
appetites of others or reform the consumption patterns that threaten both
Ireland and England.
The true heir (and former blacksmith), Christy, for example, is a seem-
ingly natural gentleman, who appears to be content enough with the life he
has been given and who is motivated by affection and a sense of responsibility
to others. Nonetheless, he is thoroughly unprepared to govern the estate when
he is confronted with his true responsibilities. "Tribes of vagabond relations"
descend on Glenthorn Castle when Christy takes up residence there, and the
estate becomes "a scene of riotous living, and of the most wasteful vulgar
extravagance" (369). Although Christy himself "has lived all his days upon
potatoes and salt, and is content" (283), his contentment can be read as com-
placency that actually helps facilitate the near destruction of the estate. His
degeneration resembles, however, that of the English aristocrat as much as it
does that of the Irish laborer rendered dull from a potato diet. Christy's de-
generation, like Glenthorn's early self-indulgent behavior, is produced by a
faulty education. From Ellinor, whose heart rules her head, Christy has learned
the wrong lessons. He cannot recognize the dangers of overindulgence, and
so he cannot understand the benefits of long-term vision that will improve the
land and all its inhabitants.
Although Ellinor provides Glenthorn similarly with an education of
the heart, the sympathies that she inspires in him are as problematic as the
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liberality she has fostered in Christy. Foremost among the traps to which
Glenthorn is susceptible upon his return to Ireland is the tendency to "give"'
injudiciously to those he should be disciplining. This is a dramatic improve-
ment over the neglect that characterized his absentee status, although his be-
havior is nonetheless still qualified by the same sense of apathy: "The method
of doing good, which seemed to require the least exertion, and which I, there-
fore, most willingly practiced, was giving away money" (101). Although "well-
meaning," Glenthorn's initial charitable attempts to improve the conditions of
his tenants are fundamentally unsound because he is indiscriminate: "I did
not wait to inquire, much less to examine, into the merits of the claimants; but,
without selecting proper objects, I relieved myself from that uneasy feeling of
pity, by indiscriminate donations to objects apparently the most miserable"
(101). Glenthorn's "pity" (an "uneasy" condition because, like Ellinor's pity
for the Glenthorn family, it smacks of his guilt) is targeted by his agent, M'Leod,
as an improper impulse in the greater design to "do good." For M'Leod, a
student of Adam Smith, the task of feeding the poor is inseparable from the
goals of education: "to teach men to see clearly, and follow steadily, their real
interests" (111). It is the confusion of interests, he suggests, which leads to
economic degeneration and hunger—a confusion spurred by inappropriate
emotional responses on the part of the aristocracy. Glenthorn has, for example,
given marriage portions to the daughters of his tenants and rewarded those
who have children, so as to encourage population. M'Leod notes, in response,
that Glenthorn's estate "was so populous, that the complaint in each family
was that they had not land for the sons. It might be doubted whether, if a farm
could support but ten people, it were wise to encourage the birth of twenty. It
might be doubted whether it were not better for ten to live, and be well fed,
than for twenty to be born, and to be half-starved" (105, emphasis Edgeworth's).
Controlled giving, on the other hand, which encouraged the industrious,
while teaching the indolent to reform, is represented as an acceptable mode
of aristocratic philanthropy. Thus Glenthorn's later desire to reward the daugh-
ter of a tenant for her self-restraint in delaying marriage, by providing her with
a small farm on which she and her future husband can live comfortably and
care for her aging father, inspires a broader pattern of assumed responsibili-
ties, and this benefits the estate as a whole. (The family does not, in this case,
subdivide and thus devaluate the father's portion of land, and they achieve
self-sufficiency at minimal cost and maximum benefit for all.) Acts of charity
when motivated solely by pity, on the other hand, constitute unsound invest-
ments and further destructive patterns of consumption. M'Leod argues, "Pity
for one class of beings sometimes makes us cruel to others. I am told that
there are some Indian Brahmins so very compassionate, that they hire beg-
gars to let fleas feed upon them; I doubt whether it might not be better to let
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the fleas starve" (102). Shifting to a more remote colonial context, M'Leod at
once presents the colonial problem as universal (i.e., all colonial situations
are alike, in that the colonizers —as much as the colonized —need to be edu-
cated to abandon archaic and unreasonable methods of confronting unpleas-
ant problems), and invokes sympathy for the colonized figure who is himself
being devoured by the current state of affairs. The Brahmin's "philanthropy"
merely disguises his displaced consumption of the beggar, whose body is the
only commodity that the beggar has to sell, and who must be eaten so as to
satisfy his own hunger temporarily. The same is equally true of the wet nurse.
But more broadly, this dynamic underscores the relationship that Edgeworth
saw between England and Ireland. M'Leod stresses, above all, that one can-
not always distinguish the difference between eating and being eaten.
Ellinor's tragedy is explicitly this inability to distinguish between being
consumed and being the consumer. Her willingness, for example, to "sacri-
fice all she had in the world for anybody she loved" leads her to be "as gener-
ous of the property of others, as of her own" (299). Such selfless generosity not
only threatens the broader interests of the community but blinds Ellinor to
the fact that in attempting to prioritize the needs of others, she has starved
herself of the emotional and physical rewards of mothering Glenthorn/Chris-
topher, her "jewel" (285, 288, 292). She recalls the pleasure of holding and
nursing him and despairs when he initially denies the preference he owes his
"old nurse, that carried ye in her arms, and fed ye with her milk, and watched
over ye many's the long night, and loved ye: ay, none ever loved, or could love
ye, so well" (280). Depriving both herself and her child of that love has cre-
ated a chain of events that not only endangers the happiness of each but dis-
torts the nature of the mother-child bond. Ellinor does not know, in fact, how
to be a mother to her real son when he acknowledges their relationship. Faced
with Glenthorn's rebirth as Christopher, Ellinor wills her own end and falls
victim to her son's decline in fortune (to his weaning from the taste for fash-
ionable life).
Ellinor's death suggests that while the influence of the mother is vital to
the cultivation of bonds of affection, her authority must in some measure be
contained. She dies when the classes are reordered for a second time (when
Christopher/Glenthorn gives up his right to the estate), but she also precipi-
tates with her death the further restructuring of the social order by freeing her
son to move beyond her orbit and releasing him from the promise he has
made to nurse her back to health and take her with him when he leaves the
estate. Only through physical separation from her body, Edgeworth suggests,
can he differentiate himself from her powerful control and move forward.
The death of the Mother becomes the originating act that founds society within
this text. In the end, this is the "secret" Ellinor must conceal, even to herself.
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If, however, Edgeworth necessarily had to bury the mother in Ennui, she
also insisted that maternalized sympathies must be resurrected in Ireland in
something of a new form, which feeds the mind while simultaneously ac-
knowledging the primacy of the body. Restoration mEnnui thus comes through
Cecilia Delamere, who inherits the Glenthorn estate after it has been all but
ruined by Christy's mismanagement. Via the intermarriage of an English
Delamere with an Irish O'Donoghoe (like those in the traditional endings of
Walter Scott's future novels), Edgeworth gestures toward the possibility of a
legitimately hybrid (and explicitly feminized) Anglo-Irish culture. Cecilia, in
fact, renames Christopher/Glenthorn (he takes the name Delamere in mar-
riage), and thus offers him a new identity, which prioritizes the influence of
the maternal (Delamere, as Elizabeth Kowaleski-Wallace points out, is "de la
mere," of the mother).37 Cecilia inspires in her husband healthy appetites that
are neither self-destructive nor disabling for others. Rather she motivates him
to "persevere" in his "intellectual labours" so as to attain "the pleasures of
domestic life" that can come only through "exertion" (396). In this sense her
domestic legislation is grounded in reciprocal affections that produce respon-
sible middle-class behavior and the possibility of real social progress. More-
over, this progress is not accomplished through the consumption of the labor
and bodies of others, but through a steady diet of words, through Glenthorn's
"eating [his] terms at the Temple" (384, emphasis Edgeworth's).
This movement away from the consumption of the Irish body to that of
the English word recalls Edgeworth's own educational intentions. For
Edgeworth, as with her protagonist, the task of inverting the consumption
dynamics in Ireland necessarily began with the reappropriation of cultural
authority in the form of the educational text. Yet Edgeworth struggled through-
out her career with the contradictions embedded in her novels, which could
only gesture toward romantic resolutions to the tensions that she continued to
see escalate in Ireland, without effecting real relief for the starving Irish lower
classes. Significantly, with the assumption of full managerial duty for the fam-
ily estate in 1826 (she would run Edgeworthstown until 1839), her public
writing declined dramatically. During these years, she increasingly questioned
in her private correspondence the physical implications of the laissez-faire
doctrine she had hesitantly promoted in novels like Ennui. It is as though she
played out those concerns with which she had struggled in her fiction, in an
Ireland that became "impossible to draw," as "realities [were] too strong, party
passions too violent to bear to see."38
In the year before her death, however, Edgeworth found something of a
tentative resolution to her own imperative to feed both minds and bodies. In
1848, she wrote one last story set in Ireland, Orlandino, which took as its
subject the value of temperance. Thus fulfilling her duty to regulate the con-
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sumption patterns of the Irish, she evidenced her continued commitment to
an educational model based on reason and the control of the appetites. Do-
nating her profits to famine relief, however, she was simultaneously able to
provide literal nourishment for the poor. Metonymizing the book (or, more
precisely, the pen) into figurative breast, she could nurture this once both
bodies and souls.
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Reproductive Urges
Literacy, Sexuality, and
Eighteenth-Century Englishness
As its starting point, this essay takes the period in eighteenth-century England
when the power of words changed profoundly and writing took on unprec-
edented authority in a field of symbolic practices. With cultural meaning no
longer legitimated and stabilized through its intimate association with mon-
archy or church, Raymond Williams, Michel Foucault, and others argue, it
could be determined in other arenas and serve other interests.1 There is evi-
dence to suggest that the ability to read and write vernacular English effec-
tively produced communities, on both sides of the Atlantic, who shared interests
and affiliations, whose power and increase in numbers depended on publica-
tions that addressed their interests. Early efforts to regulate the English lan-
guage were based on the implicit assumption that an individual's writing
attested to the quality of its human source.2 The ability to read and write
common speech distinguished the individual from his inferiors and identified
his interests in common with others outside his immediate geographic area,
commercial ties, or kinship network. As vernacular English came to repre-
sent a person's capacity for thoughts, feelings, and actions, it apparently iden-
tified those who possessed it as true English people, those most suited, even
obligated, to govern.3
With the gradual proliferation of print, increase in written forms, and
improvements in printing techniques and methods of distributing informa-
tion, the relationship presumed to exist between the elite individual who could
read and the quality of his literacy was implicitly threatened. The manner in
which writing preserved and strengthened elite ties is suggested in Alvin
Kiernan's description of the books filling aristocratic libraries "celebrating the
great princes and their courts, their kingdoms and their languages, legitimat-
ing and reinforcing the aristocratic ethos and the hierarchical social struc-
tures that entered the entire political and artistic enterprise."4 In contrast,
periodical writers, moralists, and intellectuals of the late eighteenth century
were particularly alarmed by the propensities of the novel to call into ques-
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tion this kinship between literacy and the quality of individual consciousness.
Hannah More warned that "frivolous reading" would "produce its correspon-
dent effect" in the character of young people exposed too early and too often
to its charms.5 Fiction was perceived to be powerful and hence dangerous for
a number of reasons. Not only was it easily imitated, with its multiple spin-offs
widely disseminated and avidly read, but it had the mimetic capability of
representation that could point to something that was not really there. It could
simulate personal and social qualities lacking in essential value.
Sometime around the end of the eighteenth century, to put it simply, a
problem with literacy and mass cultural reproduction became a problem with
sex or biological reproduction. Mid-eighteenth-century authors and intellec-
tuals responded to the popularizing tendencies of print culture with a slew of
dictionaries, grammar books, and novels in a concerted attempt to make ver-
nacular English behave, to control a language that took new shape every day
in the pages of novels, journals, chapbooks, pamphlets, and the like, and to
make it conform to aristocratic ideals of historical and dynastic continuity
and divine authority.6 By 1800, many writers, moralists, and j ournalists warned
of the dangers of linguistic reproduction out of control. They did so in the
same vocabulary deployed by political economists, Thomas Malthus fore-
most among them, to warn of the biological power and arithmetic increase of
population, the seemingly inevitable result of unchecked sexual reproduc-
tion among the wrong sorts of people.
The discourse on population imparted a new sense of urgency to the
problem of early mass culture because it seemed to provide a natural basis for
reproduction, a phenomenon previously understood not in sexual terms but
in its cultural capacity as a problem unique to print language.7 What had
become a tradition assuming the unlimited capacity of print language to re-
produce itself, despite efforts to control its spread, now merged with a preoc-
cupation about the sexual reproduction of bodies and populations. As a new
way of thinking about sex and literacy (or the relationship between sexual and
cultural reproduction) came into being, it displaced or dissolved the links
between reading, writing, and individuality characteristic of an older cultural
logic to become a way of talking about the social and political dangers con-
fronting the newly consolidating middle class. It is tempting to argue that the
longevity and political efficacy of this late-eighteenth-century logic is nowhere
more evident than in contemporary American newspaper accounts, senato-
rial debates, and "scholarly" books linking the sexual habits of "welfare moth-
ers" to the economic plight of the American middle class.
There is a difference then between the eighteenth and the nineteenth
century in terms of the cultural work done by the novel and the problem it
must rationalize or solve. As a historical scholar of nineteenth-century fiction,
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I want to map out a tentative trajectory from mid-eighteenth-century opti-
mism about the production of mass literacy and the reading subject, as fig-
ured in Charlotte Lennox's The Female Quixote (1752), to the sudden anxiety
about cultural and sexual reproduction out of control, texts unhooked from
their sources, bodies without end, which characterizes turn-of-the-century
morality tracts, political economies, and novels of the kind represented by
Hannah More, Thomas Malthus, and Jane Austen. This essay will trace the
discursive swerve taken by the language of cultural reproduction as it is linked
to figures of sexual reproduction and the maternal body, especially in dis-
course about what the novel should be and in the novel itself. For it is there
that the problems with language and sex overlap and interact in the most
provocative manner.
Patrilineage, Continuity, and the Trouble with Language
The troubles of Lennox's misguided aristocratic heroine inThe Female Quixote
stem from a problem with language. Raised in splendid isolation by her fa-
ther, the marquis, after his banishment from court, Arabella cultivates a fond-
ness for reading French romances in "very bad Translations." That Arabella's
odd behavior results from the French romances she reads is crucial. As Mar-
garet Anne Doody suggests, "The volumes of romances are Arabella's only
inheritance from her mother, and the female inheritance is customarily pre-
sented by women in their novels as dangerous or double-edged."8 What Doody's
reading elucidates is the manner in which the figure of the mother increas-
ingly becomes the space onto which the problem of unauthorized reproduc-
tion, as I will argue, will be mapped as the century progresses.
Arabella's first turn of the page leaves her unable to distinguish fiction
from fact, copy from original. "Her Ideas," writes Lennox, "from the Manner
of her Life, and Objects around her, had taken a romantic Turn; and suppos-
ing Romances were real Pictures of Life, from them she drew all her Notions
and Expectations" (7). Comical consequences ensue when Arabella's mis-
reading launches her on a series of adventures making plain, in Lennox's
words, "the Bad Effects of a whimsical Study" —in other words, the influence
of reading on women. Deluded by bad books, Arabella transforms noblemen
into knights, gardeners into disguised lovers, and women of easy virtue into
distraught maidens. Thus, she is unable to distinguish the knight from the
suitor out to claim her fortune, the disguised lover from the gardener out to
steal her carp, and the maiden from the prostitute out to gull her. But this is a
minor problem. What is most at issue in such illicit reproduction is the chal-
lenge to patriarchal authority implicit in Arabella's refusal to marry the man
chosen by her father, her cousin Glanville.9 By transforming "a Lover of a
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Father's recommending" into an "impropriety," Arabella's misreading of ro-
mance protocols challenges the demands of alliance governing the aristo-
cratic community. According to this logic, the sexual and the political were
united within one elite, enclosed domain so represented earlier by John Milton
in Paradise Lost as the "Union of Pure with Pure."10 Her resistance to make so
appropriate a match endangers the longevity and stability of aristocratic power.
Because aristocratic rule was predicated on the purity of blood and the antiq-
uity of ancestry, the unique character of marriage alliances was a crucial ele-
ment connoting rank, status, and power in early modern England.11
Despite the challenge to patriarchal authority mounted by Arabella's il-
licit reproduction of French romance, the literacy problem is never repre-
sented as a problem of desire. The novel certainly problematizes the
troublesome relationship between individual identity and textual replication
by playing out the consequences of a female reader's inappropriate transfer-
ence of copy to original, representation to "reality," thereby highlighting the
potential within literacy to call forth unauthorized behaviors and practices.
Nonetheless, The Female Quixote never seriously calls into question what form
social and sexual reproduction will assume; it is always perfectly clear how
these aristocrats will reproduce themselves. Literacy played only a slight role
in this political drama as Benedict Anderson observes: "The relatively small
size of traditional aristocracies, their fixed political bases, and the personaliza-
tion of political relations implied by sexual intercourse and inheritance, meant
that their cohesion as classes were as much concrete as imagined. An illiterate
nobility could still act as a nobility."12 In Lennox's isolated aristocratic milieu,
personal relationships are played out within an overarching model of conti-
nuity ensuring the uninterrupted and unchanging connection between its
members that is never seriously jeopardized by literacy gone awry.
In Glanville's eyes, Arabella's aristocratic beauty, bearing, and grace are
only magnified by her unique reading style, whereas in Arabella's somewhat
eccentric affections no comparable suitor emerges to rival Glanville—whose
appropriateness, desirability, and suitability to marry are never at issue. If
anything, Arabella's persistent efforts to reproduce in Glanville the features of
a romantic hero pay off by enhancing his attractions. He is transformed from
a bad reader, who did not obey her when "she made a Sign for him to retire"
because "he was quite unacquainted with these Sorts of dumb Commands"
(36), into a good reader, who "understood" when she made "a Sign to leave
her alone" (304). Arabella's interpretative difficulties hardly amount to any-
thing more than a series of comical mix-ups, mistaken identities, and near
misses threatening little or nothing of consequence in the social world she
orbits. Given this, the problem motivating the plot, indeed rescuing it from
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Lennox's tedious repetition of a comedy of errors, is precisely what form
Arabella's cure will take.
Conservative intentions to the contrary, The Female Quixote neither ar-
gues against cultural reproduction itself nor figures language as an uncontrol-
lable force. Although Arabella's adventures illustrate the power of fiction to
form and authorize her subjectivity, she nevertheless is cured in the end.
Marriage to Glanville brings desire squarely into alignment with the demands
of the kinship system and guarantees the continuity of aristocratic fortune and
blood. Whereas some feminist critics read Arabella's renunciation of Romance
as a portent foretelling her precipitous decline into domesticity, and see
Arabella herself as a powerless victim of the forces of patriarchy beyond her
control, such conclusions, I would argue, are based on ahistorical premises.13
Because they represent the alliance that ends the novel in terms more appro-
priate to nineteenth-century domestic fiction, Arabella's dynastic union is re-
written as middle-class matrimony. Only in so doing can feminist readings
argue that the demands of gender make subordinate privileges of rank and
status clearly belonging to Arabella, the marquis's daughter, even after mar-
riage. There is little evidence to suggest that her vast estate, material wealth,
formidable education, regal bearing, and pure blood, all political preroga-
tives of her aristocratic station, will summarily be replaced upon marriage by
the narrow confines of a gendered identity alone. It is possible to argue, how-
ever, that the marriage of Arabella and Glanville is represented in terms blend-
ing features of the kinship system governing aristocratic unions and those of
the eompanionate system characterized by the enactment of a sexual contract
between properly gendered individuals. The contractual exchange so per-
formed by Glanville and Arabella figures the newlyweds as persons possessed
of unique internal qualities uniting them "as well in these as in every Virtue
and laudable Affection of the Mind" (383). Like Samuel Richardson's Pamela
and Mr. B., Lennox's happy couple achieves the best of both old and new
orders when hereditary wealth is augmented in conjunction with a notion of
integral personal worth.
Matrilineage, Reproduction, and the Trouble with Sex
It is fair to say that mid-eighteenth-century intellectuals were not preoccupied
with the possibility of prolix authors writing too many books or fertile people
having too many children.14 While the rich versatility of written English cer-
tainly fascinated many, their concerns seemed to converge on the repair and
maintenance of traditional continuities —between books and their readers,
words and their meaning, aristocrats and their bloodlines. Discourses of
198 Anita Levy
cultural reproduction, like aristocratic kinship practices, looked back to no-
tions of origin, authenticity, and the metaphysics of blood as purveyors of
meaning and quality from the past to the present. Inasmuch as the authentic-
ity of the cultural or social source could be verified, the futurity of texts and
bodies was never in doubt and appeared immune to the incessant quantifying
demands of print culture. Certainly the anxiety of illicit reproduction —read-
ers copying books, words escaping original meanings, and bloodlines becom-
ing sullied—was always present.'5 Yet the proper regulation of literacy remained
a promising means to affect desired forms of subjectivity well into the century.
Sometime around the end of the eighteenth century, the language prob-
lem suddenly took on crisis proportions. With the spread of literacy, increase
in book production, and the tendency of the novel to generate multiple spin-
offs, the presumed relationship between writing and the individual, copy and
original began to deteriorate.16 If the increasingly frequent diatribes against
popular novels are any measure, intellectuals and authors were now more
intrigued and horrified by the dangers of reading and writing out of control.
By contrast, Dr. Johnson's attitude toward mass literary production had been
sanguine, as these words, so recounted by Boswell, make plain: "There is a
great difference in favour of that crab-apple tree which bears a large quantity
of fruit, however indifferent, and that which produces only a few."17 Even
Johnson acknowledged the value of abundance independent of the intrinsic
value of the composition. Late-eighteenth-century writers, in contrast, no longer
knew, as Johnson believed he did, how to tell the good apple from the bad
when the standard was no longer qualitative but quantitative. Put another
way, if literacy is a sign of innermost character, what happens when the de-
mocratization of reading and writing begins to obscure or to erase this origi-
nal relationship?
With the links between literacy and consciousness strained, moralists and
educators increasingly located the problem of authenticity with the literate
individual rather than with the continuity of language itself. Hannah More
was particularly alarmed by "that profusion of little, amusing, sentimental
books with which the youthful library overflows." Where Johnson found merit
in plenty, More warned of its sinister side. "Abundance has its dangers as well
as scarcity," she writes in Strictures on the Modern System of Female Educa-
tion (1799). "May not the multiplicity of these alluring little works increase
the natural reluctance to those more dry and uninteresting studies, of which
. . . the rudiments of every part of learning must consist?" (157). From such
seductions comes the frivolous reader unable to regulate her own conduct.
"Girls who had been accustomed to devour frivolous books," writes More,
"will converse and write with a far greater appearance of skill as to style and
sentiment at twelve or fourteen years old, than those of a more advanced age
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who are under the discipline of severer studies. . . and those who early begin
talking and writing like women, commonly end with the thinking and acting
like children" (160, emphasis added).
What More fears from unregulated literacy is the disruption of the proper
relation of reader, writer, and book. The reader of trifles, in her logic, be-
comes a frivolous writer, one whose conduct is similarly marred by the mere
appearance of skill and style lacking in essential substance. In so linking read-
ing, writing, and conduct, More implies that the wrong kind of literacy can
produce an individual who is a bad copy, a person of no intrinsic value, but
one who does have the skills to simulate such value. Put another way, if writ-
ing indicates the quality of its human source, it can also attribute value (or
lack thereof) to the origin (writer) rather than the origin lending value to the
text.18 Since the text can no longer be hooked to its origin, moreover, it dis-
places the original, thereby initiating an endless chain of reproduction with
no definitive source.19 Not only is the cultural artifact devalued in More's
logic, but the social value formerly believed to inhere in the literate indi-
vidual vanishes. For if literacy is no longer an accurate measure of individual
consciousness, how is the capacity for thought, feeling, and action to be deter-
mined? If the quality of literacy among one group of people had been the
basis upon which they gained prestige and power over others, as I suggested
earlier, how might mass cultural reproduction endanger their claim?
It is not easy to imagine how fiction could have acquired so much linguis-
tic power in such a short time had its dissemination in England not coincided
with the growth of the notion that the wholeness of the individual, as well as
the strength of the nation, depended on what came to be understood as a
universal drive toward sexual reproduction. Elaborated in the writing of po-
litical economy, this concept of the English nation imagined it to be a social
body composed of sexualized populations. Because writing about population
incorporated and adapted tropes of production and popular consumption
common to earlier writings on the proper regulation of cultural reproduc-
tion, it achieved unprecedented rhetorical power.
Nothing brings the history of this transformation into more visible relief
than the work of Thomas Malthus. In his 1798 Essay on the Principle of Popu-
lation, Malthus radically reconfigures the notion of reproduction, transforming
it from the controlled, determinable process imagined earlier in the century to
a biological force that overpowers efforts to contain it. Malthus structures his
argument around two basic postulates that, in effect, separate the body from
history and reanchor it in universal nature: "First, That food is necessary to the
existence of man. Secondly, That the passion between the sexes is necessary
and will remain nearly in its present state. These two laws, ever since we have
had any knowledge of mankind, appear to have been fixed laws of our nature. "m
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Three points simultaneously established here need emphasizing. First,
notice how sexual desire is configured according to a model of the natural
body and its need for food. Malthus equates sex with food, both driven by an
uncontrollable hunger; in each case, the magnitude, intensity, and frequency
are identical. Second, so naturalized and biologized, sexual passion becomes
the principle, the "fixed law" defining and organizing so-called human na-
ture. This tendency is evident, for example, in his survey of the "hunter state,"
where Malthus argues, "In the rudest state of mankind, in which hunting is
the principal occupation and the only mode of acquiring food, the means of
subsistence being scattered over a large extent of territory, the comparative
population must necessarily be thin. It is said that the passion between the
sexes is less ardent among the North American Indians than among any other
race of men" (27).
"Passion between the sexes" becomes the basis for his analysis of the eco-
nomic and social organization of Native Americans, as well as "the shepherd
state," "the tribes of barbarians that overran the Roman Empire" (27), Chi-
nese peasants, and English tradesmen. Malthus romps through time and space
violating historical and cultural boundaries, yoking together radically differ-
ent peoples, places, and histories according to their shared reproductive urges.
"The passion between the sexes," Malthus declares confidently, "has appeared
in every age to be so nearly the same that it may always be considered, in
algebraic language, as a given quantity"(52).
Through its unification of culturally and temporally diverse peoples around
the principle of sexual reproduction, Essay contributed to a new classification
system that, according to Foucault, is extraordinarily powerful precisely for its
ability to dissolve older political and economic demographies to reconfigure
them according to shared "natural" desires. Malthus's Essay, in this respect,
provides a blueprint for the nineteenth-century literature of urban explora-
tion, including James Kay Shuttleworth's Moral and Physical Condition of
the Working Classes (1832), Frederick Engels's Condition of the Working Class
in England in 1844 (1845), and Henry Mayhew's London Labour and the
London Poor (1861). As Judith Walkowitz notes, Mayhew introduced his in-
vestigation by linking the street folks of London to the ethnographic study of
"wandering tribes in general" by arguing for their common promiscuity,
irreligiosity, and laziness.21 Although sexual proclivities may be common to
all, in Malthus's logic and later in Mayhew's, some lack the requisite self-
discipline to prevent natural urge from turning into natural disaster. "The
labouring poor," Malthus writes, "seem always to live from hand to mouth,
their present wants employ their whole attention, and they seldom think of
the future" (41). So consumed by appetite, the poor appear as bearers of bad
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culture, the absence of economic restraint pointing to a more fundamental
lack of sexual discipline and self-restraint.
Finally, Malthus's postulates underline the fear of biological reproduc-
tion so crucial to his argument and transform it from a sign of cultural and
social vitality to a harbinger of sexual chaos. With his insistence that healthy
bodies eventually produce an impaired social organism, Malthus departs from
predecessors Adam Smith and David Hume, who saw rapid reproduction as
simply an index of a healthy society. The Essay, moreover, posed a threat to
the traditional Christian doctrine, embodied by Tory poet laureate Robert
Southey, that man must be fruitful and multiply.22
Thus emptied of cultural meaning and linked to nature, the sexually re-
producing body becomes the geometric foundation for the tremendous "power
of population" that Malthus fears. "Assuming then, my postulata as granted,"
Malthus continues, "I say that the power of population is indefinitely greater
than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man" (20). So over-
whelming are the voracious demands of population that popular consump-
tion will always outstrip the production of food for the multitudes. Even the
presence of plenty in the realm of production will not reduce demand, as one
might imagine, but instead will lead to more consumption. Malthus argues,
to wit, that "population does invariably increase where there are the means of
subsistence, the history of every people that have ever existed will abundantly
prove"(26). Illicit cultural reproduction is no longer attributable to a failure
of linguistic continuity, paternity, or lineage, as Lennox believed. Instead,
Malthus locates the problem in biological reproduction, itself out of control.
When Malthus uses the number of women of childbearing age to indicate the
rate of increase of a given population, he imagines the social body as female.
In so measuring illicit reproduction in terms of the issue from the body of the
mother, he shifts its source from paternity to maternity, lineage to reproduc-
tion. This shift is consonant with a more general historical trend in the latter
half of the eighteenth century, so described by Felicity Nussbaum as "a fasci-
nation with the maternal." Malthus's focus on maternal reproduction is con-
sistent with what Nussbaum calls a "significant historical change in reproduc-
tive politics."23
While it is tempting to argue that in the political economy of population
lies the source of the problem of sexual reproduction and population, it is
more reasonable to assume that Malthus's work was a symptom rather than a
cause of a more widespread shift in cultural categories. Earlier writers antici-
pated and in some sense facilitated the figure of overpopulation with their
frustrated and often comical efforts to contain the euphoria of print language
released from age-old political, practical, and material constraints. Writing
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about the so-called population problem contributed another vital component
to this process when it effectively shifted the burden of mass reproduction
from the cultural domain to the natural world. In so doing, it provided bio-
logical ground for the fear of popular consumption raised decades earlier
with the acceleration of print culture. With the lineaments of this transforma-
tion in mind, I want to turn to figures of population and popular consump-
tion as they resurface in fiction and nonfiction as vital signs of social and
cultural danger.
This metonymic overlap is particularly intriguing in late-eighteenth-cen-
tury writing about the novel and what it should be. Easily copied, widely
disseminated, popularly consumed, and sentimentally powerful, the novel
proved particularly troublesome to those desiring to control the effects of mass
literacy. "Who are those ever multiplying authors," Hannah More demands
to know, "that with unparalleled fecundity are overstocking the world with
their quick succeeding progeny? They are novel writers; the easiness of whole
productions is at once the cause of their own fruitfulness, and of the almost
infinitely numerous race of imitators to whom they give birth" (169-70).
More rewrites the figure of the author who becomes a fecund mother
spawning an "infinitely numerous race of imitators." Since women were, by
the late eighteenth century, identified as producers of novels, More's language
acquires added resonance.24 Like Malthus, who imagines the social body as
female, More identifies prodigious literary production with female reproduc-
tive capacities. As textual progeny "overstock" the cultural world, the original
relationship between author and text is irrevocably weakened by successive
generations of novels, thereby diluting the quality of culture itself. This is not a
sign of cultural health. Rather, More's rhetoric transforms the productive "body"
of the writer, like the sexually reproductive body in Malthus, into a degenera-
tive body figured in terms of its association with maternal reproduction.
What the novel loses by its copies, in Walter Benjamin's terms, is its origi-
nal aura. "The technique of reproduction," he writes, "detaches the repro-
duced object from the domain of tradition. By making many reproductions it
substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence."25 This loss of aura
might best be seen as the displacement of patriarchal continuity, so crucial to
earlier writers, by maternal "reproduction" as the means by which western
culture is transmitted.26 By symbolic extension, from a cultural world of pu-
rity and originality comes one of frivolity and cheap imitation. The degenera-
tion from one cultural moment to the next, moreover, is understood solely as
a product of the reproductive vigor of language itself. The effects of overpro-
duction on the cultural world that More depicts are remarkably similar to the
social chaos produced by overpopulation in Malthus's model. Overproduc-
tion, in each case, threatens the "natural" balance between production and
Reproductive Urges 203
consumption; a social or cultural world thus "overstocked" is a system out of
balance. Reproduction, so imagined in its sexual form by Malthus and in its
cultural shape by More, is a force in need of regulation and control. More
unwittingly problematizes the status of the novel as mass cultural object by
calling into question the relationship between quality and quantity. The novel
is a form of popular culture that is easily reproduced and widely read. Liter-
ary popularity becomes both boon and blight—marker of success and sign of
degeneracy—as Walter Scott would lament some years later in his introduc-
tion to The Abbey.
With the fear of the mass reproduction of the novel came the anxiety over
its popularity. "Women of every age, of every condition, contract and retain a
taste for novels. . . . The depravity is universal," wrote the periodical writer
known as the Sylph in a 1795 testimonial worth quoting at some length:
My sight is everywhere offended by these foolish, yet dangerous books. I
find them on the toilette of fashion, and in the work-bag of the
sempstresses; in the hands of the lady, who lounges on the sofa, and of the
lady, who sits at the counter. From the mistresses of nobles they descend to
the mistresses of snuffshops—from the belles who read them in town, to
the chits who spell them in the country. I have actually seen mothers, in
miserable garrets crying for the imaginary distress of an heroine, while their
children were crying for bread: and the mistress of a family losing hours
over a novel in the parlour, while her maids, in emulation of the example,
were similarly employed in the kitchen.27
Novels are most dangerous not only because they are most illicitly reproduc-
ible, as More maintains, but also because they are most disruptive of social
order, as the Sylph argues. Ironically, as the Sylph's rhetoric actively links
ladies who lounge on sofas to ladies who wait at counters, mistresses of noble-
men to mistresses of snuffshops, it discursively constructs a new social trajec-
tory of disorder. The danger of cultural reproduction thus out of control is
that literacy no longer differentiates among social groups—the woman of fash-
ion from the seamstress, the belle from the chit.
The passage comes to rhetorical fruition with the figure of the mother
whose self-indulgence in reading novels renders her unable to distinguish
between "the imaginary distress of an heroine" and the real distress of her
children "crying for bread." Meanwhile, the inattentive mistress, careless of
her duties and servants, jeopardizes the welfare of the household. No longer
the occasion for comedy, as in The Female Quixote, the consequences of com-
pulsive reading are so grave as to pose a threat to the very existence of the
family itself. Mass reproduction is now held responsible for this breakdown in
social and economic order, poverty, hunger, and the mismanaged household.
204 Anita Levy
It is rhetorically equated with the dangers of mass literacy itself, among them
the pleasures of reading novels giving rise to the reader's sentimental
overidentification with the heroine.28
The rapid growth of the novel-reading public, depicted in the novel's
progress from toilette to work-bag, parlour to garrett, genders female both the
novel and the social network it supposedly establishes by virtue of its promis-
cuous circulation. In so doing, this scene of reading establishes one link in the
historical chain associating mass culture with "woman" that will become a
prevalent mode for its representation in nineteenth- and twentieth-century
Europe and the United States. Literary historians generally consider the asso-
ciation of the novel with the female in the eighteenth century to be the expla-
nation for its status as a low, even dangerous, cultural form. Yet this connection
could also work the other way round, as Armstrong suggests. "If it was on the
basis of gender that people condemned fiction,. . . it was also on the basis of
gender that fiction received its strongest endorsement."29 Few studies, if any,
have explored the relationship between the novel, the figure of "woman," and
the construction of early mass culture traced briefly here in the Sylph's disqui-
sition.30 While such an inquiry is beyond the scope of the present essay, some
preliminary conclusions may be suggested. The Sylph's just-so story of girls
and their novels materializes early mass culture as a social pattern cohering
only in the novel's wake as it perversely links readers whose social ranks other-
wise hold nothing in common. It is a culture composed of individuals who
consume the wrong kind of cultural object, one that is overly sentimental,
easily reproducible, and too popular with the wrong sort of people. In the
seductions of the novel, so powerful as to lead a mother to neglect her chil-
dren, we can just make out the lure of mass culture, traditionally described,
according to Andreas Huyssen, as "the threat of losing oneself in dreams and
delusions and of merely consuming rather than producing."31 As debates about
the novel would have it, popular novel reading was no way to reproduce the
kind of individual necessary to ensure the uninterrupted integrity and conti-
nuity of one's social group, much less secure the stability of the nation. Large-
scale literacy, by extension, endangered the class of people whose claim to
power rested not on heritage or blood but on their superior consciousness
made visible in the quality of literacy itself.
Under the old system, we know that aristocrats reproduced themselves
through the maintenance and continuation of a pure metaphysical body,
whereas the underclass, according to Malthus, simply did it too much. But
how were the diverse groups of people who composed the middle class at the
end of the eighteenth century to make sense of their social experience and to
reproduce it in continuous form? How were they to preserve continuity when
social reproduction was based neither on the metaphysics of blood nor on the
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common physical urges of the body? As incipient mass culture undermined
early class continuity maintained by limited literacy, the discourse of cultural
reproduction, energized by semiotic contact with discourses of sexual repro-
duction and population, became a way of talking about danger in a social
world composed of people whose heritage and blood were often indeterminate
and whose literacy might prove an unreliable measure of personal integrity.
Jane Austen and the Perils of Reading Novels
Jane Austen went to great lengths to reconcile these two conflicting traditions
of social reproduction—genealogy and self-production through literacy. Of-
ten, her novels focus on the need to preserve the continuity of an elite com-
munity while incorporating new social elements. To figure out a new bourgeois
aristocracy on the basis of blood and individual value, Austen employs a vari-
ety of narrative strategies. As the daughter of a privileged woman who made
an "untoward choice" in marriage, Mansfield Park heroine Fanny Price's heri-
tage connects her by her mother's marriage to one of the most distinguished
families of the area. There is little else to suggest why Fanny, who comes from
relatively squalid circumstances (a Malthusian scenario, as it were), will be
the one to continue the Bertram line. Yet in shaping her various "homes" in
terms of the appearance of self-restraint or its lack, Austen provides ample
justification for Fanny's good fortune. Fanny's possession of "moral restraint,"
"regulation," and "direction," in Malthus's words, ensures that she will be the
bearer of good culture. Austen's social logic resembles Malthus's mathemat-
ics of sexual reproduction in that both privilege the same features as indica-
tors of true culture —one that eschews sexual appetite. In contrast to the
Crawfords, who are rendered fraudulent because they culturally reproduce
what "breeding" is supposed to supply, only Fanny possesses the requisite self-
discipline entitling her to make a prestigious alliance with Edmund. In the
end, she becomes the daughter whom Sir Thomas wanted and the most suit-
able candidate should Mansfield Park be in need of a new mistress.
Unlike Fanny Price and Edmund Bertram, Catherine Morland and Henry
Tilney of Northanger Abbey come from different social circles. Of all Austen's
heroines, Catherine is the most unpretentious. As Austen writes, "A family of
ten children will be always called a fine family . . .  ; but the Morlands had
little other right to the word, for they were in general very plain, and Catherine,
for many years of her life, as plain as any."32 Daughter of a clergy who "had
never been handsome" and "a woman of useful plain sense, with a good tem-
per and . . . a good constitution," Catherine has very little in the way of heri-
tage or breeding to fit her for an alliance with a member of one of the elite
country families dotting Austen's social landscape. What is more remarkable
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is the initial absence in Catherine of those sensibilities that immediately dis-
tinguish Fanny upon her entry into the Bertram household. Indeed, Austen
takes every opportunity to emphasize Catherine's unsuitability for heroism of
the kind for which Fanny is destined. Not only is she possessed of "a thin
awkward figure, a sallow skin . . . dark lank hair," but her mind is decidedly
unpromising, empty of intrinsic virtue. "She never could learn or understand
any thing before she was taught," Austen writes, "and sometimes not even
then, for she was often inattentive, and occasionally stupid" (37). Whereas
Lennox's Arabella is amply suited by wealth, beauty, and lineage to take up
her role as a heroine, Austen seems to intend Catherine for a much less distin-
guished career. In so devoting an entire chapter to unmaking her heroine,
Austen sets out the terms by which she will remake Catherine into a true
heroine according to a new set of narrative standards. Much of the energy of
Northanger Abbey goes into narrowing the demographic distance between
Catherine and Henry to make them alike.
Henry Tilney's virtues are as apparent as Catherine's are absent. "A very
gentlemanlike young man," Henry "was rather tall, had a pleasing counte-
nance, a very intelligent and lively eye, and if not quite handsome, was very
near it" (47). Not only does he talk "with fluency and spirit" but he is exceed-
ingly knowledgeable on matters of style and taste. To the astonished Mrs.
Allen, he demonstrates his "understanding" of muslin, assuring her further
that he buys his own cravats and has gained his sister's trust '"in the choice of
a gown.'" His estimation of the writing style of women's letters links good taste
in appearance to good taste in reading. In both matters he is equally confi-
dent, finding female writing "faultless except in three particulars. . . . A gen-
eral deficiency of subject, a total inattention to stops, and a very frequent
ignorance of grammar"(49). He is furthermore a member of a distinguished
family of excellent breeding, whose virtues are embodied with grace and civil-
ity by sister Eleanor. Henry is supremely well suited to enact the education
Catherine requires to reproduce socially and culturally the old squirearchy
into which she will enter with as little disruption as possible.
Because there was not one lord, not even a baronet, to be discovered in
Catherine's family, no lost inheritance to be claimed, the question remains
how Austen makes the difference between Catherine and Henry go away. How
does she make her a fit companion for him, the one most entitled to get the
man and the goods? To close the gap between her protagonists, Austen em-
ploys two strategies. First, she introduces the Thorpes, Isabella and her brother
John, whose manifest falseness, lack of manners, and dishonorable conduct
become egregious as the novel progresses. Austen's first rendering of Thorpe
is particularly important for my purposes: "He was a stout young man of mid-
dling height who, with a plain face and ungraceful form, seemed fearful of
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being too handsome unless he wore the dress of a groom and too much like a
gentleman unless he were easy where he ought to be civil, and impudent
where he might be allowed to be easy" (66). Austen thus fixes Thorpe on the
boundaries of social identity, a liminal figure whose dress and demeanor, so
oddly juxtaposed, expose the absence of definitive interior value.
Not only is Thorpe quarrelsome and dishonest but he does not read nov-
els. This is perhaps the most shocking of his failings in a novel in which one's
reading habits and tastes determine one's nature and value. Whereas Catherine
and Henry share a mutual pleasure in gothic novels that will become the
basis for Henry's prescription on the right way to read fiction, Thorpe has
"something else to do" (69). Austen takes Isabella's measure in much the
same manner. False modesty, coquetry, and husband-hunting notwithstand-
ing, Isabella is, above all, an ill-informed reader with secondhand opinions.
Without having read Samuel Richardson's Sir Charles Grandison, she pro-
nounces it "an amazing horrid book" because her friend "Miss Andrews could
not get through the first volume"(62).
Austen represents the Thorpes as pretenders, counterfeit goods whose class
claims are shown to lack essential value. They are illicit copies with no heri-
tage, fortune, or breeding, but only manners that simulate them. Thus they
fail to answer correctly the most important questions of social interpretation
that Austen raises: Are you what you say you are? And do you come from
where you say you come from, or are you making it up? Because the answer is
no in the first two cases, the Thorpes provide the false reproduction against
which the authentic articles, the true Catherine and the true Henry, come to
appear essentially valuable. Since it is John Thorpe who initially misleads the
general, feeding him false information about Catherine's prospects, the Tilneys
are linked to the Thorpes. General Tilney is turned into a greedy man who
wants a moneyed woman for his son, someone who merchandises love, in
contrast to the bourgeois Morlands who separate love from money. With the
Tilneys' value thereby compromised, the gap between Catherine and Henry
is further narrowed.
For those circulating within Austen's society, the most pressing danger
then resides in the failure of interpretation. "Launched into all the difficulties
and dangers of six weeks' residence in Bath" at the height of the social season,
with only the languid guidance of Mrs. Allen, Catherine must learn to distin-
guish among the crowd, to know the worthy acquaintance from the pretender,
the "good" copy from the "bad." This social process is not unlike the heroine's
first physical passage through the Pump Room, which Austen describes with
characteristic precision. Determined to get a good view of the dancers, she
finds "to her utter amazement. . . that to proceed along the room was by no
means the way to disengage themselves from the crowd; it seemed rather to
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increase as they went on, where she had imagined that when once fairly within
the door, they should easily find seats. . . . But this was far from the case, and
though by unwearied diligence they gained even the top of the room, their
situation was just the same; . . .  Still they moved on —something better was
yet in view; and by continued exertion of strength and ingenuity they found
themselves at last in the passage behind the highest bench" (44-45).
Not only must Catherine jockey for space in the overcrowded Pump Room,
but she must also be able to distinguish the sight worth seeing ("something
better was yet in view") from the multitude before her eyes.33 Danger, in this
world, is located in the ersatz bourgeois aristocrat, like John Thorpe, who is
the real threat to the social reproduction of the bourgeois aristocracy that
Austen envisions. Thorpe excels in the ability to simulate personal integrity
and social worth, while in essence lacking such qualities. In merely reproduc-
ing what is represented as essential or natural among Austen's gentry, the er-
satz bourgeois jeopardizes a social economy founded on the assumed link
between identity and appearance.34 This is the importance of the author's
second strategy making Catherine and Henry alike, for if Henry teaches
Catherine nothing else, he equips her with the reading skills to navigate such
treacherous social waters. In prescribing the right way to read gothic novels,
Henry solves the problem of illicit reproduction by translating from fiction to
real life. His lecture to the embarrassed heroine, who has mistaken the manor
house for the Gothic castle, the patriarch for the murderer, makes this distinc-
tion clearly. "Remember the country and the age in which we live," Austen
writes. "Remember that we are English, that we are Christians. Consult your
own understanding, your own sense of the probable, your own observation of
what is passing around you —Does our education prepare us for such atroci-
ties? Do our laws connive at them? Could they be perpetrated without being
known, in a country like this, where social and literary intercourse is on such
a footing; where every man is surrounded by a neighborhood of voluntary
spies, and where roads and newspapers lay every thing open? Dearest Miss
Morland, what ideas have you been admitting?" (199-200).
That the only danger Henry's speech admits is the failure to interpret
properly the evidence of one's senses — "what is passing around . . . in a coun-
try like this" — is extraordinary considering the historical moment in which
Austen writes. Despite this placid picture of a community ringed by "volun-
tary spies," united in mind and manner by print and transport, the late 1790s
finds England at a dangerous crossroads following the upheaval of the French
Revolution. While bands of displaced men roamed the English countryside
in search of their daily bread, the promise and peril of mass literacy was at no
time more evident than in the widespread circulation and tremendous popu-
larity of radical political tracts, broadsheets, declarations, and charters. Yet
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the only danger preoccupying Austen originates in the compromise of one's
sense-making abilities to the allure of the cheap reproduction, be it gothic
novel or bourgeois impersonator. It is from these dangers that Henry rescues
Catherine. Austen's solution for Catherine thus takes quite a different turn
from that of Lennox, whose heroine similarly lacked clarity of vision and the
good judgment that goes with it. Although counseled to separate good from
bad forms of textual reproduction, Arabella was encouraged, nevertheless, to
model herself after books, albeit the right kind of books. Henry tutors Catherine
to sever the links binding literacy to subjectivity when he calls upon her to
privilege her "own understanding," her "own sense of the probable," and her
own "observation" — all presumably distinct from literacy. According to Austen,
social problems and sexual relations do not come from "outside." They are a
matter of inner drives to be regulated and contained by self-surveillance. Only
might such a sensible woman be desirable to a man of education and taste if,
together, they would achieve the pleasures of a well-governed household and
an orderly family.
Let me conclude by pointing out that during the nineteenth century, the
literature of sociology, anthropology, psychology, and sensational fiction came
into being in response to accounts of various sexualized populations in need,
at risk, threatening, or threatened —the industrial poor cohabiting overcrowded
bedrooms; colonial peoples beckoning enticingly from harems and huts;
middle-class families drinking tea in well-appointed drawing rooms.35 What
such representations share, among other features, is the idea that there exist
populations whose sexuality is entirely out of control, in need of regulation,
or properly managed. If these images have long since become the stuff of
common sense, Dickensian kitsch, Raj revivalism, Masterpiece Theater, or
American welfare reform schemes, perhaps it is because we too share the
nineteenth-century conviction that problems of the social world are sexual
problems. So construed, they appear to originate with women, who, because
their desires are improperly regulated, have either too many babies or not
enough.
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Josephine McDonagh _ _ _ ^ ^ V
Infanticide and the Boundaries
of Culture from Hume to Arnold
Although recent critical work has had much to say about the masculine usur-
pation of maternal culture as the characteristic Romantic metaphor for the
creative process, comparatively little attention has been spared for the Ro-
mantics' less insistent and yet more menacing use of the figure of the woman
who kills her child.1 Blake's Proverb of the Devil in The Marriage of Heaven
and Hell (1798), "Sooner murder an infant in its cradle than nurse unacted
desires," and Wordsworth's ballad, "The Thorn" (1798), in which the poetic
intensity is achieved by the never confirmed possibility that Martha Ray may
have killed her child, both present texts in which child murder is posed as a
sublime object, a provocation to imaginative transcendence, a spur to creativ-
ity. The metaphorical uses of mothering, or "natural" reproduction, within
an aesthetic that privileges nature over industiy, are self-evident. The poten-
tial of infanticide as a recurrent figure for imaginative work is more difficult to
understand. The purpose of this essay is to unpick some of the meanings of
infanticide in British culture in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies to ascertain the appeal of this appalling trope.
There is no conclusive evidence that infanticide was on the rise during
this period, although demographic changes may well have made such in-
stances more visible.2 Percy Bysshe Shelley was not alone in noticing, on a
visit to the Lake District in 1812, that "the manufacturers... [have] deformed
the loveliness of Nature with human taint," as "children are frequently found
in the river which the unfortunate women employed at the manufactory de-
stroy."3 Shelley's remark reverberates with contemporary concerns having to
do with town and country, industry and nature: it is the barbarity of industry
that causes women to throw away children and transform the loveliest and, of
course, the most poetic of landscapes —the quintessential locus of British
Romanticism —into a "suburb of London." As this suggests, what is striking in
this period is not the number of infant corpses but the intense cultural invest-
ment in them. When one surveys the literature of the period, one is struck by
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the sheer quantity of references to infanticide and the variety of purposes they
serve: for example, infanticide occurs as a cause for humanitarian concern in
parliamentary discussion, as an example in philosophical debate, as a subject
of tragedy on the stage, as a check on population in political economy, as an
argument against the use of birth control, and as a marker of racial difference
or of the moral depravity of the poor.
In this essay I will focus on debates either about infanticide or in which
infanticide occurs as a significant term in the law, philosophy, political
economy, and literature in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain.4 In
each of these, infanticide tends to occur as a pretext for the discussion of one
of the larger questions that preoccupied thinkers of the time, that is, the con-
stitution and characteristics of a civilized society. In the philosophical litera-
ture, for instance, as we shall see, infanticide provides an opportunity for the
discussion of whether a capacity for sympathy or a capacity for reason is the
true mark of a civilized society. As has been well documented, such debates
took place in a context in which elite English culture struggled to conceptual-
ize and articulate its sense of its own difference from and superiority to older
and foreign societies. It did so through the development of the discourses of
the natural and human sciences, but also through its interest in manners,
domesticity and the family, and the massive wave of humanitarianism that
arose in the second half of the eighteenth century.5 In this period, the con-
cerns that cluster around the figure of infanticide are set in a climate in which
the modern is felt to be an improvement on older forms of culture, in which
child murder thrived. By the mid-nineteenth century, however, the infanti-
cidal woman will come to represent the barbaric modern, rather than the
barbaric archaic, in a context that privileges tradition over modernity.
Although the materials that I present in this essay are complex and var-
ied, it is possible to trace in them two recurrent and opposing narratives of
civilized society. In both, infanticide holds a pivotal position. In one, a ver-
sion of society derived from the tenets of reason, civilization is staked upon
the exclusion of certain groups it defines as barbarous. In this case, the prac-
tice of infanticide marks the epitome of savage behavior, which cannot be
countenanced within the bounds of a civilized and modern society. The sec-
ond narrative uses the idea of infanticide to provide a humanitarian critique
of rational society. The injustices of this society are shown to drive people to
the desperate measures of infanticide: a civilization based on reason does not
exclude barbarians but creates them. Infanticide remains as the sole humane
act, an act of salvation in a corrupt world. In this critique, another version of
civilized society is produced, one based on sympathy and feeling. These two
versions can be identified in writings by Adam Smith and David Hume, Lord
Ellenborough and Edmund Burke, Thomas Malthus and William Godwin,
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Harriet Martineau and Matthew Arnold. My contention in this essay is that
the repeated occurrences of infanticide in the literature of the period are best
understood as symptoms of unresolved problems within the conceptualization
of civilized or modern society.5 The literature of infanticide tends to be domi-
nated by the figure of the infanticidal woman, whether she be the abandoned
fallen woman, the wretched object of pity and concern, like Martha Ray or
Hetty Sorrel; the depraved, unnatural working-class woman who, in the words
of Tennyson, "kills her babe for a burial fee";7 or the racially differentiated
woman, the Indian, Chinese, or Irish, who kills her child because her culture
teaches her no better. Nevertheless, the anxieties and desires that each of these
women embodies have little to do with mothers in particular or in general.
Rather, the murdering mother gives face to a peculiar spectrum of social and
cultural concerns, all of which nevertheless affect the treatment of real infan-
ticidal women. As a rhetorical device, the infanticidal woman operates within
a range of distinctly social and material concerns. Like Martha Ray, she ap-
pears as an overdetermined term in British culture. She is the sign of poverty
or of depravity, of the impossibility of culture and civilization, the sign of the
barbarian, the marker of cultural alterity. And as she bears the burden of argu-
ments that are beyond her immediate sphere, the infanticidal woman is al-
ways tantalizing, assuming a strangely ephemeral quality — the sign of
something in excess of her bodily person.8
In the eyes of the law, the infanticidal woman tended to be unmarried. The
particularly severe 1624 law "to prevent the murder of bastards" was not
amended until 1803, and even then it did not stop targeting unmarried moth-
ers. The 1624 law had been unique in English legislation in that it presumed
guilt until innocence was proved. If an unmarried woman were to have a
child, and if that child were to die, and if she had concealed the birth and
failed to inform anyone of her pregnancy, then she would be considered guilty
of murdering the baby, the penalty for which was death by hanging. The se-
quence of events was not unusual, given the ignominy surrounding the bear-
ing of illegitimate children and the high rate of infant mortality. Lord
Ellenborough's 1803 Offenses against the Person Act (43 Geo. Ill, c.58) made
child murder the same as any other murder: innocence was presumed and
guilt had to be proved. Concealment of the birth was a secondary charge that
could be leveled if the case for murder could not be upheld, and conceal-
ment bore a penalty of two years in prison.9
Although a humanitarian lobby had argued unsuccessfully for legal re-
form in the 1770s, when the law did change thirty years later it was motivated
by rather different concerns.10 Lord Ellenborough, who introduced the suc-
cessful bill in his position as the newly appointed lord chief justice, was driven
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not by humanitarian concern but by a desire to rationalize the law, to draw
into line legislation concerning different acts of harm to other bodies and to
make the laws of Ireland match those of England following the Union in 1800.
Ellenborough introduced the bill with a view "to generalise the law with re-
gard to certain penal offenses, and to adapt it equally to every part of the United
Kingdom."11 His Maiming and Wounding Bill, which was to become the
1803 Act, encompassed a variety of offenses — "malicious shooting, attempt-
ing to discharge loaded fire arms, stabbing, cutting, wounding, poisoning and
the malicious using of means to procure the miscarriage of women, and also
the malicious setting fire to buildings" — in addition to the repealing of the
earlier 1624 law against "murdering infant bastards."12 The bill was proposed
initially in lieu of a so-called Chalking Bill, a law against "wounding and cut-
ting" that was specific to Ireland. If the Maiming and Wounding Bill were
accepted, Ellenborough argued, then the Chalking Bill would be unneces-
sary.13 However, while the bill was proposed in the spirit of a necessary ratio-
nalization of the statute books at a time of political restructuring, it should
also be seen as a strategic intervention in the maintenance of colonial con-
trol.14 The inclusion of arson in the bill is a case in point. In his presentation,
Ellenborough noted the anomaly that in Ireland it was not an offense to set
fire to one's own house, and he argued that it should be, in order to prevent
the defrauding of insurance companies. However, it seems highly significant
that at the time the bill was proposed, Irish nationalists, led by Robert Emmet,
were purchasing buildings in Ireland and burning them, as a confusion tactic,
in a campaign to overthrow the British that came to an abortive climax in
Dublin in 1803.15
At a time when humanitarian reformers of the law were seeking to reduce
the number of capital offenses, which had risen to a record high level during
the eighteenth century, the act was noteworthy in that it created ten new capi-
tal offenses.16 As far as the humanitarian reformers were concerned, the sole
positive aspect of the new act was the repeal of the 1624 infanticide provi-
sions. However, this gesture was incorporated within an attempt to make the
law more effective: due to the excessive severity of the penalty, courts had
become increasingly reluctant to find women guilty of the crime, and the law
had become inoperative.17 The new law gave opportunities for scrutinizing a
case in greater detail and punishing with a broader range of penalties. It thereby
participated in the intensified medical and legal supervision of parturition
and motherhood that took place in the nineteenth century.18
One significant effect of the act was that it drew together domestic and
criminal offenses as "offenses against the person." Murderous mothers and
the dissident Irish were thus drawn together as co-offenders against the civil
body. The legislation clearly divided civil and uncivilized behavior, and in-
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fanticidal women were firmly placed, along with the barbarous Irish, on the
wrong side of the divide.
An earlier attempt to change the law had been made in the House of
Commons in 1772, led by Burke, Fox, Harbord, and Meredith. They were
motivated by a sympathetic concern for the fate of women under a law whose
severity, they claimed, was matched by no other in the legal system. Signifi-
cantly, Ellenborough and Burke had been adversaries in an earlier situation,
as Ellenborough had served as the leading counsel for Warren Hastings in a
trial that had been provoked by Burke.19 Their strategy was to focus on the
inconsistency of the law, which encouraged unmarried women to conceal a
pregnancy, since illegitimate pregnancy incurred a public whipping and a
fine, while making concealment itself a capital offense: "Nothing could be
more unjust or inconsistent with the principles of all law, than first to force a
woman through modesty to concealment, and then to hang her for conceal-
ment."20 The argument also invoked the cause of "humanity and justice" for
the humane treatment of women, and for the equal treatment of bastards and
legitimate children: "While all due praise was allowed to legitimate children,
it was not just to give a squeeze in the neck to bastards."21 The resolution was
passed in the Commons, but failed in the Lords, as was a second bill pro-
posed by Lockhart the same year.
In the legal debates infanticide is construed in two very different ways. In
Ellenborough's attempt to redraw and bolster the boundaries of the nation,
infanticide is the sign of the barbarian. For Burke et al, infanticide provides
an occasion for sympathy, for an affective or even sentimental response. Im-
plicit in both are narratives about the nature of civilized society, but one is
based on strategies of exclusion developed from a project of rationalization,
whereas the other is based on the values of humanitarianism.
The same narratives can also be found in the philosophical literature of
the period. Adam Smith outlined the first—in which infanticide serves as a
marker of the limits of civilization — in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759,
rev. 1761). Although Smith's moral system is based on a belief in the human
capacity for sympathy, he also holds that only certain civilized forms of social
organization allow the full expression of sympathy. In the section entitled
"On the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon the Sentiments of Moral
Approbation and Disapprobation," he draws attention to practices that for
him lie beyond the boundaries of civilized human behavior, a list in which
footbinding and child murder figure prominently. "Can there be greater bar-
barity," he asks, "than to hurt an infant? Its helplessness, its innocence, its
amiableness, call forth the compassion of an enemy, and not to spare that
tender age is regarded as the most furious effort of an enraged and cruel con-
queror."22 Yet, he goes on, "we find, at this day, that this practice prevails
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among all savage nations." Smith's point is that in distant places and ages,
people murdered infants, whereas in the civilized here and now, babies enjoy
the sympathy that is the mark of civilized humanity. Infanticide marks the
absolute antithesis to modern civilization, the negation of cultured life.
Such beliefs seemed to be confirmed by travelers who returned to Britain
from journeys to distant lands. In the 1770s, Captain Cook, for instance, told
of "the children who are so unfortunate as to be begot" in the promiscuous
intimacies that marked Tahitian life. They were "smothered at the moment of
their birth."23 In this case, infanticide is a sign of the licentiousness of a people
who had begun to achieve notoriety in the West for their excessive enjoyment
of sexual pleasures. In 1789, reports were first made to the Asiatic Society on
the practices of female infanticide that had been discovered in some regions
of India.24 A long campaign was thereby set in motion by the British —akin to
the campaign to outlaw sati — to suppress these practices and to protect the
women of India from the cruelty of their barbarous menfolks.25 Although dif-
ferent, these cases demonstrate that the existence of infanticide in the ethno-
graphic record became a measure by which English society could apprehend
and celebrate its own humanity, sobriety, and restraint.
The other narrative concerning infanticide also begins to assume promi-
nence at this time. In this narrative infanticide—wherever it occurs — is repre-
sented as an event capable of raising deep human emotions. This is because
children are an eternal object of sympathy, and sympathy is identified as a
common human attribute that somehow precedes cultural differentiation.
Thus David Hume, contributing to a major midcentury debate on the claim
that modern society was far less populated than antiquity, was able paradoxi-
cally to claim that "by an odd connection of causes, the barbarous practice
[of infanticide] of the ancients might rather render those times more popu-
lous,"26 because the availability of infanticide as a form of family limitation
would encourage early marriages, yet the "force of natural affection" was such
that "very few" could carry out their intentions. Here, in Hume's estimation,
infanticide is preferable to the corrupt modern practice of placing unwanted
children in foundling hospitals.27
Hume's position on infanticide prefigures one based on self-interest which
had fairly widespread currency at the end of the century. William Alexander,
for instance, provides a version of it in his two-volume History of Women
(1779), a comparative history of manners in barbarous and civilized societies,
in which the difference between the two is marked by the degree of respect
paid to women. As was the case for Hume, infanticide is the most unnatural
of acts, for the maternal bond is the "most powerful of all human feelings."
However, Alexander draws our attention to "some savage countries" in which
the lives of women are so abject that mothers are impelled to kill their own
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female infants to save them from the horrible future that awaits them.28 As
evidence, he cites the case of a woman standing on the banks of the Oronooko
who laments the fact that her mother had not killed her at birth, so intoler-
able is her life. Here the argument has taken an interesting turn, for under
these conditions infanticide is an act of kindness, even of heroism. To cap his
case, he cites the Abbe Raynal's account of slave women who murder their
female children in a frenzy of "revenge and compassion, that they may not
become the property of their cruel masters." To kill a child, to save her from a
life of misery, under this construction, is a humanitarian act of salvation. For
Alexander, child murder is not in itself an act of savagery but, ironically, a
course imposed by savagery as the only means of escaping the life of abuse
that, in Alexander's account, is the very definition of savagery. Thus the tables
have turned, for infanticide, which begins as a mark of the savage society's
inhumanity, in contrast to the humanity of modern society, has now become,
through the idea of a noble or salvific infanticide, a sign of the savagery into
which modern society has fallen.
These philosophical arguments about the nature of civilized society were re-
peated in the population debates of the turn of the century. Hume's essay had
made an influential contribution to the discussion of the comparative sizes of
ancient and modern populations. By the end of the century, after the depopu-
lation thesis had been disproved, the debate shifted to the scarcity of resources
and the question of whether the physical world might sustain an ever-increas-
ing population.29 Those who held that it might not—the most prominent of
whom were Malthus and the political economists—believed that society would
always be dogged by the limited resources of nature and that progress would
always be impeded. Their opponents, among whom figured Godwin,
Condorcet, and Marx, agreed with Hume that the world's capacity for sus-
taining population was unlimited, as was the potential for social and scientific
improvement. Entwined in these debates, then, are different beliefs about the
power of science and technology and the possibilities for social and scientific
progress. Malthus and the political economists believed that science and ra-
tional thought could be used only to expose the limits of progress, to demon-
strate its inability to change the course of nature.30 Their opponents, on the
other hand, believed that science would give mankind the capacity to control
nature and bring about unbounded and positive social change.
What is curious, however, is that in the debates between them, the charge
of child murderer flies freely from both sides. For the Malthusians, their op-
ponents' refusal to accept the inevitability that the physical world will not be
able to sustain the population is tantamount to child murder. For the God-
winians, however, a belief in this very analytical model makes the Malthusians
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guilty of the same crime. For the Godwinians, to kill a child to save it from a
life of misery—like the slave mother or the unfortunate Oronooko woman —
is a comprehensible moral act, but to kill a child to save resources, as is sug-
gested by the Malthusian model, is morally reprehensible.
Malthus articulated his influential argument from scarcity in his 1798
Essay on the Principle of Population as it affects the Future Improvement of
Society, with Remarks on the Speculation of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and
other Writers. In Malthus's scheme, human life is ordered by a competition
between competing desires or passions — the passion for sex and the passion
for food. In the 1798 text, the former is the stronger. The drive for sexual
reproduction, he claims, is responsible for the formation of civilized society—
demographic changes, the division of labor, the enclosure of land, the forma-
tion of property. But sex also threatens civilization, for population will increase
at a higher rate than the resources that are needed to sustain it: as population
increases at a geometric rate, resources increase at an arithmetic rate. Various
checks—famine, disease, volcanoes, floods, and wars—are always clawing back
population to a sustainable and civilized level.31
Malthus denied that mankind and society could be in a state of exponen-
tial improvement because limitations on resources will always tend to make
societies oscillate between states of civilization and decay. In the much ex-
panded second edition of Essay on the Principle of Population, published just
five years later in 1803, its rhetorical scheme is clearer: the domestic haven of
middle-class English life is juxtaposed to barbarous foreign and ancient states
in which infanticide is a frequent trait. Malthus's vision of a civilized society is
similar to Adam Smith's in that it, too, is based on the idea of exclusion of
certain groups—which, like Smith, he identifies on the basis of behavior such
as killing babies. But for Malthus there is a persistent danger that society may
slip back into this state of savagery. Foreign societies thus provide an endless
specter of the state of decay into which civilization may fall. By exercising
moral restraint and the simple device of the late marriage, however, Malthus
claims in the second edition, society can stave off a collapse into savagery,
which would be the inevitable outcome of the profligacy recommended by
his opponents such as Godwin and Condorcet, who believed in free love and
the perfectibility of mankind.
The seemingly optimistic Godwin, in contrast, admitted that he was not
averse to infanticide. "Neither do I regard a new-born child with any super-
stitious reverence," he wrote in his response to Malthus in 1801. "I had rather
a child should perish at the first hour of existence, than that a man should
spend seventy years of life in a state of misery and vice."32 A similarly prag-
matic view was put forward by the socialist medical practitioner Charles Hall.
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Writing in 1805, Hall argued for the greater humanity of the Chinese, on the
grounds that the killing of children would be an act of kindness when the
alternative was a life of impoverishment: "The Chinese, who suffer the expo-
sition of their children, and even appoint men to destroy them, seem to act
more humanely than the Europeans, who cause the long, languishing suffer-
ings of children."33 Like Godwin, Hall invokes the idea of the salvific infanti-
cide as a critique of the social conditions and ideologies of his time.
Ironically, however, in a later work Godwin was one of the many to level
the charge of child murder at Malthus. He attacked Malfhus on the grounds
that his theory appeared to legitimate child murder as a positive check on
population growth. "It is obvious all through, that Mr. Malthus trusts to the
destruction of infants and young children as the street anchor of our hope to
preserve the population of Europe from perishing with hunger."34 In Godwin's
logic, this is because Malthus considered the value of a child's life to be far in
excess of any other; that is to say, a child with seventy years to live would incur
a far greater expenditure of resources than one with just twenty years to go.
For Godwin, it is not the simple fact of child murder that is the problem: to
kill an infant to save it from a life of misery is an act of noble kindness; to kill
an infant to save resources is a self-serving act of vice.
The debate between Malthus and Godwin provides a useful gloss on
Blake's proverb, cited at the beginning of this essay: "Sooner murder an infant
in the cradle than nurse unacted desires." Blake's remark could be read as a
Godwinian expression of the belief that it is better to die at birth than to live a
miserable life of "unacted desires." But the insertion of the word nurse, and its
implications of sympathy, care, affect, when set against the word murder, sug-
gest a critique of Godwin's rationalism. The proverb expresses neither party's
view, but it articulates something of the ontological crisis that is provoked
when it is presumed that lives have relative values, whether these be assessed
in relation to other lives or, indeed, to potential lives.
That the implications of Malthus's work were perceived by his critics to
be extremely worrying is clear by the outlandish list of crimes that were laid at
his door: in addition to child murder, he was found guilty of encouraging
cannibalism and sexual licentiousness. Anna Letitia Barbauld, in a diatribe
against the Napoleonic wars entitled "Dialogue in the Shades," sardonically
alluded to Malthus as the "great philosopher [who] has lately discovered that
the world is in imminent danger of being overpeopled, and that if twenty or
forty thousand could not be persuaded every now and then to stand and be
shot at, we should be forced to eat one another. . . . This discovery has had a
wonderful effect in quieting tender consciences."35 Hazlitt, for his part, com-
plained not that Malthus assumed the disposability of human life but that his
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work presumed licentiousness to be a necessary feature of human nature.
Malthus's work, Hazlitt asserts, "rests on a malicious supposition that all man-
kind . . . are like so many animals in season," and he warned against the
dangerous pornographic potential of the work in the hands of "young women
of liberal education."36 Ironically, in this roll call of perversions, the Reverend
Malthus was metamorphosed into a dangerous libertine —one version of the
savage life to which his barbarizing influence would reduce us all.
These two versions of infanticide circulated widely in the writings of the pe-
riod— and, with them, two opposing constructions of motherhood. The in-
fanticidal woman epitomizes the bad mother, the barbaric, uncivilized woman,
who rejects the maternal role and all it represents; frequently the bad mother
is a single mother.37 On the other hand, the woman who kills her child is,
paradoxically, the heroic mother, the martyr—the one who is willing to make
the ultimate sacrifice, that of her child's life. Distinct as these two construc-
tions are, the boundaries between them are frequently blurred.
This is most apparent in the furious debates that took place around the
1834 Poor Law. Of particular significance were the bastardy provisions. The
effect of these was to put an end to outrelief and the availability of financial
assistance from the child's father, thus casting the sole responsibility for ille-
gitimate children onto their mothers. With some justification, critics of the
law saw it as an incitement to infanticide.38 In 1838, for instance, a pseudony-
mous author named "Marcus" wrote a pamphlet entitled An Essay on Popu-
lousness. In the spirit of Swift's Modest Proposal, Marcus outlines his theory of
painless extinction, how to "revoke or continue a child's existence without
infringing the laws of humanity, that is, without inflicting pain."39 With mock
scientific precision he travesties the discourse of political economy, particu-
larly Malthus's work, echoing Godwin's critique of Malthus that he advocated
the slaughter of infants for reasons of economic expediency.40 For its critics,
the New Poor Law meant the sacrifice of working-class babies for the enrich-
ment of the ruling class. In this, we can recognize a version of the rhetorical
strategy that was identified in earlier social criticism: the poor law's effective
institution of the practice of infanticide demonstrated the barbarity to which
society had been reduced by the social policy of the political economists. As
far as women were concerned, however, the effect of this powerful rhetoric
was double-edged. Although it undoubtedly brought attention to the material
plight of single mothers, it did so in such a provocative way that it made them
the objects of a general fear and loathing. The result of this rhetoric was to
focus attention on the deviancy of the unmarried mother. In the moral panic
that was generated by the New Poor Law, the broader issue —the impoverish-
ment that was a direct result of the new provisions for illegitimate children —
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slipped out of the frame. There was little payoff for single mothers in a rheto-
ric that capitalized on the fact that their position was so extreme that they
might be forced to kill their children.
This demonization of single mothers should, of course, be set in the con-
text of the idealization of married mothers, which was brought about through
the strengthening of the ideology of domesticity and separate spheres that
occurred in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and reached its
pinnacle in the Victorian period.41 As the family was increasingly designated
the ideal social, economic, and moral unit, the mother was held responsible
for imparting social and moral values to children and servants. Through nur-
turing, suckling, and nourishing, the good mother reproduced not only the
population but also the values of the nation. Thus the deviancy of the infanti-
cidal woman appeared particularly acute, as she violently and symbolically
rejected not only her own baby but the whole institution of motherhood, which
was a defining force in bourgeois society.
The concept of social incorporation is central to the domestic ideology.
The good mother, as the agent of incorporation, acculturating new genera-
tions, inducing them into the body social, holds an organic function in soci-
ety. The infanticidal woman, who rejects her child, is rejected by society: she
is the pariah, the outcast, the barbarian. The barbarian is now quite specifi-
cally the undomesticated and the anti-maternal woman, and civilization has
been narrowed to encompass only bourgeois families nurtured by good, middle-
class mothers. Now motherhood has come to symbolize civilization itself,
and infanticide represents its boundaries.
In the period of the New Poor Law, writing about society tends to revolve
around the two metaphorical figures of the good mother and the bad mother,
the latter epitomized as the infanticidal woman. Infanticide continues to hold
the two rhetorical functions identified in the earlier period. For some, it is used
to mark the groups that must be expelled from the body social in the construc-
tion of the nation as a civilized and moral entity. It is often associated with the
Irish during the period in which Irish immigrants were feared as the major
disruptive force in the British workforce. For others, infanticide provides the
basis of a humanitarian critique of government social policy, as in Godwin's
and Hall's earlier work. The significant point, however, is that both uses of
infanticide converge in the construction of the domestic ideal of the good mother
and the simultaneous demonization of the sexualized, deviant woman.42
A good example of the first is provided by Harriet Martineau in her multi-
volumed Illustrations of Political Economy and Illustrations of Taxation, pub-
lished between 1832 and 1834. In "Ella of Garveloch" and "Weal and Woe in
Garveloch," numbers five and six of the Illustrations, she combines Malthu-
sian population theory with ideas about the moral and educational roles of
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mothers, to demonstrate that bad mothering colludes with shortages of re-
sources to perpetrate a selective culling of certain racial and class groups.
Thus she expands on the premonitions of Mary Wollstonecraft, who in A
Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792) had asked, "How many children
are absolutely murdered by the ignorance of women!"43 to explain the cul-
tural and social roots of this "ignorance" and how it operates in a context of
uneven and unreliable resources.
In "Ella of Garveloch," the small Scottish island community of Garveloch
increases its wealth through careful husbandry and the development of trade
and industry. In "Weal and Woe in Garveloch," the advantageous conditions
of this new state of wealth have led to an increase in population such that,
when the harvest fails one year, the community can no longer produce the
resources to sustain itself. Included in the story is a romance between Ella's
brother, the noble and upstanding Ronald, and the Widow Cuthbert, who is
already the mother of three children. As a true Malthusian, Ronald exercises
moral restraint and, for the sake of the community, decides against marrying
the widow. At a point in the story at which the conditions of deficiency reach
a crisis, Martineau includes a conversation between Ella, a mother of six, and
the Widow Cuthbert, excellent mothers both, sitting with babies on their laps,
in which they discuss the connection between population and class. Widow
Cuthbert says, "I have heard that neither the very rich nor the very poor leave
such large families behind them as the middling classes; and if the reason is
known, it seems to me very like murder not to prevent it."44
Ella continues the discussion by demonstrating that the reasons for the
physical superiority of the middle-class family are well known: both very rich
and very poor women are bad mothers. While the rich mother lives in luxury
and dissipation, plays cards all night in hot rooms, and drives in carriages
rather than taking constitutional exercise, the poor woman dangles her baby
"as if she meant to break its back and gives the poor thing nothing but pota-
toes." Neither, she goes on, are much better than the mothers in China —
where "in great cities, new-born babes are nightly laid in the streets to perish,
and many more are thrown into the river and carried away before their par-
ents' eyes" — or in India—where "it is a very common thing for female chil-
dren to be destroyed as soon as they are born."
In these tales, Martineau reiterates the point made by the Malthusians,
that infanticide functions as the benchmark of the barbarous society—the
state of decay that only the middle classes can fend off. The barbarity that is to
be protected against is now located in specially designated racial and class
groups — the Chinese, the Indians, the very rich and the very poor, and the
potato-eaters (a barely coded reference to the Irish). In Garveloch the barba-
rous group is indeed an Irish family, whose indolence and vice will be the
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cause of its own downfall. Much is made of the supposed proclivity of the
Irish for excessive reproduction and their subsequent failure to be responsible
for their children, their unwillingness to work, to save, to be sober, and so on.
It is not claimed directly that the Irish kill their children, but their excessive
reproduction and inability to support them, in this context, amounts to the
same thing. Martineau's narrative is one in which the good, middle-class,
Protestant, Scottish mothers bear strong and healthy children by exercising
restraint, thrift, industriousness, and so on, while the Irish family withers into
a state of decay and eventual extinction on Garveloch.
Ebenezer Elliott, the "Corn Law Rhymer," provides an example of the
second use of infanticide, the salvific infanticide, as a means of social critique.
As for Godwin et al., Elliott's infanticide is a sign of the barbaric state to
which England has been reduced by current social policy. In one infanticide
poem he writes:
Upon her pregnant womb her hand she laid,
Then stabb'd her living child! and shriek'd, dismay'd
"Oh, why had I a mother!" wildly said
That saddest mother, gazing on the dead—
Hurrah for the bread tax'd England.45
This mother commits the only heroic act possible in the morally and materi-
ally derelict world that she inhabits. At the end of the poem, the responsibility
for the murder is laid squarely at the feet of the government, "Wholesale Dealers
in waste, want, and war!" (line 31). The infanticidal woman in this case is the
heroic martyr, and by performing a self-denying act of moral distinction in a
fallen world she epitomizes the domestic ideal of the good mother.
A much more complex example of the salvific infanticide is provided by
Elizabeth Barrett Browning in her arresting poem "The Runaway Slave at
Pilgrim's Point" (1850), Here the black woman murders her white male child —
the result of rape by her master—"to save it from [her] curse" (line 146). The
sex and the color of the infant in this example are crucial. Unlike in the ear-
lier account provided by the Abbe Raynal, this slave mother does not murder
a female child to save her from a fate similar to her own. Rather, she identifies
her child with her oppressor ("in that single glance I had / Of my child's face,
. . . / I saw a look that made me mad! /The masters look" [lines 141-44]), and
she transforms the act into one of revenge. The force of the word save in line
146, then, is profoundly ambiguous. The idea that she "saves" the child from
the "curse" of negritude, the "curse" that is indeed her own, is complicated by
the fact of the child's color and gender. But the idea that she "saves" the child
from her own wish for violent retribution —her own "curse" — is complicated
by the fact that she "saves" him by acting out that very retribution and
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strangling him. Despite this complexity, however, the poem works by using
the infanticide in much the same way that Elliott does: in this case, to demon-
strate the degradations of slavery and racism.
For Elliott and Barrett Browning, the act of infanticide suggests a certain
kind of nobility in mothers and a capacity to bring about social redemption.
For Martineau, child murder means moral deviancy and a concomitant physi-
cal degeneracy. However, these opposing formulations share a belief in the
centrality of mothers to the definition of civilized society. For all of these writ-
ers, civilization finds metonymic representation in the figure of the good
mother—the guardian and reproducer of the values of civilized society. For
all, the good mother is identifiable by her self-sacrifices, her capacity to nur-
ture, and her possession of moral goodness —the same figure in all cases. The
good mother is, of course, an idealized, monumental figure who casts a shadow
of underachievement over all real mothers. In such a context, unmarried
women who become pregnant, especially at a time when all extramarital sex
is the cause of moral and social stigma, have no hope of being anything but
deviant bad mothers.
In cultural ideation, however, such ideals stand and amass multiple mean-
ings that bespeak the anxieties and desires of the time. By the middle of the
nineteenth century, under the force of the domestic ideology, the figure of the
good mother, in its dominant uses, tends to stand for tradition, against the
incursions of industrial society. The infanticidal woman is associated with the
disorder and change brought about by industrialization. As the good mother
stands for tradition, the infanticidal woman is the harbinger of the modern.
This is in sharp contrast to the situation at the end of the eighteenth century
and in the early nineteenth century described in the opening sections of this
essay. Then infanticide was considered an archaic, atavistic practice that sig-
naled the prelude to modern, humane society. In this later period it is still
proposed as the antithesis to the humane society, but now it is set in the con-
text of a rhetoric that concentrates anxieties on modernity rather than archa-
ism, the present and future rather than the past.
This shift, I would suggest, coincides with the development of a particu-
larly pervasive (and still dominant) notion of Culture that Raymond Williams
and Terry Eagleton have charted through the works of the major writers of the
century.46 In this formation, Culture provides a place for social critique and
for the expression of humane qualities of sympathy and compassion. Based on
the terms of organicism, Culture usually provides a narrative in which tradi-
tion—equated with organic, land-based, usually rural, face-to-face societies-
is pitched against industry—that is, mechanized, commercial, urban, alienating
societies. By extension, Culture encompasses nature, natural reproduction,
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and families. On the other side of the fence are grouped machines, science,
profits — and, we might add, perverted practices such as child murder.
George Eliot's Adam Bede (1859) exemplifies this point. Here Hetty Sor-
rel, the infanticidal woman, is contrasted with Dinah Morris, the civilized
and civilizing woman who is a Methodist preacher. The final scenes of soft-
focus domestic bliss with the now married Adam and Dinah (no longer a
preacher) and their children suggest that the novel could be read as a Malthu-
sian narrative—an expanded version of Martineau's parable —in which the
world will be peopled by the vigorous and morally superior offspring of the
civilized classes, whereas the barbarians, in the person of Hetty, will be ex-
pelled from the nation and will eventually perish.47 Joan Manheimer has
pointed out that the novel's ending is a nostalgic celebration of past times,
and that Hetty, in contrast, "challenges traditional assumptions about the
immutability of class distinctions, about the stability of community, and about
the sanctity of the family."48 In this reading, Hetty is the bearer of modernity,
representing progress through sexual liberation, a notion that cannot be coun-
tenanced in the novel. Thus Hetty presents an early example of a figure that
recurs frequently in the second half of the century with both disapprobation
and approbation: the sexually liberated woman as a sign of modernity. The
New Woman of the 1890s will provide one version of this figure.49 Moreover,
the representation of progress through a woman's sexual behavior continues
even now, as a society's capacity for being modernized or otherwise is fre-
quently staked on its attitude toward birth control. A supposedly "backward"
society such as Ireland then is "barbarous" precisely in its resistance to contra-
ception and abortion. From another perspective, of course, it is traditional
and civilized in fending off the barbarous —and murderous — practices of
modern society.50
In mid-nineteenth-century cultural theory, however, the most striking child
murderer is to be found in Matthew Arnold's essay "The Function of Criti-
cism at the Present Time" (1864). Midway through this powerful and perva-
sive articulation of high cultural values, there is a reference to a girl named
Wragg who strangled her illegitimate child?1 In the rhetorical construction of
high Culture, or Arnoldian civilization, Wragg represents the barbaric work
of industry—or anarchy—that will be fended off by the formation of the realm
of Culture. And if anarchy is represented by the bad mother, Culture, in its
civilizing mission, appropriates the function of the good mother. Like the
good mother, Culture provides a site in which a class can reproduce its val-
ues, and it does so precisely by regulating modes of literary consumption, in
the same way that the good mother performs her acculturating function
through the metaphor of feeding.
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However, Arnold's presentation of Wragg is more ambivalent than this
might suggest. In an essay that deplores the current state of English cultural
life and looks to a former generation of poets for regeneration, Wragg's Ro-
mantic ancestry is significant: like Martha Ray, Wragg performs the function
of the sublime object. For Arnold, Wragg's case controverts the jingoistic sen-
timents of self-satisfied Tories and Utilitarians that prevail in English intellec-
tual work, both of whom have celebrated the "old Anglo-Saxon race" as "the
best breed in the whole world." Wragg, on the contrary, represents the "touch
of grossness in our race," its "original short coming in the more delicate spiri-
tual perceptions," not by her crime, curiously, but rather by her name, which
Arnold calls a hideous "Anglo-Saxon name," like "Higginbottom, Stiggens
and Bugg." Her crime becomes but a device of her characterization, a con-
stituent in a list of props: "the gloom, the smoke, the cold, the strangled ille-
gitimate child"—a metonymic representation of her gross nature that is merely
the fulfillment of her charmless name. In fact, the infanticidal Wragg makes
an important contribution to Arnold's formulation of the case for disinter-
ested criticism, characterized as the free play of the imagination, by which
the mind, detached from material and practical concerns, might contem-
plate "the best that is known and thought in the world." Not only does she
expose the ideologically transparent rhetoric of politicians and social critics,
who fail to see the true nature of English society that is represented by her, but
her "gross" name and the starkness of the writing of the report that Arnold
relishes — "Wragg is in custody. . . . Wragg has strangled her child" — these
together produce a superior, unencumbered prose style that, for Arnold, will
be the facilitator and organ of higher critical insight.
Wragg has strangled her child. But, ironically, by doing so, she provides
the conditions for English intellectuals to raise themselves from the philistinism
that, for Arnold, dogs them. As the barbarian, she also offers the occasion for
an imaginative leap that will provide the basis of intellectual regeneration.
Embedded in the figure of Wragg are the traces of the redemptive or salvific
infanticide identified earlier in this essay.
Arnold's ambivalence toward Wragg rests on the convergence of the two
uses of infanticide that I have traced. Wragg is the barbarian who must be
expelled from the social body that constitutes the nation, but she is also the
occasion for a critique of that very process of national identity formation.
Furthermore, I would suggest that the arresting intervention of Wragg in the
essay marks a profound ambivalence within Arnold's notion of Culture to-
ward the idea of modernity: Arnold's work is as much a discourse of improve-
ment as it is of nostalgia and tradition. Wragg becomes a repository for these
unresolvable longings: for the past and the future, for incorporation and dis-
avowal, for improvement and stasis.
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Arnold's Wragg gives both name and face to a range of deeply rooted
anxieties about modernity and progress, on the one hand, and about tradition
and the past, on the other. In the context of this history of infanticide, that the
woman who kills her child should bear the burden of these anxieties is nei-
ther new nor extraordinary. But it is highly significant that these concerns
should remain buried in Wragg's criminal figure in a text that subsequently
assumes a determining role in the reproduction and continuity of central defi-
nitions of Englishness. It suggests that the idea of infanticide will maintain a
shadowy presence in subsequent constructions of nationhood, holding within
it, as we have seen, contrasting ideas about the nature of civilized society. The
infanticidal woman thus goes forward at the end of the century, a complex
and contradictory figure, carrying with her the marks of unresolved tensions
within long-standing debates over the boundaries of culture at this formative
period in the development of the modern nation.
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uHappy Shall He Be, That
Taketh and Dasheth Thy Little
Ones against the Stones"
Infanticide in Cooper's
The Last of the Mohicans
"I am . . . a white man without a cross."
Cotton Mather's 1702 narration of the massacre of Hannah Dustan's family
provides one of the earliest accounts of infanticide in the New World: "On
March 15,1697, the Salvages made a Descent upon the Skirts of Haverhill. . . .
The Nurse trying to Escape, with the New-born Infant, fell into the Hands of
the Formidable Salvages; and those furious Tawnies coming into the house,
bid poor Dustan rise . . . ; but e'er they had gone many Steps, they dash'd out
the Brains of the Infant, against a Tree."1
Similar reports of white children massacred by Native Americans recur
in both autobiographical captivity narratives and their fictional descendants.
In Ann Eliza Bleecker's novel The History of Maria Kittle, for example, two
mothers lose their infants to "Salvages" while their husbands are away from
the settlement: "An Indian, hideously painted, strove up to Cornelia . . . and
cleft her white forehead deeply with his tomahawk. . . . [H]e deformed her
lovely body with deep gashes; and tearing her unborn babe away, dashed it to
pieces against the stone wall." This account of violence to mother and fetus is
followed by a baby-killing only a few pages later when another mother "re-
signed [her infant] to the merciless hands of the savage, who instantly dashed
his little forehead against the stones."2 The scenario recurs in Catherine Maria
Sedgwick's nineteenth-century novel Hope Leslie: "The Indian .. . now sprang
forward and tore the infant from its mother's breast . . . tossed him wildly
around his head, and dashed him on the doorstone."3 And in Cooper's The
Last of the Mohicans, an angry Huron warrior at Fort William Henry "dash [es]
the head of [a white] infant against a rock, and cast[s] its quivering remains to
[its mother's] very feet."4
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Forty years ago, R.W.B. Lewis described the hero of American fiction as
"happily bereft of ancestry," noting that America's political parentlessness is
often figured in post-Revolution literature as biological parentlessness; how-
ever, given the range of possible fates for young white children available to
such fiction writers as Bleecker, Sedgwick, and Cooper, the recurrence of
depictions of offspring killed by Native Americans suggests that this literature
might also express America's anxiety over the possibility of being bereft of
descendants. Like the "redundancy of [the] phrase and figure" of the head-
long Indian, which Lora Romero examines in her insightful essay, "Gender,
Empire, and New Historicism," the repeated figure of a nursing babe mur-
dered by savages while a hysterical mother looks on and a father is absent, as
well as the repetition of the verb dash in all of these representations, suggest
that infanticide functions more as a sensationalist figure manifesting anxiety
about the security of the nation's future than as an empirical fact of colonial
warfare.5
Most recent historians of Native America agree that no ethnographic evi-
dence exists of consistent war practices of infanticide among northeastern
Native American tribes during this period. Historian James Axtell and others
have argued that rather than killing them, East Coast tribes customarily took
English women and children as prisoners, either selling them to the French
or adopting them: "The pattern of taking women and children for adoption
was consistent throughout the colonial period. . . . [Native Americans] cap-
tured English settlers largely to replace members of their own families who
had died, often from English musketballs or imported diseases. Consequently,
women and children—the 'weak and defenceless'—were the prime targets of
Indian raids." Daniel K. Richter claims that restoring populations decimated
by disease or battle was the major goal of most raids launched by the Iroquois
during the eighteenth century: "The essential measure of a war party's success
was its ability to seize prisoners and bring them home alive." John E. Ferling
acknowledges that "troublesome small children" were sometimes killed, but
these murders were committed en route to the raiding parties' camps if the
children irritated their captors rather than during a raid.6 Although some of
the more sensational captivity narratives describe the massacres of infants,
many others testify that children as young as fourteen days old were made
captives or adopted and that white mothers were often assisted in caring for
their infants by their Native American captors.7
The reiteration of the verb dash, like the recurrence of the trope of infan-
ticide itself, in fictional and nonfictional accounts of colonial American his-
tory suggests discursive rather than strictly documentary significance. The
source for this usage seems to be the Old Testament, a text familiar to many
American colonists and settlers, which features numerous descriptions of
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infants "dashed to pieces" within the context of the Jews' struggle to preserve
their minority culture within communities of "heathens."8 In Psalm 137, for
example, the singer cries, "O daughter of Babylon . . . / Happy shall he be,
that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones."9 The author of the
Book of Nahum recounts the destruction of the immoral city of Nineveh in a
similar manner: "Woe to the bloody city! It is full of lies and robbery. . . . Her
young children also were dashed in pieces at the top of all the streets" (Nahum
3:1-10). In these and other biblical examples, infants' heads are dashed when
immoral (i.e., non-Jewish) societies are purged of their wickedness by a wrathful
Yahweh. Elsewhere in the Old Testament, however, God's chosen people, the
children of Israel, are also "dashed to pieces" by their enemies. In the apocry-
phal Book of Judith, for example, Hebrew children are threatened by the
Assyrian armies of Holofernes. And in 2 Kings, Elisha weeps because he knows
"what thou wilt do unto the children of Israel: their strong holds wilt thou set
on fire, and their young men wilt thou slay with the sword, and wilt dash their
children, and rip up their women with child" (2 Kings 8:12).
Thematically, all of these biblical examples of infanticide foreground the
Jews' concerns over the survival of their culture threatened with ethnic and
moral contamination. Infants are the battleground on which these cultures
fight for future dominance. Most significant about these biblical references,
however, is the doubled hermeneutic: When the immoral societies of Babylon,
Nineveh, and Samaria are destroyed at the hands of the purifying Yahweh, it
can be read as part of a "just" war, yet when the chosen people are its victims,
infanticide can be read as immoral barbarism.
Given the lack of historical evidence of infanticidal practices among the
northeastern Native American nations and the variety of references to infanti-
cidal violence in Old Testament texts, what accounts for the recurrence of
this theme in early American literature? What might the repetition of both
figure and phrase signal? What are the ideological contradictions surround-
ing representations of America simultaneously as a new and fertile landscape
and as a society in which all possibilities of a future for the colonizers are
brutally extinguished when their offspring are systematically exterminated?
In an attempt to answer these questions, I would like to examine James
Fenimore Cooper's novel The Last of the Mohicans (1826), a text ostensibly
propelled by the quest to reunite broken families —Munro with his daughters,
the Mohicans with their Delaware relatives—but punctuated by the brutal
sacrifices of offspring. Although the literal massacre of a white infant and its
mother is pinned on a Native American enemy, more metaphorical infant-
killings such as the slaughter of an innocent colt and the acts of disowning
one's children are perpetrated by Natty and Munro, suggesting that the colo-
nizers are also implicated as agents of the destruction of America's future.
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Earlier critics like Leslie Fiedler have discussed this novel in terms of
"homosocial bonding," the "perpetual blood brother theme," and the "almost
inarticulate, but unquestioned love" that binds Chingachgook to Natty
Bumppo. While relationships between men are crucial in this novel, more
recent critics have focused on the interactions of other groups. Jane Tompkins,
for example, has read the novel as "an attempt to calculate exactly how much
violation or mixing of its fundamental categories [ethnicity, nationality, and
class] a society can bear." I would argue that a powerful gender subtext lies
beneath the novel's more overtly manifest concerns about these other funda-
mental categories; this subtext is everywhere, from the oft-repeated slur that
"the Delaware are women" to Natty Bumppo's repeated anxiety that being
tied to their mothers' apronstrings has ruined white men's ability to survive on
the frontier. I would suggest, then, that the recurring examples of violence
toward offspring in this text signal resistance to a much more complicated
sort of mixing than Tompkins imagines: a crossing that is at once sexual
(through biological reproduction) and racial (through miscegenation). Like
the Old Testament examples, the violence directed at offspring in Cooper's
text seems to highlight conflict between opposing communities. But if the
violence marks attempts to purify the frontier of alterity, Cooper's novel de-
fines alterity not exclusively in terms of race but also in terms of gender. Taunts
linking women and Native Americans recur, such as Magua's repeated accu-
sation that "the Delaware are women!" implying, as Shirley Samuels has sug-
gested, that when Native American men are killed in Mohicans, it is because
they resemble women. Like Native Americans who, through their understand-
ing of sustainable agricultural and hunting practices, perpetuate the fertility
of the wilderness, and therefore intrude on the novel's fantasy of white male
sufficiency, women threaten white male fantasies of self-making because they
are biologically necessary for the white population's future on the American
frontier. Women represent two undesirable qualities in Cooper's text: the trans-
mission and preservation of a conservative feminized and feminizing culture,
which Natty links with the impracticality of book-learning, and sexual corrup-
tion, which is traditionally viewed in terms of original sin but here is viewed
as well in terms of miscegenation. For these reasons, both women and Native
Americans are defined in the novel as the unwanted Other.10
The instances in which offspring are killed conflate the text's anxieties
over these two controversial issues of race and gender, suggesting to me that
white America may be "bereft of descendants," not because of the mythical
barbarism of Native Americans, but because of its own interconnected anxi-
eties about racial and sexual purity and about the female-centered processes
of biological reproduction by which families and cultures regenerate them-
selves. Whereas historical romances typically depict racial or ethnic conflicts
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resolved through a marriage between representatives of the feuding peoples,
their miscegenated offspring serving to cement the alliance, in Mohicans the
possibility of interracial union is eliminated when Cora and Uncas are killed;
mothers are excluded; and offspring, both animal and human, are brutally
killed.11 Violence toward offspring seems to stand in for unrepresented fanta-
sies of mother-killing.
What emerges as an alternative to female-dependent reproduction is a
fantasy of male parthenogenesis which assumes men can be free from depen-
dence on women in order to re-create themselves, a fantasy which continues
in contemporary American science's attempts to bypass biological genera-
tion. Inspired by this fantasy, Natty's boast that he is a "man without a cross"
can be read as meaning not only that he is not the result of miscegenation but
also that he is self-reproducing rather than reliant on women-centered repro-
duction. This fantasy of retaining the American frontier as a private domain
exclusively for the white male, however, has as its logical consequences steril-
ity and extinction. The recurring trope of infanticide then can be read as
exposing a relationship between white America's fantasies of racial and sexual
dominance and its fears of racial domination and annihilation. While simul-
taneously using depictions of "savages" attacking white families to justify white
genocidal treatment of Native Americans, these fantasies implicate white
Americans as agents of their own destruction.
Infanticide in The Last of the Mohicans
The most literal example of infanticide in Cooper's Mohicans is the massacre
of a white baby by an angry Huron warrior in chapter 17. Although not per-
fectly homologous, two other moments in the novel when the colonizers them-
selves sacrifice or disown offspring for the greater good of the patriarchal
"nation" complicate the reading of this climactic moment in Cooper's text. In
all of these examples, the deaths of offspring are blamed on external enemies-
Native American brutality, warfare, miscegenation —but closer readings re-
veal a countermyth: white Americans as agents of their own elimination.
In the earliest example of offspring-killing, Natty kills a colt whose rus-
tling in the bushes threatens to expose the Munro party to their "Mingo"
pursuers. Here, the captivity narrative convention of beastly savages brutally
murdering the children of morally superior colonists is reversed. Instead, the
rational Natty Bumppo justifies the slaughter of an innocent colt by explain-
ing it in terms of the conflict between a person's individual survival and the
survival of his dependents: "When men struggle for the single life God has
given them," Natty argues, "even their own kind seem no more than the beasts
of the wood" (LM 47). Like a child who threatens a parent's survival, the colt
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must be sacrificed.12 The psalmodist David Gamut, however, resists this ratio-
nalization and urges Natty to "spare the foal of Miriam! It is the comely off-
spring of a faithful dam" (LM 47). Gamut insists on seeing Natty's violence as
directed not only at the offspring but also at its mother when he demonstrates
pity for the butchered colt as well as for the "motherly animal" (LM, 39),
"Poor Miriam!" (LM, 51).
The mare's name and the song Gamut sings after the colt has been killed —
"First born of Egypt, smite did he, / Of mankind, and of beast also" (LM,
51) — recall two biblical accounts of infanticide that illuminate the novel's
concerns for racial purity: the pharaoh's plot to keep Jews from outnumbering
their Egyptian oppressors and Yahweh's plague on the Egyptian first-born
(Exodus 1 and 12). Miriam is the name of Moses' sister, who helps him es-
cape the pharaoh's policy of Hebrew infanticide and go on to lead the chosen
people to the promised land. Gamut's song refers specifically to Yahweh's
tenth plague, which killed all Egyptian first-born but passed over Hebrew
homes marked with lamb's blood. Both of these Old Testament stories fore-
ground fears of racial contamination between the enslaved Hebrews and their
Egyptian oppressors. The marking of Hebrew homes at Passover demonstrates
a desire for visible differences between two feuding peoples, differences which
miscegenation through intermarriage might obliterate.
The Mosaic myth was familiar to many of Cooper's readers, including
descendants of New England Puritans who had described their own exodus
from the tyranny of England in the typological terms of the Jews' escape from
Egypt.13 Using this typological framework, Cooper contextualizes the novel's
quest for the reunification of the Munro family in terms of deliverance from
the threats of racial contamination. Natty's rescue of Cora and Alice from
Magua not only reunites the family but frees Cora from the miscegenation
that Magua threatens.14 Like Moses, who is born a Hebrew but raised by the
pharaoh's daughter, Natty is biologically of one race and culturally incorpo-
rated into another, and he can therefore represent a living compromise be-
tween two conflicting races while he denies any potential for permanent
reconciliation through interracial marriage. Natty's sacrifice of a colt linked
with Moses, then, seems an act as shocking as suicide. It presages his own
expendability—his inability to regenerate his temporary compromise between
the two races—and underlines the inherent imbrication of white fantasies of
racial dominance and fears of racial domination.
More metaphorical killings of offspring in the novel are occasioned by
fathers' refusals to acknowledge their children. Both Colonel Munro and the
Delaware sachem Tamenund resist their biological paternity, preferring to
use the family metaphorically to connote their political patriarchies rather
than literally to signify "their own kind." Munro, for example, ignores his
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daughter Alice's call in order to play the part of colonel to his larger "family,"
the inhabitants of the fort. As he explains to Heyward, "All that you see here
claim alike to be my children" (LM, 171). Similarly, when Cora attempts to
remind Tamenund of a recent event involving his child, the Delaware patri-
arch interrupts to put her familial account into context within the long politi-
cal history of Delaware contact with whites. When she asks, "Is Tamenund a
father?" he puts her off by replying, "Of a nation" (LM, 305). Here the poli-
tics of warfare, which breaks up the family, also usurps its vocabulary; politi-
cal alliances structured by the "fathers" of nations replace biological alliances
dependent on the participation of mothers.15
The humiliated father of a Huron youth named Reed-that-bends makes a
similar denial of paternity when his son is denounced for cowardice: "I had no
son! He who was called by that name is forgotten; his blood was pale, and it
came not from the veins of a Huron; the wicked Chippewas cheated [me of]
my squaw!" (LM, 247). Like the sacrifice of the colt, this denial of paternity
can be read as an act of covert violence against the mother. By blaming inter-
tribal mixing and infidelity for his son's weakness, the father of Reed-that-
bends isolates Woman as the site of racial and moral contamination.
The most literal instance of infanticide is the Huron killing of a white
baby during the Fort William Henry massacre. Like the previous examples,
the incident foregrounds anxiety about both racial and sexual mixing. The
incident begins with a description of a truant provincial "being plundered of
those very effects, which had caused him to desert his place in the ranks"
(LM, 174-75). This emphasis on the redistribution of trade goods is followed
by a second scene of bartering, in which a Huron warrior is attracted by a
white woman's shawl:
As the female crowd approached them, the gaudy colours of a shawl
attracted the eyes of a wild and untutored Huron. He advanced to seize it,
without the least hesitation. The woman, more in terror, than through
love of the ornament, wrapped her child in the coveted article, and
folded both more closely to her bosom. . . . [Suddenly] the savage
relinquished his hold of the shawl, and tore the screaming infant from her
arms. Abandoning every thing to the greedy grasp of those around her, the
mother darted, with distraction in her mien, to reclaim her child. The
Indian . . . extended one hand, in sign of a willingness to exchange,
while, with the other, he flourished the babe above his head, holding it by
the feet, as if to enhance the value of the ransom. (LM, 175)
Most literally, the passage seems to be about a kind of protoconsumer desire
run amuck—a cross-cultural economic perversion —among the Native Ameri-
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cans, but I think the deviant economics also maps on to a deviant erotics.16
Indeed, the passage conflates the languages of economic exchange and eroti-
cism. When the Huron adopts a position of barter, assuming that the child he
holds is now rightly his to trade for whatever the mother can offer, the mother
cries out her terms of barter: "'Here — here—there—all—any—everything!'. . .
tearing the lighter articles of dress from her person. 'Take all, but give me my
babe!'" (LM, 175). Her desperate efforts to retrieve her infant resemble a
striptease, but her stuttering bid, the only direct speech by a white mother in
the entire novel, is insufficient to appease the angry warrior: "The savage
spurned the worthless rags, and perceiving that the shawl had already become
a prize to another, his bantering but sullen smile, changing to a gleam of
ferocity, he dashed the head of the infant against a rock, and cast its quivering
remains to her very feet" (LM, 175). That the mother almost disrobes in the
process of trying to retrieve her child conveys in microcosm the dilemma of
the novel itself: Cooper's text offers the titillation of interracial union, such as
Uncas's union with Cora, but prohibits its consummation at the very last
moment, replacing it with violence against children. The mother's subsequent
death by a "tomahawk [driven] into her own brain" (LM, 175) seems the
text's cruel punishment for her willingness to engage in an economic exchange
that might also signal an erotic exchange with the racial Other.
This final instance of infanticide simultaneously confirms and challenges
the white fantasy of a racially pure continent. If the baby's death personalizes
the massacre of American colonists, casting them as morally superior victims
of a barbarous attack, then it can justify their subsequent genoeidal treatment
of their Native American aggressors. But if the Huron can be read as adopting
the child as his own, thereby exhibiting a willingness to engage in cultural
and sexual exchange, then the child is killed by white culture's anxious rejec-
tion of miscegenation as a possible solution to racial conflict. The bartering
represents a moment of potential equality between the two races and the pos-
sibility of economic, cultural, and sexual exchange, but its dysfunctioning
reveals the price of the text's prohibition of interracial union. As the only
white infant in the novel, the baby's fate foretells a limited future for Anglo-
Americans on the continent. Its elimination implies that the last of the
Mohicans forecasts the last of the Munros as well.
All these examples of infanticide conflate anxieties about race and gen-
der by locating contamination, both moral and racial, in women's bodies:
The colt's death recalls Egyptian and Hebrew fears of racial intermingling
and Moses' ambiguous significance as culturally mixed yet racially pure;
the denial of paternity by Reed-that-bends's father similarly rests on claims
that his cowardice stems from his mother's miscegenation; and finally, the
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massacre of the white child and mother at the fort forbids the possibility of
interracial exchange. Each of these instances of infanticide suggests that the
displays of white Americans' roles as victims of Native American violence
conceal less flattering readings of white Americans as their own aggressors.
"Partial Relatives"
Structured as a historical romance, Mohicans has as its ostensible quest the
reunification of families: while Cora and Alice travel to meet their father,
Uncas and Chingachgook attempt to locate their Delaware relatives. But a
closer examination of the novel reveals that all families in Mohicans are, in
their unified states, characterized by incompleteness—by half sisters, displaced
or adopted children, and single parents. The Munro family itself comprises a
father and two grown daughters born of different mothers, as well as a poten-
tial son-in-law who has "no father to expect [him]" (LM, 102). The family of
Uncas and Chingachgook is limited to a father-and-son team, supplemented
by the kinless Natty Bumppo's role as "Uncas' father's brother" (LM, 273)
and Uncas's adoptive father (LM, 263). The quest for a reunited family, then,
signifies a return to the patriarch rather than to a family that includes both
mother and father.
Mothers, in fact, are systematically excluded from the text. Other than
the mother at the fort, who loses her life and the life of her child, there are no
white mothers represented in the novel. Only Cora appears as a doubled fig-
ure of maternity and childhood, since she represents "my more than sister, my
mother" (LM, 115) to Alice and "my babe" to Munro. A source of affection
and comfort to the younger sister, Cora is described as looking at the innocent
Alice with "maternal fondness" (LM, 156). In contrast to Alice's virginal sim-
plicity, Cora describes herself as a woman of "experience," implying a degree
of sexual knowledge: "That I cannot see the sunny side of the picture of life,
like this artless but ardent enthusiast, . . . is the penalty of experience" (LM,
150). For the same fantasies of racial and sexual purity that motivate the other
instances of infanticide in the novel, Cora must also be sacrificed.
It is worth noting that, although the rescues of women and reunions of
the family propel the plot, these reunions are only temporarily achieved. In a
description of a brief moment of domestic comfort at Munro's tent, Cooper's
prose betrays the impermanence of the colonial family structure: "Not only
the dangers through which they had passed, but those which still impended
above them, appeared to be momentarily forgotten, in the soothing indul-
gence of such a family meeting. It seemed as if they had profited by the short
truce, to devote an instant to the purest and best affections: the daughters
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forgetting their fears, and the veteran his cares, in the security of the moment"
(LM, 156, my emphasis).
Even though Natty Bumppo and the Mohican scouts deliver Alice and
Cora to their father at the fort, they are soon separated again during the Hu-
ron massacre, and when the Munro/Bumppo party arrives to rescue Cora
from her imprisonment by Magua, the Munro reunion is immediately inter-
rupted by her death. At the level of narrative, these reunions are temporary
because external threats separate or kill family members, but on a symbolic
level, one can interpret the transience of these reunions as evidence that the
family without a mother has no means of perpetuating itself into futurity.17
Cora's death marks the end of the "short truce" of the Munro family
reunion and the destruction of the potential for family and future that Cora's
sensuality promises. Her death is the moment at which all the potential signi-
fications of infanticide and mother-killing converge. The resistance to the
maternal, shown here as a resistance to Cora, is also inevitably a resistance to
miscegenation. The conflation of sexual experience and mixed ancestry in
the character of Cora reveals that the "cross" Natty insists he is without refers
to both race and sexuality. This is shown most evocatively when Munro's
explanation of the absent mothers in the text also explains Cora's mixed an-
cestry. Cora's origins are described by her father as a "curse entailed on Scot-
land, by her unnatural union with a foreign and trading people" (LM, 159).
Munro's "shedding blood in different lands," "formfing] a connexion" with a
nameless woman of mixed race, from a "foreign and trading people" —all
these details represent Munro's marriage to his first wife, Cora's mother, in
the conventions of a fling by a soldier in a strange land so that, like the expla-
nation of the cowardice of Reed-that-bends, Cora is explained by her mother's
contamination.
In the final chapters, the novel shifts its focus irrevocably from the dark
and sensual Cora as romantic heroine to her fair and virginal opposite, Alice.
In moving from the potential union of Uncas and Cora to the actual union of
Heyward and Alice, the novel traces a narrative trajectory from sensuality to
virginity and from potential miscegenation to racial purity. Rather than unite
feuding peoples, as marriages in historical romances often do, the marriage
implied at the end of the novel ensures the colonists' safety from the threats of
miscegenation: "The 'open hand' had conveyed [Munro's] surviving daugh-
ter far into the settlements of the 'pale-faces,' where her tears had, at last, ceased
to flow, and had been succeeded by the bright smiles which were better suited
to her joyous nature" (LM, 348). The asexual union of Heyward and the child-
like Alice suggests that the price of the desire for racial purity may be extinc-
tion.
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Regeneration through Self-Making
The instances of violence toward offspring depicted in Mohicans suggest that
sensational descriptions of Native American attacks on the chosen people of
colonial America may mask white Americans' own anxiety about their geno-
cidal treatment of Indians in North America and their ability to reproduce
their own culture biologically and culturally after they have exterminated the
racial Other. The trope of infanticide provides a lens through which the self-
annihilation of white American culture can be viewed, since these acts of
violence directed against children and their mothers are also directed at Ameri-
can culture itself.
Cora's death and the instances of infanticide preceding it imply that re-
production with motherhood at its center cannot function on the frontier
represented inMohicans, Although Richard Slotkin has suggested that Ameri-
can fiction offers a model of regeneration through violence rather than bio-
logical reproduction, Cooper offers another alternative to biological reproduc-
tion in The Last of the Mohicans — a fantasy of male parthenogenesis on a
frontier that only men inhabit. It is the American myth of the self-made man,
a myth that has captivated American writers from Benjamin Franklin to F.
Scott Fitzgerald. For female reproduction, Cooper substitutes the image of
the self-reliant hero who, without engaging in sexual relations, reproduces
himself through near escapes from death and the adoption of new names or
multiple identities. Natty is the primary example of this self-made man. De-
scribed by Balzac as "a magnificent moral hermaphrodite born between the
savage and the civilized worlds," he resists marriage throughout the Leather-
stocking Tales and ultimately leaves no offspring.18 Instead, he changes his own
identity throughout: "Leatherstocking," "Pathfinder," "Trapper," "Hawkeye,"
"Deerslayer," and "la Longue Carabine" are only a few of the many names he
achieves through the performance of new feats and the acquisition of new
skills.
In the character of Natty, Cooper presents a counter to the biological
model of reproduction and a safeguard to the miscegenating risks of this model.
As an absolute opposite to Cora, Natty claims to be both racially and sexually
pure. Natty's resistance to miscegenation becomes resistance to all breeding,
not simply culturally sanctioned unions. Natty succeeds in effecting the com-
promise between the two races, not through intermarriage but through the
self-making that allows him to learn the skills of his Mohican friends. But
Natty's compromise can only be short-term. Like the cross-bred mule in
Cooper's The Prairie, he is sterile; he can provide only a temporary, and there-
fore unsatisfactory, resolution to the racial and sexual contradictions of America.
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For this reason, Cooper's Mohicans is a problematic work for contempo-
rary readers. No Utopian moment of relations between the sexes or the races
emerges from the historical romance Cooper sets up. At the same time that
his text forbids miscegenation, it recognizes it retrospectively as the only pos-
sible solution to racial conflict in America. The supposed ideal of reproduc-
tion through self-making has its obvious limits. The doubled readings of the
killing of innocent offspring examined here suggest that the infanticide theme
simultaneously attempts to justify white genocide of Native Americans and
implicates white males in their culture's own sterility. Violence toward the
mother and women in general is camouflaged by violence toward children,
assumed to be caused by external racial conflict but in actuality demonstrat-
ing an internal conflict. The double place that white women inhabit as both
white (and therefore same) and female (and therefore different) means that
the distinction between agent and victim is never stable. As white, they can be
aggressors driven by desires for racial domination; as women, they are victims
of the white male desire for racial and sexual purity. This relation between
figures of infanticide and the consequent sterility of the culture is significant,
not only because Cooper establishes it in The Last of the Mohicans but be-
cause this novel is only one of several written during the early nineteenth
century in America that feature this convergence of sexual and racial politics.
The fantasy of the self-made man, as an alternative to female-centered repro-
duction, is at once a practical myth of economic opportunity in the New
World and a naive denial of the place of the Other in American society.
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Reforming the Body
"Experience" and the Architecture of
Imagination in Harriet Jacobs's
Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl
The sentimentalist paradigm for Harriet Jacobs's 1861 slave narrative, Inci-
dents in the Life of a Slave Girl, is the story of a chaste young woman heroically
fending off— or tragically falling victim to — a villainous man's sexual advances.
Jacobs's rhetorical problem with this paradigm, however, is that the domestic
ideology behind literary sentimentalism equates a woman's sexual morality
(chastity for unmarried women, maternity for those who are married) with her
credibility. Jacobs has failed to adhere to these standards, and this is precisely
her point: slavery should be condemned because it makes conventional mo-
rality impossible, as she herself exemplifies. Yet because she is writing her own
story, her physically and therefore morally damaged body may deflect her
audience's sympathy from the story itself, even though she needs to rely on the
text of that body to gain sympathy.1 Jacobs must negotiate between the reality
of her experience and the sensibility of her white northern audience. While
her narrative dramatizes the gap between their experiences, it also represents
the opportunity to bridge this gap by revealing the common desires shared by
black and white women. Hazel Carby, Jean Fagan Yellin, and others have
established that Jacobs overtly espouses domestic values to persuade her audi-
ence of her credibility, but she also sees those values as inadequate and even
harmful for slave women. As Carby puts it, Jacobs subverts domestic rhetoric
through "an exposition of her womanhood and motherhood contradicting and
transforming an ideology that could not take account of her experience."2
"Experience" Space, and Motherhood under Slavery
Although Carby does not specifically develop a theory of "experience" in her
reading, her association of womanhood and motherhood with experience re-
flects the central referentiality among these concepts in Incidents.3 In what fol-
lows, I will demonstrate that Jacobs's pregnant body and the interiors of buildings
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with which her body has come into contact are portrayed in the narrative as
contiguous spaces that represent each other metonymically. Jacobs's spatialized
representations of unspeakable experiences of domestic space not only reveal
her imaginative uses of pregnancy to free herself from various forms of confine-
ment but also create a politicized spatial language for enslaved mothers.
As used in antebellum reformist texts such as Incidents, the word experi-
ence announces the speaker's moral authority, as developed through a direct
physical engagement with the material world. Although the process is not
solely physical, it is thought that the body—especially the state of one's physi-
cal health—will make one's experience visibly evident. According to the
Emersonian model,
When [a man] comes to give all the goods he has year after year col-
lected, in an estate to his son . . . and cannot give him the skill and
experience which made or collected these, and the method and place
they have in his own life, . . . what a change! Instead of the masterly good
humor and sense of power and fertility of resource in himself; instead of
those strong and learned hands, those piercing and learned eyes, that
supple body, and that mighty and prevailing heart which the father had,
whom nature loved and feared . . . we now have a puny, protected person,
guarded by walls and curtains, stoves and down beds.4
The man without experience, whose body and spirit are not strengthened
through the physical creation of space, becomes emasculated and impris-
oned in space. However, although confinement to interior space reveals a
lack of experience here, having experience, as Emerson argues elsewhere,
allows the man to enter a sanctified interior space from which he can speak
with authority: "One class [of teachers] speaks from within, or from experi-
ence, as parties and possessors of the fact; and the other class from without, as
spectators merely. . . . It is of no use to preach to me from without. . . . [I]f a
man do not speak from within the veil, where the word is one with that it tells
of, let him lowly confess it."'
The veil, while in part alluding to ancient religious rituals in this passage,
refers almost ubiquitously in antebellum literature to the concealment of the
female body, a tradition evident in Incidents. In Jacobs's text, the lifting of the
veil reveals the experienced female body; Linda Brent's body, reshaped by
pregnancy, becomes the text of her experience.6 Those who see the body with
the "veil withdrawn," in this case Jacobs's readers, obtain knowledge of the
sexual history of her body.7
Lydia Maria Child's preface to Incidents uses the veil image to show, as
both a warning and an enticement, that readers of this narrative will experi-
ence a sexually damaged female body and learn of that body's experience:
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"The experiences of this intelligent and much-injured woman belong to a
class which some call delicate subjects, and others indelicate. This peculiar
phase of Slavery has generally been kept veiled; but the public ought to be
made acquainted with its monstrous features, and I willingly take the respon-
sibility of presenting them with the veil withdrawn."8 So, while experience
confers authority to speak, and in Child's interpretation even makes speech
essential, representations of experience as a concept tend toward images of
"veiled" interiors rather than verbal articulation.9 The problem stems partly
from the fact that the word experience is a linguistic signifier of antilanguage:
it is a generalization of particular events that are supposed to critique such
generalities. The word signifies physical and psychological events that seem
private and unrepresentable, like the celebrated mysteries of the female body
to which experience is linked; but speech, according to its basic function,
generalizes these events for public comprehension. To counteract its
externalization in speech, images of experience strive to maintain its interior-
ity. The theoretical difficulties of translating private phenomena into public
discourse are greatly enhanced in Incidents by the rigid conventionality of
sentimentalism and by Jacobs's use of her individual experience to call for
collective political action.
More important, in Jacobs's narrative, the representation of experience
as interior space also results from the impossibility of narrating her particular
experience of interior space. For reasons of decorum and because of the pain
it causes her personally, Jacobs avoids articulating her own rape by her mas-
ter, even though rape constitutes her claim to the authority of experience.10
However, as I will show, she reveals her rape by imagistically substituting her
pregnant body for the literal enclosed spaces where sexual violence takes place
in her narrative. For Jacobs, the interiority of experience (her rape and subse-
quent confinement in the garret) is fact, not theory. The practice of showing
spaces rather than speaking of events becomes an opportunity for Jacobs to
tell her story while undermining the domestic ideology of the home as sancti-
fied space. Indeed, she uses these revisions of space to dismantle the notion of
material space, thus effecting both her ultimate escape and, as a result, her
lasting political power. A brief discussion of antebellum architectural ideol-
ogy, to which I will now turn, reveals the particular spatial terms for Jacobs's
experience; I will then show how Jacobs reconceptualizes those terms through
images of damaged, inverted, even impossible domestic spaces.
The Flowery Home Ravaged
When Jacobs imagistically undermines homes, she questions the material
foundations of the cult of domesticity. The domestic architecture reform
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movement, led by Andrew Jackson Downing in the 1840s and 1850s, mass-
produced inexpensive pattern books to show individuals how to build domes-
tic ideology into the very walls of their homes: the house would shape and
paradoxically also reveal the moral character of the family within.11 In many
ways Downing's is a more ideologically programmatic version of the dynam-
ics between body and space in the Emersonian images of experience. Down-
ing shows how vines, or architectural imitations of them (such as twisted
columns), can literally enclose the house in the virtues of domesticity and its
close relative, pastoralism: vines "embower" houses, "partly concealing and
partly adorning their walls" and giving them "that expressive beauty of rural
and home feeling which makes them so captivating to every passer-by." As
Downing makes clear, vines are a metonymy for the idealized white women
who live inside: such vines are planted "generally by the mother or daughter,
whose very planting of vines is a labor of love offered up on the domestic
altar, it follows, by the most direct and natural associations, that vines on a
rural cottage always express domesticity and the presence of heart." Women
and vines are engaged in a mutual process of ideological construction, through
which they come to represent each other.12
The coyness displayed by vines ("partly concealing and partly adorning")
recalls the iconographic white woman who discreetly invited male attention
by adorning herself (and being an adornment), but conceals any improper
intimations with a modesty that makes her all the more captivating. Thus the
ability of pastoral scenery simultaneously to hide and invite attention to the
house and the women who live there is one of the ways in which it effaces the
border between interior and exterior, enabling a symbolic ambiguity that is
central to American pastoralism.13 Women train vines to make the house and
the household appear to be "embowered," lovingly sanctioned by the natural
world. According to Jacobs, slave owners use the same landscaping tricks to
demonstrate that slavery is a "natural" and therefore moral system: a hypo-
thetical visitor from the North "walks around the premises, and sees the beau-
tiful groves and flowering vines, and the comfortable huts of favored household
slaves. He asks them if they want to be free, and they say, 'O, no, massa.' This
is sufficient to satisfy him" (74). Along with the slaves' self-protective dishon-
esty, the "comfortable" slave huts and the "beautiful groves and flowering vines"
conceal cultural violence with images of nature and culture in harmony.
Jacobs's critique of pastoralism as it specifically relates to domesticity ex-
ploits the symbolic interior/exterior ambiguity of the vine-covered house. She
makes the ambiguity explicit in an image of a "flowery home" where a young
bride from the North, her mind filled with conventional pastoral fantasies,
encounters their southern revision. Jacobs exposes the slave owners' conceal-
ment of the abuses of slavery by appropriating and then dismantling the "flowery
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home" image in a rhetorical inversion intended particularly to distress north-
ern mothers:
Reader, I draw no imaginary pictures of southern homes. I am telling you
the plain truth. Yet when victims make their escape from this wild beast of
Slavery, northerners consent to act the part of bloodhounds, and hunt the
poor fugitive back into his den, "full of dead men's bones, and all
uncleanness." Nay, more, they are not only willing, but proud, to give
their daughters in marriage to slaveholders. The poor girls have romantic
notions of a sunny clime, and of the flowering vines that all the year
round shade a happy home. To what disappointments are they destined!
The young wife soon learns that the husband in whose hands she has
placed her happiness pays no regard to his marriage vows. Children of
every shade of complexion play with her own fair babies, and too well she
knows that they are born unto him of his own household. Jealousy and
hatred enter the flowery home, and it is ravaged of its loveliness. (35-36)
Jacobs redirects the process of silent witnessing that is motherhood under
slavery, forcing northern white mothers to watch their own daughters in the
way that slave mothers watch theirs.14 Like their own mothers, young brides
from the North — now mothers themselves—watch helplessly while their hus-
bands humiliate them and commit crimes against women whom they should
consider their sisters. By depicting the entrance of jealousy and hatred into
the flowery home, Jacobs exposes the vines as mere ornament, unable to con-
ceal the interior reality, in much the same way that she will expose the reality
of Flint's secluded cottage. The violent hatred that enters the house, an image
(like children's complexions) that shows rather than speaks the rape of slave
women, tears the vines from the walls, deracinating the architectural expres-
sion of pastoral ideology from its false organic connection to nature. By por-
traying the southern home as a scene of invasion, Jacobs rhetorically positions
the white woman as a fellow victim who, unlike the slave, is not raped but
ravaged of her beliefs. The veil has been violently withdrawn, and the bride —
representing the reader or her daughter—is now experienced through her
knowledge of the sexual history of the female slave body. And this will happen
again: for every fugitive slave the northerners send back to the South accord-
ing to the Fugitive Slave Law, one young white woman will go, too, and be-
come trapped in the hell of southern motherhood. Jacobs's strategy, as we will
see again, is to use the language of rape to explode the pastoral language that
enables the concealment of violence by those who commit or condone it.
The rhetorical ravaging of northern concepts of domestic space at an
early point in the narrative suggests that the reader might interpret other do-
mestic spaces as similarly inverted. Such a reading not only reveals the un-
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written dimensions of Jacobs's personal experiences of houses—specifically,
the fact of her rape—but also shows how these experiences inspired her strat-
egy of spatial inversion.15 In the turning point of the narrative, Flint attempts
to use a pastoral space to consolidate his power: he constructs a secluded
cottage where he can keep Brent as his mistress. Flint cleverly manipulates
what he believes to be Brent's devotion to domestic ideals by telling her that
the cottage will be "a home of [her] own" that will "make a lady" of her (53).
But Brent knows what this language means for slave women; she may be
mistress of the house, but only in the sense of a sexual captive; and Flint
would forcibly remake her body, like the cottage, into a container for his
children. This episode in Jacobs's narrative represents yet another revision of
pastoralism. In Downing's discussion of vine-covered cottages, he describes
them as "bewitching" and possessed of "charms."16 In this period, identical
language was used to signify the uncontrollable occult dimension of black
women's nature with which they were accused of seducing white men.17 Yet
Jacobs inverts this cultural stereotype by positioning a white man as the be-
witching seducer of a black woman, who is wise enough to see through his
adornment of both the cottage and language.
Unable to prevent rape itself—as her complicated structural references
will reveal — Brent blocks Flint's ability to increase his supply of slave chil-
dren (through his own efforts) by voluntarily becoming pregnant with a white
neighbor just before the rape becomes inevitable:
At last, [Flint] came and told me the cottage was completed, and ordered
me to go to it. I told him I would never enter it. He said, "I have heard
enough of such talk as that. You shall go, if you are carried by force; and
you shall remain there."
I replied, "I will never go there. In a few months I shall be a mother."
He stood and looked at me in dumb amazement, and left the house
without a word. (56)
Turned inside out, like the "flowery home," this scene translates Brent's re-
fusal to enter the cottage into her refusal to let Flint enter her. Jacobs renego-
tiates the instability of pastoral boundaries between inside and outside by
changing Brent's body from an immobile container (like the cottage) for Flint's
future slaves into an agent who determines whether or not she will cross the
threshold or, more precisely, let her threshold be crossed. At the end of the
scene, in another inversion, Flint becomes the silent witness to one maternity
that he cannot control.
As several critics have pointed out, the narrative itself never explains how
the affair with Sands could possibly have defeated Flint if his desire were
solely to rape her.18 The plan makes sense only if we read the cottage as a
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version of Brent's pregnant body. Brent cannot be made to enter the cottage,
because her own body has already become exterior space, enclosing another
being—and by becoming the "house" of a child other than Flint's, she can
take on the active role of deciding not to enter his "household" (36). The
presence of Brent's child expels Flint from the house/body, denying him the
role of "father" in this twisted domestic scenario. At the same time, Jacobs
strongly suggests that she herself was raped by Flint both by offering an inad-
equate explanation for avoiding his advances and by complicating the distinc-
tion between interior and exterior space. When Brent announces her second
pregnancy to Flint, he is "exasperated beyond measure" and again rushes
from the house. This time, however, he brings back scissors with which he
cuts off all her hair. He also swears and strikes her (77). The physical violence
seems to signify another rape; the hair-cutting (reminiscent of the deracination
of the vines) specifically suggests that Brent has been "ravaged."
That Brent is able to determine her child's paternity despite this abuse
becomes not only a matter of personal dignity for her and her children but a
confrontation with the southern law stating (in Jacobs's words) that '"the child
shall follow the condition of the mother,' not of the father; thus taking care that
licentiousness shall not interfere with avarice" (76). Although this meant that
Brent's children would still be Flint's slaves, they would not be direct results of
his attack: she rendered him impotent to produce fruit from his own labor.
Moreover, the white neighbor has the means to buy and free their children.
Brent's rejection of chastity can now be reread by her potentially offended
audience as a complex strategy to protect her children from the pain of being
products of rape and to arrange for their freedom even before they are born.
Under the distortion of values that slavery produces, voluntary premarital sex
is the best way of becoming the self-sacrificing mother of sentimentalism.19
In the physical and rhetorical inversions that enable Brent to escape Flint's
cottage, that is, to escape being the mother of his children, Jacobs also sug-
gests that a slave woman's ability first to choose her own lover and then to
become pregnant makes her body a truly pastoral place that further exposes
the false uses of pastoralism. Although she attacks slavery's distortion of pasto-
ralism, Jacobs strongly supports the pastoral as an ideal that can and must be
recovered through political action.20 Her recovery of her body as a pastoral
place becomes apparent in the chapter entitled "The Lover" (concerning
Brent's first and only true love, a freed black man whom Flint forbids her to
marry), which begins by continuing her reconceptualization of vine imagery:
Why does the slave ever love? Why allow the tendrils of the heart to twine
around objects which may at any moment be wrenched away by the hand
of violence? When separations come by the hand of death, the pious soul
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can bow in resignation, and say, "not my will, but thine be done, O
Lord!" But when the ruthless hand of man strikes the blow, regardless of
the misery he causes, it is hard to be submissive. (37)
Such tendrils appear all over nineteenth-century American literature.21 In close
juxtaposition to the "flowery home" image that concludes the preceding chap-
ter, however, they continue that passage's revision of pastoralism. The "flow-
ery home" is a containment device for the bodies of black and white women,
whereas these "tendrils of the heart" grow out from inside a black woman's
body, a spontaneous expression of love and desire—a pastoral ideal. The vio-
lent wrenching further highlights the physicality of this otherwise conven-
tional trope, as does the real "stunning blow" that Flint gives Brent, a few
pages later, when she tells him of her plans to marry (39). The tearing of the
tendrils by the "ruthless hand of man" (which looks very much like Flint's
hand) recalls the "ravaging" of the "flowery home," another use of pastoral
imagery in the depiction of sexual violence.
Vine imagery used in conjunction with Brent's maternal body after she
gives birth reveals her love for her children and confirms it as a truly natural
kind of love. Because she has chosen their father and loves her children, Brent's
body is sanctioned by nature: this maternal body quietly contrasts itself to the
force with which Flint manufactures houses and babies. Brent calls her son
"the little vine [that] was taking deep root in my existence" (62), and says later
that she will miss her grandmother's house, "where my children came to twine
themselves so closely round my desolate heart" (155). This later instance, in
which the "natural" maternal body is located in the grandmother's house,
doubly exemplifies ideal pastoralism. Jacobs has presented Brent's grandmother
as both the exemplar of true womanhood and the yeoman farmer of
Jeffersonian fame. A former slave, Aunt Martha cultivates a small garden and
makes preserves and other culinary specialties much sought after by the whole
community.
Aunt Martha plays the role of mother for Brent, since her real mother
died when Brent was a child. Incidents is in many ways a story of mother-
substitutes: Brent's several mother figures (including her grandmother, a kind
childhood mistress, relatives, and friends both black and white) reflect slavery's
disruptions and distortions of families —and the slaves' equally powerful im-
pulse to recuperate those families in whatever form possible. I suggest that the
interplay of body and house in the narrative reflects, among the other strate-
gies I have already described, Brent's attempts to recuperate her dead mother
by incorporating her. Brent's figurative reunion with her mother's body takes
place during her seven-year confinement in her grandmother's attic. But this
"reunion," as we will see, really means that Brent makes herself into her own
mother; that is, she becomes a mother on her own spatial and verbal terms.22
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The Maternal Body and the Hiding (of) Place
Gaston Bachelard implies a connection between a pregnant body and a house
in daydreams about a shell:
We shall never collect enough daydreams, if we want to understand
phenomenologically how a snail makes its house; how this flabbiest of
creatures constitutes such a hard shell; how, in this creature that is
entirely shut in, the great cosmic rhythm of winter and spring vibrates
nonetheless. [This problem] arises automatically, in fact as soon . . . as we
start to dream of a house that grows in proportion to the growth of the
body that inhabits it. How can the little snail grow in its stone prison?23
Bachelard never explicitly connects the shell to pregnancy, but it seems a
powerful presence here, on the order of Jacobs's motherhood. My apparently
insulting association of Brent with what Bachelard calls "this flabbiest of crea-
tures" reflects my interest in the possibility of a being, apparently totally vul-
nerable, who is still able to create an enclosure that is as nurturing on the
inside as it is hard on the outside. As opposed to Downing's idea of "natural"
proportion—that people should build their homes to reflect their unchange-
able social status — Bachelard suggests that the body inside the house could
be the standard for the house's measurement, a relationship in harmony with
"the great cosmic rhythm." What is exterior to the house does not determine
the house's dimensions. Brent's pregnancy by Sands makes her "impregnable"
like the shell, if not to Flint's sexual aggression, then at least to impregnation
with his baby. The attic is an architectural version of the idea of the pregnant
body as a protective shell, whose walls, as we will see, are reconstructed both
literally and rhetorically by Brent's body.
The escape plan that drives Brent into the attic is conceived as follows:
convinced that Brent has fled to the North, Flint will sell her children —
whom he can no longer use to threaten her into staying—to their father, Sands,
who has promised to free them. Brent's voluntary concealment in the body-
sized attic above Aunt Martha's house is also, of course, an imprisonment:
her physical and psychological sufferings receive the most vivid, detailed de-
scriptions that the usually reserved Jacobs presents.24 By confining herself to a
tiny interior, Brent represents the imprisoned status of even the best-treated
slaves; however, this act also inverts the master-slave power structure, sending
Flint on the run while Brent stays put: she "contains" him through a series of
fruitless, Ahab-like searches for her in the North. Brent inspires these searches
by sending letters to Flint, through a friend, with northern postmarks, exem-
plifying a strategy that we will see repeated: Jacobs undermines the concept of
real physical location by textualizing and then disseminating representations
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of her body.25 Indeed, fictionalizing herself as Linda Brent and then publish-
ing the narrative reenacts the trick that Brent plays on Flint. Moreover, when
Brent conceals herself in the crawl space, she chooses and enters her own
"secluded cottage," so that in still another way she has created her own imag-
istic language by inverting Flint's imposed terms.
In translating her body's spatial experiences into textual reimaginings of
space, Jacobs reveals motherhood itself as an act of spatial and ultimately
literary imagination.26 Indeed, it is through the scenes in the attic that Brent
becomes her own mother, giving birth to herself as she reconstructs the ideo-
logical norms imposed upon her body. By entering the attic, Brent creates a
maternal body around herself, like the mollusk that exudes its own shell in
Bachelard's image. A very uncomfortable and unnourishing womb, the attic
is at once "natural" like the shell, since the positive associations of Aunt
Martha's house with pastoralism now hold Brent's body, and also "unnatu-
ral," since hiding in the attic represents the extremes — including having to be
one's own mother—to which slave mothers are driven. That Brent cannot
walk but only crawl around in the attic further suggests that she is in a state of
infancy from which she will be reborn in some other form. The attic is the
place where Jacobs will invert, fully and finally, the terms of the southern law
that the child follows the mother's condition. Here, Brent reconstructs herself
as her own mother, giving new meaning to the law's suggestion that the mother
and child are somehow the same. In another inversion of the law, Brent hides
in the attic to secure her children's emancipation before her own; now she
follows their condition, letting these supposed products of slavery lead her
into freedom: even though her grandmother tries to discourage her from fi-
nally leaving, telling her, "You'll break my heart," Brent says, "My children
were continually beckoning me to the north" (149).
As we have already seen, Jacobs inverts the domestic space of the slave
owner (the "flowery home" and the "secluded cottage") by exposing its con-
cealed brutality. Through the use of her imagination, she also inverts her own
"domestic" space (the garret) by transforming it into a site of refuge. Elaine
Scarry tells us that seeing and hearing are the senses most frequently invoked
by poets as the sensory analogues for the imagination. Through them, one
seems to become disembodied, either because one seems to have been trans-
ported hundreds of feet beyond the edges of the body into the external world
or because the images of objects from the external world have themselves
been carried into the interior of the body as perceptual content and seem to
reside there, displacing the dense matter of the body itself.27
Brent sees the attic as a place of freedom: "It seemed horrible to sit or lie in
a cramped position day after day, without one gleam of light. Yet I would have
chosen this, rather than my lot as a slave, though white people considered it an
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easy one" (114). When she bores a hole in the attic wall, through which she
can watch her children, her vision (imagination) allows her to forget momen-
tarily her bodily pain. Once again, we see motherhood as silent witnessing,
but here it is as much a sign of the happiness of motherhood as of its fears and
sorrows: "Presently two sweet little faces were looking up at me, as though
they knew I was there, and were conscious of the joy they imparted" (115).
Vision and imagination cannot fully substitute for communication. Brent adds,
"How I longed to tell them I was there!" Still, with this seemingly small ges-
ture of boring a hole, Brent makes her mark on the surroundings that have
marked her for so long. In terms of the Emersonian model, Brent's body and
spirit are strengthened through the physical creation (or alteration) of space.28
As I have already suggested, this translation of a site of bodily experience into
a site of spatial refiguration reveals Jacobs's strategy of simultaneously affirm-
ing her body's presence in her narrative and disembodying herself.
Experience, as we have seen, leads to linguistic as well as individual re-
construction: the marks of experience at once testify to the truth of the
narrative's events and highlight the impossibility of locating the bodily site of
those events. Brent tells us that her scars are the tangible proof (or text) of the
seemingly fantastic occurrences in the attic: "I hardly expect that the reader
will credit me when I affirm that I lived in that dismal hole, almost deprived
of light and air, and with no space to move my limbs, for nearly seven years.
But it is a fact; and to me a sad one, even now; for my body still suffers from
the effects of that long imprisonment, to say nothing of my soul. Members of
my family, now living in New York and Boston, can testify to the truth of what
I say" (148). Brent suggests that the reader look up her family members for
verification, which would make no sense if one looked for the Brent family:
fiction and testimony collide. Even more strikingly, she hints that the skepti-
cal readers should look at her body—which exists only as the verbally con-
structed image of Linda Brent—if they really want proof. The implied reader
of these lines, who suspects the author's credibility but not her existence, would
be sent on a Flint-like search for a fictional body: that desire for proof, it
seems, can lead to violations on the order of Flint's that must be diverted.
Through her experience in the attic, then, Jacobs has remade herself in two
ways: her own body is claimed as a tangible and therefore politically inspiring
critique of conventional pastoral space, but the body as the site of proof slips
away into fictionalized prose.
Accordingly, Jacobs concludes her narrative with a lament of placelessness:
"Reader, my story ends with freedom; not in the usual way, with marriage... .
The dream of my life is not yet realized. I do not sit with my children in a
home of my own" (201). Racism and poverty are to blame on the historical
level; on the rhetorical level placelessness results from the narrative's repeated
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conversions of tangible places (bodies and houses) into written images —new
spaces which are often inside out or otherwise impossible in the physical world.
The vividly portrayed, physically confining attic paradoxically confirms the
final unlocatability of the human body in written text. Within the narrative,
the attic is a place where Jacobs's readers can pinpoint Brent's location when
the other characters think she is anywhere but there (they are, in fact, un-
aware of the attic). But at the time Jacobs wrote Incidents, Brent's counterpart
in the real world was long gone from the attic, and it was not until 1987 that
Jean Fagan Yellin definitively established that Jacobs was the book's author.
The narrative, then, is Jacobs's most revolutionary act, inasmuch as it is also
her most effective act of self-concealment. Because it fundamentally decon-
structs and diffuses temporal and spatial locations, the text is the hardest shell
of all. Refusing to be fixed in space and time, Jacobs instead uses the central
location of her experience —her body—to translate real architectural spaces
into less tangible but more earthshaking sites of writing.29
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was the matter with me. The mother of slaves is very watchful" (56). Throughout the
narrative, Jacobs comments on the attention paid by slaves and masters to the facial
features of slave children: a light-skinned child with his or her master's features indi-
cates the rape that cannot be discussed.
15. I agree with P. Gabrielle Foreman and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, who be-
lieve neither that the sexual threats to Jacobs by her master in reality remained on the
level of language nor that Jacobs could ultimately have resisted his assaults, although
Incidents claims both to be true for these individuals' fictionalized counterparts. Fore-
man writes that in Brent's condemnations of her owner, Dr. Flint, "the passion in her
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language does not seem to have a correct correlation with what she claims Flint
'says.' Jacobs transfers Linda's (unacknowledged) violated body to the body of the
word. By serving for and providing the theme for physical abuse, words act both to
describe her violation and to absorb it." See Foreman, "The Spoken and the Silenced
in Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl and Our Nig," Callaloo 13 (spring 1990): esp.
317-18; and Fox-Genovese, Within the Plantation Household: Black and White Women
of the Old South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 392.
16. Downing, Architecture of Country Houses, 207.
17. Carby, Reconstructing Womanhood, 27.
18. For example, see Foreman, "The Spoken and the Silenced," 322.
19. In "The Spoken and the Silenced," Foreman cites Carby's response to
Blassingame in order to add this important qualification of Brent's "choice" of Sands:
"Responding to historian John Blassingame's assertion that 'slave women were liter-
ally forced to offer themselves willingly,' Carby reveals the tension between 'forced'
and 'willingly' and upbraids him for his ambivalence in recognizing that what this
juxtaposition articulates is the dynamics of rape (Carby, Reconstructing Womanhood,
22-23). Although, in this exchange, they speak to the relations between slave and
master, I would suggest that this language, and these dynamics, fit Linda's situation
precisely—she is forced by Dr. Flint's behavior to submit herself willingly to Mr.
Sands" (322).
20. This corresponds with the genre of pastoral critique in antebellum (and later)
American works such as Moby Dick and The Scarlet Letter. See Marx, "Pastoralism in
America," 59-60.
21. Illustrating the use of the word tendril in the context of attachment (exces-
sive, dangerous, or otherwise) to an object, the Oxford English Dictionary points to
examples from "Man the Reformer" and Uncle Tom's Cabin: "Inextricable seem to
be the twinings and tendrils of this evil" (Emerson); "Her own earnest nature threw
out its tendrils, and wound itself around the majestic book" (Stowe).
22. For another interpretation see Jennifer Fleischner, who argues that we can-
not fully understand Jacobs if we think back only through her mothers. Her escape to
freedom evolves primarily out of her identification and association with men in her
family and not the women who, though they support her, cannot show her the way.
When Linda visits her parents' graves, it is her father's voice she hears encouraging
her to fight for her freedom. While she is in the garret, her brother and uncle care for
her. Fleischner suggests that Brent recovers her family by incorporating her father's
spirit of rebellion and her mother's capacity for self-sacrifice. Jennifer Fleischner,
Mastering Slavery: Memory, Family, and Identity in Women's Slave Narratives (New
York: New York University Press, 1996).
23. Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1969), 118.
24. Nudelman identifies the detail in this section as the clearest example of what
she calls Jacobs's "rhetoric of contrast," through which "she demandfs] sympathy and
attention on the basis of exceptionality rather than universality": "While Jacobs never
discloses the details of her sexual experience, she offers painstaking accounts of the
discomforts of her seven-year captivity. . . . The experience that most completely
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figures the difference between white and black women, which is least available as a
basis for identification, is the experience that Jacobs is able to communicate most
accurately" (959-60).
25. Carolyn Sorisid suggests a connection between literacy and the notion of
space inlncidents. "The spoken and written word are represented as noncorporeal. . . .
Jacobs's emphasis on literacy can be interpreted as creating a space in which she is not
viewed solely in terms of her body": Sorisio, "'There Is Might in Each': Conceptions
of Self in Harriet Jacobs's Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, Written by Herself,"
Legacy 13, no. 1(1996): 15. -
26. Foreman, in arguing that Jacobs's imagery is of rape rather than of mere
verbal harassment, says that Jacobs translates the events of her life to the level of
discourse: "The Spoken and the Silenced," 317. My argument is that Jacobs's
disembodiment, which corresponds to an equally strong insistence on bodily pres-
ence, has particular implications for the politics of space as enacted by the narrative
itself.
27. Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985),
165.
28. In "There Is Might in Each,'" Sorisio suggests that Jacobs revises Emerson's
and Thoreau's transcendental individualism: "Her challenge as an author was to write
the knowledge that came through her embodied experience without reifying scien-
tific essentialism. She does so by writing about her life while asserting an amorphous
and transcendent will that exists outside her slave's body" (3).
29. See Houston A. Baker Jr., Blues, Ideology, and Afro-American Literature (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). By including a reading of Jacobs in his
book, Baker indirectly compares her to a blues singer, whose signature is one of
placelessness: "The blues singer's signatory coda is always atopic, placeless: 'If any-
body ask you who sang this song / Tell 'em X done been here and gone.' Nevertheless,
the 'you' (audience) addressed is always free to invoke the X(ed) spot in the body's
absence" (5).
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